Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 22STCV30655, Date: 2023-02-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV30655 Hearing Date: February 23, 2023 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: February 23, 2023
CASE NUMBER: 22STCV30655
CASE NAME: Isador Martin, et al. v. Nusret BH LLC, et al.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Nusret BH LLC, dba
Nusr-Et Steakhouse Beverly Hills
OPPOSING PARTIES: Plaintiffs, Isador Martin, Khadijah
Betts, Ryan Casper, Viridiana Mendez, Cynthia Mercado, Daniel Miranda,
Christopher Olivera, Marina Ortiz, Melissa Preciado, Lily Reynaldo, Nekay
Sandoval, and Gerardo Gutierrez Valenzuela
TRIAL DATE: Not Set.
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
MOTION: Defendant’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration and for a Stay of Proceedings
OPPOSITION: February 8, 2023
REPLY: February
15, 2023
TENTATIVE: Defendant’s motion to
compel arbitration is granted. Defendant is to give notice.
This action arises out of the employment of Plaintiffs Isador
Martin, Khadijah Betts, Ryan Casper, Viridiana Mendez, Cynthia Mercado, Daniel
Miranda, Christopher Olivera, Marina Ortiz, Melissa Preciado, Lily Reynaldo,
Nekay Sandoval, and Gerardo Gutierrez Valenzuela (“Plaintiffs”) in various
positions with Defendants Nusret BH LLC, dba Nusr-Et Steakhouse Beverly Hills,
its parent entity Nusret US, Inc., and individual defendant, owner and
operator, Nusret Gokce (“Defendants”). Plaintiffs allege they were hired by
Defendants in or around 2021 and worked for Defendants for various lengths of
time. Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated wage and hour laws in failing to
pay overtime wages, provide meal and rest breaks, provide accurate wage
statements, and reimburse business expenses, among other violations.
Plaintiffs’ operative Complaint alleges the following causes
of action: (1) failure to pay wages and overtime in violation of Labor Code §§ 1194,
1197, (2) failure to provide meal breaks in violation of Labor Code § 226.7, (3)
failure to provide rest breaks in violation of Labor Code § 226.7, (4) failure
to reimburse business expenses in violation of Labor Code § 2802, (5) failure
to furnish accurate wage statements in violation of Labor Code § 226, (6) waiting
time penalties under Labor Code § 203—all Plaintiffs except Cynthia Mercado,
(7) conversion, and (8) unfair business practices.
Defendant now moves to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs oppose
the motion.
Plaintiffs’ Objections to Defendant’s Evidence
Overruled: 1
“California law reflects a strong public policy in favor of
arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for resolving
disputes. To further that policy, Code
of Civil Procedure, section 1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written
arbitration agreement unless one of three limited exceptions applies. Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a
party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the
arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates
the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal issues.” (CCP § 1281.2; Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th
959, 967.)
Similarly, public policy under federal law favors
arbitration and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of
contract and that courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing
with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.)
In deciding a motion or petition to compel arbitration,
trial courts must first decide whether an enforceable arbitration agreement
exists between the parties and then determine whether the claims are covered
within the scope of the agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th
955, 961.) The opposing party has the
burden to establish any defense to enforcement.
(Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.
(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 579 [“The petitioner ... bears the burden of
proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and the opposing party,
plaintiffs here, bears the burden of proving any fact necessary to its
defense.”].)
A motion to compel arbitration or stay proceedings must
state verbatim the provisions providing for arbitration or must have a copy of
them attached. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1330.)
A party may demonstrate express acceptance of the
arbitration agreement in order to be bound (e.g., Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. (9th Cir. 1992) 956 F.2d 932
[agreement to arbitrate included in job application]; Nghiem v. NEC Electronic, Inc. (9th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1437
[agreement to arbitrate included in handbook executed by employee]; Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps (1999) 74 Cal. App. 4th 1105 [88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664] [employer may
terminate employee who refuses to sign agreement to arbitrate]) or
implied-in-fact in fact acceptance (Asmus
v. Pacific Bell (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 1, 11 [96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 999 P.2d
71] [implied acceptance of changed rules regarding job security]; DiGiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp.
(1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 629, 635 [69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 300] [implied acceptance of
changed compensation rules]). (Craig v. Brown & Root (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 416, 420 (Craig).)
“A signed agreement is not necessary, however, and a party’s
acceptance [of an agreement to arbitrate] may be implied in fact….” (Pinnacle
Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Market Dev. (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223,
23 (Pinnacle), cited in Pet. Mem.
