Judge Gail Killefer, Case 22STCV28958 2023-02-23 Tentative Ruling

MOTION: Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint; Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint

TENTATIVE: Defendant’s demurrer is sustained. Defendant’s motion is granted. Plaintiff is granted 30 days leave to amend. Defendant is to give notice.

This action arises in connection with the residency of Madison Banach (“Plaintiff”) at 615 S. Catalina Ave., #122, Redondo Beach, California (the “Property”). Plaintiff alleges that she leased Unit 122 (“Rental Unit”) of the Property in July 2021 and continues to reside at the Rental Unit. During her residency, Plaintiff tendered approximately $ $3,152.00 every month in rent to Defendants Redondo Owner LLC (“Redondo”) and Greystar Management Services, LP (“Greystar”). According to Plaintiff, she began noticing several conditions in the Rental Unit during her residency, including leaking roofs, visible mold and mildew, defective plumbing, and sewage leaks. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered injury to her physical and mental health as a result of the defective conditions.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the warranty of habitability, (3) nuisance, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (5) negligence.

Defendant Redondo now demurs to the Complaint’s fourth cause of action. Defendant Redondo also moves to strike portions of the Complaint. Plaintiff opposes both motions.

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . .” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (CCP § 452; see also Stevens v. Sup. Ct. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “When a court evaluates a complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable inferences from the facts pled.” (Duval v. Board of Trustees (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 902, 906.)

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) “[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3, citing Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) In addition, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, courts strictly construe a demurrer for uncertainty “because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) “Generally it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

The elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (Christensen).)

Under California law, for conduct to be “outrageous” it must be “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (See Ess v. Eskaton Props., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 130.) Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.)

Defendant contends that the fourth cause of action is insufficiently pled because the Complaint fails to allege that Defendants engaged in outrageous conduct. (Demurrer, 4-6.) “Inaction by itself does not equate to IIED... there is no allegation that the tenancy conditions were purposely created for the purpose of inflicting emotional distress.” (Dem., 5.) Additionally, Defendant asserts that the fourth cause of action is insufficiently pled because it seemingly relies on the “inaction” of Defendants, rather than pleading allegations “that show Defendant acted with intention.” (Dem., 5-6.)

In opposition, Plaintiff alleges that the Complaint sufficiently pleads that Defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct. (Opposition, 2-4.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “ignored” the conditions Plaintiff raised and their conduct “shows reckless disregard for health and safety which in turn caused Plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional distress and therefore supports a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress” since it constitutes outrageous conduct sufficient to support an IIED claim. (Id.) Plaintiff cites to cases, including Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903 (Stoiber) for this argument.

In Stoiber, the Court of Appeal noted that “[b]ehavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.” [citation omitted] (Id. at 921.) Plaintiff alleged that she suffered “extreme emotional distress” as a result of Defendants’ “knowing, intentional and willful” failure to correct defective conditions on the leased premises. (Id.) However, the Court of Appeal did not reach a conclusion as to whether Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim for IIED, noting only that “it cannot be said as a matter of law that appellant has not stated a cause of action.” (Id. at 922.)

Here, the Complaint alleges after Plaintiff began noticing the conditions in the Rental Unit, she “continued to notify defendants of her suffering, but defendants did nothing to help plaintiffs. [sic]” (Complaint ¶ 12.) Further, Defendants were “repeatedly notified” of the conditions and “did not properly fix them.” (Complaint ¶13.) Subsequently, “the defendants have completely failed in their duty as a landlord to maintain the SUBJECT PROPERTY and have allowed slum living conditions to persist which spread infection, sickness and disease.” (Complaint ¶ 47.) The Complaint further alleges “[t]he defendants' conduct was, reckless, and or intentional and malicious, and done for the purpose of causing plaintiffs [sic] to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress.” (Complaint ¶ 48.)

