Judge Gail Killefer, Case Number: 23STCV25631, Date: 2025-05-19 Tentative Ruling

On October 20, 2023, Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan (“Plaintiff”) filed this unlawful detainer action against Defendants Linda J. Maultsby; Jaccoma Maultsby; Jezreel Maultsby; Charmaine Thompson; Blanca Estela Tinoco; George Tinoco; Olivia Weaver; All Unknown Occupants; Tenants, and Subtenants and Does 1 to 25.

Plaintiff is the owner of real property of the Subject Property located in Los Angeles, CA (the “Subject Property”). The Subject Property contains a multi-unit building which is comprised of four units with the following addresses: (1) 2757 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016; (2) 2759 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016; (3) 5107 Westhaven St., Los Angeles, CA 90016; and (4) 5109 Westhaven St., Los Angeles, CA 90016.

Defendant Linda Maultsby (hereinafter “Defendant”) is a tenant at the Subject Property pursuant to a lease agreement that pre-dates Plaintiff’s ownership of the Subject Property. Maultsby occupies 2759 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016 (the “Unit”).

Plaintiff entered into an agreement to sell the Property to a third party. The third party wished to inspect the Property, including the Unit. On August 9, 2023, Plaintiff served on Defendant a notice requiring Defendant to permit an inspection of the Property and Unit. Plaintiff subsequently delivered a second letter, requesting the same, on an unspecified date. Defendant did not allow Plaintiff to inspect the Subject Property and the Unit.

On September 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Defendant in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Department 78, (LASC Case No. 23STCV21442). Department 78 heard Defendant’s demurrer and sustained it without leave to amend, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Judgment was entered on May 14, 2024.

On October 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed this present action, raising a claim against Plaintiff for unlawful detainer. This action was stayed pending resolution of the Department 78 action.

On March 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of related cases as to the following:

1) Linda J. Maultsby v. Marcel Bruetsch, et al. (LASC Case No. 23STCV07896) filed on April 10, 2023;

2) Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby et. al. (LASC Case No. 23STCV21079) filed on August 31, 2023.

3) Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby et. al. (LASC Case No. 23STCV21442) filed on September 1, 2023.

4) Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby et. al. (LASC Case No. 23STCV21301) filed on September 1, 2023.

5) Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby et. al. (LASC Case No. 23STCV21446) filed on September 1, 2023.

6) Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby et. al. (LASC Case No. 23STCV25626) filed on October 20, 2023.

7) Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby et. al. (LASC Case No. 23STCV25637) filed on October 20, 2023.

Other cases referenced by Defendant as involving the same parties but not included in the notice of related cases are (8) Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby (LASC Case No. 23STCV25635) filed on October 20, 2023 and (9) Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby et. al. (LASC Case No. 24STCV21169) filed on October 20, 2023

After Department 78 entered judgment in favor of the Defendant, this court lifted the stay in this action and granted Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint.

On July 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) raising two causes of action for unlawful detainer. On September 3, 2024, the court sustained with leave to amend Defendant’s demurrer to the FAC based on Plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue. The FAC added Jaccoma Maultsby, Jezreel Maultsby, Charmaine Thompson, Blanca Estala Tinoco, Jorge Tinoco, and Olivia Weaver as Defendants.

On September 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). On November 19, 2024, the court overruled Defendant’s demurrer based Plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue.

On December 13, 2024, Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby filed a peremptory challenge. Consequently, this action was reassigned to Judge Gail Killefer in Department 37.