6.) “An arbitration clause within a
contract may be binding on a party even if the party never actually read the
clause.” (Ibid.) “The content of a writing may be proved by otherwise
admissible secondary evidence,” except when “a genuine dispute exists
concerning material terms of the writing,” or admitting the secondary evidence
“would be unfair.” (Evidence Code § 1521, subd. (a).) A party seeking to
introduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of a lost writing must
demonstrate that “ “a bona fide and diligent search has been unsuccessfully
made for it”” (Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002)
28 Cal.4th 1059, 1068, quoting Folsom Executors v. Scott (1856) 6
Cal.4th 460, 461.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs must be compelled to
arbitrate because Plaintiffs executed arbitration agreements as they began
their employment agreeing to arbitrate all disputes they had with Defendants.
(Motion, 2-3.)
Each Plaintiff signed a document in 2021 titled “Mutual
Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” (“Agreement”)(Avci Decl., ¶12, Exh. B). The
Arbitration Agreement provides as follows:
“...This Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate
Claims (the "Agreement") is made and entered into as of the date it
is fully executed by and between Nusret BH, LLC (the "Employer" or
"Nusret") and the individual employee whose name and signature
appears below (the "Employee"). The Employer and Employee are
referred to collectively as the "Parties." The Federal Arbitration
Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) applies to this Agreement. If for any reason the
Federal Arbitration Act does not apply, this Arbitration Provision shall be
governed in accordance with the provisions of the California Arbitration Act.
(California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1280 et seq., including the provisions
of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1283.05). ALL DISPUTES COVERED BY
THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE DECIDED BY A SINGLE ARBITRATOR THROUGH FINAL AND BINDING
ARBITRATION AND NOT BY WAY OF COURT OR JURY TRIAL.
1. CLAIMS
COVERED BY THIS AGREEMENT. This Agreement is intended to be as broad as
legally permissible, and, except as it otherwise provides, applies to all
claims or controversies, past, present, or future, that otherwise would be
resolved in a court of law or before a forum other than arbitration, including
without limitation, claims or disputes arising out of or related to the
application and selection for employment, employment relationship, and
termination of the employment relationship. Except as it otherwise provides,
this Agreement applies to any claims or disputes that the Company may have
against You or that You may have against any of the following (1) the Company;
(2) its officers, directors, employees, or agents in their capacity as such or
otherwise; (3)the Company's parent, subsidiary, and affiliated entities and
their officers, directors, employees, or agents in their capacity as such or
otherwise, (4) the Company's benefit plans or the plans' sponsors, fiduciaries,
administrators, affiliates and agents, and/or (5) all successors and assigns of
any of them.
Except as it otherwise provides, this Agreement applies,
without limitation, to claims based upon or related to discrimination,
harassment, retaliation, defamation (including post-employment defamation or
retaliation), breach of a contract or covenant, fraud, negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, wages, misclassification, minimum wage and overtime or other
compensation or any monies claimed to be owed, meal breaks and rest periods,
termination, whistleblowing, tort claims, common law claims, statutory claims,
equitable claims, and claims arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Americans With Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, Fair Labor
Standards Act, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (except for claims for
employee benefits under any benefit plan sponsored by the Company and covered
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974), Affordable Care Act,
Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act, Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act,
Older Workers Benefits Protection Act of 1990, Occupational Safety and Health
Act, Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Fair Credit
Reporting Act, False Claims Act, Equal Pay Act, and any other state or local
statutes or regulations addressing the same or similar subject matters, and all
other federal, state, or local legal claims arising out of or relating to Your
application, selection, employment, or the termination of employment (including
without limitation torts and post-employment defamation or retaliation).
Except as it otherwise provides, this Agreement applies to
any dispute, past, present, or future arising out of and/or related to the
above, including claims that arose before the Parties executed this Agreement.
However, this Agreement does not apply to litigation between Employee and
Employer pending in a state or federal court or arbitration as of the date of your
receipt of this Agreement including any class and/or collective action, for
which you are already a member or potential member of the class or collective
action. The Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency,
shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the validity,
applicability, enforceability, unconscionability, or waiver of this Agreement.
However, the preceding sentence does not apply to the "Class Action
Waiver" below. Notwithstanding anything else in this Agreement or the AAA
Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (discussed below), any
dispute relating to the validity, applicability, enforceability,
unconscionability or waiver of the Class Action Waiver may only be determined
by a court and not an arbitrator. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent or excuse Employee from using the Employer's existing
internal procedures for resolution of complaints, and this Agreement is not
intended to be a substitute for using such procedures.
