Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 21STCV43141, Date: 2025-02-18 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 21STCV43141    Hearing Date: February 18, 2025    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 Tuesday, February 18, 2025

CASE NUMBER:                   21STCV43141

CASE NAME:                        Wilshire West Tower, One, LLC, et al. v. ANR Development Company, LLC

MOVING PARTY:                 Cross-Defendants Rapid Medical Logistics, LLC and Joseph Yemini

OPPOSING PARTY:             Cross-Complainants ANR Development Company, LLC and Agustin N. Rodriguez

TRIAL DATE:                        22 July 2025

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

                                                                                                                                                           

PROCEEDING:                      Motion for Summary Judgment

OPPOSITION:                        17 January 2025

REPLY:                                  31 January 2025

 

TENTATIVE:                         Cross-Defendant Yemini’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Cross-Defendant Rapid Medical’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

                                                                                                                                                           

 

Background

 

On November 22, 2021, Wilshire West Tower One, LLC; Wilshire West Tower Two, LLC; Wilshire West Tower Three, LLC; and Wilshire West Tower Four, LLC (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a claim for breach of written lease against ANR Development Company, LLC (“Defendant” or “ANR”); and Does 1 to 100.

 

On May 11, 2023, Plaintiffs and Defendant ANR entered a stipulated judgment wherein Plaintiffs obtained judgment against Defendant ANR.

 

On May 12, 2022, Defendant ANR filed a Cross-Complaint against Rapid Logistics Couriers LLC (“Rapid Logistics”); Joseph Yemini (“Yemini”) (collectively “Cross-Defendants”) and Does 1 to 10.

 

On February 15, 2023, Defendant/Cross-Complainant ANR filed the operative First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FACC”) adding Rapid Medical  Logistics, LP (“Rapid Medical”) as Cross-Defendant. The FACC alleges four causes:

 

1)     Breach of Written Sublease against Rapid Logistics;

2)     Conversion against Rapid Logistics and Yemini;

3)     Trespass against Rapid Medical; and

4)     Breach of Written Sublease against Rapid Logistics.

 

On January 10, 2024, Cross-Complainant ANR and Cross-Defendant Rapid Logistics entered a stipulated judgment wherein ANR obtained a judgment against Rapid Logistics for Breach of Written Sublease, and the remaining causes of action against Rapid Logistics were dismissed.

 

Rapid Medical and Yemini (collectively “Cross-Defendants”) now move for summary judgment against Cross-Complainants ANR and Agustin Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) as to the remaining causes of action alleged against them, conversion and trespass. Cross-Complainants oppose the Motion. The matter is now before the court.

 

Evidentiary Objections

 

Cross-Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Erin Banks:

 

Objections Nos. 1 to 7, 11- 13 are overruled.

 

Objections Nos. 8 to 10 are immaterial, and the court declines to rule on these objections because they are immaterial to the court’s disposition of this Motion. (CCP, § 437c(q).)  All objections not ruled upon are preserved for appeal.  Cross-Defendant stipulated in Cross-Complainant’s Additional Material Fact No. 41, that the furniture belonged to ANR.

 

Cross-Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections to Cross-Complainant’s Exhibit 5: Phone Directory

 

Objection No. 14 is based on lack of relevance. The court declines to rule on the objection because it is immaterial to the court’s disposition of this Motion. (CCP, § 437c(q).)  All objections not ruled upon are preserved for appeal. 

 

Cross-Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Kevin Abbot.

 

            Objection No. 15 is overruled.

 

Cross-Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections to Cross-Complainant’s Exhibits 7 to 11, and 13

 

Objections Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19, 21 are based on inadmissibility due to lack of authentication and are overruled. Kevin Abbot’s declaration asserts personal knowledge of the exhibits and any issue with authentication can explored at trial. (See Aaron & Andrew, Inc. v. Sears Holdings Management Corp. (C.D. Cal., Mar. 26, 2018, No. CV 14-1196 SS) 2018 WL 1942373, at *6 [“Accordingly, the Court will assume, without deciding, that the documents pulled from AMIN's website are admissible for consideration on summary judgment.”].)

            Objection No. 20 is sustained as the letter is hearsay.

 

Request for Judicial Notice

 

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) “Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)

 

Cross-Defendants request judicial notice of the following:

 

Exhibit B: A true and correct copy of the parties’ Stipulation for Judgment against Rapid Logistics Couriers LLC and in favor of ANR Development Company, LLC, entered by this Court on January 10, 2024.

 

Exhibit C: A true and correct copy of Cross-Complainants’ Reply Brief in Support of Cross-Complainants’ Motion to Add Rapid Mgmt Svcs, Inc. as Judgment Debtor, dated March 29, 2024.