On April 1, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to disqualify counsel. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

On April 15, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

On April 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary adjudication (“MSA”). Defendant filed an opposition on May 15, 2025, at 8:37 p.m. These matters are now before the court.

motion to disqualify counsel

CCP § 128(a)(5) authorizes the Court, in furtherance of justice, to control the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.¿ (CCP, § 126(a)(5).)¿ This authority necessarily includes disqualifying an attorney. (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. Tracinda Corp. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1837–1838.) The issue of disqualification ultimately involves a conflict between the clients’ right to counsel of their choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility. (Ibid.) However, the paramount concern must be the preservation of public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar and the recognized and important right to counsel of one’s choosing must yield to considerations of ethics that run to the very integrity of our judicial process. (Ibid.)¿

Whether an attorney should be disqualified is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (Henriksen v. Great Am. Sav. & Loan (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 109, 113.) In exercising that discretion, the trial court is required to make a reasoned judgment which complies with the legal principles and policies applicable to the issue at hand. (Ibid.)¿

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452(c), (d), and (h).) “Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)

Exhibit A: A true and correct copy of the Minute Order, dated March 3, 2025 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #24STCV21169).

Exhibit B: A true and correct copy of the relevant pages of Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan’s Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens Recorded, which is the Declaration of Barry Blue, filed on June 27, 2023 - Maultsby v. Bruetsch (L.A.S.C. # 23STCV07896).

Exhibit C: A true and correct copy of the Minute Order, dated March 3, 2025 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #24STCV21169).

Exhibit D: A true and correct copy of the Opposition to Demurrer to Complaint, dated February 14, 2024 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. # 23STCV25631).

Exhibit E: A true and correct copy of the Further Order Re: Post-Judgment … and Payment of Deposit to Plaintiff, dated June 14, 2024 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. # 23STCV21446).

Exhibit F: A true and correct copy of the Judgment, filed on November 13, 2024 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. # 23STCV21446).

Exhibit G: A true and correct copy of the Second Amended Complaint, dated March 24, 2025 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #24STCV21169).

Exhibit H: A true and correct copy of the Form 5500 - Annual Return / Report of Employee Benefit Plan for Mural Media LLC 401K Plan filed with the U.S. Department of Labor for calendar year of 2014.

Exhibit I: A true and correct copy of the Certificate of Certified Copy of the Computer Generated Report for Mural Media, LLC (Registry #55143789) from the State of Oregon, Office of the Secretary of State Corporation Division, dated 7/8/2024.

Exhibit J: A true and correct copy of the Certified copies of Mural Media, LLC documents filed with the California Secretary of State.

Exhibit K: A true and correct copy of the Certificate from U.S. Department of Labor, dated February 27, 2024 – Form 5500 - Annual Return / Report of Employee Benefit Plan for Mural Media LLC 401K Plan for calendar year of 2015.

Exhibit L: A true and correct copy of the Notice of Filing of Notice of Removal, filed on November 13, 2024 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25626).

Exhibit M: A true and correct copy of the Notice of Stay of Proceedings, filed on November 13, 2024 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25626).

Exhibit N: A true and correct copy of the Declaration of Michael W. Stoltzman Jr Re: Lack of Federal Court Removal - Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25626).

Exhibit O: A true and correct copy of the Minute Order, dated November 14, 2024 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25626).

Exhibit P: A true and correct copy of the Request for Entry of Default, filed on November 22, 2024 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25626).

Exhibit Q: A true and correct copy of the Order of Remand from U.S. District Court, filed on November 22, 2024 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25626).

Exhibit R: A true and correct copy of the Ex Parte Application Requesting The Court Enter Default Judgment, filed on February 6, 2025 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25626).

Exhibit S: A true and correct copy of the Minute Order, dated February 7, 2025 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25626).

Exhibit T: A true and correct copy of the Complaint, dated October 10, 2024 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby (L.A.S.C. #23STCV26374).

Exhibit U: A true and correct copy of the Assignment of Deed of Trust, recorded on April 26, 2021 as instrument no. 20210654283 with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office.

Exhibit V: A true and correct copy of the Quitclaim Deed, recorded on June 30, 2023 as instrument no. 20230428044 with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office.

Exhibit W: A true and correct copy of the Agreement and Plan of Merger, filed with the California Secretary of State, on May 5, 2020.