...
3. ARBITRATION PROCEDURES.
The arbitration will be administered by the American Arbitration Association
(the "AAA"), pursuant to its Employment Arbitration Rules and
Mediation Procedures (the "AAA Rules") applicable at the time the arbitration
is commenced, including the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of
Protection, with judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator to be entered
in any court having jurisdiction thereof. If the AAA Rules are inconsistent
with the terms of this Agreement, the terms of this Agreement shall govern. A
copy of the AAA Rules can be found online by going to www.adr.org. Employee may
also obtain a copy of the AAA Rules by, either calling the American Arbitration
Association at (800) 778-7879 or by contacting the Human Resources Department.
...
6. SELECTION OF ARBITRATOR.
The matter shall be heard and be determined by one (1) neutral arbitrator who
must be a practicing lawyer, mutually selected by the Parties, with at least
ten (10) years of experience in employment law. In the event the Parties cannot
agree on the selection of an arbitrator, one neutral arbitrator shall be
appointed as provided in the AAA Rules. However, that arbitrator must be a
practicing attorney with at least ten (10) years of experience in employment
law or a retired state or federal judge from any jurisdiction.
7. MOTIONS. The
arbitrator shall have jurisdiction to hear and rule on prehearing disputes and
is authorized to hold prehearing conferences by telephone or in person, as the
arbitrator deems necessary. The arbitrator may allow the filing of a
dispositive motion if the arbitrator determines that the moving Party has shown
substantial cause that the motion is likely to succeed and dispose of, or
narrow, the issues in the case. The arbitrator shall have the authority to set
deadlines for filing dispositive motions, and to set briefing schedules for any
motions. The arbitrator shall have the authority to adjudicate any cause of
action, or the entire claim, pursuant to a motion for summary adjudication and
in deciding the motion, shall apply the substantive law applicable to the cause
of action. Finally, in deciding any dispositive motion, the arbitrator shall
have the authority to conduct independent legal research.
8. DISCOVERY. The AAA
Rules regarding discovery shall apply to any arbitration conducted pursuant to
this Agreement. The arbitrator shall decide all discovery disputes. Further,
the arbitrator shall have the authority to determine which discovery mechanisms
shall be utilized, but shall do so in furtherance of the Parties' intention
that, by entering into this Agreement, they will gain the benefits of a speedy
and less expensive dispute resolution procedure.
...
16. WAIVER. The Employer
may waive its right to require Employee to arbitrate a Covered Claim initiated
by Employee. However, the Parties agree that such a waiver shall not be deemed
a waiver or relinquishment by Employer to enforce its rights against Employee
in the future. Further, such waiver shall be limited to the specific Claim(s)
at issue and shall not be construed as a general waiver of the requirement to
arbitrate all other Covered Claims.
...
18. FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT.
Any arbitration conducted pursuant to this Agreement shall be governed and
enforced by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ l-16m the
"FAA").
19. FEES AND COSTS.
Employee shall be responsible for payment of AAA filing fees, provided that
fees shall not exceed the maximum amount permitted by the rules of the AAA.
Except as provided above. Employer shall be responsible for any remaining AAA
fees and expenses and shall be responsible for the arbitrator's fees and
expenses. To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, each Party shall
pay its own costs and attorney's fees, if any. However, if either Party
prevails on a statutory claim which affords the prevailing Party attorney’s
fees and costs, or if there is a written agreement providing for attorney's
fees and costs, the arbitrator may award reasonable attorney' s fees and costs
to the prevailing Party. Any dispute as to the reasonableness of any fee or
cost shall be resolved by the arbitrator. Notwithstanding the foregoing, to the
extent permitted by applicable law. Employee agrees that if Employee files a
court action concerning a Covered Claim, or refuses to arbitrate a Covered
Claim, the Employer shall be entitled to recover its costs including any
applicable AAA costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing the
arbitration provisions of this Agreement.
...
25. VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT.
BY EXECUTING THIS AGREEMENT, EMPLOYEE REPRESENTS THAT EMPLOYEE UNDERSTANDS THIS
AGREEMENT AND FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED INTO IT AFTER BEING PROVIDED AN
ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITYTO FULLY REVIEW AND COMPREHEND IT AND SEEK THE ADVICE OF
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, WHICH THE EMPLOYEE HAS DONE TO THE EXTENT DESIRED.
...
27. CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
WAIVER. This Agreement affects your ability to participate in class or
collective actions. Both the Company and you agree to bring any dispute in
arbitration on an individual basis only, and not on a class or collective basis
on behalf of others. There will be no right or authority for any dispute to be
brought, heard or arbitrated as a class or collective action, or as a member in
any such class or collective proceeding ("Class Action Waiver").
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement or the JAMS Rules,
disputes regarding the validity, enforceability or breach of the Class Action
Waiver may be resolved only by a civil court of competent jurisdiction and not
by an arbitrator. In any case in which (1) the dispute is filed as a class or
collective action and (2) a civil court of competent jurisdiction finds all or
part of the Class Action Waiver unenforceable, the class or collective action
to that extent must be litigated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction,
but the portion of the Class Action Waiver that is enforceable shall be
enforced in arbitration. You will not be retaliated against, disciplined or
threatened with discipline as a result of your filing of or participation in a
class or collective action in any forum. However, the Company may lawfully seek
enforcement of this Agreement and the Class Action Waiver under the Federal
Arbitration Act and seek dismissal of such class or collective actions or
claims. The Class Action Waiver shall be severable in any case in which the
dispute is filed as an individual action and severance is necessary to ensure
that the individual action proceeds in arbitration.
Private attorney general representative
actions brought on behalf of the state under the California Labor Code are not
arbitrable, not within the scope of this Agreement and may be maintained in a
court of law, but any claim on your own behalf as an aggrieved employee for
recovery of underpaid wages (as opposed to representative claims for civil
penalties) shall be arbitrable...”
(Motion, Avci Decl., Exh. B.)
The Agreement is signed by all Plaintiffs and Kristi
Thompson on behalf of Nusret BH, LLC. (Avci Decl., Exh. B.) However, an
arbitration agreement need not include both parties’ signatures to be
enforceable. (Serafin v. Balco Properties, Ltd. LLC (2015) 235
Cal.App.4th 165, 176 [existence of agreement to arbitrate can be confirmed
through evidence of the parties’ conduct.]) Thus, Defendant contends the
Agreement encompasses all of Plaintiffs’ claims, and necessarily incorporates
the Federal Arbitration Act as the parties agreed that the FAA governs the
signed Agreement. (Motion, 3-6.) Defendant further argues the Agreement
“affects commerce because Defendant’s business activities regularly and
consistently involve commerce... Here, Defendant’s operations regularly involve
the purchase and use of food, equipment, and other items and supplies from
numerous suppliers and distributors, which in turn are transported across state
lines for delivery and sale.” (Motion, 7-8.)
Further, Defendant contends that the Agreement “explicitly
delegates” authority to the arbitrator to determine the applicability and
enforceability of this Agreement. (Motion, 8-9; citing AT&T Tech. v.
Communications Workers of America, (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 649.) Thus,
Defendant contends the question of “whether the Agreement is a valid contract”
should be left to the arbitrator to determine, but even if the “Court
nevertheless does so,” the court should still find the Agreement to be a valid
contract. (Motion, 9-10.) Defendant points to the mutual assent by the parties,
and further contends Plaintiffs’ wage and hour claims “are squarely within the
scope of the Agreement, which covers all disputes with respect to Plaintiff’s [sic]
employment.” (Motion, 10-13.) Further, Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs
have “unequivocally waived any right to participate in any collective actions,”
and that the Agreement “clearly precludes Plaintiffs’ participation in any
collective action and requires arbitration of their individual claims.”
(Motion, 13-14.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs contends that arbitration must not
be compelled because a valid arbitration agreement does not exist. (Opposition,
3-7.) Plaintiffs contend they “signed opt-out letters” and that Defendant “must
now establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiffs’ opt-out
revocations are invalid.” (Opp., 5.) The court here notes Plaintiffs have
failed to attach as exhibits their opt-out letters which were purportedly
received by Defendant’s counsel. Plaintiffs further argue that under the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), “Defendant’s motion seeks to compel
arbitration based on purported electronic signatures,” but “Defendant does not
provide evidence to establish that Plaintiffs ever agreed” to execute the
Agreement “by electronic means.” (Opp., 5-6.)
In reply, Defendants contend correctly the Agreement
“explicitly informed Plaintiffs their electronic signature would have the same
legal effect of a handwritten signature” and that “Plaintiffs signed the
Arbitration Agreement” regardless. (Reply, 3-4.) The court also notes that no
authentication of an opposing party’s signature is required as a preliminary
matter in moving to compel arbitration. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc.
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846.)
Thus, the court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs have
failed to meet their burden of producing admissible evidence to challenge the
authenticity of the Agreement.
