Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 23STCV25479, Date: 2025-05-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV25479 Hearing Date: May 30, 2025 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: Friday, May 30, 2025
CASE NUMBER: 23STCV25479
CASE NAME: Martha Antuche, et al. v. General Motors LLC
MOVING PARTY: Defendant General Motors
OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiffs Martha Antuche and
Jonathan Salas
TRIAL DATE: 22 July 2025
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
PROCEEDING: Motion for Summary
Judgment/Summary Adjudication
OPPOSITION: 9 May 2025
REPLY: 19
May 2025
TENTATIVE: Defendant GM’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendant is to submit a proposed judgment
within 5 days. The Court schedules an
OSC Re: Proposed Judgment for June 24, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. Defendant to give notice.
Background
On
October 18, 2023, Martha Antuche and Jonathan Salas (collectively “Plaintiffs”)
filed this lemon law action against General Motors LLC (“Defendant”) and Does 1
to 10. The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts five causes of
action: (1) Violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2, (2) Violation of Civ. Code §
1793.2(b), (3) Civ. Code § 1793.2(a)(3), (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability (Civ. Code §§ 1791.1, 1794), and (5) Violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §
2301-2312).
On
January 31, 2025, Defendant GM moveD for summary judgment on the FAC or, in the
alternative, for summary adjudication.
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion. The matter is now before the court.
I. Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’
pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in
fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”¿ (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c),
requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence
submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted
by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
Summary adjudication may be granted as to one or more causes of action within
an action, or one or more claims for damages. (CCP, § 437c(f).)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
A defendant moving for summary judgment bears two burdens:
(1) the burden of production – presenting admissible evidence, through material
facts, sufficient to satisfy a directed verdict standard; and (2) the burden of
persuasion – the material facts presented must persuade the court that the
plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of a cause of action, or a
complete defense vitiates the cause of action. (CCP § 437c(p)(2);¿Aguilar,¿supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 850-851.) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that
the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some
essential element of the claim.¿¿(Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31
Cal.App.4th 574, 590.)¿¿Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.”¿(Ibid.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
“On ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is
to ‘liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’” (Cheal
v. El Camino Hospital¿(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, 760.) On a summary
judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the
opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While
viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its
primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.
[Citation.]” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.¿(1999) 75
Cal.App.4th¿832, 839.)¿¿¿
II. Discussion
A. Factual Summary
The FAC alleges that on or about August 30, 2017, Plaintiffs
purchased a 2015 Chevrolet Cruze (the “Subject Vehicle”) that Defendant GM
manufactured. (FAC, ¶¶ 6, 9.) The FAC asserts that when the Subject Vehicle was
purchased, Plaintiff received express written warranties in which Defendant GM
undertook to provide services and repairs in the event of nonconformity within
the applicable warranty period. (Id. ¶ 11.)
The Subject Vehicle suffered from defects regarding the HVAC,
cooling system, and engine defects that substantially impaired the use, value,
and safety of the Subject Vehicle. (FAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs took the Subject
Vehicle to an authorized service and repair facility but Defendant GM and/or
its authorized service and repair facility but they failed to conform the
Subject Vehicle to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number
of repair opportunities, failed to promptly replace or repurchase the Subject
Vehicle in violation the Song-Beverly Act, and failed to fulfill their
obligations under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
Defendant
GM now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication.
B. 1st
to 3rd Causes of Action - Violations of the Song-Beverly
Act
In Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (Rodriguez),
the California Supreme Court held that “a motor vehicle purchased with an
unexpired manufacturer's new car warranty does not qualify as a ‘motor vehicle
sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty’ under section 1793.22, subdivision
(e)(2) ’s definition of ‘new motor vehicle’ unless the new car warranty was
issued with the sale.” (Id. at p. 196.)
