Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 24STCV15903, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 24STCV15903    Hearing Date: March 5, 2025    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 Wednesday, March 5, 2025

CASE NUMBER:                   24STCV15903

CASE NAME:                        Vicino Limited Partnership v. Jonathan Menlo, et al.

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendant MCBY26, LLC

OPPOSING PARTY:             Plaintiff Vicino Limited Partnership

TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

                                                                                                                                                           

PROCEEDING:                      Demurrer to Complaint

OPPOSITION:                        20 February 2025

REPLY:                                  26 February 2025

 

TENTATIVE:                         Defendant MCBY26’s demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. The court finds that MCBY26 has no interest in the real property real property located at 329-335 South Rampart Boulevard in Los Angeles, CA and dismisses MCBY26 from this action.

 

                                                                                                                                                           

 

Background

 

On December 4, 2024, Plaintiff Vicino Limited Partnership (“Plaintiff’) filed a Complaint against Jonathan Menlo; Rikki Menlo; Jonathan Menlo and Rikki Menlo as Husband and Wife; Meir Siboni; Ravit Siboni; Meir Siboni and Ravit Siboni as a community property estate; MCBY26, LLC (“MCBY26”); all persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property adverse to Plaintiff’s title, or any cloud on Plaintiff’s title to the Property; and Does 1 to 50.

 

The Complaint alleges three causes of action: (1) breach of guaranty; (2) quiet title; and (3) declaratory relief.

 

Defendant MCBY26 demurs to the Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. The matter is now before the court.

 

Demurrer[1]

 

I.         Legal Standard

 

Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.¿ (CCP § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In evaluating a demurrer, the court accepts the complainant’s properly pled facts as true and ignores contentions, deductions, and conclusory statements. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1976) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Moreover, the court does not consider whether a plaintiff will be able to prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such proof. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 604.) 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

 

II.        Discussion

 

A.        Summary of Allegations

 

The Complaint alleges that on or about March 18, 2021, Defendants Jonathan Menlo and Meir Siboni obtained from Plaintiff a business-purpose mortgage loan secured by a deed of trust on real property located at 329-335 South Rampart Boulevard in Los Angeles, CA (the “Property”). (Compl., ¶ 13.) On or about November 2023, the Loan went into default and neither borrower nor any Defendant named in this action cured the Loan default. (Id. ¶ 19.) “At some point in time after Plaintiff made the Loan, but before the foreclosure sale was completed, defendant MCBY26, LLC acquired an interest in the Subject Property.” (Id. ¶ 20.) “Plaintiff alleges the interest of defendant MCBY26, LLC, if any ever existed, was extinguished by operation of the June 6, 2024 trustee’s sale.” (Ibid.)

 

On June 6, 2024, “Plaintiff elected to foreclosure [sic] on its security interest in the Subject Property and conduct a trustee’s sale (foreclosure sale).” (Compl., ¶ 21.) “At the trustee’s sale there were no bidders other than Plaintiff who took the property back in the trustee’s sale.” (Ibid.)  “As a result of a trustee’s sale held on June 6, 2024, Plaintiff holds an interest in the Property as a fee simple owner” and its Trustee’s Deed dated June 6, 2024, is “recorded with the Los Angeles County Recorder as document number 20240376192.” (Id. ¶ 32.) “Plaintiff seeks to quiet title against defendants MCBY, LLC, and DOES 1 through 50, who may have a claim in the Subject Property by virtue of a Grant Deed recorded with the Los Angeles Cunty [sic] Recorder on June 5, 2023, bearing document number 230364483.” (Compl., ¶ 34.) “The claim of Defendant MCBY, LLC are uncertain/contingent in that MCBY, LLC’s title was junior to that of Plaintiff when Plaintiff conducted the trustee’s sale on June 6, 2024. As such, MCBY, LLC’s claims are without any right, and Defendant has no right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the Subject Property or any part of it.” (Id. ¶ 34.) “After completion of the trustee’s sale, the amount due, unpaid and owing to Plaintiff under the Loan totaled the sum $2,883,359.01.” (Compl., ¶ 22.)

 

B.        MCBY26’s Demurrer

 

Defendant MCBY does not deny the allegations in the SAC and asserts that Plaintiff has no viable cause of action against MCBY because after the nonjudicial foreclosure, Plaintiff became the title owner, and all junior interests were wiped away.

 

“California has an elaborate and interrelated set of foreclosure and antideficiency statutes relating to the enforcement of obligations secured by interests in real property.” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1236.) “Pursuant to this statutory scheme, there is only ‘one form of action’ for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured by a mortgage or deed of trust. That action is foreclosure[.]” (Id. at p. 1236.)

 

“As a general rule, the purchaser at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale receives title under a trustee's deed free and clear of any right, title or interest of the trustor.” (Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 831; see Civ. Code §§ 2924-2924k.) “A properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale constitutes a final adjudication of the rights of the borrower and lender. [Citation.]  Once the trustee's sale is completed, the trustor has no further rights of redemption. [Citation.]” (Moeller, at p. 831.)“If the trustee's deed recites that all statutory notice requirements and procedures required by law for the conduct of the foreclosure have been satisfied, a rebuttable presumption arises that the sale has been conducted regularly and properly; this presumption is conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser.” (Id. at p. 8831; see Civ. Code § 2924.)

“Generally speaking, the foreclosure sale extinguishes the borrower's debt; the lender may recover no deficiency.” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 927.)

“The statutory scheme concerning nonjudicial foreclosure contemplates that in order to protect its interest, a junior lienor must pay the trustor's obligation to the senior lienor.” (FPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E & G Investments, Ltd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1023.) “If a junior lienor does not cure the default in the senior obligation or redeem at the senior foreclosure, its lien will be extinguished at the foreclosure sale unless the successful bidder purchases at a price high enough to pay off the senior indebtedness and the junior indebtedness as well.” (Id.)

Defendant MCBY26 asserts:

 

After the nonjudicial foreclosure in which Plaintiff became the title owner, all junior interests were wiped away. Unless the nonjudicial foreclosure is challenged, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint seeks nothing more than an advisory opinion as to some future claim or harm, which California case law prohibits. For these reasons and as explained below, Defendant’s demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend.

 

(Demurrer at p. 4:14-19.)

Plaintiff’s opposition fails to show that Plaintiff did not acquire the property free and clear after the foreclosure, that disputed issues of fact exist, or any other reason why this demurrer should not be sustained. Therefore, the court is inclined to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend and dismiss the action as to Defendant MCBY26 as MCBY26’s junior interest in the Property was extinguished by the foreclosure sale on June 6, 2024.

 

Conclusion

 

Defendant MCBY26’s demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. The court finds that MCBY26 has no interest in the real property real property located at 329-335 South Rampart Boulevard in Los Angeles, CA and dismisses MCBY26 from this action.

 



[1] Pursuant to CCP § 430.41, the meet and confer requirement has been met. (Tokar Decl., ¶ 2.)