Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 21STCV43979, Date: 2023-12-18 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 21STCV43979    Hearing Date: January 11, 2024    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 Thursday, January 11, 2024

CASE NUMBER:                   21STCV43979

CASE NAME:                        Yue Ma, et al. v. Linghan “Hank” Cao, et al. 

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendant/Cross-Complainant Ideal International Investment, Inc.

OPPOSING PARTY:             Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants Yue Ma, Lihong Zhao, Sunny West Coast Co., and Hua Ming Technology Co.

TRIAL DATE:                        18 June 2024

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

                                                                                                                                                           

PROCEEDING:                      Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

OPPOSITION:                        28 December 2023

 

REPLY:                                  3 January 2024

 

TENTATIVE:                         Cross-Complainant Ideal’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is denied.

                                                                                                                                                           

 

Background

 

This is a breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and corporate dissolution action arising out of investments made by Plaintiffs Yue Ma (“Ma”), Lihong Zhao (“Zhao”), Sunny West Coast Co. (“Sunny”), and Hua Ming Technology Co. (“HM Tech”), into Defendant Ideal International Investment, Inc. dba Ideal Logistics (“Ideal”), a trucking and logistics business. Defendant Linghan “Hank” Cao (“Cao”) is the CEO, CFO, and secretary of Ideal.

 

Plaintiffs allege Ideal also operates several subsidiaries that are undercapitalized and shells of Ideal and Cao. Plaintiffs further allege Ideal was to operate until October 13, 2021, pursuant to an agreement between the parties, when the parties could decide to continue or dissolve the business. Plaintiffs allege that in late September or early October 2021, Coa offered to buy out Plaintiffs’ share at an unreasonable rate in exchange for 25% of the equipment used.

 

On October 19, 2021, the Plaintiffs allege Cao had a discussion with Ma’s husband regarding a disputed $650,000 payment when Cao took out a firearm and threatened to kill Ma’s husband and his entire family. Plaintiffs then allege that in November 2021, Cao sold off, used, transferred, or otherwise disposed of Ideal’s corporate assets into Cao’s other businesses. Plaintiffs allege Cao continues to operate Ideal’s business in Atlanta. Plaintiffs bring derivative claims as shareholders and individual causes of action.

 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract (derivatively) (2) breach of fiduciary duty (derivatively), (3) conversion (derivatively), (4) violation of Business and Professions code 17200 (derivatively), and (5) involuntary dissolution of corporation (individually).  

 

On December 20, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint. (“FAC”) The FAC alleges the same five causes of action.  

 

On March 11, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. (“SAC”) The SAC alleges the same five causes of action but was amended to include individual claims for the first cause of action.  On June 07, 2022, the demurrer to the SAC was sustained with leave to amend.

 

On July 7, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). The TAC alleges the same five causes of action as the original Complaint. On July 5, 2023, Defendants Hweisan Liu and E&C Logistics filed a demurrer to the TAC. In response, the Plaintiffs dismissed the first and fourth causes of action against Defendants Liu and E&C Logistics, and the second cause of action as against E&C Logistics. The demurrer to the third cause of action was sustained with leave to amend.

 

On August 22, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”). On January 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the operative Fifth Amended Complaint (“5AC”), which is nearly identical to the 4AC. The 5AC alleges:

1)     Breach of Contract (Directly) against Defendants Cao and Does 1 to 100

2)     Breach of Contract (Derivatively) against Cao and Does 1 to 100;

3)     Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Directly) against all Defendant Cao and Does 1-100;

4)     Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Derivatively) against all Defendants except Ideal;

5)     Conversion (Derivatively) against all Defendants except Ideal;

6)     Involuntary Dissolution of Corporation – Ideal International Investment (Corp. Code §  1800) against Ideal and Does 1 to 100.

 

On June 30, 2023, Defendants JPI Express, Inc. and Jun Pan filed a Cross-Complaint against Defendants Cao and Ideal International Investment for indemnity.

 

On March 7, 2022, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Ideal filed a Cross-Complaint against You Ma; Linhong Zhoa; Sunny West Coast Co.; Hua Ming Technology Co.; Jiafeng Yuan; and Jianhua Liu (the “Cross-Defendants”), alleging: (1) Breach of Penal Code § 495; (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duties; and (3) Violation of the Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.

 

On October 23, 2023, Ideal filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction against the Cross-Defendants.  The Cross-Defendants oppose the Motion. The matter is now before the court.

 

Motion for a preliminary injunction

 

I.                Legal Standard

 

CCP § 527(a) provides in relevant part: “[a] preliminary injunction may be granted at any time before judgment upon a verified complaint, or upon affidavits if the complaint in the one case, or the affidavits in the other, show satisfactorily that sufficient grounds exist therefor.”¿ (CCP § 527(a).)¿ “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final resolution upon a trial.”¿ (Grothe¿v. Cortlandt Corp.(1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316.) 