The Rodriguez Court concluded that the legislative history of the
Song-Beverly Act “do not indicate any intent to cover used vehicles with an
unexpired manufacturer's new car warranty.” (Id. at p. 203.) “Indeed,
what we find most significant about the legislative history is that it makes no
mention of used vehicles.” (Id. at p. 203.) “Against this backdrop, it
would be anomalous to construe “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's
new car warranty” (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2)) to include any used car sold by a
distributor or retailer with a preexisting, unexpired manufacturer's warranty.”
(Id. at p. 202)
Defendant GM asserts Plaintiffs cannot pursue breach of express
warranty claims under the Song-Beverly Act against GM because Plaintiffs did
not purchase a “new motor vehicle” but a used vehicle. The Parties do not
dispute that the Subject Vehicle was delivered to Rydell Chevrolet to its
original owner(s) on May 13, 2015, with 14 miles on the odometer. (Undisputed
Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 4.) In connection with this transaction, GM issued a
New Vehicle Limited Warranty with (i) bumper-to-bumper coverage for the earlier
of 36 months or 36,000 miles and (ii) powertrain coverage for the earlier of 60
months or 100,000 miles. (UMF No. 5.)
On August 21, 2018, Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle used
from Coachella Valley Volkswagen with more than 26,000 miles. (UMF No. 2.)
Accordingly, the Subject Vehicle is not a “new motor vehicle” under the
Song-Beverly Act.
The Song-Beverly Act addresses used products under Civ. Code § 19795.5,
which “‘provides express warranty protections for used goods only where the
entity selling the used product issues an express warranty at the time of
sale.’” (Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 201 [italics
original].) Defendant GM asserts that the only express warranty was issued to
the original purchaser of the Subject Vehicle, and not to Plaintiffs as the
subsequent buyers. (Roybal Decl., ¶ 3, Ex A; Jensen Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, Ex. A.) “For
new products, liability extends to the manufacturer; for used products,
liability extends to the distributor or retail seller and not to the
manufacturer, at least where the manufacturer has not issued a new warranty or
played a substantial role in the sale of a used good.” (Rodriguez, at p.
202.)
The court finds that Defendant GM has met its initial burden of
showing there are no triable issues of fact. The burden now shifts to Plaintiffs
to show that triable issues of fact exist that preclude summary adjudication.
Plaintiffs assert that when they purchased the Subject Vehicle on
or about August 20, 2019, Plaintiffs entered into a warranty contract with
Defendant GM. (Khodanian Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. A.) Plaintiffs only evidence is the
Retail Installment Sales Contract, dated August 20, 2018. (Ibid.) They offer
no deposition testimony, declarations, or other evidence showing that at the
time the Subject Vehicle was purchased, Defendant GM issued a new express warranty
that was different than the unexpired manufacturer’s warranty originally issued
to the original buyers of the Subject Vehicle. “[T]he phrase ‘other motor
vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty’ was not intended to cover
any used car with an unexpired new car warranty.” (Rodriguiez, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 202.)
Moreover, while Plaintiffs rely on Stiles v. Kia America, Inc.
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 913 to assert that Plaintiffs may still bring
Song-Beverly claims under Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action, Stiles
is no longer good law and has been “depublished” or “not citable” due to the California
Supreme Court’s Rodriguez decision. (Stiles v. Kia Motors America
(Cal. 2025) 328 Cal.Rptr.3d 874 [562 P.3d 1].) Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to
cite any case law finding purchasers of a used vehicle with a remaining
unexpired manufacturer warranty can pursue claims under the Act against the
manufacturer for violations of Civ. Code §§ 11793.2(b) and 1793.2(a)(3).
Plaintiffs fail to show that triable issues of material fact exist
as to whether the Subject Vehicle was a used vehicle with a new warranty issued
at the time of purchase. Therefore, summary adjudication is granted as to the
first through third causes of action.
C. 4th Cause of Action - Breach of the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability
Under the Song-Beverly Act, “a consumer may bring claims for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability” pursuant to Civ. Code § 1791.1.
(Carver v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 864,
878.) “Section 1791, subdivision (a) defines “consumer goods” as “any new
product” that meets specified conditions.” (Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 385, 398 (Nunez).) “It is evident from these provisions
that only distributors or sellers of used goods—not manufacturers of new
goods—have implied warranty obligations in the sale of used goods.” (Id.
at p. 399 [italics original], see also Civ. Code, § 1795.5.)