Exhibit X: A true and correct copy of the Application to Register a Foreign Limited Liability Company for Pensco Trust Company LLC, filed on September 9, 2011 with the California Secretary of State.

Exhibit Y: A true and correct copy of the LLC Termination – Certificate of Cancellation for Pensco Company LLC, filed on December 4, 2020 with the California Secretary of State.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted as to Exhibits C, D, H, and K.

However, Defendant fails to explain how Exhibits A, B, E, F, G, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, and T—which are orders issued by another court in other actions—are relevant to this case. “Although a court may judicially notice a variety of matters (Evid. Code, §¿450 et seq.), only relevant material may be noticed.” (American Cemwood Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 431, 441, fn. 7.) Trial court rulings in state and federal courts have no precedential value, and Defendant fails to show that those orders have a preclusive effect on this action. Defendant similarly fails to explain how Exhibits I, J, U, V, W, and Y are relevant to this Motion.

Therefore, Defendant’s request for judicial notice is denied as to Exhibits A, B, E, F, G, I, J, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, and Y.

Defendant moves to disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel on the basis that Plaintiff’s counsel has misrepresented Plaintiff’s capacity to bring suit, such that it cannot enter into an agreement for legal representation, rendering the verification of the SAC by Plaintiff’s counsel invalid.

First, the court notes that on November 19, 2024, this court overruled Defendant’s demurrer based on Plaintiff’s lack of capacity. The court specifically noted that “[i]n general, any person or entity has capacity to sue or defend a civil action in the California courts. This includes artificial ‘persons’ such as corporations, partnerships and associations.” (American Alternative Energy Partners II v. Windridge, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 551, 559.) “A partnership or other unincorporated association has capacity both to sue and be sued in the name it has assumed or by which it is known.” (Ibid; see also CCP, § 369.5(a).) “Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged its capacity to sue.” (11/19/2024 Minute Order at p. 6.)

The court agrees that by filing this Motion on the basis that Plaintiff lacks the capacity to sue, Defendant is in effect seeking reconsideration of the November 19, 2024 Order. “The name of a motion is not controlling, and, regardless of the name, a motion asking the trial court to decide the same matter previously ruled on is a motion for reconsideration.” (Powell v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1577.) Moreover, Defendant fails to show that Plaintiff’s alleged lack of capacity to bring suit is grounds for disqualification of Plaintiff’s counsel.

Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s motion on the basis that Defendant has no standing to seek disqualification because she had no attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff’s counsel. “ ‘[A] moving party must have standing, that is, an invasion of a legally cognizable interest, to disqualify an attorney.’ ” (In re Marriage of Murchison (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 (Murchison) quoting Great Lakes Construction, Inc. v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1357 (Great Lakes).) Generally, the party moving for disqualification “ ‘must have had an attorney-client relationship with that attorney,’” or “‘some sort of confidential or fiduciary relationship must exist or have existed.’” (Murchison, at p. 581 quoting Great Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356.)

Defendant’s Motion fails to provide any evidence that she had an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff’s counsel or that Plaintiff’s counsel had a confidential or fiduciary relationship with Defendant.

The Great Lakes Court recognized that there is “a minority view inasmuch as it permits a nonclient to move to disqualify opposing counsel.” (Great Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) However, this “ ‘minority view does not alter well-established standing requirements’ ” because ‘the nonclient must meet stringent standing requirements, that is, harm arising from a legally cognizable interest which is concrete and particularized, not hypothetical.’ ” (Moreci v. Scaffold Solutions, Inc. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 425, 434 (Moreci) quoting Great Lakes at p. 1357.) This “‘standing requirement for attorney disqualification motions protects against the strategic exploitation of the rules of ethics and guards against improper use of disqualification as a litigation tactic.’ ”a non-client to move to disqualify opposing counsel.’” (Moreci, at p. 452 quoting Great Lakes, at p. 1358.)

