Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 23STCV12711, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV12711    Hearing Date: March 27, 2024    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 Wednesday, March 27, 2024

CASE NUMBER:                   23STCV12711

CASE NAME:                        Shanah Richardson v. Roya Gheytanchi, et al.

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendants Roya Gheytanchi and Yousef Gheytanchi

OPPOSING PARTY:             Plaintiff Shanah Richardson

TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

PROCEEDING:                      Demurrer with Motion to Strike

OPPOSITION:                        21 February 2024

REPLY:                                  27 February 2024

TENTATIVE:                         Defendants’ demurrer to the eighth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is overruled. Defendants’ motion to strike is denied. The court orders Defendants to file an Answer within 10 days.  The Court also schedules an OSC Re: Filing of Answer and a Case Management Conference for April 25, 2024, at 8:30 a.m.  Defendants to give notice.

Background

On June 5, 2023, Shanah Richardson (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Roya Gheytanchi; Yousef Gheytanchi (collectively “Defendants”) and Does 1 to 20.

The operative Complaint alleges ten causes of action: (1) tenant harassment in violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code §§ 45.33, 45.35; (2) negligent maintenance of premises; (3) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment (contract); (4) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment (tort); (5) tortious breach of warranty of habitability (intentional tort); (6) breach of warranty of habitability (Civ. Code §§ 1941.1); (7) unlawful entry in violation of Civ. Code § 1954; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (10) unlawful business practices in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.

On October 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint which alleges identical causes

of action.  On November 27, 2024, Defendant filed a Demurrer with a Motion to Strike.  On

February 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Opposition.  Defendant filed a reply on February 27, 2024. 

The matter is now before the Court. 

request for JUDICIAL notice

The Court may take judicial notice of records of any court of record of the United States. (Evid. Code, § 452(d)(2).) However, the court may only judicially notice the existence of the record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.) 

Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of the courts’ prior ruling on the motion to strike the Complaint, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Motion to Strike.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted.

Discussion

I.         Legal Standard

A.        Demurrer 

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)¿“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.”¿(C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)¿For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded.¿ (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.)¿A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.”¿(Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿ 

B.        Motion to Strike 

¿Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); CRC, rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP, § 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)¿¿¿¿ 

C.        Leave to Amend 

“Where the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question.” (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿¿¿ 

II.        Demurrer[1]

A.        Summary of Allegations in FAC

The Complaint alleges Plaintiff was a tenant in an accessory unit on a single-family home located at 1640 S. Crest Drive, Los Angeles, California 90035 (the “subject property”) for about 13 years. (FAC ¶¶ 1, 12.) The subject property was subject to the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“LARSO”) and other tenant protections. (FAC ¶¶ 1, 12.) Defendant Roya Gheytanchi and Yousef Gheytanchi were her landlords. (FAC ¶¶ 2, 3, 13, 14, Ex. A.)

In 2014, Plaintiff informed Defendants that the unit had mold that contributed to Plaintiff’s health and lung issues, including pneumonia and “cough-variant asthma.” (FAC. ¶ 18.) In 2015 and 2017, Plaintiff by email also informed Defendant Roya about mold under the sink and her ongoing lung issues, including “nonfamilial hypogammaglobulinemia.”  (FAC ¶ 18.)

Defendants refused to fix the underlying water intrusion resulting in the mold being a recurring issue. (FAC ¶ 19.) Defendants’ refusal to fix the underlying problem affected Plaintiff’s safety and rights as a tenant to quiet enjoyment as well as Plaintiff’s health as she developed “a mold allergy, resulted in urticaria, itching, and swelling over entire body that required emergency room and Urgent Care visits, steroid shots, courses of prednisone, and multiple medications” and eventually developed “cough-variant asthma” due to the mold. (FAC ¶¶ 19, 20.)

Defendants repeatedly refused to fix the rotten door frame and whenever the front door fell off its hinges, Defendants would screw the door back into its rotting frame. (FAC ¶¶ 17, 20, 25, 28, 36, 42.) The front door eventually would not open or close, Plaintiff became injured as a result of trying to open and close the door, and Defendants intentionally refused to fix the door. (FAC ¶¶ 42, 45-47.) After the incident, Plaintiff was left without a locking front door for two months until it was repaired in March 2022 with a new door frame and door. (FAC ¶ 49.) Defendants also refused to fix the security grate window, causing the Plaintiff serious stress about her safety. (FAC ¶ 37.)

To have Plaintiff voluntarily relinquish her tenancy, in 2019 Defendant Roya informed Plaintiff that “things that broke would no longer be fixed.” (FAC ¶¶ 22, 23.) Defendant Roya also called Plaintiff a “f-ing parasite, nothing but a parasite,” and knowing Plaintiff was Christian screamed “F—your Christianity” whenever Plaintiff walked through the yard to access her unit. (FAC ¶ 24.) The Complaint asserts that Defendants asked Plaintiff personal questions about her employment, health, and finances and told her they wanted her to leave. (FAC ¶ 31.) Defendant Roya would also mock Plaintiff’s employment, health, and financial status, “comparing her derisively – and loudly – to ‘normal people. ’ ” (FAC ¶ 31.)

By September 2021, Plaintiff could no longer borrow money for rent and Plaintiff expressed her intent to apply for a rent relief program. (FAC ¶ 32.) On September 5, 2021, when rent was due, Defendant Roya berated Plaintiff for applying for rent relief and not paying rent.  She threatened to evict Plaintiff despite Defendant Roya knowing that he had no right to do so without following the relocation process, and illegally accepting rent for an unpermitted unit. (FAC ¶¶ 30, 33, 34.) Defendant Roya went so far as to contact her parents, including her father who had dementia, to inform them that Plaintiff needed to move out. (FAC ¶ 38.)