 

Cross-Complainant’s request judicial notice of the following:

 

Exhibit 13: A certified copy of a Status Certificate for Rapid Logistics Couriers LLC from the Delaware Secretary of State.

 

The court grants Cross-Defendants’ and Cross-Complainants’ Requests for Judicial Notice.

 

motion for summary judgment

 

I.         Legal Standard

 

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”¿ (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) Summary adjudication may be granted as to one or more causes of action within an action, or one or more claims for damages. (CCP § 437c(f).)¿¿¿¿¿¿ 

 

A plaintiff moving for summary adjudication bears the burden of showing there is no defense to a cause of action. (CCP § 437c(a).) The burden can be met if the plaintiff “has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on that cause of action.” (CCP, § 437c, (p)(1); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) If the plaintiff meets this burden, it is up to the defendant “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP., § 437c(p)(1); see also S.B.C.C., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 383, 388.) 

 

Defeating summary judgment requires only a single disputed material fact. (See CCP § 437c(c) [a motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”] [italics added].) Thus, any disputed material fact means the court must deny the motion – the court has no discretion to grant summary judgment. (Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925, fn. 8; Saldana v. Globe-Weis Systems Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1505, 1511-1512.)

 

II.        Discussion

 

            A.        Procedural Clarifications

 

Cross-Defendants Rapid Medical and Yemini bring this motion for summary judgment against Cross-Complainants ANR and Agustin Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”). Cross-Complainants assert Rodriguez is not a party to either the conversion or trespass claim as he did not bring the trespass or conversion claim at issue and ANR is the sole owner of the Furniture and the sole entity damaged. (Opposition, at p. 6:2-9.) Cross-Defendants do not challenge Cross-Complainants’ representation as to Rodriguez, therefore the court agrees that Rodriguez is not a proper party to this Motion.

 

Second, Cross-Defendants move for summary judgment, without requesting summary adjudication in the alternative. Summary judgment must dispose of the entire complaint. (CCP, § 437c(c); see also Twain Harte Associates, Ltd. v. County of Tuolumne (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 71, 80.)¿ Ordinarily, this would require the court to deny the entire motion even if the court found judgment in favor of Cross-Defendants as to one cause of action. However, as the conversion claim is only alleged against Yemini and the trespass claim is only alleged against Rapid Medical, the court treats Cross-Defendants’ request for summary judgment as two separate motions each challenging a separate cause of action by a separate Cross-Defendant. The court proceeds on the merits.

 

B.        Factual Summary

 

This action arises from a sublease agreement between Cross-Complainant ANR Development Company LLC (“ANR”) and an entity called Rapid Logistics Couriers LLC (“Rapid Logistics”). Cross-Defendant Joseph Yemini (“Yemini”) agreed to act as guarantor for the sublease. Yemini entered into a Settlement Agreement and General Release with ANR and Cross-Complainant Agustin Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) on or about June 14, 2022. (Yemini Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. A.)

 

The General Release states in relevant part:

 

3.         GENERAL RELEASE. ANR and Rodriguez, on behalf of themselves, their respective heirs, successors, relatives, assigns, principals, and shareholders and each of them, hereby release and forever discharge Yemini and each of his predecessors, successors-in-interest, partners, affiliates, assigns, trustees, beneficiaries, estates, agents, servants, employees, representatives, attorneys, and all other persons, firms, or corporations with whom any of the aforementioned have been, are now, or may hereafter be affiliated, and each of them (the “Releasees”) from all claims, suits, actions, charges, demands, damages, costs and attorney's fees, past, present and future, known or unknown, both legal and equitable in any manner arising out of or relating to the Premises, the Action, any transaction between the Parties and the above recitals, including but not limited to, claims for breach of contract, attorney fees, costs, as well as any and all claims arising under any common law, state law, or federal law.

 

4.         RELEASE OF UNKNOWN CLAIMS. It is the intention of the Parties hereto in executing this Agreement that this instrument is a general release which shall be effective as a bar to each and every action, claim, demand, or cause of action released hereby. ANR and Rodriguez recognize they may discover, incur or suffer loss, damage or injuries that are in any way related to the subject matter of this Agreement, the nature or magnitude of which are unknown or unanticipated at the time of execution of this Agreement, which could be the basis of some action, claim, demand or cause of action. It is the intention of the Parties in executing this Agreement that it will deprive ANR and Rodriguez of each such action, claim, demand or cause of action and prevent them from asserting it against any other party hereto and/or any other person or entity. ANR and Rodriguez hereby acknowledge familiarity with the provisions of Section 1542 of the California Civil Code, which provides as follows:

 

A general release does not extend to claims that the creditor or releasing party does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release and that, if known by him or her, would have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor or released party.

