Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 19STCV19669, Date: 2024-03-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV19669 Hearing Date: March 25, 2024 Dept: 37
HEARING
DATE: Monday, March 25,
2024
CASE
NUMBER: 19STCV19669
CASE NAME: Michael
Eisenberg v. Chad McQueen, et al.
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Michael Eisenberg
OPPOSING PARTY: Defendants Chad McQueen and City National Bank as
Trustee of the Terry McQueen Testamentary Trust
TRIAL DATE: 16 March 2024
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
PROCEEDING: Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the
alternative, Summary Adjudication
OPPOSITION: 20 February 2024
REPLY: 4
March 2024
TENTATIVE: Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment or,
in the alternative, Summary Adjudication is denied. Plaintiff to give notice.
Background
This action arises from a letter sent on June
5, 2018, on behalf of Defendant Chad McQueen (“McQueen”) and the Estate of
actor Steve McQueen (“McQueen Defendants”), disputing the origins of a Rolex
watch (the “Watch” or “Rolex Submariner”). Michael Eisenberg (“Plaintiff”)
alleges that he and non-party Phillips Auction (“Phillips”) entered into an
agreement on or about August 2, 2017, wherein Phillips agreed to auction off a
Rolex Submariner watch owned by Plaintiff which had allegedly been purchased by
Steve McQueen, engraved, and given to his then stuntman, Loren Janes (the
“Watch.”) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s letter asserted that Steve McQueen
did not own the watch and never gifted it to Loren Janes and thus requested
that Phillips withdraw the auction.
Plaintiff alleges that the McQueen
Defendants’ conduct caused Phillips to eventually withdraw the Watch from
auction, causing the Watch to be devalued and any potential sale to fall
through. Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint on June 5, 2019. The
Complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) tortious interference with
contract, (2) intentional interference with economic advantage, (3) negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage, and (4) trade libel.
On December 20, 2019, the McQueen Defendants/Cross-Complainants
filed a Cross-Complaint against Phillips Auctioneers, LLC (“Cross-Defendant” or
“Phillips”). On September 22, 2021,
Cross-Complainants filed the Second Amended Cross-Complainant (“SACC”). The
SACC now includes City National Bank as Trustee of the Terry McQueen
Testamentary Trust as a Cross-Complainant.
On January 4, 2023, the
McQueen Cross-Complainants filed the Third-Amended Cross-Complaint (“TACC”)
alleging seven causes of action: (1) equitable indemnity on a comparative fault
basis, (2) total indemnity, (3) apportionment of fault, (4) declaratory relief,
(5) negligence, (6) false advertising, and (7) violation of Civil Code § 3344.1. On
September 26, 2022, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Philips and
against the McQueen Cross-Complainants.
On August 11, 2022, the court denied the
McQueen Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims. (See 1/11/22
Order.) Now Plaintiff’s move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary
adjudication as to all causes of action alleged in the Complaint. The McQueen
Defendants oppose the Motion.
I. Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion for
summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism
to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite
their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”¿ (Aguilar
v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c(c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment
if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from
the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) Summary adjudication may be granted as to one
or more causes of action within an action, or one or more claims for damages.
(CCP § 437c(f).)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
¿¿¿¿
A defendant moving for
summary judgment bears two burdens: (1) the burden of production – presenting
admissible evidence, through material facts, sufficient to satisfy a directed
verdict standard; and (2) the burden of persuasion – the material facts presented
must persuade the court that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more
elements of a cause of action, or a complete defense vitiates the cause of
action. (CCP § 437c(p)(2);¿Aguilar,¿supra, 25 Cal.4th at p.
850-851.) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot
be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of
the claim.¿¿(Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574,
590.)¿¿Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that
cause of action or defense thereto.”¿(Ibid.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
¿¿¿¿
“On ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the court is to ‘liberally construe the evidence in support
of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party.’” (Cheal v. El Camino Hospital¿(2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 736, 760.) On a summary judgment motion, the court must
therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder
could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this
manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify
issues rather than to determine issues. [Citation.]” (Binder v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co.¿(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th¿832, 839.)¿
II. Defendants
Evidentiary Objections
A. Objections to the Declaration of Paul
Boutros
Objection
Nos. 1-3, 5-7, 11, 12, and 16 overruled.
Objections Nos. 4, 8, 9, 13, 15, 17 – 21 are
sustained.
Objection No. 10 is overruled as to the
statements relating to the Declarant’s research and finding but sustained as to
Exhibit H and I which are referenced in Paragraph 13 of the Declaration, but
those exhibits are not attached.