 

“The ultimate questions on a motion for a preliminary injunction are (1) whether the plaintiff is ‘likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of the injunction than the defendants are likely to suffer from its grant,’ and (2) whether there is ‘a reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits.’ ”(Huong Que, Inc. v.¿Luu(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 408.)¿ “In thus balancing the respective equities of the parties, the court must determine whether, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by it.”¿(Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471.)

 

“The decision to grant a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court ... before the trial court can exercise its discretion the applicant must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to injunctive relief.¿ The applicant must demonstrate a real threat of immediate and irreparable injury.”¿ (Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. State of California(1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 131, 138.)¿¿“[A]n injunction is an unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will not be granted if the remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately compensate the injured plaintiff,” and the party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden to prove its absence.¿ (Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1564-1565.) 

 

II.             Request for Judicial Notice

 

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) “Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)

 

Cross-Complainant Ideal requests judicial notice of the following:

 

1)     Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, including Exhibits 1 and 2.

 

Ideal’s request for judicial notice is granted.

 

Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants request judicial notice of the following:

 

1)     Exhibit 1: Statement of Information of LA GreenWheels Transportation Inc., filed with the California Secretary of State on February 10, 2021.

 

2)     Exhibit 2: Statement of Information of LA GreenWheels Transportation Inc., filed with the California Secretary of State on April 15, 2023.

 

Cross-Defendants request for judicial notice is granted.

 

III.           Evidentiary Objections

 

Cross-Defendants submit evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Linghan “Hank” Coa:

 

Objection No. 1 is sustained as the Declarant fails to provide facts as to how and when it came to know that LA GreenWheels was wholly owned by Ideal.

 

Objections Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 are overruled.

 

Objection No. 5 is sustained as to the statement “Mr. Yuan unlawfully took possession of Certain Ideal funds” is a legal conclusion.

 

Objection No. 8 is sustained due to hearsay.

 

IV.       Discussion

 

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Ideal seeks an order freezing the assets of Cross-Defendants Yue Ma, Lihong Zhao, Sunny West Coast Co., Hua Ming Technology Co., Jiafeng Yuan, Jianhua Liu (collectively “Cross-defendants), and their officers, employes and agents, and more specifically from diverting, transferring, pledging, spending, disposing of, assigning, hypothecating or otherwise encumbering or moving any of the funds in the bank account number 325118478393 (the “Bank Account”) at Bank of America or any other funds or assets that are the property of Ideal and/or Ideal’s wholly owned subsidiary LA GreenWheels Transportation Inc (“LA GreenWheels).

 

Ideal also seeks an order requiring Cross-Defendants to redeposit in the Bank Account any funds previously diverted, transferred, or otherwise moved from the Bank Account and order Cross-Defendant to place any other funds or assets that are the property of Ideal and/or its wholly owned subsidiary LA GreenWheels into escrow with an escrow agent which is mutually agreeable to Ideal and Cross-Defendants.

 

Ideal alleges that beginning on March 20, 2019, it operated through its wholly owned subsidiary, LA GreenWheels. (Cao Decl. ¶ 4.) Ideal was owned by Cross-Complainants and Cross-Defendants, with each being a minority shareholder owning 35% of Ideal’s shares. (Cross-Complainants’ RJN Ex. 1 [Agreement at § 1].)  Cao asserts that Cross-Defendant Jiafeng Yaun (“Yuan”), Ideal’s Chief Operating Officer, opened the Bank Account and established himself as the sole signatory on the Bank Account. (Cao Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5.)

 

Ideal provides evidence that from 2019 to 2021, payments were made from LA GreenWheels to Ideal from the Bank Account. (Cao Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. A.) Yaun stopped remitting funds to Ideal when the Agreement expired on October 13, 2021. (Cao Decl. ¶ 8.) Ideal asserts that Yuan unlawfully took possession of certain Ideal funds held in the Bank Account. (Cao Decl. ¶ 9.) Despite Fleet One Factoring making payments to LA GreenWheels during October 2021 and November 1, 2021, totaling $976,279.09, none of those funds were forwarded to Ideal. (Cao Decl. ¶ 10.) Cao believes that those funds are in danger of being diverted by Cross-Defendants . such that an order is needed to prevent the funds from being diverted, or if they were diverted, ordering that the funds be restored. (Cao Decl. ¶ 11, 12.)

 

A.              Reasonable Probability on Prevailing on the Merits

 

“In seeking a preliminary injunction, [the party seeking the injunction] b[ears] the burden of demonstrating both likely success on the merits and the occurrence of irreparable harm.” (Savage v. Trammell Crow Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 1571.) A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show the absence of an adequate damages remedy at law. (CCP § 526(a)(4).) “Injunctions will rarely be granted (absent specific statutory authority) where a suit for damages provides a clear remedy.” (Weil & Brown, Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2016) ¶ 9:519.)

