Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 23STCV11420, Date: 2024-11-06 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 23STCV11420    Hearing Date: November 6, 2024    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 Wednesday, November 6, 2024

CASE NUMBER:                   23STCV11420

CASE NAME:                        Jeryl Smith v. Los Angeles Unified School District

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District

OPPOSING PARTY:             Plaintiff Jeryl Smith

TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

                                                                                                                                                           

PROCEEDING:                      Demurrer to Sixth Amended Complaint

OPPOSITION:                        22 October 2024

REPLY:                                  30 October 2024

 

TENTATIVE:                         Defendant LAUSD’s demurrer to the sixth amended complaint is sustained without leave to amend. The action is dismissed.

                                                                                                                       

 

Background

 

On May 22, 2023, Jeryl Smith (“Plaintiff”), filed a Complaint against the Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD” or “Defendant”) and Does 1 to 20.  

 

The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges seven causes of action: (1) violation of Ed. Code § 22458, (2) negligence, (3) conversion, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) fraudulent misrepresentation, (6) elder abuse, and (7) retaliation.  

 

On October 4, 2023, Defendant LAUSD’s demurrer and motion to strike the SAC was sustained with leave to amend.

 

On October 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) alleging six causes of action: (1) violation of Ed. Code § 22458, (2) negligence, (3) conversion, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) intentional misrepresentation, and (6) elder abuse, and (7) retaliation.  

 

On January 30, 2024, the court sustained LAUSD’s demurrer with leave to amend the first and third causes of action and denied leave to amend the second, fourth, and sixth causes of action. LAUSD’s motion to strike was also granted with leave to amend.

 

On February 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”) alleging two single causes of action for violation of Ed. Code § 22458 and conversion. On May 13, 2024, the court sustained Defendant LAUSD’s demurrer to the 4AC with leave to amend.

 

On May 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Fifth Amended Complaint (“5AC”) alleging a single cause of action for violation of Ed. Code § 22458. On July 29, 20204, the court sustained the demurrer to the 5AC with leave to amend.

 

On August 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Sixth Amended Complaint (“6AC”) alleging the same single cause of action for violation of Ed. Code § 22458.

 

LAUSD now demurs to the 6AC. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. The matter is now before the court.

 

Demurrer[1]

 

I.         Legal Standard

 

Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.¿ (CCP, § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In evaluating a demurrer, the court accepts the complainant’s properly pled facts as true and ignores contentions, deductions, and conclusory statements. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1976) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Moreover, the court does not consider whether a plaintiff will be able to prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such proof. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 604.) 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

 

II.        Discussion

 

A.        Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

 

The court previously sustained the demurrer to the 5AC on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to show he exhausted his administrative remedies under Ed. Code § 22219(a):

 

(a) The board may in its discretion hold a hearing for the purpose of determining any question presented to it involving any right, benefit, or obligation of a person under this part.

The court found that the fact STRS attempted to obtain information from LAUSD but had been unsuccessful was not a showing of exhaustion of administrative remedies because there was no allegation that Plaintiff made a request to the Teacher’s Retirement Board, but the request was denied. (See Rush v. State Teachers' Retirement System (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 151, 156–157 [“Rush requested a hearing pursuant to section 22219, which authorizes the Teachers’ Retirement Board (the board) to hold a hearing to determine ‘any  question presented to it involving any right, benefit, or obligation of a person under [the Teachers’ Retirement Law].’ ”].)

 

The court sustained the demurrer to the 5AC because Plaintiff failed to allege that she presented to the Board a request to correct her retirement benefits under section 22219, thus exhausting her administrative remedies. Plaintiff has now amended the pleadings and filed the operative 6AC alleging in the relevant part:

 

26. CalSTRS, on or about January 26, 2023, sent a letter to plaintiff informing her that the agency had “done its due diligence to retrieve the necessary information to take appropriate actions on [...plaintiff’s] account.” CalSTRS noted that it had “made multiple attempts to correspond with LAUSD, but to no avail.” A copy of the letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit “D” and made a part hereof.

 

27. After efforts for a hearing by the administrative board through CalSTRS failed, plaintiff was left with no choice but to bring this action.

 

Exhibit D is a “Citizen’s Complaint” filed with the Office of Legal Ethics and Accountability informing Plaintiff that it has been unable to retrieve the information from LAUSD “in order to correct discrepancies on your account with no success” and informing Plaintiff she should contact LAUSD to take action so that “CalSTRS may make any necessary modifications to your account.” (6AC, Ex. D.)

 

Plaintiff’s opposition does not deny that Plaintiffs request to have his retirement benefits corrected was not presented to the Board but argues that Ed. Code § 22219 does not apply because it “is restrict to a conflict between a member denied a benefit or an obligation by CalSTRS.” (Opp. at p. 3:24-4:2.) Plaintiff does not cite any case law in support of this proposition and the proposition contrasts with the broad language of section 22219 as it applies to “any right, benefit, or obligation of a person under this part.” In O'Connor v. State Teachers' Retirement System (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1610, the plaintiff had an administrative hearing before the STRS Board wherein he challenged how the Board calculated his retirement benefits. (Id., at p. 1613.) If after an administrative decision is rendered, Plaintiff can file a petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to CCP § 1094.5.

 

Second, Plaintiff cites no case law to show that Plaintiff is excused from presenting his claims before the Board or that such a claim was presented and later rejected or denied by the Board, such that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Plaintiff cites no case law or procedures from CalSTR showing that the presentation of a complaint before the Office of Legal Ethics and Accountability satisfies the requirement of presenting a claim before the Teachers’ Retirement Board for adjudication. Plaintiff fails to show that the final letter from the Office of Legal Ethics and Accountability advising Plaintiff to contact LAUSD and ask LAUSD to take action satisfies the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

 

The ‘rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in California jurisprudence.’ [Citation] Generally, it means a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. [Citation.] More specifically, ‘[t]he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided by statute, regulation, or ordinance, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act.’ [Citations.]

(Parthemore v. Col (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1379.) This is true even when the administrative remedy contains permissive language. (See Morton v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 977, 982 [“It is the rule that if an administrative remedy is available, it must be exhausted even though the administrative remedy is couched in permissive language”].) “Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and the remedy exhausted before the courts will act; a court violating the rule acts in excess of jurisdiction.” (Hollon v. Pierce (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 468, 475; see also Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 100.) “ ‘[W]hen a statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction.’ ” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 661.)

 

The court finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not presenting his request to have his retirement benefits calculated to the Board. The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. The action is dismissed.

 

The court does not address LAUSD’s demurrer based on uncertainty due to the 6AC’s request for damages, penalties, and attorney’s fees as those points are now moot.

 

Conclusion

 

Defendant LAUSD’s demurrer to the sixth amended complaint is sustained without leave to amend. The action is dismissed.



[1] Pursuant to CCP § 430.41, the meet and confer requirement has been met. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 3.)