Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 22STCV37953, Date: 2025-02-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV37953    Hearing Date: February 18, 2025    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 Tuesday, February 18, 2025

CASE NUMBER:                   22STCV37953

CASE NAME:                        Jacob Shaw v. Honda Performance Development, Inc., et al.

MOVING PARTY:                 Plaintiff Jacob Shaw

OPPOSING PARTY:             Defendants Experis US, Inc.; Experis US, LLC and Manpower Group US, Inc.

TRIAL DATE:                        Not set.

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

PROCEEDING:                      Demurrer to Answer

OPPOSITION:                        30 January 2025

REPLY:                                  5 February 2025

TENTATIVE:                         Plaintiff’s demurrer to Defendant Honda Racing’s Answer is granted with leave to amend as all affirmative defenses raised in the Answer but overruled as to the 5th affirmative defense.

Defendant Honda Racing is granted 10 days leave to amend. The court sets the OSC RE: Amended Answer for March 7, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.

PROCEEDING:                      Demurrer to Answer

OPPOSITION:                        03 February 2025

REPLY:                                  06 February 2025

TENTATIVE:                         Plaintiff’s demurrer to Defendants Manpower and Experis’ Answer is granted with leave to amend as all affirmative defenses raised in the Answer but overruled as to the 7th affirmative defense. Defendants Manpower and Experis are granted 10 days leave to amend. The court sets the OSC RE: Amended Answer for March 7, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.

Background

On December 05, 2022, Jacob Shaw (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Honda Racing Corporation USA erroneously sued as Honda Performance Development, Inc. (“Honda Racing”); Experis US, LLC (“Experis”); Manpower Group US, Inc. (“Manpower”) (collectively “Defendants”) and Does 1 to 50.  

On October 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Sixth Amended Complaint (“6AC”) alleging sixteen causes of action: (1) disability and/or perceived disability discrimination, (2) failure to engage in the interactive process, (3) failure to accommodate disability, (4) retaliation in violation of Gov. Code § 12940(m)(2), (5) violation of the California Family Rights Act – interference; (6) violation of the California Family Rights Act – retaliation; (7) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment, (8) violation of Labor Code section 233 and 234, (9) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (10) failure to pay overtime wages; (11) failure to provide meal periods, (12) failure to authorize and permit rest periods, (13) failure to pay all wages due upon separation, (14) failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements, and (15) unfair and unlawful business practices.  

On December 3, 2024, Defendants Honda Racing and Experis and Manpower filed Answers to Plaintiff’s 6AC. Plaintiff now demurrers to Defendants Honda Racing and Manpower’s Answers. Defendants oppose the Motion. The matter is now before the court.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A.        Demurrer 

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)¿“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.”¿(C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)¿For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded.¿ (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.)¿A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.”¿(Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿ 

B.        Motion to Strike 

¿Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); CRC, rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)¿¿¿¿ 

C.        Leave to Amend 

“Where the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question.” (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿¿¿ 

Demurrer to answer[1]

A.        Demurrer to Honda Racing’s Answer

Plaintiff demurs to Honda Racing’s Answers to the 6AC on the basis that the 1st through 52nd affirmative defenses do not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense, and are uncertain or unavailable as a matter of law.

Having read Defendants Honda Racing’s Answer, the court agrees that all 52 affirmative defenses are devoid of any facts supporting each defense.

Defendant Honda Racing does not deny that its affirmative defenses lack factual support but assert the defenses are permissive because the complaint is unverified, affirmative defenses are waived if not raised, and Plaintiff is not prejudiced in allowing the sufficiency of the affirmative defenses to be tested through discovery.

Defendant Honda Racing’s assertion that a general denial is sufficient because the 6AC is unverified lacks merit. CCP § 431.30 states that if a complaint “is not verified, a general denial is sufficient but only puts in issue the material allegations of the complaint.” Plaintiff further asserts that section 430.30 requires a Defendant to include in its answer, a “statement of any new matter constituting a defense.” (CCP § 431.30(b)(2).)

