Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 22STCV33796, Date: 2024-09-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV33796 Hearing Date: September 6, 2024 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: Friday, September 6, 2024
CASE NUMBER: 22STCV33796
CASE NAME: Xavier Page v. Baker Management, Incorporated
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Baker Management
OPPOSING PARTY: None.
TRIAL DATE: Not Set.
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
PROCEEDING: Motion for Summary
Judgment
OPPOSITION: None.
REPLY: None.
TENTATIVE: Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
granted. Defendant to give notice.
Background
On October 18, 2022,
Xavier Page (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Baker Management,
Incorporated (“Defendant”) and Does 1 to 10. The Complaint alleges three causes
of action: (1) Violations of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act
(“ICRAA”) (Civ. Code § 1786 et seq.); (2) Invasion of Privacy; and (3)
Declaratory Relief.
On June 6, 2024, the
Court granted Defendant’s Motion for an Order to Deem its Request for Admission
admitted against Plaintiff.
On July 2, 2024,
Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment. The motion remains unopposed.
The matter is now before the court.
I. Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’
pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in
fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”¿(Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the
evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’
and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) Summary adjudication may be granted as to one or more
causes of action within an action, or one or more claims for damages. (CCP, §
437c(f).)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
¿¿¿¿¿¿
A defendant moving for summary judgment bears two burdens:
(1) the burden of production – presenting admissible evidence, through material
facts, sufficient to satisfy a directed verdict standard; and (2) the burden of
persuasion – the material facts presented must persuade the court that the
plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of a cause of action, or a
complete defense vitiates the cause of action. (CCP, § 437c(p)(2);¿Aguilar,¿supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 850-851.) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that
the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some
essential element of the claim.¿¿(Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31
Cal.App.4th 574, 590.)¿¿Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.”¿(Ibid.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
¿¿¿¿¿¿
“On ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is
to ‘liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’” (Cheal
v. El Camino Hospital¿(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, 760.) On a summary
judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the
opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While
viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its
primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.
[Citation.]” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.¿(1999) 75
Cal.App.4th¿832, 839.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
¿¿¿¿¿¿
Defeating summary judgment requires only a single disputed
material fact. (See CCP, § 437c(c) [a motion for summary judgment “shall be
granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law”] [italics added].) Thus, any disputed material fact means the
court must deny the motion – the court has no discretion to grant summary
judgment. (Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925, fn. 8; Saldana
v. Globe-Weis Systems Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1505, 1511-1512.)¿¿¿¿¿
II. Discussion
This action arises out of Plaintiff’s housing
application wherein Plaintiff was required to complete a rental application for
a unit on the Property, thus permitting Defendant to obtain private and
personal information about Plaintiff. (Ex. 1 [Compl., ¶¶ 15, 18].) Plaintiff
alleges that in requesting information about Plaintiff’s criminal background,
previous evictions, and an investigative consumer report regarding Plaintiff’s
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living,
Defendant violated the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (“ICRAA”)
by failing to provide proper disclosure and authorization. (Comp., ¶¶ 1-4, 5,
7, 16, 17, 21-13, 31, -45.) Plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy based on
Defendant’s alleged violation of ICRAA and a claim for declaratory relief based
on the fact that Defendant’s rental application violated ICRAA. (Compl., ¶¶
46-51.)
On June 4, 2024, the court deemed admitted
Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s requests for admissions (“RFA”) wherein
Plaintiff admitted the following:
1)
At the
time he filled out a rental application to lease his unit at the Property,
Defendant was not the management company on the unit/building.
2)
Plaintiff
never received a rental application from Defendant at any time.
3)
Plaintiff
never received a request to obtain a credit report and other background
information from Defendant at any time.
4)
Plaintiff
was never presented with any form from Defendant to obtain credit information
or background on Plaintiff at any time Plaintiff filled out the rental
application for his unit at the Property.
5)
Plaintiff
never conducted an investigation prior to filing this lawsuit, as to whether or
not Defendant ever presented him with a rental application and a request to
obtain his credit report and other background information, at the time he
applied to lease his unit on the Property.
6)
Plaintiff
has no facts to support Defendant is liable to him for violations of ICRAA, as
alleged in the Complaint.
7)
Plaintiff
suffered no damages, as alleged in the Complaint.
8)
Plaintiff
has no facts to support Defendant is liable to him for Declaratory Relief, as
alleged in the Complaint.
9)
Plaintiff
suffered no damages, as alleged in the Complaint.
(Hawatmeh Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 2 RFA, Ex. 3 [Notice
of June 5, 2024 Ruling.)
Consequently, Defendant asserts it is entitled
to summary judgment as all three causes of action alleged in the
Complaint.
A. Defendant’s
Entitlement to Summary Judgment
ICRAA requires a
“person” seeking an “investigative consumer report” on a “consumer” in
connection with the hiring of a dwelling unit to comply with certain statutory
obligations. (Civ. Code, § 1786.16(a).) These statutory obligations are as
follows:
Defendant asserts
that because Plaintiff admitted that during the relevant time, he filled out
the rental application, Defendant was not the management company of the unit on
the Property. (Ex. 2 [RFA No. 6].) Accordingly, Plaintiff admitted that Defendant
did not provide Plaintiff with a rental application, or request to obtain his
credit report or background at any time. (RFA No. 7.) Plaintiff also admitted
that Defendant never presented Plaintiff with a form to obtain his credit
report or background at the time he filled out the rental application. (RFA No.
9.) Plaintiff further admitted that he never investigated before filing this
action as to whether Defendant ever presented him with a rental application and
a request to obtain his credit report and other background information at the
time he filled out the rental application. (RFA No. 10.)
Given the above,
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot provide any evidence to support his
ICRAA claim and derivative causes of action such that Plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment. First, Plaintiff has failed to oppose this Motion and has
admitted that there are no facts to support Plaintiff’s claim for invasion of
privacy. (RFA No. 12.) Second, because Plaintiff’s third cause of action for
declaratory relief is wholly derivative of the ICRAA claim, the third cause of
action also fails as a matter of law. (See City of Lancaster v. Netflix,
Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1114.) Plaintiff further admitted that
there are no facts that show Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for declaratory
relief as alleged in the Complaint. (RFA No. 13.) Lastly, Plaintiff admitted he
suffered no damages. (RFA No. 14.)
The court finds
that Defendant has satisfied its burden of showing that there are no triable
issues of fact and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law. Plaintiff has failed to oppose the motion and present evidence that
triable issues of material fact exist that preclude granting summary judgment.
Therefore, the court grants the Motion for summary judgment.
Conclusion
Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is granted. Defendant to give notice.