Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 22STCV12671, Date: 2023-11-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV12671 Hearing Date: November 3, 2023 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: Friday, November 3, 2023.
CASE NUMBER: 22STCV12671
CASE NAME: Holly Baird,
et al. v. County of Los Angeles, et al.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant County of Los Angeles
OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Holly Baird and Nigel
Carter.
TRIAL DATE: 16 January 2024
PROOF
OF SERVICE: OK
PROCEEDING: Motion for Summary
Judgment or, in the alternative, for Summary Adjudication
OPPOSITION: 10 August 2023
REPLY: 18 August 2023
TENTATIVE:
Defendant County’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Background
On April 14, 2022, Holly
Biard and Nigel Carter (“Plaintiffs”) filed
a Complaint against the County of Los Angeles (the “County”), Los Angeles
Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) Deputy Gloria Lee
(“Lee”), and Sargent Feder (“Feder”). In September of 2022, Sargent
Feder was dismissed from this action.
Deputy Lee was never served.
The Complaint
alleges police misconduct arising out of a July
11, 2021, incident which resulted in Plaintiffs’ detention. Plaintiffs allege
that on July 11, 2021, after parking their vehicle at El Matador Beach in the
County of Los Angeles, several LASD deputies, including Defendant Lee, rushed
their vehicle and forcibly arrested Plaintiffs.
Defendants allegedly escalated the encounter despite no resistance from
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege LASD deputies mistreated Plaintiff Carter causing
injury to his wrists, and left Plaintiff Baird in the police vehicle under
sweltering heat. Plaintiffs further allege Plaintiff Baird was asked to state Plaintiff
Carter had assaulted her, which Plaintiff Baird denied. After releasing
Plaintiff Baird from the vehicle, Plaintiffs allege Plaintiff Carter remained
in the police vehicle for some time. Plaintiffs further allege that upon their
release, Defendant Feder came forward and identified himself as a supervisor
but refused to identify any other officers.
Plaintiffs’
Complaint alleges three causes of action:
1)
Interference
with Constitutional Rights (Bane Act – Cal. Civ. Code §52.1);
2)
False Imprisonment; and
3)
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
On May 5, 2023, Defendant
County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, or Summary Adjudication in the
alternative. Plaintiffs filed opposing papers on August 10, 2023. Defendant County filed a reply on August 18,
2023.
The matter is now before the court.
I. Legal
Standard
“The
purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to
cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(a) provides:
A party may move for summary judgment in any action or
proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no
defense to the action or proceeding. The
motion may be made at any time after 60 days have elapsed since the general
appearance in the action or proceeding of each party against whom the motion is
directed or at any earlier time after the general appearance that the court,
with or without notice and upon good cause shown, may direct…. The motion shall be heard no later than 30
days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders
otherwise. The filing of the motion
shall not extend the time within which a party must otherwise file a responsive
pleading.
A
motion for summary judgment may be granted “if all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (CCP, § 437c(c).) “The motion shall be supported by affidavits,
declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters
of which judicial notice shall or may be taken.
The supporting papers shall include a separate statement setting forth
plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are
undisputed. Each of the material facts
stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence. The failure to comply with this requirement
of a separate statement may in the court’s discretion constitute a sufficient
ground for denial of the motion.” (CCP §
437c(b)(1); see also CRC, rule
3.1350(c)(2) & (d).)
In
analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step
analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine
whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine
whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material
factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294 (Hinsley).)
CCP
§ 437c(p)(2) provides:
A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of
showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or
more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met
that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show
that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto. The
plaintiff or cross-complainant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials
of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but,
instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of
material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.
The
court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party
and accept all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” (Hinesley, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 294; Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39
Cal.4th 384, 389 [Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in
favor of that party.”].) A motion for
summary judgment must be denied where the moving party’s evidence does not
prove all material facts, even in the absence of any opposition (Leyva v. Sup. Ct. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d
462, 475) or where the opposition is weak (Salasguevara
v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, 387).