Objection No. 14 is sustained as to Exhibit J
as the exhibit is not attached. The rest of the objection is overruled.
Objection No. 22 is sustained as to Exhibit N
and any statement regarding the contents of Exhibit N as Exhibit N is
not attached to the Bouros Declaration and the Declarant tries to prove the
contents of the writing in violation of the secondary evidence rule.
B. Objection to the Statement of Marshall
Terrill
Objection No. 23 is sustained.
C. Objections to the Declaration of Michael
Eisenberg
Objection No. 23 is sustained.
Objection No. 25 is overruled.
Objections Nos. 26 and 27 are immaterial to the court’s disposition of this Motion and the
court declines to rule on these objections. All objections not ruled upon are
preserved for appeal. (CCP. § 437c(q).)
D. Objection to
the Declaration of Gary Combs
Objection No. 28 is sustained.
E. Objection to the Declaration of Ronald
B. Duhame
Objection No. 29 is sustained.
F. Objections to the Declaration of
Alessandro “Alex” Ciani
Objection No. 30 – 32 are overruled.
G. Objections to the Declaration of Mo
Stojnovic
Objection No. 33 and 34 are overruled.
III. Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections
A. Declaration of Steven A. Garcia
Objection Nos. 1 and 2 are sustained.
B. Objections to the Declaration of Chad
McQueen
Objections Nos. 3 - 5 and 8 are overruled.
Objection No. 6 is sustained in part due to
hearsay as to Paragraph 7, lines 11 to 15.
Objection No. 7 is sustained.
C. Objection to the Declaration of Neile
Adams
Objection No. 9 is overruled.
D. Objections to the Declaration of Arthur
Barens
Objections Nos. 10 and 12 are sustained.
Objection No. 11 is overruled.
E. Objections to the Declaration of David
Hall
Objections Nos. 14 - 19 are overruled.
Objection No. 20 is immaterial to the court’s disposition of this Motion and the
court declines to rule on these objections. All objections not ruled upon are
preserved for appeal. (CCP § 437c(q).)
IV. Discussion
A. Factual
Summary
The following facts are undisputed unless
supported by citation to the evidence. Plaintiff presently owns a Rolex
Submariner (the “Watch”) that was purportedly purchased by the late actor,
Steve McQueen, and gifted to his stuntmen, Loren Janes, with the engraving
“LOREN THE BEST DAMN STUNTMAN IN THE WORLD STEVE.” (Hsu Decl. Ex. B, C, Ex. F [Eisenberg Depo.
at pp. 51:13-52-10], Ex. R.) The McQueen Defendants maintain that Steve McQueen
did not purchase the Watch and did not gift it to Janes. (See McQueen Decl. ¶
7, 8; Barret Decl. ¶¶ 10-15, 21; Coleman Decl. ¶¶ 9-15; Farnsworth Decl. ¶¶
4-8; Foxworth Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 17-24; Coleman Decl. ¶¶ 13-17; Norris Decl. ¶
3-16; Robinson Decl. ¶ 8.)
The parties do not dispute that on August 2,
2017, Plaintiff and Phillips Auctioneers LLC (“Phillips”) entered into an
agreement to sell the Watch at auction in the Fall of 2018 on Plaintiff’s behalf
with a percentage of the sale price being paid to Phillips (the “Consignment
Agreement”). (Hsu Decl. Ex. G [Consignment Agreement], Ex. E [Boutros Depo. at
pp. 70:6-73:19].) Phillips issued a press release dated June 4, 2019, publicly
announcing the action of the Watch, then set for October 25, 2018. (Hsu Decl.
Ex. H.) Plaintiff maintains that he had at least two interested buyers who would
have bid at least $1.5 million for the Watch. (Stojnovic Decl. ¶¶2-5, Ciani
Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.)
The parties also do not dispute that on June
5, 2018, Arthur Barens (“Barens”), counsel representing the Estate of Steve
McQueen, on behalf of the McQueen Defendants sent Phillips a letter asserting
the province attributed to the Watch was untrue. (Hsu Decl. Ex. O.) The June 5,
2018, letter stated in relevant part:
After interviews with the McQueen family, we
are convinced that this watch [sic] not as represented and based on the
information we have developed, the watch was never worn by Steve McQueen and
the inscription is completely inconsistent with any previous accolade of Steve
McQueen on any gift.
