Judge Gail Killefer, Case Number: 23STCV02390, Date: 2023-08-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 23STCV02390, Date: 2023-08-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV02390 Hearing Date: November 15, 2023 Dept: 37

HEARING DATE: Wednesday, November 15, 2022

CASE NUMBER: 23STCV02390

CASE NAME: Immigrant Rights Defense Co. v. Sonia I. Zaldivar

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Sonia I. Zaldivar

OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC

TRIAL DATE: Not Set

PROOF OF SERVICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: Motion to Compel Further Responses

OPPOSITION: 21 September 2023

REPLY: 29 September 2023

TENTATIVE: Defendant Zaldivar’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to SROGS, Set 1, No. 4 is denied, as are the parties’ respective requests for sanctions.

Defendant Zaldivar’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to SROGS, Set 2, Nos. 7 to 14 is granted. The court awards sanctions in the sum of $500.00, plus $60.00 for the filing fee, against Plaintiff’s counsel of record, Sebastian M. Medvei, to be paid to Defendant’s counsel within 30 days. Defendant to give notice.

Background

This is a dispute arising in connection with the work of Defendant Sonia I. Zaldivar (“Zaldivar”) as an Immigration Consultant in California. Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant failed to comply with the Immigration Consultants Act of California (“ICA”) when she operated as an Immigration Consultant.

Plaintiff brings this claim for an injunction on behalf of the general public as authorized by Business & Professions Code § 22446.5(a).¿ Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has violated multiple provisions of ICA and, as such, Plaintiff is entitled to obtain an injunction on behalf of the general public.¿¿

On June 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging a single cause of action for injunctive relief for violation of the Immigration Consultant Act (“ICA”). Plaintiff also filed a Doe amendment, adding Z Legal Services Inc. (“Z Legal”) as a Defendant.

On August 8 and 9, 2023, Defendant Zaldivar filed Motions to Compel Further Response to Special Interrogatories (“SROGS”), for Set 1 and Set 2. Plaintiff opposed the motions on September 21, 2023. Defendant filed reply briefs on September 28 and 29, 2023.

On September 19, 2023, the court entered a default against Zaldivar. On November 6, 2023, the court granted Zaldivar’s motion to set aside the September 19, 2023, entry of default.

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES

I. Legal Standard

On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that: (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under CCP § 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (CCP § 2030.300(a).) The responding party has the burden of justifying its objections. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-21.)¿

Notice of a motion to compel further must be given 45 days of service of the response or any supplemental response, or on or before any specific later day to which the propounding party and responding party may have agreed in writing. (CCP § 2030.300(c).)¿Finally, California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345 requires that all motions or responses involving further discovery contain a separate statement with the text of each request, the response, and a statement of factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345(a)(3)).¿¿

II. Request for Judicial Notice

The Court may take judicial notice of records of any court of record of the United States. (Evid. Code, § 452(d)(2).) However, the court may only judicially notice the existence of the record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.)

Defendant Zaldivar requests judicial notice of the following:

Exhibit F: A true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Terminating Sanctions, served on July 20, 2023. Defendant is seeking judicial notice of only part of the document; namely, page 7, lines 14-28.

Exhibit G: A true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Opposition to a motion to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Medvei, filed on June 23, 2020, in LASC Case Number 20STCV00503, captioned as Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC v. Joe Renderos Iraheta, et al. Defendant is seeking judicial notice of only part of the document; namely, the Declaration of Sebastian Medvei, page 6, lines 2-12.

Exhibit M: A true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Terminating Sanctions, served on July 20, 2023. Defendant is seeking judicial notice of only part of the document; namely, page 7, lines 14-28.

Exhibit N: A true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Opposition to a motion to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Medvei, filed on June 23, 2020, in LASC Case Number 20STCV00503, captioned as Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC v. Joe Renderos Iraheta, et al. Defendant is seeking judicial notice of only part of the document; namely, the Declaration of Sebastian Medvei, page 6, lines 2.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibit F and M are granted but denied as to Exhibit G and N, because the contents of a declaration are reasonably subject to dispute and not a proper subject for judicial notice. (See Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882 [“Courts may not take judicial notice of allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court records because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require formal proof.”].)

III. Discussion

A. MTCF Responses to SROGS, Set 1

Defendant Zaldivar seeks further response to SROGS, Set 1 not because the responses themselves are deficient, but because Plaintiff’s counsel, Sebastian M. Medvei, signed the discovery verifications.