Even under the minority view, Defendant fails to show that in the absence of an attorney-client relationship, she has a legally cognizable interest in seeking Plaintiff’s counsel’s disqualification, such that Defendant has standing to bring this motion. The lack of standing alone is sufficient for the court to deny the Motion. (Moreci, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 444.)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064.) “In deciding or reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, all properly pleaded material facts are deemed to be true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged.” (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.) When considering demurrers and judgment on the pleadings, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 720-21.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action. (Id.) “In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action.” (Gami v. Mullikin Medical Ctr. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 870, 876.) A non-statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made any time before or during trial. (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.)¿¿

“‘Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.’ ” (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.)

Exhibit A: A true and correct copy of the Complaint – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby, (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25631).

Exhibit B: A true and correct copy of the Answer – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby, (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25631).

Exhibit C: A true and correct copy of the City of Los Angeles, Statement of Registration of Rental Units for Subject Property, valid July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024.

Exhibit D: A true and correct copy of the four separate - 3-page - LAHD Declaration Re: Request to Verify the Filing of an Eviction Notice with the Los Angeles Housing Department for APN: 5049015030, response date March 4, 2025 for all four units of the subject property.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted as to Exhibits A, B, and D as they concern the subject property located at 2759 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016. (SAC, ¶ 7.) However, Exhibit C is a Statement of Registration of Rental Units for a property located at 2757 S. Mansfield Avenue, and Defendant fails to explain how Exhibit C relates to the Property as issue in this UD action. Therefore, judicial notice of Exhibit C is denied.

Exhibit 1: “Minute Order.” This document was filed in this case on or about February 18, 2025.

Exhibit 2: “Motion to Compel” re: Special Interrogatories. This document was filed in this case on or about August 7, 2024.

Exhibit 3: “Motion to Compel” re: Requests for Production. This document was filed in this case on or about August 7, 2024.

Exhibit 4: “Notice of Ruling” re: Motions to Compel. This document was filed in this case on or about November 19, 2024.

Exhibit 5: “Motion for Sanctions.” This document was filed in this case on or about March 5, 2025.

Exhibit 6: “Notice of Ruling” re: Motion for Sanctions. This document was filed in this case on or about April 17, 2025.

Exhibit 7: “Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale.” This document was recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about May 26, 2023.

Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Plaintiff’s UD action fails due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) § 151.09. The Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“LARSO”) provides that a copy of any written notice terminating a tenancy must be filed with the LAHD within three days of service on the tenant. (LAMC § 151.09(C)(9).) A failure to do so may be raised as an affirmative defense in an action by a landlord to recover possession of a rental unit. (Id. § 151.09(E).)

In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, any defects must either appear on the face of the pleading, or else be taken by judicial notice. (Bezirdjian v. O’Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322). “[J]udgment on the pleadings must be denied where there are material factual issues that require evidentiary resolution.” (Id. at p. 322.)

The SAC states “[t]he Subject Property is a single parcel of real property, which contains a multi-unit building that is comprised of 4 different units, with the following mailing addresses: (1) 2757 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016; (2) 2759 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016; (3) 5107 Westhaven St., Los Angeles, CA 90016; and (4) 5109 Westhaven St., Los Angeles, CA 90016.” (SAC, ¶ 6.) “This unlawful detainer complaint is directed at the unit with the mailing address of 2759 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016 (the “Unit”).” (Id. ¶ 7.)

LARSO applies to “Rental Units” defined as “[a]ll dwelling units, efficiency dwelling units, guest rooms, and suites, as defined in Section 12.03 of this Code, and all housing accommodations as defined in Government Code Section 12927, and duplexes and condominiums in the City of Los Angeles, rented or offered for rent for living or dwelling purposes . . .” (LAMC, § 151.02.) Excluded from the definition of “Rental Units” are “Dwellings, one family, except where two or more dwelling units are located on the same parcel. This exception shall not apply to duplexes or condominiums.” (Id. § 151.02(1).)