 

ANR and Rodriguez hereby knowingly, voluntarily and expressly waive any rights or benefits conferred by the provisions of California Civil Code Section 1542, or any other law of the same or similar effect which the State of California may hereafter enact, or the law of any other state or jurisdiction with the same or similar effect.

 

(Yemini Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. A, ¶¶ 3-4.)

 

The Parties agree that if the conversion and trespass claims arose prior to the signing of the General Release on June 24, 2022, Cross-Complainant ANR’s conversion and trespass claims are barred. Cross-Defendants Rapid Medical and Yemini assert that any future tort claims were also barred by the General Release, and they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Alternatively, Cross-Defendants assert that ANR cannot establish the essential elements of conversion as alleged against Yemini and Trespass against Rapid Medical.

 

C.        General Release Cannot Release Claims for Future Intentional Torts

 

In City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, the California Supreme Court explained that it would be a violation of public policy for an agreement to release liability for future torts amounting to more than ordinary negligence. Civ. Code § 1668 states “All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”

 

The California Supreme Court defined “ordinary negligence” as “an unintentional tort.” (City of Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 753.) Consequently, the General Release can only bar future claims for unintentional torts, but not intentional torts like Conversion and Trespass. “Thus, a necessary element of the tort is an intent to exercise ownership over property which belongs to another. For this reason, conversion is considered an intentional tort.” (Collin v. American Empire Insurance Company (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 787, 812 [bold added].)  “‘The essence of the cause of action for trespass is an ‘unauthorized entry’ onto the land of another. Such invasions are characterized as intentional torts, regardless of the actor's motivation.’” (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1042 [bold added] citing Civic Western Corp. v. Zila Industries, Inc. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 1, 16.)

 

The court concludes it would be a violation of Civ. Code § 1668 for the General Release to bar future unknown claims for intentional torts.

 

D.        2nd Cause of Action – Conversion as Alleged against Yemini

 

The FACC alleges that ANR is the sole owner of the Furniture and did not consent to Cross-Defendants taking the Furniture after the Sublease expired on November 30, 2022. (FACC ¶¶ 29, 30, 34.)

 

Cross-Defendant Yemini asserts ANR served deficient discovery responses when asked to provide facts to show that Yemini “wrongfully exerted control over the Furniture.” (“Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 32.) ANR responded by asserting: “Nevertheless Rapid Logistics and Defendant Yemini took the furniture after vacating the subject property. Discovery and investigation are ongoing.” (UMF No. 33.) Cross-Defendant Yemini submitted a declaration that that he did not take any furniture from the Property and asserts that ANR has not provided any evidence of conversion. (Yemini Decl., ¶ 12.) The court finds that by pointing to Cross-Complainant’s deficient discovery responses, Yemini has met his initial burden of showing there are no triable issues of material fact. The burden shifts to Cross-Complainant ADR to show there are triable issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.

 

                        i.          Cross-Defendant’s Evidence of Conversion

Cross-Defendant ANR presents the declaration of its office manager, Erin Banks, who asserts that when ANR subleased the Property to Rapid Logistics on February 18, 2019, the Furniture remained at the Property. (Banks, Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 3) Banks asserts they visited the Property before and after it was vacated on November 30, 2022, and that the Furniture was there in November 2022 prior to the Lease ending. (Id. ¶ 10.) “When I went to the Property immediately after the Property was vacated, all of the Furniture was gone.” (Ibid.) ANR also points to Rapid Medical’s discovery responses wherein it states that the “furniture is in the possession of Rapid Logistics Couriers LLC.” (Abbot Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. 12.) ANR further provides evidence that Rapid Logistics ceased to be in good standing with the Delaware Secretary of State effective June 1, 2023. (Id., Ex. 13.) ANR also provides evidence that Yemini signed the sublease as Rapid Logistics’ general manager. (Banks Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 3 at p. AOE 043.) Yemini also “executed a Guaranty of Sublease as part of the sublease and thereby guaranteed the monetary obligations of Rapid Logistics.” (Id., Ex. 4.)

ANR fails to show that Yemini can be held liable for conversion. ANR asserts that Yemini is the principal of Rapid Logistics. (Opposition, at p. 2:17-18.) “First, a principal who personally engages in no misconduct may be vicariously liable for the tortious act committed by an agent within the course and scope of the agency.” (Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 680, 691.) Yemini as the principal of Rapid Logistics cannot be held vicariously liable for torts committed by his agent, Rapid Logistics, due to the Stipulated Judgment entered on January 10, 2024. Judgment was entered in favor of ANR and against Rapid Logistics as to the claim for breach of written sublease, and the remaining causes of action against Rapid Logistics, including the claim of conversion, were dismissed. (1/10/2014 Stipulated Judgment.)

