Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 22STCV24299, Date: 2023-05-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV24299    Hearing Date: May 17, 2023    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 May 17, 2023   

CASE NUMBER:                   22STCV24299

CASE NAME:                        CNP 56, LP, et al. v. Ivett Rodriguez, et al. 

TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set.

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

                                                                                                                                                           

MOTION:                               Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication  

MOVING PARTY:                 Plaintiff CNP 56, LP, formerly known as CNP 56, LLC. 

OPPOSING PARTIES:          Defendants, Ivett Rodriguez, Diane Taylor, and all Persons unknown claiming legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the Property

OPPOSITION:                        None filed as of May 15, 2022

REPLY:                                  No Opposition filed.

                                                                                                                                                           

TENTATIVE:                         Plaintiff’s motion is granted. Plaintiff is to give notice and prepare a proposed judgment.  An OSC re Proposed Judgment is set for June 2, 2023, at 8:30 a.m.

                                                                                                                                                           

Background

This is an action for quiet title arising in connection with property located at 854 E. 32nd Street, Los Angeles, California 90011 (the “Property”).  Plaintiff CNP 56, LP, fka CNP 56, LLC (“CNP”) alleges that Diana Taylor (“Taylor”), Ivett Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) and all other unknown persons claim an interest in the Property (collectively “Defendants”). According to the Complaint, CNP acquired title to the Property pursuant to a Grant Deed dated July 18, 2018, and recorded July 31, 2018. However, according to the Complaint, Taylor signed a Quitclaim Deed dated February 2, 2021, purporting to convey the Property from “Community Property” to herself. Further, Taylor asserted further ownership in the Property by signing a Quitclaim Deed dated June 23, 2021, purportedly conveying the Property from “Diane Taylor of Chp 56” to Rodriguez. Taylor and Rodriguez recorded the Quitclaim Deed on August 19, 2021. CNP alleges Defendants have refused to vacate the Property, even though they do not have legal title to the Property.  

 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the sole cause of action for quiet title.  Default was entered against Defendants Rodriguez and Taylor on September 16, 2022.

 

On December 30, 2022, CNP filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. No opposition has been filed. 

 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

CNP moves for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication as follows:

 

1.     Plaintiff is entitled to summary adjudication as to the Complaint’s only cause of action for quiet title.

 

Request for Judicial Notice

 

CNP requests judicial notice of the following in support of its motion:

 

1.     Exhibit A: Certificates of Status and Certificate of Conversion for CNP.

2.     Exhibit B: Grant Deed for Property to CNP dated July 18, 2018.

3.     Exhibit D: Tax Receipts for payment of Property taxes for Property.

4.     Exhibit F: Quitclaim Deed, 8/19/21, Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office Instr. No. 2021126844, transf. APN 5120-027-014 from “Diane Taylor of Chp 56” to Ivett Rodriguez.

5.     Exhibit G: Notice of Lis Pendens regarding the Property.

6.     Exhibit H: Notice of Proposed Action regarding the Property.

7.     Exhibit I: Defendants’ Answer in Unlawful Detainer Action, County of Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 21STUD02642.

8.     Exhibit J: Order for Entry of Judgement, dated March 3, 2022, in the Unlawful Detainer Action.

 

CNP’s request is granted. The existence and legal significance of these documents are proper matters for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452(h).) However, the court may not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the documents.  (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)  Documents are only judicially noticeable to show their existence and what orders were made.  The truth of the facts and findings within the documents are not judicially noticeable.  (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 885.)

Discussion

 

I.                Legal Authority

 

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  CCP § 437c(a) provides:

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.  The motion may be made at any time after 60 days have elapsed since the general appearance in the action or proceeding of each party against whom the motion is directed or at any earlier time after the general appearance that the court, with or without notice and upon good cause shown, may direct….  The motion shall be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.  The filing of the motion shall not extend the time within which a party must otherwise file a responsive pleading.

A motion for summary judgment may be granted “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  (CCP § 437c(c).) 

“The motion shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken.  The supporting papers shall include a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed.  Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.  The failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may in the court’s discretion constitute a sufficient ground for denial of the motion.”  (CCP § 437c(b)(1); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(c)(2) & (d).) 

In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294 (Hinesley).)  CCP § 437c(p)(2) provides:

A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.  Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.  The plaintiff or cross-complainant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.

The court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party and accept all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”  (Hinesley, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 294; Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389 [Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”].)  A motion for summary judgment must be denied where the moving party’s evidence does not prove all material facts, even in the absence of any opposition (Leyva v. Sup. Ct. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 462, 475) or where the opposition is weak (Salasguevara v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, 387). 

II.             Factual Summary

 

A.    Background

 

Plaintiff acquired the Property through Grant Deed, recorded on July 31, 2018. (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) ¶ 2.) CNP acquired the Property through Probate Case No. 17STPB07453, from the Estate of Alice Motley. (UMF ¶ 4.) CNP acquired further title policy insurance during the acquisition which showed free and clear title to the Property, and CNP has continued to pay all property taxes owed for the Property since acquisition. (UMF ¶¶ 3-5.)

 

Two Quitclaim Deeds have been signed by Defendants, and the June 23, 2021 Quitclaim Deed was recorded conveying the Property from Taylor to Rodriguez. (UMF ¶¶ 6-12.) Defendants have continued to assert and misrepresent an ownership stake in the Property following CNP’s acquisition. (UMF ¶¶ 11-13.) 