As the Subject Property “is a single parcel of real property, which contains a multi-unit building that is comprised of 4 different units” the court is not persuaded that the Subject Property is not subject to LARSO.

However, the court agrees that disputed issues of fact that do not appear on the face of the SAC preclude this court from granting Defendant’s Motion. Defendant’s RJN Ex. 1 is a copy of the original Complaint filed in this action, including Exhibit A, which is the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale dated May 26, 2023. (RJN Ex. A [Compl., Ex. 1].) Defendant’s RJN Ex. 7 is a copy of the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale dated May 26, 2023. The Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale shows that Plaintiff obtained an undivided 47.618% interest in the Subject Property pursuant to the “terms and provision of the Deed of Trust executed by Linda J. Maultsby, A Married Woman as Her Sole and Separate Property . . . (RJN Ex. A, RJN Ex. 7.)

Accordingly, the Deed of Trust shows Defendant was the previous owner of the Property. This means that if Defendant had a tenancy, it ceased when she acquired ownership of the Property. (Vucinich v. Gordon (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 434, 437 citing Civ. Code, § 1933(3).) Accordingly, Defendant fails to show that she is a tenant.

Moreover, the SAC alleges that “Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that all Defendants claim to have a right to occupy the Unit located at the Subject Property pursuant to written lease agreements that pre-date Plaintiff’s ownership of the Subject Property.” (SAC, ¶ 23.) Whether such a lease exists is a disputed issue of fact, not subject to adjudication on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Because Defendant fails to show that she is a Tenant, she fails to show that Plaintiff was a Landlord, as defined by LAMC § 151.02, who receives or is entitled to receive rent from Defendant. Defendant also fails to show she is a tenant, “entitled to use or occupancy of a rental unit.” (LAMC, § 151.02.) Consequently, Defendant fails to show that Plaintiff was required to comply with LAMC § 151.09 because that section only applies to landlords seeking to recover possession from a tenant. It remains disputed whether Plaintiff is a landlord and Defendant is a tenant, and whether LAMC § 151.09 applies.

Second, while LAMC § 151.09(E) allows a tenant to assert an affirmative defense based on violations of LARSO, Defendant has not shown that she is a tenant entitled to raise such a defense. Third, Defendant, not Plaintiff, bears the burden of proving affirmative defenses, and Defendant has failed to show that on the face of the SAC, such a defense applies and that she has standing to assert such a defense. Lastly, Defendant fails to show that purported violations of LARSO by Plaintiff deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction over this UD action.

motion for summary adjudication

In an unlawful detainer action, notice of a motion for summary judgment must be given in compliance with CCP § 1013 and § 1170.7. (CRC, rule 3.1351(a).)¿CCP §¿1170.7 provides that a motion for summary judgment may be made at any time after the answer is filed upon giving five days’ notice.¿“The procedures governing a motion for summary judgment in an unlawful detainer action are streamlined (e.g., separate statements are not required under section 437c, subdivision (s) of the Code of Civil Procedure), but such a motion ‘shall be granted or denied on the same basis as a motion under [Code of Civil Procedure s]ection 437c’ [citation].” (Borden v. Stiles (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 337, 344–345.)

Any opposition to the motion and any reply to an opposition may be made orally at the time of hearing. (CRC, rule 3.1351(b).)¿ If a party seeks to have a written opposition considered in advance of the hearing, the written opposition must be filed and served on or before the court day before the hearing.¿(CRC, rule 3.1351(c).)¿ Service must be by personal delivery, facsimile transmission, express mail, or other means consistent with CCP §§¿1010-1013, and reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other party or parties no later than the close of business on the court day before the hearing.¿ (Id.)¿ The court, in its discretion, may consider written opposition filed later.¿ (Id.)¿

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) “Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)

Exhibit 1: “Deed of Trust” dated January 30, 2020, executed by Defendant. This document was recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about February 4, 2020.

Exhibit 2: “Notice of Default” dated June 29, 2022. This document was recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about June 30, 2022.

