Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 21STCV23803, Date: 2022-09-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV23803 Hearing Date: September 22, 2022 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: September 22, 2022
CASE NUMBER: 21STCV23803
CASE NAME: Steven Norris v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center
OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Steven Norris
TRIAL DATE: None
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
MOTION: Defendant’s Petition to Compel
Arbitration and for a Stay of Proceedings
OPPOSITION: September 6, 2022
REPLY: September 12, 2022
Tentative: Defendant’s
motion is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to arbitrate his claims with Defendant.
The action is stayed pending the completion of arbitration or further order of
the court. The court sets an order to show cause re status of the arbitration
for October 3, 2023, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 37. Defendant is to give
notice.
This action arises out of the employment of Steven Norris
(“Plaintiff”) as an Environmental Services Technician with Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center (“Defendant”). Plaintiff alleges that he began working for Defendant in
1999, and was later moved to the Plaint Operations department as a Senior
Crafts Worker in November 2017. Plaintiff alleges Defendant and Defendant’s
employees disregarded Plaintiff’s disability history, denied his request for
accommodations, and did not engage in a good faith process to find
accommodations for Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s operative Complaint alleges three causes of
action: (1) denial of reasonable accommodation in violation of the Fair Housing
Employment Act (“FEHA”); (2) disability discrimination in violation of the FEHA;
and (3) unlawful retaliation in violation of the FEHA.
Defendant now moves to compel arbitration. Plaintiff opposes
the motion.
“California law reflects a strong public
policy in favor of arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for
resolving disputes. To further that
policy, CCP § 1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration
agreement unless one of three limited exceptions applies. Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a
party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the
arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates
the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal issues.” (CCP § 1281.2; Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th
959, 967.) Similarly, public policy
under federal law favors arbitration and the fundamental principle that
arbitration is a matter of contract and that courts must place arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according
to their terms. (AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
(2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.)
In
deciding a motion or petition to compel arbitration, trial courts must first
decide whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties
and then determine whether the claims are covered within the scope of the
agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The opposing party has the burden to
establish any defense to enforcement. (Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 571, 579 [“The petitioner ... bears the burden of proving the existence
of a valid arbitration agreement and the opposing party, plaintiffs here, bears
the burden of proving any fact necessary to its defense.”].)
Here,
attached to the declaration of Bryan Hickey, Defendant provides a copy of the “Mutual
Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” and its Petition to Compel Binding Arbitration
points to the relevant language therein.
(Motion, 1-2, Hickey Decl. ¶¿5, Ex. B.)
A motion to compel arbitration or stay proceedings must
state verbatim the provisions providing for arbitration or must have a copy of
them attached. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1330.)
A party may demonstrate express acceptance of the
arbitration agreement in order to be bound (e.g., Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. (9th Cir. 1992) 956 F.2d 932
[agreement to arbitrate included in job application]; Nghiem v. NEC Electronic, Inc. (9th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1437
[agreement to arbitrate included in handbook executed by employee]; Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps (1999) 74 Cal. App. 4th 1105 [88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664] [employer may
terminate employee who refuses to sign agreement to arbitrate]) or
implied-in-fact in fact acceptance (Asmus
v. Pacific Bell (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 1, 11 [96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 999 P.2d
71] [implied acceptance of changed rules regarding job security]; DiGiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp.
(1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 629, 635 [69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 300] [implied acceptance of
changed compensation rules]). (Craig v. Brown & Root (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 416, 420 (Craig).)
“A signed agreement is not necessary, however, and a party’s
acceptance [of an agreement to arbitrate] may be implied in fact….” (Pinnacle
Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Market Dev. (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223,
23 (Pinnacle), cited in Pet. Mem. 6.) “An arbitration clause within a contract may
be binding on a party even if the party never actually read the clause.” (Ibid.)
“The content of a writing may be proved by otherwise admissible secondary
evidence,” except when “a genuine dispute exists concerning material terms of
the writing,” or admitting the secondary evidence “would be unfair.” (Evid.
Code § 1521(a).) A party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of a lost writing must demonstrate that “ “a bona fide and diligent
search has been unsuccessfully made for it”” (Dart Industries, Inc. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059, 1068, quoting Folsom
Executors v. Scott (1856) 6 Cal.4th 460, 461.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff must be compelled to
arbitrate because Plaintiff executed arbitration agreements on or about November
15, 2017, with an effective date of November 26, 2017, agreeing to arbitrate
all disputes. (Motion, 1.)
Plaintiff signed a document titled “Mutual Agreement to
Arbitrate Claims.” (“Arbitration Agreement”) (Id.; Hickey Decl. Exh. B.)
