Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 23STCV12105, Date: 2025-02-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV12105 Hearing Date: February 24, 2025 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: Monday, February 24, 2025
CASE NUMBER: 23STCV12105
CASE NAME: Joe Perez, et al. v. Jody Leverett, et al.
MOVING PARTY: Cross-Defendants
Justin Toobi, Joseph Isaac Perez, and Negar Sara Sarshar
OPPOSING PARTY: Cross-Complainants DYRY, LLC and
RYDY Corporation
TRIAL DATE: Not set.
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
PROCEEDING: Demurrer to First
Amended Cross-Complaint
OPPOSITION: 07 February 2025
REPLY: None
filed.
TENTATIVE: Cross-Defendants’
demurrer is overruled and the request for a plea in abatement is denied. Cross-Defendants
must file an Answer within 10 days. An OSC Re: Answers is set for March 13,
2025, at 8:30 a.m.
Background
On May 30, 2023, Joe Perez and Justin Toobi (“Plaintiffs”) filed a
Complaint against Jody Leverett, DYRY LLC, RYDY Corporation (collectively
“Defendants”), and Does 1 to 100.
The operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges six causes
of action for (1) Bad Faith Retention of Security Deposit (Civ. Code, §
1950.5); (2) Breach of Contract; (3) Violations of Bus. & Prof. Code §§
17200 et seq.; (4) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (5) Violation
of West Hollywood Municipal Code § 17.32.020; and (6) Cancelation of Voidable
Contracts and Restitution Revenue & Tax Code §§ 23304.1, 23305A, et seq.
On August 30, 2024, Defendants DYRY, LLC and RYDY Corporation
filed a Cross-Complaint against Joseph Isaac Perez, Cindy Borges Corriea De
Mello; Justin Toobi, Negar Sara Sarshar; and Roes 1 to 10.
The operative First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FACC”) alleges four
causes of action: (1) Breach of Written Agreement; (2) Common Counts; (3)
Breach of Written Agreement; and (4) Common Counts.
Cross-Defendants Justin Toobi, Joseph Isaac Perez, and Negar Sara
Sarshar (hereinafter “Cross-Defendants”) demur to the FACC. Cross-Complainants
DYRY, LLC and RYDY Corporation oppose the demurrer. The matter is now before
the court.
request
for JUDICIAL notice
The court may
take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United
States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record
of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and
propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of
immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably
indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) “Taking
judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its
contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)
Cross-Defendants request Judicial Notice of the following:
Exhibit A: California Secretary of State the Corporate
Status, Certificate of Status, of RYDY Corporation as of December 23, 2024.
The request for judicial notice is granted.
I. Legal Standard
Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect
by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A
demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer
must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.¿
(CCP, § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In
evaluating a demurrer, the court accepts the complainant’s properly pled facts
as true and ignores contentions, deductions, and conclusory statements. (Daar
v. Yellow Cab Co. (1976) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713; Serrano v. Priest (1971)
5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Moreover, the court does not consider whether a plaintiff
will be able to prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such
proof. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d
590, 604.)
Leave to amend must be allowed
where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to
show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)
II. Discussion
Cross-Defendants demurrer to the FACC on the basis that
Cross-Complainant RYDY Corporation (“RYDY”) is a foreign entity not registered
with the California Secretary of State and lacks the capacity to sue for
failing to comply with Corp. Code §§ 2203(c).
California restricts foreign corporations from transacting
intrastate business in California without first obtaining a certificate of
qualification from the California Secretary of State. (Corp. Code, § 2105.) A
foreign corporation conducting intrastate business that does not register with
the California Secretary of State is prohibited from maintaining any action or
proceeding based upon any intrastate business it conducted in the state before
becoming compliant with section 2105. (Corp. Code, § 2203(c).)
As
the party seeking to challenge Cross-Complainant RYDY’s standing under
California Corp. Code § 2203, Cross-Defendants bear the burden of proving (1)
the action arose out of RYDY’s transaction of intrastate business and 2) the
action was commenced prior to RYDY qualifying to transact intrastate business.
(See United Medical Management Ltd. v. Gatto (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1732,
1740; United Systems of Arkansas, Inc. v. Stamison (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th
1001, 1007.) However, for Corporation Code §§ 2105 and 2203 to apply,
Cross-Defendants must offer evidence that RYDY engaged in intrastate business
and was required to obtain a certificate of qualification under section 2015
prior to filing this action. Cross-Defendants fail to meet this burden.
California
Corporations Code § 191 defines “transact intrastate business” as “entering
into repeated and successive transactions of its business in this state, other
than interstate or foreign commerce.”¿(Corp. Code, § 191, subd. (a).)¿ The FACC arises out of a single interstate transaction, a 2020
Lease entered by the Parties on August 28, 2020 for the lease of a residential
property located in West Hollywood, CA. (FACC, ¶¶ 8-12, Ex. A.)
Cross-Defendants fail to show that RYDY engaged in intrastate commerce.
Accordingly, Corp. Code § 2203 does not apply. (See Charlton Silk Co. v.
Jones (1923) 190 Cal. 341, 342.)
As Cross-Defendants have failed to show that RYDY engaged in
“repeated and successive transactions” of intrastate commerce rather than
interstate commerce, RYDY was not required to obtain a certificate of
qualification to conduct intrastate business. (Corp. Code,§§ 191(a).)
The demurrer is overruled and the request for a plea in abatement
is denied.
Conclusion
Cross-Defendants’ demurrer is overruled and the request for a plea
in abatement is denied. Cross-Defendants must file an Answer within 10
days. An OSC Re: Answers is set for March 13, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.
[1]
Cross-Defendants assert they
met and conferred with Cross-Complainants on September 12, 2024, but the FACC
was not filed until November 20, 2024. (Toobi Decl., ¶ 2.) Therefore,
Cross-Defendants have failed to show that met and conferred with
Cross-Complainants in good faith. (Seañez Decl., ¶¶ 2-58.) “Any determination by the court that the meet and
confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a
demurrer.” (CCP § 430.41(a)(4).) As the failure to meet and confer does not
constitute grounds to overrule a demurrer, the court continues to the merits.