Exhibit 3: “Notice of Trustee’s Sale” dated April 3, 2023. This document was recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about April 6, 2023.

Exhibit 4: “Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale” dated May 25, 2023. This document was recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about May 26, 2023.

Exhibit 5: “Second Amended Complaint” filed by Defendant. This document was filed in this Court, in Case No. 23STCV07896, on or about January 16, 2024.

Exhibit 6: “Second Amended Complaint” filed by Plaintiff. This document was filed in this Court, in this case, on or about September 13, 2024.

Exhibit 7: “Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories.” This document was filed in this Court, in this case, on or about August 7, 2024.

Exhibit 8: Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production.” This document was filed in this Court, in this case, on or about August 7, 2024.

Exhibit 9: Order re: Motions to Compel. This document was filed in this Court, in this case, on or about November 19, 2024.

Exhibit 10: “Motion for Terminating Sanctions” filed by Plaintiff. This document was filed in this Court, in this case, on or about March 5, 2025.

Exhibit 11: Order re: Motion for Terminating Sanctions. This document was filed in this Court, in this case, on or about April 16, 2025.

Exhibit 1: A true and correct copy of the Second Amended Complaint, filed on September 13, 2024 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby, (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25631).

Exhibit 2: A true and correct copy of the Mural Media LLC 401k Plan’s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint, filed on March 15, 2024 – Maultsby v. Bruetsch, (L.A.S.C. #23STCV07896).

Exhibit 3: A true and correct copy of the Opposition to Mural Media LLC 401k Plan’s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint, filed on May 21, 2024 – Maultsby v. Bruetsch, (L.A.S.C. #23STCV07896).

Exhibit 4: A true and correct copy of the Minute Order, dated August 7, 2024 – Sustaining Demurrer without Leave to Amend – Maultsby v. Bruetsch, (L.A.S.C. #23STCV07896).

Exhibit 5: A true and correct copy of the Minute Order, dated March 3, 2025 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby, (L.A.S.C. #24STCV21169).

Exhibit 6: A true and correct copy of the Second Amended Complaint, filed on March 24, 2025 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby, (L.A.S.C. #24STCV21169).

Exhibit 7: Plaintiff’s Opposition to Linda J. Maultsby’s Demurrer to Complaint, filed on February 14, 2024 – Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan v. Maultsby, (L.A.S.C. #23STCV25631).

Exhibit 8: A true and correct copy of the Certificate of Certified Copy of the Computer Generated Report for Mural Media, LLC (Registry #55143789) from the State of Oregon, Office of the Secretary of State Corporation Division, dated 7/8/2024.

Exhibit 9: A true and certified copy of the Oregon Secretary of State, Certificate of No Record for MURAL MEDIA LLC.

Exhibit 10: A true and correct copy of the Oregon Secretary of State, Certificate of No Record for MURAL MEDIA LLC 401K PLAN.

Exhibit 11: A true and correct copy of the Declaration of Tammy Wendoll in Support of Defendant Pensco Trust Company, LLC, Custodian FBO Sylla McClellan IRA’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on May 2, 2025 – Maultsby v. Bruetsch, (L.A.S.C. #23STCV07896).

Defendant’s request for judicial notice of Exhibit 1, 7, and 10 is granted as these are court records filed in this action and the court may take judicial notice of these documents’ existence, but not the truth asserted therein. Defendant’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 11 is denied as these documents were filed in other actions, have no precedential value, and are irrelevant to this Motion.

Plaintiff submitted untimely objections to the Declaration of Hector Flores. The court overruled the objections.

The SAC alleges that Plaintiff is a 401K retirement plan and the owner of the Subject Property legally described as “Lot 446 of Tract No. 1446, in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California, as per Map recorded in Book 20, Page 34 of Maps, in the office of the County recorder of said County.” (SAC, ¶¶ 1, 5.) The Subject Property “is a single parcel of real property, which contains a multi-unit building that is comprised of 4 different units and this UD action is directed at the unit with the mailing address of 2759 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016 (the “Unit”). (Id. ¶ 6, 7.)