CCP § 2030.250 states that “[t]he party to whom the interrogatories are directed shall sign the response under oath unless the response contains only objections.” In responding to Plaintiff’s SROGS, Set 1, Plaintiff’s counsel responded as an agent of Plaintiff and “waive[d] any lawyer-client privilege and any protection for work product [] during any subsequent discovery from that attorney concerning the identity of the sources of the information contained in the response.” (CCP § 2030.250(b).) Therefore, attorney-client privilege and work product privilege are waived as to any questions contained in SROGS, Set 1.

An attorney cannot verify a response on behalf of an individual party. [Citation] However, an attorney may verify a response as officer or agent of a corporate party. (§§ 2030.250, subd. (b); 2033.260, subd. (b).) Doing so, however, will constitute a limited waiver of the attorney-client and work product privileges, ‘during any subsequent discovery from that attorney concerning the identity of the sources of the information contained in the response.’ (§§ 2030.250 (b); 2033.260(b).)

(Melendrez v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1351; see also CCP § 2030.250.)

Plaintiff’s counsel can verify Plaintiff’s responses to SROGS, Set 1. Consequently, the responses to SROGS, Set 1 are not made deficient by the fact that the responses were verified by Plaintiff’s counsel acting as an agent for Plaintiff.

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345 requires that a separate statement be filed whenever a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories is made. Section C of rule 3.1345 states the requirements of the contents of a separate statement:

The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Material must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference. The separate statement must include-for each discovery request (e.g., each interrogatory, request for admission, deposition question, or inspection demand) to which a further response, answer, or production is requested-the following:

(1) The text of the request, interrogatory, question, or inspection demand;

(2) The text of each response, answer, or objection, and any further responses or answers;

(3) A statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute;

(4) If necessary, the text of all definitions, instructions, and other matters required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it;

(5) If the response to a particular discovery request is dependent on the response given to another discovery request, or if the reasons a further response to a particular discovery request is deemed necessary are based on the response to some other discovery request, the other request and the response to it must be set forth; and

(6) If the pleadings, other documents in the file, or other items of discovery are relevant to the motion, the party relying on them must summarize each relevant document.

Here, Defendant Zaldivar’s separate statement is woefully deficient because it makes references to Exhibit E, which is not included in the separate statement but is instead an attachment to the Motion. Exhibit E provides only Plaintiff’s response and not the text of the interrogatories, which would allow the court to ascertain if Plaintiff’s response to the interrogatory is incomplete or evasive. Moreover, both of Defendant Zaldivar’s discovery motions failed to “identify the interrogatories, demands, or requests by set and number.” (CRC Rule, 3.1345(b).

Searching through Defendant Zaldivar’s papers, in Exhibit D, offered in support of the parties meet and confer effort, the court found that Plaintiff was responding to this interrogatory:

State the date of each alleged violation of the Immigration Consultant Act that YOU allege in YOUR Complaint, in addition to all facts relating to each alleged violation.

(See Exhibit E, SROGS, Set 1, No. 4.)

Plaintiff’s response is as follows:

As to the Business and Professions Code section 22441(d) violations, Plaintiff is informed and believes that those violations have been ongoing from the inception of the business to the present. Plaintiff is informed and believes that those violations continue to this date because Defendant continues to advertise those services. As to the Business and Professions Code section 22442 violations, Plaintiff is unable to determine when the violations occurred because Defendant has refused to respond to Request for Production No. 1, whether those violations have actually occurred-Plaintiff is, however, in possession of circumstantial evidence of noncompliance by virtue of Defendant's refusal to comply with discovery. The date of discovery of this circumstantial evidence is the date of receipt by Plaintiffs counsel of Defendant's responses to the discovery. As to the Business and Professions Code section 22442.1 violations, Plaintiff is unable to determine, because Defendant has refused to respond to Request for Production No. 2, whether those violations have actually occurred-Plaintiff is, however, in possession of circumstantial evidence of noncompliance by virtue of Defendant's refusal to comply with discovery. The date of discovery of this circumstantial evidence is the date of receipt by Plaintiff's counsel of Defendant's responses to the discovery. As to the Business and Professions Code section 22442.2 violations, Plaintiff contends that those violations have occurred from the inception of the business to the present. More specifically, those violations were known to occur on the following dates: I) as to the website, zlegalservices.com, the violation was first discovered on February 2, 2023; 2) as to the GMB page, the violation was first discovered on February 2, 2023, and the violation has continued to occur as of 2:00 p.m. the date of the signing of this verification; 3) as to the instagram/z.legal.services/page the violation was first discovered on May 18, 2023 and the violation has continued to occur as of 2:00 p.m. the date of the signing of the verification. As to the Business and Professions Code section 22443 .1 violations, Plaintiff contends that Defendant, herself, violated between 2000 and 2017 and that, on information and belief, Maritza Montes is presently violating that provision as of 2:00 p.m. the date of the signing of the verification. Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response as additional information comes to light.