The Arbitration Agreement provides as follows:
“It is not uncommon for disputes to arise between an employer
and an employee. Arbitration is a speedy, impartial and cost-effective way to
resolve these disputes. For this reason, except as otherwise provided in this
Agreement, you and Cedars-Sinai agree that all claims or controversies in any
way relating to or associated with your employment or the termination of your
employment…will be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration. For purposes of
this Agreement, Claims includes, but is not limited to, all statutory,
contractual and/or common law claims including, but not limited, claims arising
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act; the Equal Pay Act of 1963; the Family and Medical Leave Act;
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act; the California Family Rights
Act; the California Labor Code and Wage Orders of the Industrial Welfare
Commission; the Fair Labor Standards Act; and the Americans with Disabilities
Act.
...
Arbitration Procedures
The party seeking arbitration must initiate arbitration
proceedings by filing with JAMS in Los Angeles County a written demand for
arbitration, in accordance with JAMS requirements. ... In the event no
agreement can be reached, the arbitrator shall be appointed in accordance with
the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures in effect at the time
the Claim is submitted (“JAMS Rules”). The arbitration will be administered by
JAMS pursuant to its Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures and subject
to JAMS policy on Employment Arbitration Minimum Standards of Procedural
Fairness. The arbitrator’s fee will be paid by Cedars-Sinai. ... The parties
shall be entitled to engage in discovery as authorized by the JAMS Rules.”
(Hickey Decl., Exh. B, 1-2.)
The Arbitration Agreement are signed by Plaintiff and Andrew
R. Ortiz, Senior Vice President of Human Resources and Organization Development.
An arbitration agreement need not include both parties’ signatures to be
enforceable. (Serafin v. Balco Properties, Ltd. LLC (2015) 235
Cal.App.4th 165, 176 [existence of agreement to arbitrate can be confirmed
through evidence of the parties’ conduct.])
In opposition, Plaintiff contends “the purported agreement
is legally void because Defendant Cedars had no right to bargain terms of
employment directly with Plaintiff, as he is ... represented by a labor union,
who vehemently denies the validity of the purported agreement.” (Opposition,
1.) Plaintiff provides no supporting authorities for this contention, other
than a declaration of a Union Representative which calls for a legal conclusion
as to the binding effect of this Agreement. (Opposition, Exh. B.) Second,
Plaintiff contends it is “per se unconscionably for Defendant to seek to
enforce an agreement to arbitrate that it knew, or should know, is invalid.”
(Opp., 1-2.) Again, Plaintiff provides no supporting authorities for these conclusory
claims.
In reply, Defendant first correctly explains that a showing
of procedural and substantive unconscionability are both needed to show a
defense to the arbitration agreement. (Reply, 3.) Defendant further contends
the “U.S. Supreme Court has stated that an employee’s separate individual
contract with an employer may be enforced if it is consistent with a collective
bargaining agreement,” and therefore contends that the Arbitration Agreement is
consistent with the collective bargaining agreement. (Reply, 3-4.) Defendant cites
to Willis v. Prime Healthcare
Services, Inc., (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 615, 630 for this contention. The Willis court, in
relevant part, states:
“Plaintiff's position is in part
that the individual agreement, with its arbitration clause, cannot be enforced
because of the National Labor Relations Act. That is the gist of the J.I.
Case decision which held that individual contracts could not be used
as a bar to engaging in collective bargaining. Mere reference to a collective
bargaining agreement for damage computation ordinarily is insufficient to
implicate section 301(a) preemption in varying circumstances...”
(Willis, supra, 231 Cal.App.at 632)(citations
omitted).
As such, Defendant contends “Mr. Norris ... attempts to use
the existence of a CBA as a reason not to enforce a valid, separate arbitration
agreement that he entered into with Defendant. But just like the claims of the Willis
plaintiff, Mr. Norris’ claims have nothing to do with the provisions of the
CBA...” (Reply, 4.) The court agrees.
Because Plaintiff has failed to show how any collective
bargaining agreement involving Plaintiff is implicated by this Arbitration
Agreement, and because Plaintiff has further failed to argue either substantive
or procedural unconscionability as a defense, the court finds an enforceable
arbitration agreement exists between the parties.
For these reasons, Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration
is granted.
Conclusion
Defendant’s motion is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to
arbitrate his claims with Defendant. The action is stayed pending the
completion of arbitration or further order of the court. The court sets an
order to show cause re status of the arbitration for October 3, 2023, at 8:30
a.m. in Department 37. Defendant is to give notice.