While Plaintiffs point to the UETA, their opt-out letters,
and an unsigned declaration submitted by Defendant, Defendant has remedied the
unsigned declaration by submitting a dated and signed declaration in 24 hours,
and Plaintiffs have failed to explain how their signatures could not be
enforced here, or provide opt-out letters to question the validity of the
Agreement. More importantly, Plaintiffs fail to provide admissible evidence, or
point to relevant authority, to show that the FAA does not govern these claims.
Thus, the court finds the FAA governs the Plaintiffs’ claims, given that the
nature of Defendants’ operations affects interstate commerce.
For these reasons, the court finds that an enforceable
agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties.
III.
Defenses to Arbitration
Plaintiff argues that in the event it is found that a valid
agreement to arbitrate exists, arbitration should still not be compelled
because the arbitration agreements are both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable, do not meet the Armendariz factors, and because the
Agreement does not implicate the Federal Arbitration Act. (Opposition, 3-15.)
A.
Unconscionability
Pursuant to Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114 both procedural and substantive
unconscionability must be present in order for a court to exercise its
discretion to refuse to enforce a valid arbitration agreement.
Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement violates the
Armendariz factors as it is an adhesion contract, requires
confidentiality, purportedly restricts recoverable fees and costs, requires
Plaintiffs to pay arbitration costs, and is unconscionable as it fails to
incorporate the AAA Rules. (Opposition, 6-14.)
With regards to procedural unconscionability, the court
agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs cannot claim unfair surprise with regards
to an alleged failure to provide notice as the document stands alone with
several statements regarding the intent of the parties to arbitrate in
emphasis. (Reply, 4-5.) “Plaintiffs do not argue in their opposition that they
were lied to, placed under duress, manipulated into signing the Arbitration
Agreement, or otherwise subjected to a surprise or other sharp practices.” (Id.)
Defendant further contends “there is no restriction on remedies to Plaintiffs
nor are they burdened with the cost of arbitration,” and “Plaintiffs concede
that confidentiality by itself is not substantively unconscionable if not
written too broadly,” which Defendant argues the confidentiality provision is
not. (Reply, 6-7.) Arbitration agreements that apply to both parties equally
are generally not substantively unconscionable. (Sanchez v. CarMax Auto
Superstores Cal., LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 398, 403-404.)
Further, the court agrees with Defendant the Agreement
specifically provides for a neutral provider under AAA Rules, provides for
sufficient discovery consistent with AA Rules, provides for a written decision,
and does not require Plaintiffs to pay arbitration expenses. (Motion, 17-20.)
The court further agrees with Defendant that the Agreement sufficiently
incorporates the AA Rules by reference, and specifically gave Plaintiffs the
opportunity to review the AAA Rules. (Reply, 6-7.)
Lastly, Plaintiffs allege the Agreement violates Labor Code
§ 432.6, as “Plaintiffs were forced to sign the arbitration agreement as a
condition of their employment” and is therefore an adhesive contract in
violation of that section. (Opposition, 4-5.)
Labor Code § 432.6 prohibits employers from requiring
arbitration of claims for violation of FEHA or the Labor Code as a condition of
employment or continued employment, even if the employee can opt out of the
agreement or receives a benefit by accepting the agreement. (Lab. Code §
432.6(a).) In addition, Lab. Code § 432.6 prohibits an employer from
threatening, retaliating, or discriminating against or terminating an applicant
or employee because of a refusal to agree to arbitration. (Lab. Code §
432.6(a).) However, the law also states that it is not intended to invalidate a
written arbitration agreement that is enforceable under the FAA. (Lab.
Code § 432.6(f).) As this court has already found the Agreement to be
enforceable under the FAA, the court now disregards this contention.
The court agrees with Defendant. Plaintiffs point to no
authority, and the court is aware of none, in support of their contentions that
the Agreement was both procedurally and/or substantively unconscionable.
Further, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their burden of showing the
Agreement does not implicate the Federal Arbitration Act, and have further
failed to show how the Agreement is in violation of section 432.6. Lastly,
Plaintiffs fail to show how the Agreement does not incorporate the necessary AAA
Rules, or failed to provide notice to Plaintiffs of the fact that the document they
signed was an Arbitration Agreement. Thus, Defendant’s arbitration agreements
with Plaintiffs are not procedurally and/or substantively unconscionable, are
enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act, and are valid as an agreement
between the parties to arbitrate the claims which form the bases of Plaintiffs’
causes of action.
Thus, Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is granted.
Conclusion
Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is granted. Defendant
is to give notice.