(See Motion, Exhibit D.)

The court finds that the response to SROGS, Set 1, No. 4 is not incomplete or evasive. Defendant Zaldivar’s motion is denied, as is her request for sanctions.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is also denied.

A. MTCF Responses to SROGS, Set 2

Defendant Zaldivar argues that Plaintiff’s responses to SROGS, Set 2 are untimely because they were served by mail rather than electronically, and when Plaintiff’s counsel did serve them electronically, they were served to Defense counsel’s business address and not the email address for service. CCP § 1010.6 states a document may be served electronically, but there is no evidence that the parties formally agreed that service would only be by electronic service rather than by mail. Furthermore, at the November 6, 2023, hearing, it was agreed that Defendants would be served at the following email address: assistantoharalaw@gmail.com.

Accordingly, the court is unpersuaded that Plaintiff’s discovery responses were untimely because they were served electronically.

As explained above, Plaintiff’s discovery responses are not unverified simply they were verified by counsel rather than by Plaintiff. (CCP § 2030.250.) Plaintiff’s counsel did not improperly verify a response on behalf of an individual party, but raised objections such that attorney-client privilege was not waived. (See Melendrez, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351; see also CCP, § 2030.2450 [“The party to whom the interrogatories are directed shall sign the response under oath unless the response contains only objections.”].)

Here, Plaintiff’s responses contained boilerplate objections to SROGS, Set 2, Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. For example, Plaintiff’s response to SROGS, Set 2 No. 7 states:

Objection: 1) Relevance/Scope, CCP §2017.01 0; 2) Attorney work product; 3) Unintelligible as to “YOU” Plaintiff is not a natural person and cannot independently engage in acts, or be ‘told” anything; 4) Attorney-client privilege.

The court agrees that Plaintiff failed to show that its objections have merit. Accordingly, Defendant Zaldivar’s request for further responses to SROGS, Set 2, Nos. 7 to 14 is granted.

C. Request for Sanctions

CCP § 2030.300(d) provides:

The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

Defendant Zaldivar requests sanctions in the sum of $3,500.00 against Plaintiff’s counsel Sebastian Medvei, in addition to $60.00 spent on the filing fee. Defendant’s counsel asserts that her hourly billing rate is $700.00 per hour for personal injury cases and that she spent 5.0 hours preparing the Motion.

The court finds that hours billed by counsel are excessive, particularly in light of counsel’s failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.145. The court grants the request of counsel for Defendant Zaldivar for sanctions in the sum of $500.00, plus $60.00 in filing fees against Plaintiff’s counsel.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is denied.

Conclusion

Defendant Zaldivar’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to SROGS, Set 1, No. 4 is denied, as are the parties’ respective requests for sanctions.

Defendant Zaldivar’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to SROGS, Set 2, Nos. 7 to 14, is granted. The court awards Defendant’s counsel sanctions in the sum of $500.00, plus $60.00 for the filing fee, against Plaintiff’s counsel of record, Sebastian M. Medvei, to be paid within 30 days.

Defendants to give notice.

HEARING DATE: Wednesday, November 15, 2022

CASE NUMBER: 23STCV02390

CASE NAME: Immigrant Rights Defense Co. v. Sonia I. Zaldivar

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Sonia I. Zaldivar

OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC

TRIAL DATE: Not Set

PROOF OF SERVICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: Motion to Quash

OPPOSITION: 23 October 2023

REPLY: 27 October 2023

TENTATIVE: Defendant Z Legal Services, Inc’s Motion to Quash is denied.

Background

This is a dispute arising in connection with Defendant, Sonia I. Zaldivar’s (“Zaldivar”) operating as an Immigration Consultant in California. Plaintiff, Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC. (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant has operated as an Immigration Consultant not in conformity with the Immigration Consultants Act of California (“ICA”).

Plaintiff brings this claim for an injunction on behalf of the general public as authorized by Business and Professions Code § 22446.5(a).¿ Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has violated multiple provisions of ICA and as such Plaintiff is entitled to obtain an injunction on behalf of the general public.¿¿

On July 17, 2023, Defendant Z Legal filed a motion to quash the service of summons of the SAC. Plaintiff filed opposing papers on October 23, 2023. Defendant Z Legal filed a reply on October 27, 2023. The court continued the motion hearing on November 3, 2023, to November 6, 2023, and, again, to November 15, 2023. The court now rules as follows.

MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS

I. Legal Standard

CCP § 418.10(a) states: “A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve or file a motion…[t]o quash service of summon on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.”¿¿¿

A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the California or United States Constitutions. (CCP § 410.10.) When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all necessary jurisdictional criteria are met. (Jewish Defense Org. v. Superior Court¿(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054-55; see also Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568 [“When a motion to quash is properly brought, the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.”].) This burden must be met by competent evidence in affidavits and authenticated documentary evidence. (Jewish Defense Org., at p. 1055.)

II. Request for Judicial Notice

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452(c), (d), and (h).) “Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)

Defendant Z Legal requests judicial notice of the following:

1) EXHIBIT A: Summons, filed on February 3, 2023
EXHIBIT B: Complaint, filed on February 3, 2023

2) EXHIBIT C: (474) Amendment to Complaint, filed on 7/10/2023

3) EXHIBIT D: Summons, served on Z Legal Services Inc on 7/14/2023

4) EXHIBIT E: Articles of Incorporation of Z Legal Services, Inc, dated February 9, 2023

5) EXHIBIT F: Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint

6) EXHIBIT G: 2023 operative statutes of the Immigration Consultant Act: Business & Professions Code §§ 22440, 22441, 22441.1, 22442, 22442.1, 22442.2, 22442.3, 22442.4, 22442.5, 22442.6, 22443, 22443.1, 22443.2, 22443.3, 22444, 22445, 22446.5, and 22447.

7) EXHIBIT H: Conformed copy first page of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Quash Service of Summons, filed on October 23, 2023.

Z Legal’s request for judicial notice is granted.

III. Evidentiary Objections

Defendant Z Legal’s objections to the Declaration of Sebastian M. Medvei and Exhibit 1 in the declaration are overruled.

IV. Discussion

Specially appearing defendant, Z Legal moves to quash the service of summons of the SAC on the basis that Plaintiff’s Doe Amendment adding Z Legal as a named Defendant was improper because Z Legal did not exist at the time of the filing of the original Complaint. The parties do not dispute that Z Legal was formed on February 9, 2023, and that Plaintiff had already filed this action on February 3, 2023. (Defendant’s RJN Ex. E.) Therefore, Defendant argues that because Z Legal did not exist at the time this action was filed, Plaintiff cannot name Z Legal as Doe Defendant 1.

CCP § 474 states in relevant part:

When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the action is commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly; provided, that no default or default judgment shall be entered against a defendant so designated, unless it appears that the copy of the summons or other process, or, if there be no summons or process, the copy of the first pleading or notice served upon such defendant bore on the face thereof a notice stating in substance: “To the person served: You are hereby served in the within action (or proceedings) as (or on behalf of) the person sued under the fictitious name of (designating it).”

Plaintiff fails to point to any language in section 474 or cite any relevant legal authority holding that a Doe amendment is invalid against an entity that did not exist at the time the Complaint was filed.

The limitation placed on section 474 is that the amendment not be made in “bad faith” and that the plaintiff be truly ignorant of the true names of the fictitious defendants. (See Breceda v. Gamsby (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 167, 176.) “The purpose of this section is to help a plaintiff who truly does not know the name of someone against whom he states a cause of action, in order to prevent the running of the statute of limitations.” (Schroeter v. Lowers (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 695, 700.) Therefore, by Z Legal’s own admission, Plaintiff could not have discovered its identity prior to the filing of the Complaint because Z Legal did not exist at the time.

Moreover, a complaint can be amended to add new facts which occurred after the filing of the initial complaint. (Honig v. Financial Corp. of America (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 960, 966.) This also includes adding a new defendant. (McGee Street Productions v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 [Finding a complaint may be amended to add a new defendant if the statute of limitations has not passed or plaintiff was unaware of the true identity of party at the inception of the suit and made the amendment pursuant to CCP § 474].) Accordingly, Z Legal fails to show that Doe amendment was improper.

Secondly, Z Legal asserts that Doe 1 cannot be Z Legal because the allegations in the SAC refer to a person and not an entity and that per the provisions of the ICA, only a person—not an entity—can be held liable for violating the ICA. The proper mechanism to challenge the pleadings is by demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, not a motion to quash the service of summons. Any alleged defects in Plaintiff’s pleadings do not establish that service was improper on Z Legal. (See Armstrong v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 420, 424 [“If it be a fact that the complaint here does not state a cause of action against the fictitiously named defendants, and that therefore an amended complaint naming them might be barred by the statute of limitations, this did not prevent them from being parties to the action.”].)