II. Request for Judicial Notice
The
Court may take judicial notice of records of any court of record of the United
States. (Evid. Code, § 452(d)(2).) However, the court may only judicially
notice the existence of the record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky
v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.)
Defendant
County requests judicial notice of the following:
1) Exhibit A:
Baird et. al. v. County of Los Angeles, United States District Court Case No.
22-877 PA (JEMx), Notice of Request for Removal of Action, [Document 1].
2) Exhibit B:
Baird et al. v. County of Los Angeles, 21STCV46014 Removed State Complaint
alleging Bane Act violations under CC §52.1, Sec. 1983 Excessive Force, Sec.
1983 Unlawful Search and Seizure, False Imprisonment and Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress stemming from the same incident of July 11, 2021,
[Document 1.1 – Exhibit A to Notice of Request for Removal].
3) Exhibit C:
Baird et. al. v. County of Los Angeles, USDC Case No. 22-877 PA (JEMx),
[Document 12], Minute Order Dismissing federal case.
4) Exhibit D:
Baird et. al. v. County of Los Angeles, USDC Case No. 22-877 PA (JEMx),
[Document 13], Judgment of Dismissal of federal case.
Defendant
County’s request for judicial notice is granted.
III. Evidentiary Objections
No
evidentiary objections have been filed.
IV. Discussion
A. Plaintiff’s Failure to Seek Leave to
Amend
The
pleadings limit the scope of the issues to be determined in a motion for
summary judgment and “[i]f plaintiff
wishes to expand the issues presented, it is incumbent on plaintiff to seek
leave to amend the complaint either prior to the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment, or at the hearing itself. To allow a party to expand its
pleadings by way of opposition papers creates, as it would here, an unwieldy
process.” (Laabs v. City of Victorville
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258.) Defendants object to Plaintiffs’
Doe amendments and new theory of liability raised in its opposing papers on the
basis that Plaintiff delayed in seeking leave to amend.
On
August 3, 2023, after Defendant County filed this Motion for Summary Judgment
or, in the alternative, for Summary Adjudication, Plaintiffs filed two Doe
Amendments, naming Deputy Kyle Murphy (“Murphy”) as Doe 1 and Deputy Mathew
Regan (“Regan”) as Doe 2. On September 12, 2023, the Plaintiffs filed proof of
service for Deputy Murphy and Deputy Regan. The proof of service for Deputy
Regan shows that he was served on or about August 16, 2023; Deputy Murphy was
served on or about August 21, 2023. Consequently, both Murphy and Regan were
served in this action after the Plaintiffs filed their opposing papers to
this Motion.
“[W]hen
a plaintiff seeks leave to amend his or her complaint only after the defendant
has mounted a summary judgment motion directed at the allegations of the
unamended complaint, even though the plaintiff has been aware of the facts upon
which the amendment is based, ‘[i]t would be patently unfair to allow
plaintiffs to defeat [the] summary judgment motion by allowing them to present
a ‘moving target’ unbounded by the pleadings.’” (Falcon v. Long Beach
Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1280 (Falcon) citing Melican
v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176.)
Defendant County asserts that the Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in making the
Doe amendments because the Plaintiffs already knew the identities of Deputies
Murphy and Regan. Accordingly, the County urges that the Doe amendments be disregarded
as should Plaintiff’s new theory of liability.
Plaintiffs
previously filed this action in the Los Angeles Superior Court
(21STCV46014). Defendants removed the
action to federal court, USDC Case No. 22-CV-00877-PA-JEM. That case involved the same Defendants and operative
facts. (Supp. Kelly Decl. ¶ 2.) The County asserts that during discovery it
provided the names of deputies Murphy and Regan during discovery on August 22,
2022. (Ibid.) The federal action was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
(RJN Ex. C.)
After the
federal case was dismissed, this action was filed on April 14, 2022. (Ibid.)
On September 15, 2022, Plaintiffs requested that Defendant County resend the
electronic link that included the identities of the deputies, and that said
link was sent to Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Id. ¶ 1, Ex. A.) Defendant County
asserts that despite two Case Management Conferences taking place, plus a mediation
on March 16, 2023, Plaintiffs took no action to name the Doe Defendants, conduct
discovery, or notice depositions. (Supp. Kelly Decl. ¶ 5.)
