Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 19STCV10479, Date: 2023-12-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV10479 Hearing Date: December 13, 2023 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: Wednesday, December 13, 2023
CASE NUMBER: 19STCV10479
CASE NAME: Anthony Guytan v. Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, et al.
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Swift Transportation
Co. of Arizona, LLC and Swift Transportation Services, LLC
OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Anthony Guytan
TRIAL DATE: Post Trial
PROOF
OF SERVICE: OK
PROCEEDING: Motion to Tax Costs
OPPOSITION: 29 November 2023
REPLY: 6 December
2023
TENTATIVE:
Defendants’ Motion
to Tax Costs is denied.
Background
This
action arises from Anthony Guytan’s (“Plaintiff”) employment with Swift
Transportation from 2015 to 2016. The Complaint alleges that during his
employment, Plaintiff engaged in activities protected under the public
policies, regulations, and laws of the State of California and that as a result
of Plaintiff’s protected activity and complaints, Swift Transportation launched
into a retaliatory campaign against Plaintiff that culminated in his
termination.
After
Plaintiff’s termination, he filed a lawsuit against Swift Transportation
alleging Fair Employment and House Act (“FEHA”) claims for discrimination,
harassment, and retaliation, California Family Right Act violations,
whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination, Labor¿
Code
violations, assault and battery. That
the lawsuit was resolved in 2017.
The
Complaint further alleges that in December 2018, US 1 Logistics hired Plaintiff
and, when it checked Plaintiff’s job references, it was furnished with false
information that Plaintiff had refused to take a legitimate drug test while
employed by Swift Transportation.¿¿
The Complaint alleges four causes of action
against Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, Swift Transportation
Services, LLC, Swift Transportation Co, Inc., Swift Transportation Company,
(collectively “Defendants”) and Lee Stevens: (1) violation of the FEHA; (2)
violation of California Labor Code §§ 1050 et seq.; (3) intentional
interference with prospective economic relation; and (4) defamation.¿
The
Complaint was filed on March 27, 2019, and the case was first set for trial on
September 28, 2021. At Plaintiff’s
request, the trial was continued to February 15, 2022. (Minute Order, 8/12/2021.) The court, sua sponte, continued the
trial to March 1, 2022. (Minute Order,
11/15/2021.)
On
January 28, 2022, the court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or,
in the alternative, for summary adjudication on the second through fourth
causes of action and the claim for punitive damages. (Order, 1/28/2022.) The motion was otherwise denied. (Id.) This ruling left the first cause of action,
alleging a FEHA violation, for trial.
When
counsel announced they were not ready for trial on February 22, 2022, the court
continued the trial to May 3, 2022. (Minute
Order, 2/22/2022.) Trial was continued again to July 5, 2022, to
August 23, 2022, to January 31, 2023, and finally. to February 21, 2023. (Minute Orders, 4/26/2022; 6/28/2022; 8/16/2022;
10/4/23; 1/31/2023.)
Jury selection
began on February 21, 2023; the court declared a mistrial on February 23,
2023. (Minute Orders, 2/21/2023 and
2/23/2023.)
On April 7, 2023,
the court scheduled the jury trial for July 5, 2023. (Minute Order, 4/7/2023.)
Jury selection
began on July 6, 2023; the jury was impaneled that day. (Minute Order, 7/6/2023.) On July 7, 2023, the court impaneled the alternate
jurors and Plaintiff called his first witness.
(Minute Order, 7/7/2023.) On July
18, 2023, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. (Minute Order,
07/18/23.) The jury awarded Plaintiff $600,000.00 in damages, consisting of
$250,000.00 for noneconomic loss, including physical pain/mental suffering, and
$350,000.00 for past loss of earnings. (Id.)
On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a
Memorandum of Costs.
On September 6, 2023, the Defendants
filed a Motion to Tax Plaintiff’s Costs. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The
matter is now before the court.
I. Legal
Standard
A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs, including attorneys’
fees, as a matter of right.¿ (CCP §§ 1032(a)(4), 1032(b), 1033.5.)¿Gov. Code §
12965(c)(6) provides in part that “[i]n civil actions brought under [the FEHA],
the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party, including the
department, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert witness
fees.”