Third, Z Legal argues that service was invalid because Plaintiff failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.221(c) which requires that Plaintiff serve a copy of the ADR information package on each defendant along with a copy of the Complaint. Rule 3.221(c) does not state that the failure to serve a copy of the ADR packet results in improper service. Defendant Z Legal fails to show how Plaintiff’s failure to include the ADR packet in its service of summons made the service ineffective pursuant to CCP §§ 413.20, 415.10, or 416.10. The purpose of rule 3.221(c) is to promote alternative and more effective and efficient dispute resolution. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 465.) Rule 3.221(c) does not govern whether service was proper and whether the defect had actual notice that a suit was pending. Furthermore, Defendant Z Legal fails to cite any legal authority holding that the failure to serve the ADR packet renders service improper.

Fourth, Z Legal argues that its Motion to Quash should be granted because Plaintiff failed to check the fictitious name box in the summons are required by CCP § 474. The relevant provision of section 474 states:

[N]o default or default judgment shall be entered against a defendant so designated, unless it appears that the copy of the summons or other process, or, if there be no summons or process, the copy of the first pleading or notice served upon such defendant bore on the face thereof a notice stating in substance: “To the person served: You are hereby served in the within action (or proceedings) as (or on behalf of) the person sued under the fictitious name of (designating it).”

Here, Z Legal asserts that the summons it was served failed to check the fictitious name box and was blank as the “Notice of person being served.” (Zaldivar Decl. Ex. D) Plaintiff argues that the summons informed Z Legal that it was being sued Doe 1 because even though the fictitious name box was blank, the summons informed Z Legal it was being “sued herein as DOE 1.” (Medvei Decl. Ex. 2.)

In Carol Gilbert, Inc. v. Haller (2009), the summons was not marked to indicate that the party was being sued under a fictitious name and instead checked the box that the party was being sued “as an individual defendant.” (179 Cal.App.4th 852, 858–859.)

The form of summons used in this state is intended to facilitate compliance with the foregoing requirement by providing a checkbox whereby the serving party can indicate that the recipient is being served as a person sued under a fictitious name, with the name to be written on the form at that point. [] The summons served here had not been so marked. It was only marked to show service on defendant “as an individual defendant.. . . The problem lies in the failure to check the box and fill in the blank so as to “stat[e] in substance” that he was sued as the person named in the accompanying pleadings as Doe 1. (§ 474.)

(Id. at p. 858.)

Unlike the plaintiff in Carol Gilbert, Inc., Plaintiff did comply “in substance” with the requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 474 by informing Z Legal on the face of the summons that it was being “sued herein as DOE 1,” its fictitious name. (Medvei Decl. Ex. 2; Zaldivar Decl. Ex. D.) There was no “complete absence of the required notice from the summons” to support the finding that Plaintiff failed to comply with notice requirements of section 474. (Carol Gilbert, Inc., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 859.) Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiff substantially complied with the notice requirements of section 474 because the summons made clear to Z Legal that it was being sued a Doe 1. Such notice “made it highly probable” that had Plaintiff checked the fictitious name box and written Doe 1 “it would have impart[ed] the same notice as full compliance” and provided “such notice” as to “put the defendant on his defense.” (Carol Gilbert, Inc., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 866 [interna citations and quotation marks omitted].) Therefore, Plaintiff substantially complied with notice requirements of section 474 by giving Z Legal explicit notice it was being sued as Doe 1.

Lastly, Plaintiff’s proof of service for Z Legal, filed on November 6, 2023, and completed by a California registered process server, establishes the presumption that service was proper upon Z Legal’s agent for service of process. “Evidence Code section 647 provides that a registered process server's declaration of service establishes a presumption that the facts stated in the declaration are true.” (Rodriguez v. Cho¿(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742, referencing American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara¿(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390.) Defendant Z Legal failed to present any evidence to rebut Plaintiff’s evidence that Sonia Zaldivar was personally served, as Z Legal’s agent for service of process, on July 14, 2023. Zaldivar’s declaration does not deny that she was served nor does her declaration provide any facts as to why the July 14, 2023 service was improper.

Accordingly, Defendant Z Legal’s Motion to Quash the Service of Summons is denied.

Conclusion

Defendant Z Legal Services, Inc’s Motion to Quash the Service of Summons is denied.