Defendant GM asserts that because the Subject Vehicle is used, Plaintiffs
cannot assert an implied warranty claim against GM as manufacturer because the
Song-Beverly Act does not create implied warranties against manufacturers for
the sale of used consumer goods. (See Civ. Code, § 1795.5.) “The Act
also provides implied warranties for used products. These are shorter than the
implied warranties for new products; their maximum duration is three months.” (Rodriguez
v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, 218, aff'd (2024) 17
Cal.5th 189.)“As is the case with
liability for breach of express warranties, ‘in the sale
of used consumer goods, liability for breach of implied warranty lies with
distributors and retailers, not the manufacturer,’ unless the
manufacturer issues a new warranty along with the sale of the used good.” (Id.
at p. 218 citing Nunez, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 398.)
As the Parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs bought the vehicle
used with 26,000 miles remaining on the warranty, the court agrees that
Defendant GM has met its initial burden of showing that the Subject Vehicle is
a used vehicle and Plaintiffs cannot prevail on the implied warranty claim.
Plaintiffs’ opposition asserts that their implied warranty claim
remains viable under Civ. Code §§ 1791.1 (implied warranty), 1794 (remedies),
or 1795.5 (retailer liability). The court disagrees.
First, section 1791.1 provides an implied warranty of
merchantability against vehicle manufacturers, “but in no event shall such
implied warranty have a duration of less than 60 days nor more than one year
following the sale of new consumer goods to a retail buyer.” (Id. §
1791.1(c).) As the vehicle was purchased new, and more than a year after its
original sale, any claims under section 1791.1 are barred. (UFM Nos. 2, 4, 5.)
Second, section 1795.5 only applies to retailers or
distributors, and Plaintiffs failed to
produce evidence showing that GM acted as a retailer or distributor. “Where the
manufacturer sells directly to the public, however, it takes on the role of a
retailer” and can be held liable as a retailer. (Nunez, supra, 61
Cal.App.5th at p. 399; see Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 334, 340 (Kiluk) [The manufacturer “partnered with a
dealership to sell used vehicles directly to the public by offering an express warranty
as part of the sales package,” and by doing so, “stepped into the role of a
retailer and was subject to the obligations of a retailer under section
1795.5.”].)
Plaintiffs assert that as they took the Subject Vehicle to an
authorized repair facility and GM authorized repairs, this shows GM acted as a retailer
or distributor. (Decl., ¶¶ 8, 14, Ex. C, D.) The evidence cited, however, does
not show that GM acted as a retailer or distributer by offering the vehicle to
the public for purchase. “Under the lemon law, only distributors and retail
sellers, not manufacturers, are liable for breach of implied warranties in the
sale of a used car where, as here, the manufacturer did not offer the used car
for sale to the public.” (Nunez, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p.
389.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that they purchased the subject
vehicle from Coachella Valley Volkswagen on August 21, 2018, and fail to show
that GM was involved in the transaction or issued a new vehicle warranty like
the manufacturer in Kiluk. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to show that GM
acted as a retailer or distributor of used goods at the time the Subject
Vehicle was purchased, such that GM can be held liable for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability. In the absence of an obligation to abide
by implied warranties, Plaintiffs cannot show that GM is liable to Plaintiffs
for damages under Civ. Code § 1794.
Based on the above, summary adjudication is granted as to the
fourth cause of action.
D. 5th Cause of Action -
Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
“The
Magnuson–Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
(Magnuson–Moss), 15 U.S.C. sections 2301 et seq., authorizes a civil suit by a
consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty.” (Daugherty
v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 832–833 (Daugherty).)
“Magnuson–Moss ‘calls for the application of state written and implied warranty
law, not the creation of additional federal law,’ except in specific instances
in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule.” (Id. at p. 833.)
Consequently, the “failure to state a warranty claim under state law
necessarily constituted a failure to state a claim under Magnuson–Moss.” (Ibid.)