 

III.           Analysis

 

A claim for quiet title should state (1) the legal description of the property and its street address or common designation, (2) the title of the plaintiff and the basis of the title, (3) the adverse claims to plaintiff’s title, (4) the date as of which the determination is sought, and (5) a prayer for determination of plaintiff against adverse claims.  (CCP § 760.020.) “Such an action is brought, as authorized by the statute, for the purpose of determining any adverse claim that may be asserted therein by a defendant to the land in controversy; and this does not mean that the court is simply to ascertain, as against a plaintiff shown to have a legal interest, whether or not such defendant has some interest, but also that the court shall declare and define the interest held by the defendant, if any, so that the plaintiff may have a decree finally adjudicating the extent of his own interest in the property in controversy.”  (Lechuza Villas West v. California Coastal Com’n (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 218, 242.)“The object of the action is to finally settle and determine, as between the parties, all conflicting claims to the property in controversy, and to decree to each such interest or estate therein as he may be entitled to.” (Id.)  “Of course, if the plaintiff fails to show any legal interest in the property in controversy, and as to which he asserts title, he must fail altogether, and could not complain of a judgment of nonsuit, but where he shows any legal interest, he is entitled to have that interest declared by the court.” (Id.)

 

California courts have recognized that “[t]he existence of an ‘actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties,’ suffices to maintain an action for declaratory relief.”¿ (Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.¿(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 605 (Ludgate).)¿ “Any person interested under a written instrument, ... or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property,¿ ... may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court ... for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract."¿ (Ibid., quoting CCP § 1060.)¿¿¿ 

 

The elements of a bona fide purchaser are “payment of value, in good faith, and without actual or constructive notice of another’s rights.” (Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1251.) “ ‘[A] bona fide purchaser for value who acquires his interest in real property without notice of another’s asserted rights in the property takes the property free of such unknown rights.’ ” (Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pyle (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 513, 521.) Actual notice is “express information of a fact.” (612 South LLC v. Laconic Limited Partnership (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1278 (citing Civil Code § 18). Conversely, constructive notice is a “legal fiction.” (First Bank v. East West Bank (First Bank) (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1314-15.) “To have constructive notice, a person must have notice or knowledge of the circumstances, ‘which, upon reasonable inquiry, would lead to that particular fact.’ ” (612 South LLC, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at 1278.) “The act of recording creates a conclusive presumption that a subsequent purchaser has constructive notice of the contents of the previously recorded document.” (Ibid.) The recording prescribed by law requires the instrument to be indexed for the obvious reason that “a subsequent purchaser should be charged only with notice of those documents which are locatable by a search of the proper indexes.” (Lewis v. Superior Court (Lewis) (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1867; see also Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson (1995) 12 Cal.4th 345, 355 (noting that “[r]ecording consists of copying the instrument in the record book and indexing it under the names of the parties”).

 

Here, CNP asserts summary judgment is merited as to the lone cause of action, as the Complaint specifically identifies the Property at issue by street address and legal description, specified the title of which determination is sought, has described the adverse claims of Defendants to the title of Plaintiff, and has sought to quiet title as of the date of the filing of this Complaint, July 27, 2022. (Motion, 5-6.)

 

CNP further contends it has established “lawful title to the Property by and through its duly recorded and valid Grant Deed, which was recorded in 2018” and that at the time “Plaintiff acquired the Property, neither Defendants nor any other parties claimed an ownership interest in the Property.” (Motion, 6. RJN Exh. B.)

 

Further, CNP correctly contends “Plaintiff’s clearly superior paper title alone demonstrates that it is entitled to a presumption of ownership. Moreover, that presumption cannot be overcome because all other evidence also supports Plaintiff’s ownership claim”—referencing CNP’s continued payments of all owed and due property taxes, an embrace of the responsibilities as part of the ownership right to the Property. (Motion, 6-7.)

 

A deed that has not been delivered or accepted is void and completely ineffective to transfer title. (See Civil Code §1054; Green v. Skinner (1921) 185 Cal. 435, 439-440; Rothney v. Rothney (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d. 566, 570[“Delivery is a question of fact which is to be determined from the circumstances surrounding the particular transaction.”]) “The delivery and acceptance are of necessity simultaneous and correlative acts. The law does not force a man to take title to real property against his will.” (Reina v. Erassarret (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d. 418, 426.) Acceptance by the grantee requires that the grantee have an intention to take legal title to the property, manifested by his or her conduct or declaration. (Henneberry v. Henneberry (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 125, 129.)

Viewing the evidence submitted in the light most favorable to Defendants, the court finds that no triable issues exist regarding CNP’s claims.

 

The court finds CNP has established no triable issues exist as to: (1) the description and identification of the property at issue; (2) that Plaintiff clearly and plainly acquired title to the Property free and clear of other title rights; (3) that the adverse claims of ownership by Defendants are without proof or evidentiary inference in their favor, given the clear lack of ownership stake for the conveying Defendants; (4) that determination of these claims is now sought with the filing of this Complaint; and (5) a prayer for determination has been made of this court. There is a clear lack of triable issues of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s ownership of the Property, especially given Plaintiff’s acquisition through probate proceedings from the Estate of Alice Motley. This is made even more resolute by the lack of Defendant’s opposition and no attempt to dispute any of the contended facts.

 

The court therefore finds summary adjudication and/or judgment is merited as to the lone cause of action.

 

For these reasons, CNP’s motion is granted.

 

Conclusion

 

Plaintiff’s motion is granted. Plaintiff is to give notice, and prepare a proposed judgment.