CCP § 1033.5 sets forth the costs recoverable by the prevailing
party. To recover a cost, it must be reasonably necessary to the litigation and
reasonable in amount. (Perko’s Enterprises, Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises
(l992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 244.) “If the items appearing in a cost bill appear
to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show
that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State
Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-74.) “On the other hand,
if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of
proof is on the party claiming them as costs.” (Id.)
II. Discussion
Pursuant to
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs, Plaintiff seeks to recover costs totaling
$51,552.32. Defendants have filed this Motion to tax costs on the basis that
certain costs are not recoverable as a matter of law, are unreasonable in
amount, or are not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (CCP
§ 1033.5(c)(2)-(3).)
A. Deposition Costs
Defendants oppose the deposition costs
for Robert Flores (“Flores”) as Flores was not involved with Plaintiff or this
action. (Cole Decl. ¶ 4.) Defendants assert that Flores’ deposition confirmed
that Flores did not have any supervisory responsibility for the terminal where
Plaintiff worked, and that the deposition did not yield useful information. (Id.
¶ 5.) Plaintiff argues that the deposition of Flores was necessary to obtain
admissible evidence that was introduced at trial. (Abrolat Decl. ¶ 4, Ex.
C.) Plaintiff correctly asserts he had
the right to conduct discovery as a “matter of right” and “[t]his right includes an entitlement
to learn ‘the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.’ [Citation.]” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541.)
The court agrees that the deposition
costs incurred with deposing Flores were reasonable and necessary and will not
be taxed.
Defendants also
object to the cost of obtaining the deposition transcripts of Plaintiff in the
underlying action, as the parties had agreed that each would bear their own
costs in connection with the settlement of that case. (Cole Decl. ¶ 6.)
Accordingly, Defendants assert that it is inappropriate for Defendants to pay
for transcripts related to the underlying action.
Plaintiff states that
he did not purchase a copy of his deposition transcript in the underlying
action because his deposition was taken on September 7, 2017, and the case settled
on September 18, 2017, and thus there was no need to purchase the transcript.
(Abrolat Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff further asserts that many of the same facts in
the previous matter were discussed at trial in this action, such that
Plaintiff’s deposition transcripts were a necessary part of trial preparation,
including preparing Plaintiff for cross-examination.
The court is
satisfied that Plaintiff has shown that his prior deposition transcripts were
necessarily incurred and will not be taxed.
Defendants also state
that it is unreasonable for Defendants to pay for the non-appearances at
depositions of Barbara Predmore, Jeremy Baca, and Robert Flores when the cause
for their nonappearance was due to Plaintiff’s failure to mutually agree on
dates. (Cole Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants fail to cite any
legal authority that allows deposition costs for nonappearance to be waived.
Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that his counsel did reach out to Defense counsel
to obtain disposition dates but received no reply and the depositions were
necessary to oppose the motion for summary judgment. (Abrolat Decl. ¶¶ 8- 15,
Ex. D.) Since the three deponents were not produced, the court continued the
motion for summary judgment on January 28, 2022, and ordered that Baca, Flores,
and Predmore be produced for deposition. (Abrolat Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. E.)
The court agrees that
the deposition costs were reasonably incurred and are recoverable.
i. Court Reporter Costs
Defendants also
object to various court reporter costs listed under “Deposition Costs” but not
associated with depositions. The court reporter costs were incurred for a Final
Status Conference (“FSC”) on the following dates: February 22, 2022; April 26,
2022; June 28, 2022; August 2, 2022; August 16, 2022; October 4, 2022; January
24, 2023; January 31, 2023; February 16, 2023; June 27, 2023; and June 30,
2023. Defendants argue that it was
unreasonable for Plaintiff to incur these costs on eleven separate occasions
when Plaintiff’s counsel could manage scheduling and did not need to secure
court reporter services for various “Final Status Conferences” that either did
not occur or were non-substantive.
Defense
counsel asserts that “[t]he majority of these conferences involved housekeeping
matters related to the timing and order of witnesses, use of the courtroom
technology and other logistics, for which there was no need for a court
reporter. Substantive matters potentially impacting an appeal, such as motions
in limine and jury instructions, were not argued or decided at all eleven of
these Final Status Conferences.” (Cole Decl. ¶ 8.)