Only after
the County has filed its Motion do Plaintiffs seek to name the Doe Defendants and
advance a new theory of liability in their Opposition brief. There were no such Respondeat Superior or
Negligence claims in the operative Complaint and no discovery was conducted on these
issues. For this reason, the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment focuses
solely on the issues presented in the original Complaint. The County’s Reply Brief challenges the Plaintiff’s
late Doe Amendments and presentation of a new theory of liability.
Pursuant to Falcon,
the court has the discretion to not consider Plaintiffs’ Doe amendments
and new theory of liability if the court finds there was “unwarranted delay in
seeking leave to amend” and “the proposed
amendment is ‘offered after long unexplained delay ... or where there is a lack
of diligence’ [Citation].” (Falcon, supra, Cal.App.4th at p. 1280.)
Plaintiffs opposing papers fail to explain why Plaintiffs were not diligent in
making the Doe amendments. Accordingly, the court has the discretion to deny the
Plaintiffs’ Doe amendments under CCP § 474 because the Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed
in filing the amendments. (See A.N. v. County of Los Angeles
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1065 [Trial court acted within its discretion in
opposing the plaintiff’s Doe amendments due to unreasonable delay].)
When a plaintiff seeks to file a Doe
amendment pursuant to CCP § 474, “‘the relevant
inquiry when the plaintiff seeks to substitute a real defendant for one sued
fictitiously is what facts the plaintiff actually knew at the time the
original complaint was filed.’ [Citation].” (McOwen v.
Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 9437, 942 [italics original].) Here,
Defendant County has shown that Plaintiffs knew the identities of Deputies
Murphy and Regan before the filing of this action and that their identities
were discoverable long before the County filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
Here, the court rejects the Plaintiffs’
Doe amendments. Since the Plaintiffs Doe amendments are ineffective
and Plaintiffs have not sought leave to amend the Complaint to add new causes
of action, the court will address the County’s Motion on its merits and only
consider the issue raised in Plaintiff’s original Complaint and Defendant’s
Motion. Plaintiffs’ new theory of liability based on Respondeat Superior
Negligence, raised for the first time in its opposing papers, will not be
considered by the court. (See Laabs, supra, p. 163 Cal.App.4th at
1258 [“The complaint limits the
issues to be addressed at the motion for summary judgment. The rationale is
clear: It is the allegations in the complaint to which
the summary judgment motion must respond.”].)
B. First Cause
of Action: Interference with Constitutional Rights (Bane Act Civ. Code § 52.1)
Civil Code § 52.1 (the “Bane
Act”) allows an individual to sue for damages if a person or persons
“interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by
threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any
individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this
state….”¿ (Civ. Code § 52.1(a), (b).)¿¿“‘The essence of a Bane Act claim is
that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e.,¿‘threat[],
intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing
something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff
to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.”’¿ (King
v. State of Cal. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 294 citing Austin B. v.
Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 883.)
Defendant
County asserts that it cannot be held liable under the Bane Act because as a
public entity, direct liability must be based on a specific statute declaring
the entity to be liable or creating some duty of care. (See Gov. Code § 815(a);
Eastburn v. Regional Fire
Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175,
1179.) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to name a statute that imposes
direct or vicarious liability on the County and instead merely states that
Defendants violated the Bane Act.
The
Bane Act itself imposes no duty or liability on the County because the County
is not a “person or persons” under the Act. “[N]othing in
the language of the Bane Act indicates that it creates even a general rule of
actionable duty for public entities.” (Towery v. State of California
(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 226, 233.) The Bane Act applies to a “person or persons,” whether or not acting under
color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion with an individual’s
constitutional rights. (Civ. Code § 51.2(a).) Although the Bane Act does “does
not define ‘person,’ Civil Code § 14 states that, as used in that code, ‘the
word person includes a corporation as well as a natural person.’ Thus, Civil
Code § 52.1 does not on its face provide any claim against the State itself.” (Towery,
supra, at p. 14 Cal.App.5th at 233.)
