Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 24STCV14976, Date: 2025-01-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV14976 Hearing Date: January 3, 2025 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: Friday, January 3, 2025
CASE NUMBER: 24STCV14976
CASE NAME: Saleta Darnell v. Los Angeles Community College, et al.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Los Angeles Community
College District
OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Saleta Darnell
TRIAL DATE: Not Set
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
PROCEEDING: Demurrer to Complaint
OPPOSITION: 24 December 2024
REPLY: None
as of 12/30/2024
TENTATIVE: Defendant’s demurrer is sustained. Plaintiff
may amend her Complaint to request declaratory or injunctive relief based on
the Defendant’s failure to confer her degree but may not seek monetary damages
without first complying with the claim presentation requirement of the
Government Tort Claims Act. In the alternative or in conjunction with the
above, Plaintiff may file a petition to file a late claim under Gov. Code § 946.6.
Plaintiff is granted 10 days leave to amend. The court takes off calendar the
Case Management Conference and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend, scheduled
for February 5, 2025. The Court sets an OSC
RE: Amended Complaint for January 22, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. Defendant to give
notice.
Background
On June 14, 2024, Saleta Darnell
(“Plaintiff”), in pro per, filed this action against the Los Angeles Community
College District (“LACC), also sued as, West Los Angeles College (“WLAC”)
(collectively “Defendant”). The Complaint alleges a single cause of action for
breach of contract.
Defendant now demurs to the Complaint.
Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The matter is now before the court.
request
for JUDICIAL notice
The court may
take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United
States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record
of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and
propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of
immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably
indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) “Taking
judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its
contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)
Defendant
requests that the court take judicial notice of the Declaration of Eric Kim on
the basis that Evid. Code § 452(c) authorizes judicial notice of official
records of state agencies.
While
Eric Kim is general counsel for Defendant, Defendant fails to cite any legal
authority supporting the finding that a declaration by Defendant’s legal
counsel constitutes an official record of a state agency. (See Lockley v.
Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 875, 882 [“Courts may not take judicial notice of allegations in
affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court records because such
matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require formal
proof.”].)
The
court denies the Defendant’s request for judicial notice. Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s request
for judicial notice is also denied as the objections are moot.
I. Legal Standard
Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect
by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A
demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer
must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.¿
(CCP, § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In
evaluating a demurrer, the court accepts the complainant’s properly pled facts
as true and ignores contentions, deductions, and conclusory statements. (Daar
v. Yellow Cab Co. (1976) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713; Serrano v. Priest (1971)
5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Moreover, the court does not consider whether a plaintiff
will be able to prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such
proof. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d
590, 604.)
Leave to amend must be allowed
where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to
show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)
II. Discussion
Plaintiff filed this action for breach of contract on the basis
that she completed her associate degree in paralegal studies and completed all
required coursework with a “C” or better and all other required criteria, but Defendant
failed to confer her paralegal degree. (Compl., at p. 1.) Plaintiff asserts
that Defendant changed the degree requirements in 2019 and violated the WLAC
Catalog 2016-2018 which applied when she was a student. (Id., at p. 7.)
The Complaint asserts that Defendant breach its contractual obligations by
failing to provide the agreed-upon degree after Plaintiff met all requirements.
(Ibid.) Plaintiff seeks damages for loss of income caused by Defendant’s
failure to confer a degree, damages for the costs of books, school supplies,
parking permits, and childcare costs incurred during the time she was working
on the completion of her degree. (Id. at pp. 8-9.)
Defendant demurs to the breach of contract claim on the grounds
that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Government Claims Act and that the
June 14, 2023, letter (hereinafter “the June 2023 Letter”) did not constitute
substantial compliance with the Government Claims Act. The Complaint asserts
that Plaintiff sent the June 2023 Letter to Dr. James Limbaugh, President of
WLAC, requesting that Plaintiff’s degree be conferred on her. (Compl., p. 2,
Ex. 2.) The June 2023 Letter was forwarded to WLAC’s general counsel, Eric C.
Kim. (Id.) Plaintiff’s former counsel, Paker Stanbury LLP, sent a letter
to Dr. Limbaugh demanding that WLAC investigate the matter as to why Plaintiff
was not conferred her paralegal degree and to “make the necessary arrangement
to issue the AA degree in paralegal studies to Plaintiff” within 10 business
days. (Id., Ex. 2.)
Plaintiff asserts that the June 2023 letter substantially complied
with the requirements of the Government Claims Act. The court disagrees. The
doctrine of substantial compliance “contemplates that there is at least some
compliance with all of the statutory requirements. [Citation.] A claim that
fails to substantially comply with sections 910 and 910.2, may still
be considered a ‘claim as presented’ if it puts the public entity on notice
both that the claimant is attempting to file a valid claim and that litigation
will result if the matter is not resolved.” (Del Real v. City of Riverside
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 769 (Del Real).)
The court agrees that Gov. Code § 910 requires that the notice
include “[a] general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury,
damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation
of the claim.” The June 2023 Letter is devoid of a request for damages and
instead requests that the matter be investigated and that the Plaintiff be
conferred her paralegal studies degree. “Thus, a failure to even estimate the
amount of damages on the claim document cannot be remedied by application of
the doctrine.” (A.S. v. Palmdale School Dist. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
1091, 1097.) “Appellant specified several administrative actions which he
wanted the District to take, but did not state he was seeking monetary damages
and made no attempt at all to estimate, even roughly, an amount of damages or
state whether or not the claim would be a limited civil case.” (Id. at
p. 1098; see also Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 769 [“The
letter is devoid of any description of injury or loss allegedly suffered, fails
to indicate that anyone involved in the accident was a public employee and
fails to state any amount claimed. Thus, it bears little or no resemblance to a
government tort claim.”].)
While Plaintiff may assert a claim for declaratory relief or
injunctive relief without needing to comply with the Government Tort Claims
Act, here Plaintiff is required to substantially comply with the requirements
of Gov. Code § 910 because Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (See Gov. Code, § 945.6 [“Except as provided
in Sections 946.4 and 946.6, no suit for money or damages may be brought
against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required…].)
“[T]he claim filing requirements of this statute, usually referred
to as the Government Tort Claims Act or the Tort Claims Act ‘are not limited to
tort claims, but extend also to claims for money or damages based on contract
[citation], and ‘Government Claims Act’ is
therefore a more appropriate label than Tort Claims Act.’” (Lozada v. City
and County of San Francisco (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1147, fn. 1 citing
Gatto v. County of
Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 750, fn. 3.) Plaintiff also fails to allege
that her claim is exempt from the presentation requirements as outlined in Gov.
Code § 905.
Therefore, the court agrees that Plaintiff’s breach of contract
claim is barred due to her failure to present a timely claim.
Second, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim is barred by Ed. Code § 81655, which prohibits a breach of
contract suit against the Defendant unless the Board has approved or ratified
the contract, regardless of whether the contract is oral or written. Ed. Code §
81655 states in the relevant part:
Wherever
in this code the power to contract is invested in the governing board of the
community college district or any member thereof [and such power is delegated,]
no contract made pursuant to such delegation and authorization shall be valid
or constitute an enforceable obligation against the district unless and until
the same shall have been approved or ratified by the governing board, said
approval or ratification to be evidenced by a motion of said board duly passed
and adopted.
Plaintiff’s opposition does not refute the fact that Ed. Code §
81655 requires approval or ratification of the alleged contract by the Board
and that the Complaint fails to allege such a fact. Consequently, there is no
valid contract and Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails.
Defendant’s demurrer is sustained. Plaintiff may amend her
Complaint to request declaratory or injunctive relief based on the Defendant’s
failure to confer her degree but may not seek monetary damages without first
complying with the claim presentation requirement of the Government Tort Claims
Act. In the alternative or in conjunction with the above, Plaintiff may file a
petition to file a late claim under Gov. Code § 946.6.
Conclusion
Defendant’s
demurrer is sustained. Plaintiff may amend her Complaint to request declaratory
or
injunctive
relief based on the Defendant’s failure to confer her degree but may not seek
monetary
damages
without first complying with the claim presentation requirement of the
Government
Tort
Claims Act. In the alternative or in conjunction with the above, Plaintiff may
file a petition
to
file a late claim under Gov. Code § 946.6. Plaintiff is granted 10 days leave
to amend. The
court
takes off calendar the Case Management Conference and Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to
Amend,
scheduled for February 5, 2025. The
Court sets an OSC RE: Amended Complaint for
January
22, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. Defendant to give notice.
[1]
Pursuant to CCP § 430.41, the meet and confer
requirement has been met. (Jeffrey Decl., ¶¶ 3, 4.)