Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 24STCV05785, Date: 2024-10-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV05785    Hearing Date: October 23, 2024    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 Wednesday, October 23, 2024

CASE NUMBER:                   24STCV05785

CASE NAME:                        Maria Soto v. Jonathan Club

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendant Jonathan Club

OPPOSING PARTY:             Maria Soto, on behalf of herself and all other Aggrieved Employees

TRIAL DATE:                        9 September 2024

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

PROCEEDING:                      Motion to Stay

OPPOSITION:                        14 October 2024

REPLY:                                  18 October 2024

TENTATIVE:                         Defendant’s motion to stay the action is denied.

Background

On March 7, 2024, Maria Soto, on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees (“Plaintiff”) filed a PAGA action against the Jonathan Club (“Defendant”).

Defendant has now moved to stay the action under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The matter is now before the court.

MOtion to stay

I.         Legal Standard

When nearly identical actions are in courts of different jurisdictions, the court in the second action may, in its discretion and as a matter of comity, stay that action pending decision in the first action.¿ (Thomson v. Continental Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 738, 746 (Thomson); Mave Enterprises, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1423; Gregg v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 134, 136; Simmons v. Superior Court (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 123-124.)¿ In doing so, the court should consider “ ‘the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party, and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other jurisdictions.¿ It should also consider whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced.’¿[Citation.]”¿ (Thomson, at pp. 746-747.)¿ 

“Under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, when two California superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved in litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.¿ The rule is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same controversy, and preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits.”¿ (People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 769-770.)¿ 

II.        Request for Judicial Notice

The court may take judicial notice of records of any court of record of the United States. (Evid. Code, § 452(d)(2).) However, the court may only judicially notice the existence of the record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.) 

Defendant requests judicial notice of the following:

1)     Exhibit B: A true and correct copy of  the Complaint in Joaquin Del Cid Jr v. Jonathan Club, Case No. 20STCV12113.

2)     Exhibit C: A true and correct copy of the Complaint in Maria Soto v. Jonathan Club, Case No. 24STCV05785.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted.

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the following:

1)     Exhibit A: Complaint filed on March 26, 2020 by Joaquin Del Cid, Jr. against Jonathan Club, filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court, entitled Del Cid v. Jonathan Club; Case No. 20STCV12113 (the “Del Cid Matter”).

2)     Exhibit B: Exhibit B: Notice of Related Cases filed on April 4, 2024, by Jonathan Club, in the Del Cid Matter.

3)     Exhibit C: Exhibit C: Notice of Ruling filed on April 26, 2024, by Jonathan Club, in the Del Cid Matter, wherein the Honorable Stephen I. Goorvitch ruled that “cases, 20STCV12113 and 24STCV05785, are not related under California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a).”

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is granted.

III.      Discussion

Defendant asserts that this action should be stayed under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction because there is an ongoing and earlier-filed PAGA action against Defendant entitled Joaquin Del Cid Jr. v. Jonathan Club (the “Del Cid Action”) (LASC Case No. 20STCV121130).

A.        Defendant’s Motion is Timely and Not Waived

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant waived the right to seek a stay based on the  rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction because the issue was not raised on a demurrer. The court disagrees as the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is an affirmative defense that can be raised by demurrer or in the answer. (See Accurso v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1154–1155; Color–Vue, Inc. v. Abrams (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1604.)

“By contrast, other sorts of objections a defendant might have on the merits—including an objection that liability is barred by an affirmative defense—are ordinarily deemed ‘waived’ if the defendant does not raise them in its demurrer or answer to the complaint.” (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 807 citing CCP, § 430.80(a).) Because Defendant raised the issue of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction in its Answer, the court finds that the motion has not been waived and the court will proceed to address the Motion on the merits.

            B.        Request for Stay Under Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction

In Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County¿(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, the appellate court found that a court has the “power to stay a subsequent PAGA representative suit that is wholly subsumed by a prior PAGA representative suit—i.e., where the second suit alleges the same Labor Code violations based on the same facts and theories as the prior suit [.]” (Id. at p. 260.)  

The Del Cid Action was filed on March 26. 2020, whereas this instant action was filed on March 7, 2024. (Defendant’s RJN, Ex. B.)  In the Del Cid Action, fact summary closed on January 21, 2022, and on September 12, 2022, the court ordered Del Cid’s individual PAGA claims to arbitration, currently scheduled for February 24, 2025. An Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal (Arbitration) is set for April 2, 2025. On April 16, 2024, the Del Cid court declined to relate the cases.

Defendant asserts this instant action arises out of the same Labor Code violations as the Del Cid action but adds two new allegations (unlawful deductions and failure to reimburse business expenses). Therefore, because the Labor Code violations are similar and the allegations are against the same Defendant, Defendant argues that this court should stay this action because it is substantially the same and arises from the same transaction or events as the Del Cid Action.

Plaintiff asserts this action is different because the Plaintiff in this action was employed as a housekeeper attendant from about February 14, 2020, to about April 24, 2023. Meanwhile, the plaintiff in the Del Cid Action was employed as a nighttime parking attendant from May 18, 2005 to September 2019. (Plaintiff’s RJN, Ex. A [Compl.].) Therefore, the employment periods did not overlap.

In Shaw, the court stayed the second lawsuit because the claims overlapped, but Defendant fails to show that the claims in the Del Cid Action overlap with the claims in this action given that there is no overlap in the period of employment. In other words, the Defendant fails to show how a judgment or settlement in the Del Cid Action would bar recovery in this action. For the Del Cid Action to have a preclusive effect on this action, Plaintiff in this action must be a member of the plaintiff class covered in the Del Cid Action. (See Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 591; Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 492.)

In the absence of such a showing, the Court fails to see how the Del Cid Action completely subsumes or has a  preclusive effect on the present action such that there is a risk of conflicting rulings. “In determining whether the causes of action are the same for purposes of pleas in abatement, the rule is that such a plea may be maintained only where a judgment in the first action would be a complete bar to the second action. (Lord v. Garland (1946) 27 Cal.2d 840, 848.) 

Second, Defendant fails to show that the Del Cid court has the ability to grant full relief to the Plaintiff in this action. “[T]he remedies sought in the separate actions need not be precisely the same so long as the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.” (Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 788.)

That Plaintiff is also an employee of Defendant and alleges substantially similar Labor Code violations is not sufficient to find that the claims are identical, given that the Labor Code violations arouse after the events in the Del Cid Action.  Therefore, the court fails to find that the Labor Code violations in this action “arises out of the same transaction or events.” (County of Siskiyou v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 83, 89.)

As Defendant fails to show that the Del Cid Action would completely bar recovery in the instant action, the court fails to find that the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction applies and requires a stay of this action.

            C.        Request for Discretionary Stay

“Granting a stay in a case where the issues in two actions are substantially identical [citation] is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. “ ‘In exercising its discretion the court should consider the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party, and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other jurisdictions.¿ It should also consider whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced.’¿ [Citations.]”¿ (Thomson v. Cont’l Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 738, 746-747.) 

That it would be more efficient for Defendant to complete discovery after the Del Cid Action is adjudicated is not a sufficient basis to stay this action. Moreover, Defendant fails to persuade the Court that it should grant a stay given that the instant action is not duplicative of or subsumed by the Del Cid Action and involves a controversy that arose after the events in the Del Cid Action.

More importantly, Defendant fails to show that the Del Cid Action will grant Plaintiff the requested relief and that this action is duplicative of the Del Cid Action such that a stay is warranted to prevent conflicting rulings. Even if the Del Cid Action has a preclusive effect on this action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to protect Defendant from any cumulative and/or conflicting PAGA judgments such that a discretionary stay is not warranted.  

Therefore, Defendant’s request for a discretionary stay is denied.

Conclusion

Defendant’s motion to stay the action is denied.