Plaintiff’s
counsel states that she expected the court to rule on motions in limine and
trial documents at the FSC and Plaintiff expected the trial to commence on
February 21, 2022. (Abrolat Decl. ¶¶ 20-22, Ex. E, F, G.) The FSC and trial
were continued. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 24, Ex. G, H.) At the June 28, 2022, FSC,
Plaintiff’s counsel again expected the court to rule the motions in limine and
trial documents, but the court continued the FSC to August 2, 2022, and then the
parties stipulated to a further continuance to August 16, 2022. (Id. ¶
25, Ex. I.) The FSC was continued to October 4, 2022, then to January 24, 2023.
(Id. ¶¶ 26, 27, Ex. J, K.) At the January 24, 2023, hearing the court
ordered the parties to continue trial preparation, with trial set for January
31, 2023. (Id. ¶ 28, Ex. L.) On February 16, 2023, the Court ruled on
some of the parties’ MILs and confirmed that the trial would begin on February
21, 2023. (Id. ¶ 29, Ex. M.) After a mistrial, another FSC was held on
June 27, 2023, and continued to June 30, 2023. (Id. ¶ 30, Ex. N.) The
trial was set for July 5, 2023. (Id. ¶ 31, Ex. O.)
Since
the FSC and trial dates were continued, and not due to Plaintiff’s wronging,
Plaintiff’s counsel “held a good faith and reasonable belief that each of the
hearings would result in an FSC and that the Court would issue rulings on MILs
and trial documents.” (Abrolat Decl. ¶ 32.) For this reason, a court reporter
was present at each hearing, and the costs incurred were reasonably incurred.
The court agrees that court reporter costs should not be taxed.
B. Service
of Process Fees
Defendants
object to the unreasonable and excessive amount of service of process costs
related to Dolly Arvizu ($439.92), trial subpoena to Lee Stevens ($1,704),
trial subpoena to Cynthia Proels ($457.13), and trial subpoena to Butch Goodwin
($725.75).
Plaintiff
states that because Defense counsel did not accept service for these
individuals and did not provide their last known contact information, it
resulted in increased fees, as shown by Plaintiff’s invoices. (Abrolat Decl. ¶
33, 34, 36, Ex. P, Q, R, S.) The court agrees that the fees were reasonably
incurred and will not be taxed.
C. Expert
Witness Fees
Defendant
objects to Plaintiff’s expert witness fees because they were not court ordered.
(CCP § 1033.5(a)(8).) Defendant also objects to the fact that Plaintiff seeks
to recover costs for three expert witnesses when only two were called to
testify at trial. Plaintiff withdrew Dr.
Elizabeth Jude Durano Canete from the witness list at the eleventh hour and counsel
had already stipulated to the admissibility of documents related to her
examination of Plaintiff. (Cole Decl., ¶
9).
In a FEHA action, the court may award the
prevailing party “attorney's fees and costs, including expert witness fees[.]”
(Gov. Code § 12965(c)(6).) Therefore, Plaintiff can recover fees for expert
witnesses without a court order as Gov. Code § 12965 “is an express exception
to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b) and the former, rather than the
latter, therefore governs costs awards in FEHA cases.” (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 105.) The court agrees that
Plaintiff is entitled to recover expert witness fees even if one of Plaintiff’s
experts was not called to testify.
In reply, Defendants continue to rely on
CCP § 1032(b) to assert that certain costs are not recoverable to interject new
objections to trial exhibit costs, and to insist that Plaintiff offer itemized
billing invoices for certain costs not challenged in its initial Motion. “If
the items on a verified cost bill appear proper charges, they are prima facie
evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily
incurred.” (Seever v. Copley Press, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1550,
1557.) First, Plaintiff’s costs appear to be proper. Second, Defendants waited
until its reply to challenge and request invoices for costs related to
“witness” and “other” fees. Since Defendants waited until the reply to
challenge such costs for the first time, the court declines to address the
matter. “Points raised for the first time in a reply brief will not be
considered.” (Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (1986)
187 Cal.App.3d 299, 320.)
Based on the above, Defendants’ Motion is
denied.
Conclusion
Defendants’ Motion to Tax Costs is denied.