The dismissal of the conversion claim precludes the court from finding that Rapid Logistics is liable for conversion. Moreover, ANR’s evidence that Yemini signed the Lease and executed a Guaranty are insufficient to show that Yemini is the principal of Rapid Logistics, rather than just its agent. Similarly, ANR fails to show that Yemini personally engaged in the conversion of the Furniture.

ANR fails to meet its burden of presenting evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to Yemini’s liability for conversion. Therefore, summary judgment is granted as the second cause of action.

E.        3rd Cause of Action – Trespass as Alleged against Rapid Medical

 

The FACC alleges that despite ANR subleasing the Property located at 6420 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1900, Los Angeles, California 9004, to Rapid Logistics only, it allowed Rapid Medical to intentionally enter the Property and begin occupying and operating a business from the Property. (FACC, ¶¶ 10, 37.) “ANR did not give permission for the entry or continued occupancy by Rapid Medical and “Rapid Medical’s trespass was a substantial factor in causing ANR’s harm.” (Id., ¶¶ 39, 40.)

 

Cross-Defendant Rapid Medical asserts that ANR submitted deficient discovery responses wherein the only fact it had to support its trespass claim was that “Rapid Medical’s website listed the Property as its address. Additionally, a phone directory found at the Property included several people who apparently work for Rapid Medical. Discovery and investigation are ongoing.” (UMF No. 26; Kaufman Decl., Ex. D, p. 7.) ANR responded similarly when asked to “State ALL facts in support of YOUR allegation in paragraph 40 of the CROSS-COMPLAINT that ‘Rapid Medical’s trespass was a substantial factor in causing ANR’s harm.” (UMF No. 27.) ANR does not dispute the fact that it never supplemented its responses. (UMF No. 29.)

 

Cross-Defendant Rapid Medical also argues that when it asked ANR to “State ALL dates of alleged entry by Rapid Medical onto the Property”, ANR responded: “Responding Party does not know when Rapid Medical first occupied or entered the Property, but the last date of occupancy appears to be November 30, 2022. Discovery and investigation are ongoing.” (UMF Nos. 31, 32.) Defendant Yemini also submitted a declaration asserting that Rapid Medical never had any employees. (Yemini Decl., ¶ 13.) The court finds that by pointing to Cross-Complainant’s deficient discovery responses, Rapid Medical has met its initial burden of showing there are no triable issues of material fact. The burden shifts to Cross-Complainant ADR to show there are triable issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.

 

i.          Cross-Defendants Evidence of Trespass

 

Cross-Defendant ANR asserts that when Banks visited the vacated Property on November 30, 2022, she saw a phone directory purporting to have the contact information of a Rapid Medical employee. (Banks Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 5.) “I saw a phone directory affixed to a dry erase board outside of what was Joseph Yemini's office.” (Banks Decl., ¶ 11.) “This directory includes a person named “Saul Corte” with an email address of saul.corte@gorapidmedical.com. Gorapidmedical.com is the website for Rapid Medical Logistics.” (Ibid., Ex. 5.) “Saul Corte” phone number on the directory is listed as 818-617-9719, which Bank’s asserts is an area code in Los Angeles, CA.

 

ANR presents evidence that https://www.gorapidmedical.com is the home page of Rapid Medical. (Abbot Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 8.) ANR also presents evidence that Rapid Medical’s primary address is “6420 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1900, Los Angeles, CA 90048”, which is the address of the Property. (Id. ¶ 5, Ex. 9; FACC, ¶ 10.) Lastly, ANR presents evidence that “Rapid Medical” has a career page website, https://www.gorapidmedical.com/careers, inviting visitors to apply for positions. (Abbot Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 10.)

 

Cross-Defendant Rapid Medical’s evidence is sufficient to raise triable issues of fact as to UMF Nos. 37, 38, and 39 as to whether Rapid Medical “never had” any employees, whether Rapid Medical never entered or occupied the Property, and whether Rapid Medical “never received mail or correspondence at the Property.” While Cross-Defendant Rapid Medical argues ANR’s evidence is insufficient to show entry onto the Property, they raise triable issues of fact which Rapid Medical deemed material by designating them as UMF Nos. 37, 38, and 39.

 

Summary judgment is denied as to the third cause of action for trespass.

 

Conclusion

 

Cross-Defendant Yemini’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Cross-Defendant Rapid Medical’s motion for summary judgment is denied.