Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 22STCV04368, Date: 2025-05-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV04368    Hearing Date: May 9, 2025    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 Friday, May 9, 2025

CASE NUMBER:                   22STCV04368

CASE NAME:                        Lermont Moukoian v. The Estate of Harutiun Moukoian, et al. 

MOVING PARTY:                 Plaintiff Lermont Moukoian individually and as Trustee of the Lermon Moukoian Living Trust

OPPOSING PARTY:             Defendants The Estate of Harutiun Moukoian; Zovinar Suzie Postajian Moukoian (“Zovinar” or “Suzie”) individually and as Trustee of the Zov S. Postajian Moukoian Living Trust. 

TRIAL DATE:                        7 October 2025

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

PROCEEDING:                      Motion for Reconsideration

OPPOSITION:                        7 April 2025

REPLY:                                  21 April 2025

TENTATIVE:                         On its own Motion, the court reconsiders the January 25, 2024, MSA ruling granting summary adjudication as to the eighth cause of action and now denies summary adjudication as to the eighth cause of action.

Background

This action involves a dispute over ownership of a property. On February 3, 2022, Lermont Moukoian (“Plaintiff” or “Lermont”) individually and as Trustee of the Lermont Moukoian Living Trust filed a Complaint against The Estate of Harutiun Moukoian; Zovinar Suzie Postajian Moukoian (“Zovinar” or “Suzie”) individually and as Trustee of the Zov S. Postajian Moukoian Living Trust (collectively “Defendants”); Does 1 to 70, and All Persons or Entities Unknown Claiming Any Legal or Equitable Right, Title, Estate, Lien or Interest in the property located in Glendale, California (the “Glendale Property”).  

The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed March 17, 2023, alleges nine causes of action: (1) Cancellation of Instruments under Civ. Code § 3412; (2) Financial Elder Abuse in violation of Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 15610.27, 15610.30, and 15657.5; (3) Physical Elder Abuse in violation of Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 15610.27, 15610.07, 15610.57, and 15657; (4) Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation; (5) Quiet Title; (6) Conversion; (7) Unjust Enrichment; (8) Prob. Code §§ 850 and 859 for double damages; and (9) Declaratory Relief. 

On September 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Adjudication. On January 25, 2024, the court granted summary adjudication in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants as to the first, fifth, eighth and ninth causes of action.

Defendants now seek reconsideration of the court’s order granting summary adjudication as to the eighth cause of action. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion. The matter is now before the court.

motion for RECONSIDERATION

I.         Legal Standard

In Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, the California Supreme Court held “ that sections 437c and 1008 limit the parties’ ability to file repetitive motions but do not limit the court's ability, on its own motion, to reconsider its prior interim orders so it may correct its own errors.” (Id. at p. 1107.)  “Section 437c, subdivision (f)(2), can easily be so interpreted” as “as imposing a limitation on the parties' ability to file repetitive motions, but not on the court's authority to reconsider its prior interim rulings on its own motion.” (Id. at p. 1105.)

II.        Discussion

Defendants assert that the court should reconsider the granting of summary adjudication as to the eighth cause of action, including the finding of bad faith under Prob. Code § 859, because Defendant Zovinar Suzie Postajian Moukoian (“Zovinar”) had no involvement in the original transfer of the Property from Plaintiff to her late husband, she did not participate in the discussions, execution, or planning of the conveyance, and she relied on the representations of her husband regarding the transaction. (Motion, Ex. A [Zovinar Depo. pp. 45:12-13; 48:6, 50:16; Ex. B [Zovinar Depo. p. 56:1-8]; C [Plaintiff Depo. pp. 46:3-47:22].)

The court agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration under CCP § 1008 must be denied because the fact that Zovinar was not present is not a new fact that warrants reconsideration, as this fact was known to Zovinar at the time the MSA was heard and Zovinar was not diligent in presenting the fact to the court. The burden under Section 1008 “is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial.” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213; see also Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 833 [finding that Section 1008 imposes the special requirement of having to not only show new or different facts, circumstances, or law, but also to “show diligence with a satisfactory explanation for not presenting the new or different information earlier…”].) 