It has been further pointed out to me that in
fact Mr. Janes was not a personal friend of Mr. McQueen nor was he ever present
for any family event of the McQueens and we believe the representations in the
advertisement you have published is false, misleading and constitutes a fraud
on the public.
We do not believe that Mr. McQueen owned the
subject watch and we know of no associate that could confirm the provenance
attributed to the Rolex Submariner. Steve McQueen’s former wife, Neile Adams,
as well as his son, Chad McQueen, have made a comprehensive historic review of
the watches that Steve McQueen may have presented to his friends and have
confirmed that Mr. McQueen never gifted the watch in question to Loren Janes.
(Hsu Decl. Ex. O.)
Plaintiff asserts that the statement of the McQueen
Defendants as to the second paragraph above was false as a matter of fact
because the McQueen Defendants never confirmed the Watch’s provenance. The
McQueen Defendants assert that the statement was an opinion.
According to email correspondence between
Phillips’ counsel and Barens, the McQueen Defendants’ position about the
provenance of the Watch was based in part on a publication authored by Jake
Ehrlich (“Ehrlich”) in his magazine “Jake’s Rolex World” which allegedly
challenged the veracity of the Watch. (Hsu Decl. Ex. K at pp. MSJ00120-MSJ00121; Ex. J.)
On June 14, 2018, Phillips’ counsel informed
Barens that after Phillips provided additional documents to Ehrlich, he had
“withdrawn his questioning of the provenance of the Rolex Submariner and had
concluded that the watch was in fact given by Steve McQueen to Loren Janes.”
(Hsu Decl. Ex. K at pp.
MSJ00115-MSJ0016.) Despite Phillips requesting the McQueen Defendants
confirm they no longer questioned the provenance of the Watch, Barrens
responded that the McQueen Defendants “continue to be of the opinion that the
provenance of the subject watch is not as represented and they dispute the
authenticity of the inscription.” (Id. at p. MSJ0016.)
Due to the McQueen Defendants’ statement
about the Watch, Phillips terminated the Consignment Agreement with Plaintiff
and withdrew the Watch from the auction. (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) 35.)
Despite withdrawing the Watch from auction, Philips maintained that “we remain
confident Steve McQueen gave the watch to Loren Janes based on further evidence
and testimonials from people close to Steve McQueen and Loren Janes.” (UMF 36.)
Plaintiff asserts he has been unable to sell the Watch. (Eisenberg Decl. ¶8.)
Plaintiff
now moves for summary judgment, or summary adjudication, as to all four causes
of action alleged against the McQueen Defendants.
Plaintiff’s
Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts contains a total of 37
purportedly undisputed material facts (“UMF”). Rather than listing each UMF for
each cause of action, all 37 material facts are listed as being material to all
four causes of action. (See CRC, rule 3.1350(d).) Accordingly, to defeat Plaintiff’s Motion, the McQueen
Defendants require only a showing of a single disputed material fact. (See CCP § 437c(c) [a motion for summary judgment
“shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law”] [italics added].) Thus, any disputed material
fact means the court must deny the motion as the court has no discretion to
grant summary judgment. (Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925,
fn. 8; Saldana v. Globe-Weis Systems Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1505,
1511-1512.)¿¿¿¿
B. First, Second, and Third Causes of Cause of Action –
Tortious Interference with Contractual
Relations, Intentional Interference with Economic Advantage (IIEA), and
Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (NIPEA)
“Tortious interference with contractual
relations requires ‘(1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff
and a third party; (2) the defendant's knowledge of that contract; (3) the defendant's intentional acts designed to
induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual
breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting
damage.’ ” (Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
1130, 1141 (Ixchel).) “[T]o state a claim for interference with an
at-will contract by a third party, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant
engaged in an independently wrongful act.” (Id. at 1148.)
“Tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage [“IIPEA”], on the other hand, does not depend on the
existence of a legally binding contract. A plaintiff asserting this tort must
show that the defendant knowingly interfered with an ‘economic relationship
between the plaintiff and some third party, [which carries] the probability of
future economic benefit to the plaintiff.’ ” (Ixchel, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at p. 1141 [internal quotation marks omitted].) “The
five elements for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
are: (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party,
with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the
defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of
the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of
the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by
the acts of the defendant.” (Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71, fn.
6.)
The tort of negligent
interference with a prospective economic advantage (“NIPEA”) differs in that
the defendant's act disrupting the economic relationship does not need to be
intentional. (Venhaus v. Shultz (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1072,
1078.) For both IIPEA and NIPEA, the interference must be wrongful by some
legal measure other than the fact of the interference itself. (Della
Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 378.)
