Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 22STCV15202, Date: 2024-01-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV15202 Hearing Date: January 18, 2024 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: Thursday, January 18, 2024
CASE NUMBER: 22STCV15202
CASE NAME: David Gibson, Executor for and on Behalf off, The Estate of William
Henry Braun, Jr.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Mary Kay Barnhill
OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff David Gibson, Executor
for and on behalf of The Estate of William Henry Braun Jr.
TRIAL DATE: Not Set
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
PROCEEDING: Demurrer to First Amended
Complaint
OPPOSITION: 26 December 2023
REPLY: 28
December 2023
TENTATIVE: The demurrer is sustained without leave to
amend only as to Defendant Robert Barnhill, Defendant Estate of Robert Barnhill
and Defendant Estate of Stratton Clarence Lindenmeyer. Defendant Mary Kay Barnhill to give notice.
Background
On May 6, 2022, David
Gibson, as executor for and on behalf of the Estate of William Henry Braun, Jr.
(“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Robert Barnhill; Estate of Robert
Barnhill;
Mary Kay Barnhill;
Steven Barnhill; Estate of Stratton Clarence Lindenmeyer; Stephen
Rumph; Melinda Rumph;
American Contractors Indemnity Company; Clarice
Rambo Gibson; and
Does 1 to 110.
The operative First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed December 23, 2022, alleges eleven causes of
action: (1) Negligence; (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (3) Constructive Fraud;
(4) Unjust Enrichment and Imposition of Constructive Trust; (5) Conversion; (6)
Conspiracy to Commit Conversion; (7) Aiding and Abetting Conversion; (8)
Accounting; (9) Quiet Title; (10) Release of Bound; and (11) Waste.
On January 10, 2023,
Steven Barnhill was dismissed as a Defendant. On April 11, 2023, American
Contractors Indemnity Company was also dismissed as a Defendant.
On August 14, 2023,
Steven Rumph filed a Cross-Complaint against David Gibson as Executor of the
State of Willaim Henry Braun, Jr. and Robert Barnhill, et al. for Breach of
Contract, Common Counts, and Fraud.
On December 20, 2023,
Defendant Mary Kay Barnhill filed a Demurrer to the FAC. Plaintiff opposes the
Motion. The matter is now before the court.
request
for JUDICIAL notice
The Court may
take judicial notice of records of any court of record of the United States.
(Evid. Code, § 452(d)(2).) However, the court may only judicially notice the
existence of the record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky v.
Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.)
Defendant Mary Kay
Barhill requests judicial notice of the following:
1)
Minute Order from the Probate Court
attached hereto as Exhibit A showing that Plaintiff was appointed Executor of
William Henry Braun Jr. on May 20, 2022
2)
Letters Testamentary issued to
Plaintiff on July 6, 2022, attached hereinto as Exhibit B.
Defendant Mary Kay Barnhill’s
request for judicial notice is granted.
I. Legal Standard
Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect
by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A
demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer
must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.¿
(CCP, § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In
evaluating a demurrer, the court accepts the complainant’s properly pled facts
as true and ignores contentions, deductions, and conclusory statements. (Daar
v. Yellow Cab Co. (1976) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713; Serrano v. Priest (1971)
5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Moreover, the court does not consider whether a plaintiff
will be able to prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such
proof. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d
590, 604.)
Leave to amend must be allowed
where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to
show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)
II. Demurrer[1]
Defendant Mary Kay Barnhill (“Mary”)
demurrers to the FAC on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to comply with the creditor’s
claim procedures of Probate Code § 9000 et seq. and that the FAC is time
barred by CCP § 366.2.
A.
Claims
Against Deceased Persons Must Comply with the Mandatory Creditor’s Claims Procedures
Claims against deceased persons must
comply with the mandatory creditor’s claim procedures. (Prob. Code §§ 9000, et seq.) The court agrees with Defendant Mary that the
underlying lawsuit on the face of the FAC is a “claim” because it “is
predicated on monetary damages for tort claims against Decedents for actions
prior to death. (FAC ¶ 2.)” (Demurrer, 6.)
Here, the FAC lacks allegations
of compliance with the requisite statute for Robert Barnhill or Stratton
Clarence Lindenmeyer. The demurrer is
sustained on this basis as to Defendants Robert Barnhill, the Estate of
Robert Barnhill and the Estate of Stratton Clarence Lindenmeyer.
B. Plaintiff’s
Claims are Time-Barred against the Deceased Defendants
Defendant Robert Barnhill died on May 10,
2021. (FAC ¶ 2.) Defendant Stratton Clarence Lindenmeyer died in 2017. All
other Defendants are presumed to be alive.
CCP § 366.2 provides in relevant part:
If
a person against whom an action may be brought on a liability of the person,
whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether accrued or not
accrued, dies before the expiration of the applicable limitations period, and
the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced within one year after
the date of death, and the limitations period that would have been applicable
does not apply.
(CCP § 366.2(a).)
Plaintiff does not dispute that the statute
of limitations in section 366.2 applies but instead asserts that the action was
timely filed because Robert Barnhill died on May 10, 2021, and this action was
filed on May 6, 2022.
Defendant Mary, however, presents
evidence that Plaintiff was not appointed Executor of the Estate until May 20,
2022. (RJN Ex. A.)
“’A probate or trust estate is not a
legal entity; it is simply a collection of assets and liabilities. As such, it
has no capacity to sue or be sued, or to defend an action. Any litigation must be maintained by, or against, the
executor [or personal representative] of the estate.’ [Citation.] It is the
personal representative of a probate estate that may ‘[c]ommence and maintain
actions and proceedings for the benefit of the estate.’ (Prob.Code, § 9820
subd. (a).)” (Smith v. Cimmet (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1390–1391
[internal quotations omitted].)
The court agrees that when the Complaint
was originally filed, Plaintiff did not have the legal capacity to commence
this action until the Probate Court appointed him as Executor of the Estate of William Henry Braun, Jr. (RJN
Ex. A, B.)
Accordingly, pursuant to Prob. Code § 366.2(a),
Plaintiff’s claims against the deceased Defendants are time-barred. Plaintiff
also fails to show that the statute of limitations against the deceased
Defendants is tolled for reasons permitted under section 366.2(b). The court,
therefore, sustains the demurrer without leave to amend as to Defendants Estate
of Robert Barnhill and Estate of Stratton Clarence Lindenmeyer.
After Plaintiff was appointed Executor of
the Estate of William Henry Braun, Jr., Plaintiff filed the operative FAC on
December 23, 2022. An
amended pleading supersedes the original pleading, which ceases to perform any
function as a pleading. (See People ex rel. Strathmann v.
Acacia Research Corp. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 487, 506; LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 862, 875, fn. 5.)
Defendant Mary has not brought the demurrer
to the FAC on her own behalf. The action
may continue against Defendant Mary and all other Defendants who are not
deceased. However, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to
Defendant Robert Barnhill, Defendant Estate of Robert Barnhill, and Defendant Estate
of Stratton Clarence Lindenmeyer.
Conclusion
The demurrer is sustained without
leave to amend only as to Defendant Robert Barnhill, Defendant Estate of Robert
Barnhill and Defendant Estate of Stratton Clarence Lindenmeyer.
Defendant Mary Kay Barnhill to
give notice.
[1]
Pursuant to CCP § 430.41,
the meet and confer requirement has been met. Although
no meet and confer declaration has been filed, the meet and confer requirement
has been met. (See Mot. Ex. E.)