Nevertheless, this court retains the discretion to reconsider its own interim orders. (See Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094 (Le Francois).) Le Francois held that a court “on its own motion” may “reconsider its prior interim orders so it may correct its own errors” and not those of the parties before it. (Id. at p. 1107 [italics added].) “[I]t should not matter whether the ‘judge has an unprovoked flash of understanding in the middle of the night’ [citation] or acts in response to a party's suggestion. If a court believes one of its prior interim orders was erroneous, it should be able to correct that error no matter how it came to acquire that belief.” (Id. at p. 1108.) On its own motion, this court has reviewed the order granting summary adjudication in favor of Plaintiffs as to the eighth cause of action and has found that the ruling was in error.

First, Plaintiff’s sought summary adjudication as to only part of the eighth cause of action, rather than the entire cause of action, inclusive of the request for damages under Prob. Code § 859. ‘The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues’” and to frame “the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.’” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381.)

The eighth cause of action in the operative FAC, asserted a claim under Prob. Code § 850 but also requested double damages and attorney fees and costs pursuant to Prob. Code § 859^[1]. (FAC, ¶¶ 81- 85.)

However, in their MSA, Plaintiffs never requested that the court determine Defendants’ liability pursuant to Prob. Code § 859, only that the court determine whether Plaintiffs could bring a claim under Prob. Code § 850. In other words, Issue 3 in the MSA only requested adjudication as to Prob. Code § 850, and not liability under Prob. Code § 859.  Plaintiffs defined Issue 3 as follows:  

ISSUE 3: LERMONT MOUKOIAN AS TRUSTEE OF THE LERMONT MOUKOIAN LIVING TRUST IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY ADJUDICATION IN HIS FAVOR AS TO THE EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION TO RETURN PROPERTY BACK TO LERMONT’S TRUST PURSUANT TO CAL. PROBATE CODE §850 AS A MATTER OF LAW, RETURNING THE GLENDALE PROPERTY BACK TO LERMONT MOUKOIAN, AS TRUSTEE OF THE LERMONT MOUKOIAN LIVING TRUST, ESTABLISHING THAT LERMONT, AS TRUSTEE IS THE SOLE OWNER OF THE GLENDALE PROPERTY IN FEE SIMPLE AS OF FEBRUARY 3, 2022, AND THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE NO INTEREST WHATSOEVER IN THE GLENDALE PROPERTY.

(MSA, at p. 3:1-8; Separate Statement p. 62.)

Plaintiffs’ moving papers and separate statement filed in support of their MSA stated no facts showing that Defendant Zovinar took, concealed, or disposed “of the property by the use of undue influence in bad faith or through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse[.]” (Prob. Code, § 859.) Plaintiffs’ MSA failed to brief Prob. Code § 859 or outline the facts showing how Zovinar used undue influence in bad faith or committed elder financial abuse^[2], such that she is liable for damages under Prob. Code § 859.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs failed to fully present the eighth cause of action for summary adjudication because they never requested adjudication as to a finding of liability under Prob. Code § 859 and never presented facts to establish such liability. “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (CCP § 437c(f)(1).) Consequently, Plaintiffs failed to meet their initial burden of showing that there are no triable issues of fact as to Defendants’ liability under Prob. Code § 859.

On the court’s own Motion, the court reconsiders the January 25, 2024, MSA ruling granting summary adjudication in favor of Plaintiffs as to the eighth cause of action. The court finds that it was an error to grant summary adjudication as to the eighth cause of action, now reconsiders its order, and denies summary adjudication as to the eighth cause of action. 

Conclusion

On its own Motion, the court reconsiders the January 25, 2024 MSA ruling granting summary adjudication as to the eighth cause of action and now denies summary adjudication as to the eighth cause of action.