Affirmative defenses are a “new matter” and introduce new issues not raised in the complaint. “Such ‘new matter” is also known as ‘an affirmative defense.’ ” (Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758, 812 (Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases).) In other words, defenses or objections based on “new matter” “must be specifically pleaded.” (Advantec Group, Inc. v. Edwin's Plumbing Co., Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 621, 628.)  “The phrase ‘new matter’ refers to something relied on by a defendant which is not put in issue by the plaintiff.”  (Walsh v. West Valley Mission Community College District (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1546.)  Where the answer sets forth facts showing some essential allegation of the complaint is not true, such facts are not new matters but are denials.  (Ibid.) Here, Defendant Honda Racing fails to cite the Complaint to support its affirmative defenses.

Furthermore, without specific factual allegations to support Defendant Honda Racing’s affirmative defenses, Plaintiff is not on notice as to what specific act or omission gave rise to the affirmative defense. Moreover, without specific factual allegations, Defendant’s defenses consist solely of legal conclusions. (See Bagatti v. Department of Rehabilitation (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 344, 366, fn. 8 [“These conclusionary allegations, which allege no specific acts, are insufficient to survive demurrer.”].)

Defendant Honda asserts the court should tolerate the lack of factual allegations supporting its affirmative defenses because discovery is the proper mechanism to test its affirmative defenses. This is not the law. Defendant must plead affirmative defenses with specificity unless Defendant can show that the facts raised by the “new matter” are known only to Plaintiff. “The particularity required in pleading facts depends on the extent to which the defendant in fairness needs detailed information that can be conveniently provided by the plaintiff.” (Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.)

The court knows that affirmative defenses are waived if not raised in the Answer. (See California Academy of Sciences v. County of Fresno (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1436, 1442 [“A party who fails to plead affirmative defenses waives them.”].) However, this does not grant Defendant Honda Racing the right to plead every possible affirmative defense without factual support.  If Defendant believes certain fasts exist to support its affirmative defenses, those facts may be pled on information and belief, provided Defendant has a basis for believing the allegations to be true. (See Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1106; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 551, fn. 5.) If Defendant has no factual basis or belief to assert an affirmative defense, it cannot plead such a defense. If subsequent discovery reveals facts to support a particular affirmative defense, Defendant can always amend then amend its Answer.

 “As we have noted, affirmative defenses cannot be pled as mere legal conclusions but must instead be alleged with as much factual detail as the allegations of a complaint.” (Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 813.) As Defendants Honda Racing failed to plead factual allegations to support their affirmative defenses, Plaintiff’s demurrer to their Answer is sustained with leave to amend as to all affirmative defenses except the fifth affirmative defense.

The 5th affirmative defense states this action is barred by the applicable statute of limitation. CCP § 458 specifically provides that a state of limitation affirmative defense may be pled without any accompanying facts. Therefore, the demurrer to the 5th affirmative defense is overruled.

B.        Demurrer to Manpower and Experis’ Answer

Plaintiff similarly demurs to the Answer filed by Manpower and Experis and all 54 affirmative defenses raised in the Answer on the basis they do not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense and are uncertain or unavailable as a matter of law.

The court sustains the demur to Manpower and Experis’ Answer on the same basis that affirmative defenses must be pled with specificity. Moreover, Defendants Manpower and Experis fail to show how affirmative defenses Nos. 3, 10, 12-13, 1, 23, 29, and 35 reference specific factual allegations in the 6AC and do not require additional factual support.

The demurrer to Manpower and Experis’s Answer is sustained with leave to amend as to all affirmative defenses raised except as to the 7th affirmative based on the action being barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s demurrer to Defendant Honda Racing’s Answer is granted with leave to amend as all affirmative defenses raised in the Answer but overruled as to the 5th affirmative defense.

Defendant Honda Racing is granted 10 days leave to amend. The court sets the OSC RE: Amended Answer for March 7, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.

Plaintiff’s demurrer to Defendants Manpower and Experis’ Answer is granted with leave to amend as all affirmative defenses raised in the Answer but overruled as to the 7th affirmative defense. Defendants Manpower and Experis are granted 10 days leave to amend. The court sets the OSC RE: Amended Answer for March 7, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.