“[A]n act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is
proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other
determinable legal standard.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1159.)
Plaintiff’s moving papers
ignore the fact that Plaintiff claims the first, second, and third causes of
action require Plaintiff to plead and prove an independent wrongful conduct by
the McQueen Defendants to prevail. On reply, Plaintiff asserts that the independent
wrongful conduct is predicated on its fourth cause of action for trade liable,
which serves as the independent wrongful conduct necessary to support the
first, second, and third causes of action. (Reply at p. 7, fn. 3.) Accordingly,
the success of Plaintiff’s first, second, and third causes of action are
dependent on the success of the fourth cause of action.
The court finds that
Plaintiff failed to meet his initial burden of showing that there are no
triable issues of material fact. Plaintiff’s UMF No. 1 asserts that Plaintiff owns
the Watch which “had originally been purchased by the late actor, Steve
McQueen, and gifted to his leading stuntmen, Loren Janes, with the engraving “LOREN THE BEST DAMN
STUNTMAN IN THE WORLD STEVE.” (UMF 1.) The evidence cited by Plaintiff in UMF
No. 1 shows, however, that he is the owner of the watch and purchased the watch
for Erika Janes, but not that the watch was originally purchased by Steve
McQueen and gifted to Janes. (Hsu Decl. Ex. B, C, F.) The Declaration of Garly
Combs stating that Steve McQueen had gifted a Rolex watch to Janes is based on
hearsay evidence as to what he “heard from other stuntmen” and is not
admissible evidence. (Combs Decl. ¶ 3.) The Declaration of Ronald B. Duhame,
based on his observations, at best establishes that while filming The Sand
Pebbles, Janes served as Steve McQueen’s stunt double and Duhame heard from
Janes that McQueen had given him a Rolex Watch. (Duhame Decl. ¶ 4.) However,
the statement is also hearsay and fails to show that Rolex purportedly given to
Janes is the Watch at issue in this action. Furthermore, Ehrlich’s conclusion
that it was “extremely likely that the watch in question was indeed the gifted
by Steve McQueen to Loren Janes” does not establish the Watch’s actual
provenance. (UMF 26.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to show
that UMF No. 1 is undisputed.
Since the authenticity of the Watch remains
disputed, Plaintiff’s damages are speculative.
Plaintiff fails to show that damages can be assessed with reasonable
certainty. The Declaration of Mo Stojnovic shows that he would have bid as high
as 3 million but only if the Watch was given as a gift by Steve McQueen.
(Stojnovic ¶¶ 2, 5, 6.) The Declaration of Alessandro “Alex” Ciani similarly
reflects the fact that he would have bid up to $1.5 million but only if the
Watch was indeed gifted by Steve McQueen. (Ciani Decl. ¶¶ 7-9.) The auction
never took place, and the possibility exists that Stojnovic and Ciani’s bids
would have been under $1.5 million.
As Plaintiff has failed to show that the
Watch was indeed given by Steve McQueen to Loren Janes, it is speculation as to
whether the Watch would have been sold for at least $1.5 million. Accordingly,
UMF Nos. 14 and 15 are disputed, as those bids were dependent on the fact the
Watch at issue was indeed purchased by Steve McQueen and gifted to Janes.
Moreover, because the authenticity of the Watch has not been established,
Plaintiff admits that he has been unable to sell the watch. (Eisenberg Decl.
¶8.) As Plaintiff’s damages remain speculative,
Plaintiff cannot establish damages, an essential element to his first, second,
and third causes of action.
Summary adjudication is denied as to the
first, second, and third causes of action because Plaintiff has failed to meet
his initial burden of showing that no triable issues of material fact exist.
C. Fourth
Cause of Action for Trade Libel
“Trade libel is the publication of matter disparaging the
quality of another’s property, which the publisher should recognize is likely
to cause pecuniary loss to the owner.” (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1010.) “The tort encompasses ‘all false statements
concerning the quality of services or product of a business which are intended
to cause that business financial harm and in fact do so.’ [Citation.] To
constitute trade libel, a statement must be false.” (Ibid.) “Since
mere opinions cannot by definition be false statements of fact, opinions will
not support a cause of action for trade libel.” (Id. at pp.
1010-1011.) “‘Unlike personal defamation, the plaintiff seeking damages for trade libel must ... carry the burden of proving
that the disparaging statement is false.’ ”(City of Costa Mesa v. D'Alessio
Investments, LLC (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 358, 378 citing Guess, Inc. v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d
473, 479.)