Plaintiff now moves for summary adjudication against Defendant Linda J. Maultsby (“Defendant”) regarding the second cause of action for unlawful detainer, and for possession of the real property located at 2759 S. Mansfield Avenue. Plaintiff asserts that all other named Defendants in this action have defaulted or been dismissed. (Motion at p. 1, fn. 1.) The Issue Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication of is as follows:

Issue No. 1: There is no defense to the second cause of action for unlawful detainer since the undisputed facts establish Plaintiff’s entitlement to summary adjudication on this cause of action as a matter of law since: (1) Plaintiff obtained title to the Subject Property through purchase of the Subject Property at a non-judicial foreclosure sale held in compliance with Civil Code section 2924, et seq., and title has been duly perfected by Plaintiff; (2) that a 3- Day Notice to Quit was served on Defendant; and (3) despite the expiration of the 3-Day Notice to Quit, that Defendant continues to occupy the Subject Property to the present without any right to do so.

“In an unlawful detainer action brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a, subdivision (b)(3), the plaintiff must show that he or she acquired the property at a regularly conducted sale and thereafter ‘duly perfected’ title.” (The Bank of New York Mellon v. Preciado (2013) 224 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 9.) “[W]here the plaintiff in the unlawful detainer action is the purchaser at a trustee’s sale, he or she ‘need only prove a sale in compliance with the statute and deed of trust, followed by purchase at such sale, and the defendant may raise objections only on that phase of the issue of title. Matters affecting the validity of the trust deed or primary obligation itself, or other basic defects in the plaintiff's title, are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment.’” (Old National Financial Services, Inc. v. Seibert (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 460, 465 [italics original].)

Plaintiff presents evidence that in January 2020, Plaintiff and others—PENSCO Trust Company LLC, Custodian FBO Sylla McClellan, James C. Elkins and Melinda J. Elkins, Trustees of the Elkins Family Revocable Trust of 2002, and Trustee of the Lawrence C. Henig, D.D.S., Inc. Age Based Profit Sharing Plan (collectively “Lenders”)—provided a $840,000.00 loan to Defendant, secured by a Deed of Trust recorded against the Subject Property and in favor of the Lenders. (RJN Ex. 1.) Third Party, S.B.S. Trust Deed Network (“SBS”), was designated as the Trustee of the Deed of Trust recorded against the Subject Property. (Ibid.)

On June 20, 2022, Defendant defaulted on the loan and SBS recorded a Notice of Default. (RJN Ex. 2.) Defendant continued to default on the loan, and on April 3, 2023, SBS recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale against the Subject Property. (Plaintiff’s RJN Ex. 3.) On May 9, 2023, SBS held a trustee’s sale of the Subject Property, at which time Plaintiff and the other Lender acquired title to the Subject Property. (Plaintiff’s RJN Ex. 4.)

A “Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale” was recorded in favor of the Lenders as follows:

S.B.S. TRUST DEED NETWORK, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, as Trustee, (whereas so designated in the Deed of Trust hereunder more particularly described or as duly appointed Trustee) does hereby GRANT and CONVEY to

MURAL MEDIA LLC 401K PLAN AS TO AN UNDIVIDED 47.618% INTEREST AND PENSCO TRUST COMPANY LLC, CUSTODIAN FBO SYLLA MCCLELLAN IRA; 080000001321 AS TO AN UNDIVIDED 23.810% INTEREST AND JAMES C. ELKINS AND MELINDA J. ELKINS, TRUSTEES OF THE ELKINS FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST OF 2002, AS TO AN UNDIVIDED 16.667% INTEREST AND LAWRENCE HENIG, TRUSTEE OF THE LAWRENCE C. HENIG, D.D.S., INC. AGE BASED PROFIT SHARING PLAN AS TO AN UNDIVIDED 11.905% INTEREST

(herein called Grantee) but without covenant or warranty, expressed or implied, all right title and interest conveyed to and now held by it as Trustee under the Deed of Trust in and to the property situated in the county of Los Angeles, State of California, described as follows:

Lot 446 of Tract No. 1446, in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California, as per Map recorded in Book 20, Page 34 of Maps, in the office of the County recorder of said County.