In Civil Code section 14, the Legislature defined “county” to
include “city and county” and purposefully omitted “county” as an entity that
could be defined as a “person or persons” that could be found directly liable
for violations of the Bane Act. For Defendant County to be
liable for violating the Bane Act, there must be a statute that directly or
indirectly imposes liability on the County. (See e.g. Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003)
31 Cal.4th 1175, 1178 [Liability against public entities under
the Bane Act premised on breach of mandatory duty under Gov. Code § 815.6,
direct liability under Health & Saf. Code, § 1799.107; and vicarious liability under 815.2]; O'Toole v. Superior Court
(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 488, 493 [Liability under the Bane Act brought pursuant
of breach of mandatory duty under Gov. Code § 815.6 and Pen. Code, § 626.6.].)
Absent a specific statute that imposes direct liability on the
County, Defendant County cannot be held directly liable for violating the Bane
Act. Similarly, the Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to name a specific statute
under which the County can be held vicariously liable for violating the Bane
Act, and the Plaintiffs have failed to timely name and serve the individual
deputies, thus precluding a finding of various liability against the County. Defendant County is correct in asserting that Plaintiffs fail to
state a statutory basis for imposing liability on the County. The
court is unaware of any case law permitting a finding of liability under the
Bane Act on the County without a finding of liability against the individual
officers. Therefore, there is no basis for finding that Plaintiffs can prevail
on their first cause of action as a matter of law. Summary adjudication as to
the first cause of action is granted.
C. Second Cause of Action – False
Imprisonment
“‘The elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment
are: (1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without
lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.’” (Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
947, 962.)
Defendant
County correctly asserts that as a public entity, it is not subject to tort
liability unless a statute imposes liability. (See Gov. Code § 815(a), Eastburn,
supra, 31 Cal.4th.1175 at p. 1183 [“In other words, direct tort liability of public
entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at
least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort
provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity
for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of
general tort principles.”].)
Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to name a
specific statute that imposes direct or vicarious liability on the County for
the tort of false imprisonment. Even if Plaintiffs were to amend their Complaint
to impose vicarious liability on the County for the individual conduct of LASD
deputies under Gov. Code § 815.2, there are no individual defendants in the
case. Sargent Feder was dismissed; Deputy
Lee was never served. The Doe amendments
naming Deputies Murphy and Regan are ineffective due to Plaintiffs unreasonable
delay in seeking amendment. (CCP § 474.)
Therefore, because Plaintiff
fails to state a statutory basis for holding Defendant County liable for false
imprisonment, the second cause of action fails as a matter of law.
Summary adjudication is
granted as to the third cause of action.
D. Third Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress (IIED)
“A cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1)
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing,
or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress;(2) the
plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous
conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to
exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the
defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the
realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th
1035,1050-1051 [internal citations omitted].)
Although the Plaintiffs’
Complaint alleges that several LASD deputies engaged in conduct that caused the
Plaintiffs to suffer Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”), the
Plaintiffs dismissed Defendant Feder from this action, failed to serve Deputy
Lee, and failed to timely name the Doe Defendants. Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ third cause of
action fails because the County cannot be found to be vicariously liable for
the actions of the individual LASD deputies who have been served or have not
been named in this action. (See Gov. Code § 815.2; 820(a).) “The Tort Claims Act draws a clear distinction
between the liability of a public entity based on its own conduct, and the
liability arising from the conduct of a public employee.” (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127.) Although a public entity may be held vicariously
liable under Gov. Code, § 815.2, “the Act contains no
provision similarly providing that a public entity generally is liable
for its own conduct or omission to the same extent as a private person or entity.
Rather, the Act provides that a public entity is not liable for an injury
‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute....’ (Gov. Code § 815.)” (Id.
at p. 1127 [italics original].) Here, Plaintiff also failed to name a statute
that imposes direct liability on the County for the tort of IIED.
Therefore, summary adjudication is granted as to the third cause
of action.
As Plaintiffs have failed to articulate a statute under which
Defendant County can be held liable, Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails as a matter of
law and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Conclusion
Defendant County’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted.