Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 24STCV02921, Date: 2024-07-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV02921    Hearing Date: July 9, 2024    Dept: 37

CASE NUMBER:                   24STCV02921

CASE NAME:                        Llewellyn McCray v. East Coast/West Coast Logistics, et al.

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendant East Coast/West Coast Logistics, LLC

OPPOSING PARTY:             Plaintiff Llewellyn McCray

TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

PROCEEDING:                      Motion to Stay

OPPOSITION:                        25 June 2024

REPLY:                                  01 July 2024

TENTATIVE:                         Defendant’s Motion to Stay is denied. Defendant to give notice.

Background

On February 5, 2024, Llewellyn McCray (“Plaintiff”) filed a Private Attorney General Act  (“PAGA”) action against East Coast/West Coast Logistics dba The Gilbert Company (“East Coast/West Coast”); HR Direct Services Inc.; HR Direct Services LLC; The GHR Company LLC; The GHR Management Company; and Does 1 to 50.

On May 2, 2024, Defendant East Coast/West Coast (hereinafter “Defendant”) moved to stay this action pending the resolution of an action filed in San Bernardino County entitled Fausto v. East Coast/West Coast Logistics, LLC, et. al, Case No. CIVSB2322813. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The matter is now before the court.

motion to stay

I.         Legal Standard

When nearly identical actions are in courts of different jurisdictions, the court in the second action may, in its discretion and as a matter of comity, stay that action pending decision in the first action.  (Thomson v. Continental Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 738, 746 (Thomson); Mave Enterprises, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1423; Gregg v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 134, 136; Simmons v. Superior Court (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 123-124.)  In doing so, the court should consider “ ‘the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party, and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other jurisdictions.  It should also consider whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced.’ [Citation.]”  (Thomson, at pp. 746-747.) 

“Under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, when two California superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved in litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.  The rule is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same controversy, and preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits.”  (People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 769-770.) 

II.        Request for Judicial Notice

The court may take judicial notice of records of any court of record of the United States. (Evid. Code, § 452(d)(2).) However, the court may only judicially notice the existence of the record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.) 

Defendant requests judicial notice of the following:

1)     Exhibit A: Operative Complaint, McCray v. East Coast/West Coast, et. al., Case No. 24STCV02921, Los Angeles County Superior Court, filed on February 5, 2024.

2)     Exhibit B: Operative Complaint, Fausto v. East Coast/West Coast, et. al., Case No. CIVSB-2322813, San Bernardino County Superior Court, filed on September 20, 2023.

3)     Exhibit C: Notice of Related Case, filed by Defendant East Coast / West Coast, filed on March 25, 2024.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted.

III.      Discussion

A.        Request to Stay Under Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction

Defendant contends that this action should be stayed under the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction because staying the action will promote judicial efficiency, prevent inconsistent judgments, and protect litigants from duplicative and harassing litigation. In Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, the appellate court found that a court has the “power to stay a subsequent PAGA representative suit that is wholly subsumed by a prior PAGA representative suit—i.e., where the second suit alleges the same Labor Code violations based on the same facts and theories as the prior suit [.]” (78 Cal.App.5th 245, 260.)

Defendant asserts that the action pending in San Bernardino County, entitled Fausto v. East Coast/West Coast Logistics, LLC, et. al, Case No. CIVSB2322813 (the “Fausto Action”), is brought against all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant from July 27, 2022, to the present, which includes Plaintiff, and alleges the same Labor Code violations. Accordingly, Defendant represents that this action is completely subsumed by the Fausto Action.

Plaintiff disputes this assertion and asserts that the parties in this action and the Fausto Action are not the same. Plaintiff asserts this action is not subsumed by the Fausto Action because this action includes four Defendants that are not included in the Fausto Action and no claims or penalties are sought against these four Defendants. Moreover, this action alleges and seeks penalties for two labor code violations not included in the Fausto Action. Accordingly, the Fausto Action cannot afford Plaintiff the full relief sought here.

Unlike the statutory plea of abatement, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require absolute identity of parties, causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions. [Citations.] If the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to bring before it all the necessary parties, the fact that the parties in the second action are not identical does not preclude application of the rule. Moreover, the remedies sought in the separate actions need not be precisely the same so long as the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.

(Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 788 (Plant Insulation).)

Under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, “exactitude is not required” meaning the parties and the remedies sought need not be identical and what “is sufficient for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction that the issue in both actions is the same and arises out of the same transaction or events.” (County of Siskiyou v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 83, 89; see also Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1175.)

First, the Fausto Action encompasses Labor Code violations that occurred in August 2022 until January 2023, whereas this action covers claims from December 2021 to June 2023. (Compare RJN Ex. B, ¶¶ 5, 39 with Complaint, ¶ 24.) Accordingly, this court is not persuaded that this action is completely subsumed by the Fausto Action because four defendants and two labor code violations are not part of the Fausto Action and Defendants have failed to show that per the pleadings, the court in the Fausto Action “ ‘has the power to litigate all the  issues and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.’ ” (In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 190 citing Plant Insulation, supra, 224 Cal.App. at p. 788.)

Defendant fails to show that the court in the Fausto Action has the power to litigate all the issues in this action and grant all the relief requested in this action such that the adjudication of the Fausto Action would bar Plaintiff’s recovery in this action. Defendant fails to point out what specific allegations in the Fausto Action Complaint extend employer liability to the four other Defendants in this action. Furthermore, Defendant fails to show how denial of a stay in this action “would duplicate court efforts, waste resources, and potentially produce divergent results” given that the parties are not the same and the Fausto Action excludes two Labor Code violations not sought in the Fausto Action.   (Shaw, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 262.) Consequently, this court is not persuaded that this action is completely subsumed by the Fausto Action such that the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction should be applied to stay the action. Lastly, Defendant fails to show how a judgment in the Fausto Action would be a complete bar to recovery in this instant action.

            B.        Request for Discretionary Stay

“Granting a stay in a case where the issues in two actions are substantially identical [citation] is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.  ‘In exercising its discretion the court should consider the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party, and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other jurisdictions.  It should also consider whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced.’  [Citations.]”  (Thomson v. Cont’l Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 738, 746-747.)

The court finds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to protect Defendants from any cumulative and/or conflicting PAGA judgments such that a discretionary stay is not warranted.

Based on the above, the motion to stay is denied.

Conclusion

Defendant’s Motion to Stay is denied. Defendant to give notice.