Liberally construing the allegations of the FAC in favor of Plaintiff, the court finds the fourth cause of action insufficiently pled. Specifically, the fourth cause of action alleges that Plaintiff repeatedly and specifically notified Defendants of her issues with the Rental Unit and that Defendants responded in a delayed fashion through means which did not resolve the issue. The fourth cause of action also alleges that Plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a result of Defendants’ delayed and insufficient response. Pursuant to Stoiber, this would be sufficient to state a claim for IIED for purposes of demurrer. However, Plaintiff fails to plead specific allegations regarding what the “substandard living conditions” of the Rental Unit included, beyond conclusory and ambiguous clauses which do not provide factual allegations regarding the conditions themselves. Further, while Plaintiff claims she suffered emotional distress, the Complaint only provides as support statements to that effect, without further factual allegations to define the emotional distress caused to Plaintiff.

Defendant’s demurrer is sustained. Plaintiff is granted 30 days leave to amend. Defendant is to give notice.

Pursuant to CCP § 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (CCP § 437.)

Motions to strike are used to challenge defects in the pleadings not subject to demurrer. (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 529 [recognizing that an objection that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is ground for a general demurrer, not a motion to strike.].) Any party may move to strike the whole or any part of a pleading within the time allotted to respond to the pleading. (CCP § 435(b)(1).) The allegations of a complaint “must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (CCP § 452.) The court “read[s] allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume[s] their truth.” (Clauson v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

Defendant first contends paragraph 8 of the Complaint should be stricken as “RACQUEL” is not a party to this action, and is not known to the Defendant or identified as a defendant by Plaintiff. Plaintiff, in her opposition, does not oppose this request. (Opp., 3-5.) The court therefore grants Request no. 1.

Defendant also contends that the Complaint’s request for punitive damages must be stricken because the Complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating that Defendants acted with malice, oppression or fraud. (Motion, 4-6.) According to Defendants, the Complaint’s allegations amount to allegations of landlord negligence and are insufficient to equate to malicious, oppressive or fraudulent conduct sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages, as they fail to show “Defendant’s officer, director or any managing agents had advance knowledge of any acts of malice, oppression, or fraud, let alone showed a conscious disregard of them.” (Id.)

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that the Complaint sufficiently supports a request for punitive damages because the Complaint alleges that Defendants responded insufficiently to Plaintiff’s repeated complaints of ongoing habitability issues in the Rental Unit and of the fact that such conditions were causing her extreme distress. (Opposition, 3-5.)

As discussed above, the court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint insufficiently states a claim for IIED. The court therefore finds that the Complaint’s requests for punitive damages is insufficiently pled such that they must be stricken. The court therefore grants Request no. 2.

Defendant also contends the Complaint’s request for attorney fees must be stricken since it is improper pursuant to the Lease Agreement signed between the parties, and incorporated as Exhibit to the Complaint. (Motion, 6-7.) Defendant argues provisions of the Lease Agreement limit attorney fees to “an amount of no more than $1200,” and that Plaintiff’s other claims do not provide for attorney fees by statute as necessary pursuant to CCP § 1021. (Id.)

“The prevailing party may recover from a non-prevailing party attorney's fees and any costs of litigation in an amount of no more than $1200.” (Complaint, Exh. A., 6.)

Pursuant to the relevant language of the Lease Agreement, the court also finds the Complaint’s request for attorney fees in an unlimited amount to be improper and grants Request no. 3.

Defendant’s motion is granted. Plaintiff is granted 30 days leave to amend as to punitive damages only. Defendant is to give notice.

[1] Defendant submits the declaration of their counsel, Jamie Shepherd (“Shepherd”), to demonstrate compliance with statutory meet and confer requirements. Shepherd attests that on January 10, 2023, counsel sent a correspondence through email to Plaintiff’s counsel to meet and confer about the issues raised in this demurrer, and that “[a]fter a brief exchange, no agreement was reached.” (Shepherd Decl. ¶ 3.) The Shepherd Declaration is sufficient for purposes of CCP §§ 430.41 and 435.5.