Plaintiff asserts that the following
statement below is false because the McQueen Defendants did not make a
comprehensive historic view of the Watch and never confirmed whether Steve
McQueen gifted the Watch at issue to Janes:
Steve McQueen’s former wife, Neile Adams, as
well as his son, Chad McQueen, have made a compressive historic review of the
watch that Steve McQueen may have presented to his friends and have confirmed
that Mr. McQueen never gifted the watch in question to Loren Janes.
(Hsu Decl. Ex. O.)
Plaintiff presents evidence that at his
deposition, Chad McQueen testified as follows:
Q: I’m
asking you right now at the time you learned of the Phillips auction, did you
do anything to confirm that the watch was or was not gifted by your father to
Loren Janes. I don’t believe I got an answer to that question.
A: I
can’t recall if I ever did talk to anybody. I don’t believe I did. That’s not
my style.
[
After the Question was repeated]
A: You
mean my dad gave it to Janes[?] I never confirmed it. My feeling from the
beginning was it wasn’t true. And I know for a fact that the garage burnt to
the ground when his house burnt and everything is new. No, I never confirmed
it. And I always go with my instincts which is no, I don’t buy it.”
(UMF 28.) Chad McQueen further testified that
his belief that the provenance of the Watch was false was based on “a deep
feeling” and the belief that the watch “was not something my dad gave to [Janes]”
based on the gifts he had seen his father give to other people. (UMF 29, 30.)
Chad McQueen’s mother, Nelie Adams McQueen,
testified that the provenance of the Watch was false based on her life with McQueen
but she confirmed that she did not speak to other people or ask questions
related to the Watch, or conduct research.
(UMF 33.)
Q: But
you didn’t do anything in addition to that having that knowledge to
confirm? You didn’t speak to other
people or you didn’t ask questions?
A: No.
Q: You
didn’t do your own research?
A. No
(Hsu Decl. Ex. D [Adams McQueen Depo. at pp.
90:13-91:22].)
The court finds that Plaintiff has
sufficiently proven that the McQueen Defendants made a false statement of fact
when they asserted that they had conducted “a comprehensive historic review of
the watches that Steve McQueen may have presented to his friends” and that the
McQueen Defendants did not in fact “confirm[] that Mr. McQueen never gifted the
watch in question to Loren Janes.” (Hsu Decl. Ex. O.) The statement was
defamatory because it disparaged the Watch by asserting that its provenance was
false without the Defendants having investigated and confirming the truth of
their statements.
However, Plaintiff cannot meet his initial
burden of showing there are no triable issues of material fact because
Plaintiff’s UMF No. 1— asserted to be material to all four causes of action—remains
disputed, as the authenticity of the Watch has not been confirmed.
As the provenance of the Watch remains
disputed, so does the amount of damages at issue. In Erlich v.
Etner (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 69, the appellate court found that Plaintiff
had not proven damages despite a jury award in Plaintiff’s favor. (Id.
at p. 74.) Similar to the plaintiff in Erlich, Plaintiff here fails to
present admissible evidence as to the value of the Watch before the
McQueens made their statements and after the statement was made. Before
the McQueen Defendants made their statement, Phillips’ lowest and highest estimates
for the Watch were $300,000.00 and $600,000.00 respectively. (Hsu Decl. Ex. G
at p. MSJ00102.) The McQueen Defendants also present evidence that with the
provenance of the Watch in dispute, its expert estimates the current value of
the Watch to be $21,800.00 and $378,000.00 if its provenance were confirmed
based on two comparable auctions for high-profile celebrity gifting of watches.
(Hall Decl. ¶ 10.) As the auction never took place and no actual bids were
made, it remains speculative as to how much the Watch would have sold for.
Accordingly, triable issues of material fact exist as to the fourth cause of
auction.
The McQueen Defendants assert that their
statements were opinions not assertions of fact. “[W]here an expression of
opinion implies a false assertion of fact, the opinion can constitute
actionable defamation.” (Wong v. Jing (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1370.) “[T]he determination of whether the allegedly
defamatory statement constitutes fact or opinion is a question of law.” (Selleck
v. Globe International, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1123,
1133.) While the court agrees that Plaintiff has shown that the McQueen
Defendants made a false statement of fact about conducting a comprehensive
review and confirming the provenance of the Watch, Plaintiff failed to show
that no triable issues of material fact exist.
Accordingly, summary adjudication is denied
as to the fourth cause of action.
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is
denied.
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the
alternative, Summary Adjudication is denied. Plaintiff to give notice.