Accordingly, the facts before the court reflect that Plaintiff is not the sole owner of the Subject Property. A prerequisite for a UD action is that the Plaintiff have perfect title. The buyer pursuant to a trustee’s sale, must show that “the sale was conducted in accordance with section 2924 of the Civil Code and that title under such sale was duly perfected,” meaning “ ‘all steps have been taken to make it perfect, i.e., to convey to the purchaser that which he has purchased, valid and good beyond all reasonable doubt.’” (Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 948, 953.) “‘A perfect title must be one that is good and valid beyond all reasonable doubt[.]’ ” (Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 644, 649.) “Other definitions of title are: ‘The words “good title” import that the owner has the title, legal and equitable, to all the land, and the words ‘defective title’ mean that the party claiming to own has not the whole title, but some other person has title to a part of portion of the land.’ ” (Id. at p. 649.)

While the SAC alleges that Plaintiff is the owner of the Subject Property, the “Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale” shows that Plaintiff only has a 47.618% interest in the Subject Property, with the other Lenders holding an undivided interest in the Subject Property. (Plaintiff’s RJN, Ex. 4.) In other words, Plaintiff fails to show it has the exclusive right of possession. (See Adler v. Elphick (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 642, 648 [“The deed did not create any separate interests in the property or any right to exclusive occupancy of either unit. No plaintiff separately owns any one unit.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to show it has perfect title and can pursue an action for possession without the authorization or participation of the other co-owners/Lenders.

Therefore, Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 6, asserting that Plaintiff perfected title, is unsupported by the evidence presented and remains disputed. More importantly, perfect title is an element of a UD action, and Plaintiff fails to show it has met this element.

Plaintiff also fails to show that no triable issues exist as to other facts cited in its Separate Statement. UMF No. 7 purports to assert that Defendant cannot challenge the foreclosure sale as the Defendant admitted she was in default on the foreclosed loan. However, the only evidence cited in UMF No. 7 is a verified Complaint filed by the Defendant in another action. However, Defendant may not rely on verified pleadings to support their motion for summary adjudication. “Verified pleadings may not be used to support or oppose summary judgment motions because the statute expressly restricts the types of evidence that can be used and does not include verified allegations.” (Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290; see CCP, § 437c(b)(1).)

Similarly, in support of UMF No. 14, which asserts that the reasonable daily rental value of the Subject Property is $106.67, Plaintiff cites to its SAC, ¶ 34, as evidence of the existence of this fact. However, a party moving for summary adjudication cannot rely on its own pleadings, even if verified, to support its motion. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 720, fn. 7 [“a party cannot rely on the allegations of his own pleadings, even if verified, to make or supplement the evidentiary showing required in the summary judgment context”]; see also IFS Industries, Inc. v. Stephens (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 740, 753.) Thus, UMF No. 14 also remains disputed.

The court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet its initial burden of showing that no triable issues of material fact exist as to the second cause of action. Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

Lastly, as Plaintiff has failed to meet their initial burden for summary adjudication and as Defendant’s opposition was untimely filed, depriving Plaintiff of the opportunity to respond, the court does not consider Defendant’s opposition. (See (CRC, rule 3.1300(d).) More importantly, Defendant is not prejudiced by the court’s refusal to consider her opposition, and the opposition is not necessary for the court’s disposition of this Motion.

Defendant’s motion to disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel is denied. Defendant’s MJOP is denied. Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication is denied.

[1] CCP § 439 requires the moving party to meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings. No meet and confer declaration has been filed confirming compliance with CCP § 439.