On November 12, 2021, Defendants received a letter from Plaintiff’s attorney informing Defendants that they should stop harassing Plaintiff and her family, that Defendants knew the unit was illegal and that Defendants were not permitted to collect rent on the unit, and that the eviction Defendants threatened was forbidden. (FAC ¶ 39.) The letter also addressed the Defendants’ refusal to make repairs and informed Defendants that the unit did not meet habitability standards. (FAC ¶ 39.)

On July 14, 2022, the City of Los Angeles issued a substandard order and ordered that the use and occupancy of Plaintiff’s unit be discontinued.  (FAC ¶ 51.) In July 2022, over Plaintiff’s objections, Defendants gave notice that a plumber was coming, causing Plaintiff concern due to her immune deficiency and concerns about COVID. (FAC ¶ 55.)

Plaintiff filed this action on July 5, 2023. Defendants now demurrers to the eighth cause of action.

B.        Eighth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by appellants with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the appellants’ outrageous conduct. [Citation.]  Conduct is considered outrageous when it is ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.]” (Belen v. Ryan Seacrest Productions, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1164.) Whether Defendant’s conduct was outrageous, oppressive or malicious is a question of fact for the jury. (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499.)

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims of harassment are “not credible” and should not be considered. (Demurrer at p. 6: 23-24.) Defendants further assert that Plaintiff did not reveal her autoimmune issues to Defendants until Defendants told her to leave. (Demurrer at p. 7:102.) However, what knowledge Defendants had about Plaintiff’s health issues and when they obtained such knowledge are disputed issues of fact. "On a demurrer a court's function is limited to testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint. [Citation.] 'A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.’ [Citation.]” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-114.) Accordingly, the court cannot make the determination that Plaintiff’s claims are without merit at the pleading stage. "Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer." (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)

Defendants further assert that “[n]one of the allegations show any willful actions done with the intent to harm Plaintiff. Any claim that these actions resulted in Plaintiff's suffering severe mental and emotional distress (FAC at ¶ 113) are disingenuous and completely self-serving.” (Demurrer at p. 7:3-5.) The court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants willfully refused to conduct repairs on the property, allowed Plaintiff’s unit fall into disrepair and the mold issue to persist despite knowing of Plaintiff’s health issues with the intent of having Plaintiff terminate her lease. Defendants’ conduct resulted in the Plaintiff having to take more anxiety medication and Plaintiff also suffered physical injury, “including herniated discs in her spine and nerve damage that causes continued weakness on her left side.” (FAC ¶ 48.) Moreover, Plaintiff's allegations of harassment by Defendant Roya are properly pled and show intentionally outrageous conduct. (FAC ¶¶ 22-24, 31.)

Based on the above, the demurrer to the eighth cause of action is overruled.

III.      Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike the following from Plaintiff’s Complaint:

1)     Paragraph 50, page 11, lines 1-2 ("Defendants' intentional harassment and refusal to fix the door was intentional, oppressive and malicious.");

2)     Paragraph 66 ("Defendants acted with malice and intended to cause injury to

Plaintiff and engaged in despicable conduction [sic] with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of Plaintiff”;

3)     Paragraph 67 ("Defendants' actions demonstrate oppression, because defendants engaged in despicable conduct that subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights as a tenant";

4)     Paragraph 68 in its entirety;

5)     Paragraph 93 in its entirety;

6)     Paragraph 94 in its entirety;

7)     Paragraph 95 ("Defendants’ refusal to maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition with the intent to force Plaintiff to vacate the property in order to avoid paying relocation fees, was carried out with a willful disregard for Plaintiff’s rights and safety as a tenant. As such, Plaintiff may recover punitive damages. Punitive damages should issue to dissuade Defendants from violating the rights of their tenants and from putting the health of their tenants at risk");

8)     Paragraph 115 ("Defendants’ actions were outrageous, intentionally causing Plaintiff severe emotional distress and/or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress");

9)     Paragraph 116 in its entirety;

10) The prayer for exemplary and punitive damages at paragraph 1(c);

11) The prayer for exemplary and punitive damages at paragraph 5(b); and

12) The prayer for exemplary and punitive damages at paragraph 8(b)

Upon motion, the court shall strike an allegation of punitive damages unless the ultimate facts showing an entitlement of such relief have been pled by a plaintiff. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) To survive a motion to strike, claims for punitive damages must provide facts showing the defendant acted maliciously, with the intention or willful and conscious disregard of her likelihood to cause harm. (Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.) To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code § 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.)¿ The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Id.)

¿“Malice” is defined in Civ. Code § 3294 (c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 891.) Fraud means “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(3). 

The court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged Defendants harassed Plaintiff by repeatedly threatening Plaintiff with eviction and harassing her by calling Plaintiff  a “parasite,” refusing to maintain the unit in a habitable condition despite knowing about the need for repairs regarding the mold, and the adverse impact the lack of repairs had on Plaintiff’s health.(FAC ¶ 19, 20, 25, 28, 36, 43, 45-47, 62.) As Plaintiff alleges that such conduct was intentionally done to cause Plaintiff to vacate her unit, the court finds the allegations are sufficient to support the finding that Defendants’ conduct was oppressive as Defendants acted with willful and conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights as a tenant. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).)

Therefore, Defendants’ motion to strike is denied.

Conclusion

Defendants’ demurrer to the eighth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is overruled. Defendants’ motion to strike is denied. The court orders Defendants to file an Answer within 10 days.  The Court also schedules an OSC Re: Filing of Answer and a Case Management Conference for April 25, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. Defendants to give notice.