Judge Gail Killefer, Case Number: 22STCV22994, Date: 2024-09-17 Tentative Ruling

This action stems from a claim for childhood sexual assault. On July 14, 2022, Mary Bolden (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Doe 1 with four causes of action:

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The matter is now before the court.

motion for judgment on the pleadings[1]

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064.) “In deciding or reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, all properly pleaded material facts are deemed to be true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged.” (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.) When considering demurrers and judgment on the pleadings, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 720-21.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action. (Id.) “In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action.” (Gami v. Mullikin Medical Ctr. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 870, 876.) A non-statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made any time before or during trial. (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.)¿¿

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) “Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)

1) Exhibit 1: Notice of Entry of Order in Jane Doe #1, et al. v. Acalanes Union High School District, et al., Contra Costa County Superior Court, Case No. C22-02613, regarding the sustaining of defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend on June 13, 2023.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice of Exhibit 1 is denied. Defendant LAUSD seeks judicial notice of a trial court ruling in another case which is unpublished with no precedential value in this court. The opinion is submitted not as evidence but is cited as precedent. Such a citation is beyond the scope of judicial notice and is legally improper. (Budrow v. Dave & Buster’s of California, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 875, 884-885.)

Plaintiff similarly requests judicial notice of several minute orders and trial court orders that are submitted not as evidence but as precedent. As stated above, this is legally improper, and the court denies Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits 2 to 17.

Exhibit 18 is “Assembly floor analysis AB 218 dated August 30, 2019.” The court may take judicial notice of an assembly bill. (K.M. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 717, 740.) Exhibit 19 is the appellate opinion by the First Appellate District, Division Five, in West Contra Costa Unified School District v. The Superior Court of Contra Costa County (Appellate Case No. A169314). The court may similarly take judicial notice of Exhibit 19 because it is an official court order.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is denied as to Exhibits 1 to 17 and granted as to Exhibits 18 and 19.

Defendant LAUSD requests judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Assembly Bill 218’s (“AB 218”) retroactive elimination of the government claims requirement constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds prohibited by Article XVI, § 6 of the California Constitution.

Under the Government Tort Claims Act, no person may sue a public entity or public employee for money or damages unless a timely written claim has been presented to and acted on or deemed rejected by the public entity. (Gov. Code, §§ 905, 912.4, 945.4.) Gov. Code § 905(m) exempts “[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse.” (Gov. Code, § 904(m); see also A.M. v. Ventura Unified School Dist. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1254–1255 (A.M.).)¿¿ Furthermore, Gov. Code § 905(p) explicitly states:

The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.

AB 218, as codified in CCP § 340.1, abolished the statute of limitation for childhood sexual assault claims, and subdivisions (m) and (p) of Gov. Code § 905 expressly exclude such claims from the claim presentation requirement and retroactively revives such claims. Because AB 218 revives childhood sexual assault claims that would otherwise have lapsed, Defendant LAUSD asserts Plaintiff’s entire action is barred because it violates the gift clause of the California Constitution.

Defendant LAUSD fails to address the recent decision in West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1243 [323 Cal.Rptr.3d 904, 913], in which the Court of Appeal found that AB 218 did not violate the gift clause of the California constitution.

As we explain, waiver of the claim presentation requirement did not constitute an expenditure of public funds that may be considered a “gift” because AB 218 did not create new “substantive liability” [citation] for the underlying alleged wrongful conduct. Instead, AB 218 simply waived a condition the state had imposed on its consent to suit. [Citations.]

The West Contra Costa Court found that AB 218’s retroactive elimination of the government claims requirement is not unconstitutional because a gift of public funds is not unconstitutional if it is used for a public rather than a private purpose. “’The benefit to the state from an expenditure for a ‘public purpose’ is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited there from.’ ’ ” (West Contra Costa, at p. 912 [internal citations omitted].) “Even if we had ruled that AB 218 authorizes expenditures within the scope of the gift clause, the expenditures are not “gifts” because they serve a public purpose.” (Id., at p. 919.)

Therefore, LAUSD’s claim that AB 218 is unconstitutional because it violates the gift clause is without merit. Moreover, the decision of the appellate court is binding on this court. (Cuccia v. Superior Court (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 347, 353–354; Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Consequently, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

[1] CCP § 439 requires the moving party to meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The meet and confer requirement has been met. (Ochoa Decl., ¶ 4.)