 

The court agrees that Ideal’s moving papers fail to discuss the likelihood of success on the merits as to any of the three causes of action alleged against Cross-Defendants. Ideal raises the point for the first time on reply in response to the Cross-Defendants' assertion that Ideal has not established an ownership interest in the funds in the Bank Account.

 

Cross-Defendants assert that Ideal failed to sue LA GreenWheels for its failure to transfer funds to Ideal and failed to present evidence that LA GreenWheels is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ideal. As stated above, Cross-Defendants produced evidence that LA GreenWheels is independently owned by Cross-Defendant Yuan. (Cross-Defendants’ RJN Ex. 1, 2.) Cross-Defendants also state that Ideal fails to show that any of the business contracts LA GreenWheels required it to remit the funds to Ideal. Cross-Defendants attach a copy of a purchase agreement between WEX Bank supported by Fleet One Factoring, LLC and LA GreenWheels, that makes no reference to Ideal or transmitting funds to Ideal. (Totten Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A.) The court agrees that Ideal fails to show that an agreement existed between Ideal and LA GreenWheels that required LA GreenWheels to remit funds to Ideal and that if such an agreement existed, the obligation did not expire at the time Ideal’s Agreement expired.

 

Accordingly, Cross-Defendants maintain that Ideal cannot prove that LA GreenWheels was a wholly owned subsidiary of Ideal. Moreover, Cross-Defendants argue that even if LA GreenWheels was required to transfer funds to Ideal, any such duty expired on October 13, 2021, when Ideal’s operating agreement was set to expire. (Cross-Complainants’ RJN Ex. 1.) Accordingly, Ideal’s claim that the course of dealing showed LA GreenWheels issued about 27 checks to Ideal, does not support the finding that the obligation to continue giving funds to Ideal continued after October 13, 2021, when Ideal’s operating agreement expired. 

 

As Ideal has failed to show that it continues to have an ownership interest in the Bank Account, Ideal fails to meet its burden of showing it has a probability of succeeding on the merits.

 

B.    Balance of Equities

 

Ideal contends that it will suffer irreparable harm if the court does not issue a preliminary injunction because if the funds of LA GreenWheels are diverted it would likely render Cross-Defendants insolvent and unable to pay damages owed to Cross-Complainants. Cross-Defendants argue that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over LA GreenWheels because it is not a named party in this action. However, Ideal is not seeking an order requiring LA GreenWheels to turn over funds in the Bank Account to Ideal. Instead, as shown by the proposed order, the order is aimed at Cross-Defendants and their offers, employees, and agents and seeks to enjoin them from diverting funds from the Bank Account and if the funds have been diverted, an order requiring that the funds be restored. That LA GreenWheels has not been served in this action is irrelevant as the remedy Ideal seeks in this Motion does not require LA GreenWheels’ participation, but that of Yuan and other Cross-Defendants who control or have access to the Bank Account. 

 

Cross-Defendants assert that LA Green Wheels is not a wholly owned subsidiary of Ideal, but is an independent company owned by Yuan. (Cross-Defendants RJN Ex. 1, 2.) Ideal fails to rebut this evidence. Therefore, Ideal fails to show after its Agreement expired on October 13, 2021, LA GreenWheels had a continuing obligation to transfer funds to Ideal and that Ideal continues to have an ownership interest in the funds held in the Bank Account. Moreover, Cross-Defendants assert Ideal fails to present evidence LA GreenWheels will or has actually diverted funds from the Bank Account. “An injunction cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents' fears about something that may happen in the future. It must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity.” (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.)

 

The only evidence offered by Ideal is Cao’s declaration as Chief Executive Officer stating that LA GreenWheels is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ideal. (Cao Decl. ¶ 4.) Ideal failed to show that LA GreenWheels’ operating agreement or governing documents show that LA GreenWheels is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ideal. Moreover, the checks LA GreenWheels sent to Ideal only indicate that it was for “factor” and not because of agreement the parties. (Cao Decl. Ex. A.) Moreover, the checks stopped after Ideal’s operating agreement expired, and Ideal failed to produce evidence that LA GreenWheels has a continued obligation to send checks. Accordingly, Ideal fails to show that it has an ownership interest in the Bank Account and that Cross-Defendants have wrongfully diverted funds from the Bank Account. Without such evidence, the court cannot find that Cross-Defendants have diverted funds to be insolvent at the time of judgment and that the damages they currently seek are inadequate to compensate Ideal.

 

Based on the above, the Motion is denied.

 

Conclusion

 

Cross-Complainant Ideal’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is denied.