Defendant
GM maintains the fifth cause of action fails as a matter of law because
Plaintiffs do not state a viable state law claim. Courts have held that even if
relief is not available under the Song-Beverly Act, a cause of action under the
Magnuson-Moss Act may be based on other state laws, such as the warranty
provisions under California Commercial Code, §§ 2313 and 2714. (See Orichian
v. BMW of North America, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1332; see also
Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 928 [purchaser’s
express warranty claims under the California Commercial Code were viable
despite the lack of a viable cause of action under the Song-Beverly Act].)
Here,
however, the FAC only asserts claims under the Song-Beverly Act and alleges no
breaches of the California Commercial Code. As the Song-Beverly Act claims
fail, there is no state law claim to support a claim for violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Therefore, Defendant GM has met its initial burden
of showing no triable issues of fact exist and it is entitled to summary
adjudication as a matter of law.
In
their opposition, Plaintiffs assert that Magnuson-Moss claims do not require
parallel claims because said claims can be premised on standalone federal
breach of warranty claims. “Magnuson-Moss supplements California law of
warranty and establishes a cause of action under the federal act for breach of
written warranty.” (Orichian v. BMW of North America, LLC (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 1322, 1332.) The Orichian case is distinguishable because
the written warranted were premised on breach of written warranties under the
California Commercial Code, an allegation that is absent in Plaintiffs’ FAC.
“Plaintiff's count under Magnuson-Moss for breach of written warranty was based
on the California Uniform Commercial Code, which provides a remedy for breach
of express warranty.” (Id. at p. 1332.)
Plaintiff
also cites Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905 and Clemens
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1017, in support of their
proposition that Magnuson-Moss claims may stand independent of any Song-Beverly
claims. However, in Dagher and Clemens, both plaintiffs invoked
provisions of the California Commercial Code in connection with their
Magnuson-Moss claims. “Clemens alleges a violation of the Act only insofar as
DaimlerChrysler may have breached its warranties under state law; there is no
allegation that DaimlerChrysler otherwise failed to comply with the
Magnuson–Moss Act. Therefore, the federal claims hinge on the state law
warranty claims.” (Clemens, at p. 1022, fn. 3; see also Ngo v. BMW of
North America, LLC (9th Cir. 2022) 23 F.4th 942, 945 [“Her sixth claim,
based on the Magnuson-Moss Act, will “stand or fall with [the] express and
implied warranty claims under state law.”].)
In
Brilliant v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. (N.D. Cal., July 7, 2010, No. C
09-04568 SI) 2010 WL 2721531, at *1, the “Defendant offered a limited express
warranty which covered repairs or replacements of any defects . . .” whereas in
this action, the Plaintiffs have failed to show that Defendant GM issued to
Plaintiffs a new express or implied warranty that is enforceable under the
Magnuson-Moss Act. Plaintiffs offer no evidence that they received a written
warranty under as defined the Act and that Defendant GM acted as the supplier
or warrantor, as defined by the Act. (15 U.S.C.A. § 2301 subd. (4)-(6). ) While
Plaintiffs assert that the Subject Vehicle came with an unexpired warranty,
Plaintiffs cite case law finding that Defendant GM can be held liable under the
Magnuson-Moss Act for failing to comply with the terms of an unexpired warranty
it did not issue.
In
the absence of a written warranty, GM cannot be held liable under the
Magnuson-Moss Act for failing to comply with warranties that never existed.
Accordingly, summary adjudication as to the fifth cause of action is granted.
Defendant
GM’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Plaintiffs
request that judgment be entered without prejudice and leave to amend be
granted. The court denies Plaintiffs’ request because such an amendment would
be prejudicial to the Defendant, given the proximity of trial and Plaintiffs’
lack of diligence in seeking amendment.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth
above, Defendant GM’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendant is to
submit a proposed judgment within 5 days.
The Court schedules an OSC Re: Proposed Judgment for June 24, 2025, at
8:30 a.m. Defendant to give notice.