Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 23STCV22798, Date: 2024-12-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV22798    Hearing Date: December 6, 2024    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 Friday, December 6, 2024

CASE NUMBER:                   23STCV22798

CASE NAME:                        The State of California v. Apex Development Inc., et al.

MOVING PARTY:                 Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant California Department of Transportation

OPPOSING PARTY:             None

TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

PROCEEDING:                      Demurrer to Cross-Complaint

OPPOSITION:                        None

REPLY:                                  None

TENTATIVE:                         Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to the first cause of action and overruled as to the second cause of action. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant must file an Answer by December 16, 2024.  An OSC Re: Answer and Case Management Conference is set for January 15, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.  Moving party to give notice.

Background

On September 20, 2023, The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation (“Plaintiff”) filed this Unlawful Detainer action against Apex Development Inc. (“Apex”); Anthony Now Aid; MCA Trucking, Pacific Express Pallets; (collectively “Defendants”) and Does 1 to 20.

On June 11, 2024, Defendant Apex Development filed a Cross-Complaint (“CC”) against Plaintiff asserting two causes of action: (1) Quasi Contract – Restitution; and (2) Intentional Interface with Contract. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant now demurs to the Cross-Complaint. The demurrer remains unopposed. The matter is now before the court.

request for JUDICIAL notice

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452(c), (d), and (h).) “Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant requests judicial notice of the following:

Exhibit 1: Written lease agreement, executed on June 18, 2008, between Apex Development, Inc. and the State of California, Department of Transportation [Caltrans], for Airspace Lease Area No. 07-LAX010- 0012-05.

As Exhibit 1 is referenced in the Cross-Complaint, the court may take judicial notice of the existence of Exhibit 1. (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 753-754.) The request for judicial notice is granted.

Demurrer[1]

I.         Legal Standard

Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.¿ (CCP, § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In evaluating a demurrer, the court accepts the complainant’s properly pled facts as true and ignores contentions, deductions, and conclusory statements. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1976) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Moreover, the court does not consider whether a plaintiff will be able to prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such proof. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 604.) 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

II.        Discussion

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant demurs to the first and second causes of action in the Cross-Complaint on the basis the facts are insufficient to constitute a cause of action.

First, Plaintiff asserts that the first cause of action for quantum meruit causes of action are specifically not allowed against government entities like CalTrans. (Gov. Code, §§ 811.2; 13975.) “[A]n  action for quantum meruit may not be maintained against the government, as a matter of law.” (Lundeen Coatings Corp. v. Department of Water & Power (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 816, 834.) “As a general rule, a public entity cannot be sued on an implied in law or quasi-contract theory, because such a theory is based on quantum meruit or restitution considerations which are outweighed by the need to protect and limit a public entity's contractual obligations.” (Id. at p. 834, fn. 9.)

As the demurrer remains unopposed, the demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.

Second, Plaintiff also asserts the first and second causes of action are common law causes of action not based in statute, and a public entity like CalTrans cannot be held liable pursuant to the Government Claims Act. “The basic architecture of the Act is encapsulated in Government Code section 815. Subdivision (a) of that section makes clear that under the GCA, there is no such thing as common law tort liability for public entities; a public entity is not liable for an injury ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.’” (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803 citing Gov. Code § 835(a).)

The Cross-Complaint alleges that Daryl Myatt, a right-of-way agent for Caltrans, was aware Apex Development had a written rental agreement for storage with Apex Tenants, but Myatt came to the Subject Property on numerous occasions to advise and instruct Apex’s tenants not to pay rent as CalTrans intended to evict Apex from the Subject Property. (CC, ¶¶ 25, 126.). As a result of Myatt’s and CalTrans’ interference, Apex’s tenants stopped paying rent. (Id. ¶ 27.) The Cross-Complaint asserts that Myatt, as a public employee, can be held liable for his action under Gov. Code § 820(a) and Caltrans can be held proximately liable under Gov. Code § 815.2(a) because Myatt was acting within the scope of his employment. (Id. ¶ 28.)

Plaintiff fails to explain why CalTrans cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of its employee, Myatt. “Vicarious liability is a primary basis for liability on the part of a public entity, and flows from the responsibility of such an entity for the acts of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior. “ (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1128.)

As Plaintiff fails to explain why Myatt and CalTrans cannot be held liable under Gov. Code §§ 820(a) and 815.2(a), the demurrer to the second cause of action is overruled.

Conclusion

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to the first cause of

action and overruled as to the second cause of action. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant must file an

Answer by December 16, 2024.  An OSC Re: Answer and Case Management Conference is set

for January 15, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.  Moving party to give notice.