Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 24STCV17341, Date: 2025-04-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV17341 Hearing Date: April 21, 2025 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: Monday, April 21, 2025
CASE NUMBER: 24STCV17341
CASE NAME: Maria Lopez v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
MOVING PARTY: Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Association
OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Maria Lopez
TRIAL DATE: Not set
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
PROCEEDING: Motion to Compel
Arbitration
OPPOSITION: 08 April 2025
REPLY: 14
April 2025
TENTATIVE: Defendant Chase’s motion to compel
arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual PAGA claims is granted. Plaintiff’s
representative PAGA action is stayed pending arbitration.
Background
On July 12, 2024, Maria Lopez (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of herself
and other similarly situated employees, filed this Private Attorneys General
Act (PAGA) action against JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
(“Defendant” or “Chase”) and Does 1 to 50.
Defendant Chase now moves to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s
individual PAGA claims. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The matter is now before
the court.
Motion
to Compel Arbitration
I. Legal Standard
“California law reflects a strong public policy in favor of
arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for resolving
disputes.¿ To further that policy, Code of Civil Procedure, section 1281.2
requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless one of
three limited exceptions applies.¿ Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a
party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the
arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates
the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal¿ issues.”¿
(CCP, § 1281.2; Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 959, 967.)¿ Similarly, public policy under federal law favors
arbitration and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of
contract and that courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing
with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms.¿ (AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.)¿¿¿¿
¿¿¿
In deciding a motion or petition to compel arbitration,
trial courts must first decide whether an enforceable arbitration agreement
exists between the parties and then determine whether the claims are covered
within the scope of the agreement.¿(Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.)¿ The opposing party has the burden to establish any
defense to enforcement.¿ (Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 571, 579 [“The petitioner ... bears the burden of proving the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement and the opposing party, plaintiffs
here, bears the burden of proving any fact necessary to its defense.”].)¿¿
II. Request for Judicial Notice
The court may take judicial notice
of records of any court of record of the United States. (Evid. Code, §
452(d)(2).) However, the court may only judicially notice the existence of the
record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.)
Defendant Chase requests judicial
notice of the following:
Exhibit 1: Bello v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2013-00075469-CU-WT-NC (June 4, 2014),
order compelling arbitration based on defendant’s Binding Arbitration Agreement.
Exhibit 2: Hightower v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., C.D. Cal. Case No. 11-cv1802, Dkt. No. 140 (Jan. 28, 2014), order
compelling arbitration based on defendant’s Binding Arbitration Agreement.
Exhibit 3: Sangeladji v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC501672 (Duffy-Lewis, J.)
(Jan. 27, 2014), order compelling arbitration on defendant’s Binding
Arbitration Agreement.
Exhibit 4: Hwang v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., C.D. Cal. Case No. 11-cv10782 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2012), order
compelling arbitration on defendant’s Binding Arbitration Agreement.
Exhibit 5: Cottrell v. JPMorgan Chase &
Co., et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC577399, Order Granting
Petition to Compel Arbitration (Sept. 9, 2015) (Feffer, J.).
Exhibit 6: Jonathan De La Cerda v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., Alameda Superior Court Case No. 22CV008384 (Reilly, J.)
(Aug. 25, 2023).
Exhibit A: The report attached to the to the
Declaration of Alexander L. Grodan, listing the location of each branch
operated by Chase as of March 7, 2025, that is maintained by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and available for download on the FDIC’s
website at: https://banks.data.fdic.gov/bankfindsuite/bankfind/details/628.
“‘Judicial notice is the
recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the
court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue
in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.’” (Lockley
v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 875, 882.)
Defendant Chase’s request for
judicial notice of Exhibit A is granted. However, Exhibits 1 to 6 are trial
court rulings in state and federal courts that have no precedential value, and
are submitted by the Defendant not as evidence, but as precedent. This is
beyond the scope of judicial notice and is legally improper. (See Bolanos v.
Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761; Budrow v. Dave &
Buster's of California, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 875, 884–885.)
Therefore, the request for judicial notice is denied as to Exhibit 1 to 6.
III. Discussion
Defendant Chase moves to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s
individual PAGA claims on the basis that Plaintiff signed a Binding Arbitration
Agreement (the “BAA”). (Drummond Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. A.) The BAA sates in relevant
part:
Binding Arbitration Agreement:
[ . . . ]
This agreement will be governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C section 1 et seq.
As a condition of and in
consideration of my employment with JPMorgan Chase & Co. or any of its
direct or indirect subsidiaries, I agree with JPMorgan Chase as follows:
1. SCOPE: Any
and all “Coved Claims” (as defined below) between me and JPMorgan Chase
(collectively “Covered Parties” or “Parties” . . .) shall be submitted to
and resolved by final and binding arbitration in accordance with this
Agreement.
2. COVERED CLAIMS: “Covered Claims” include all legally protected
employment-related claims . . ., that I now have or in the future may have
against JPMorgan Chase or its officers, directors, shareholders, employees, or
agents which arise out or relate to may employment or separation from
employment with JPMorgan Chase . . . arise out of or relate to my employment
or separation from employment with JPMorgan Chase . . . including, but
not limited to, claims of . . . failure to pay wages, bonuses or other compensation,
. . . and violations of any other common law, federal, state, or local statute,
ordinance, regulation or public policy . . . .
[ . . . ]
4. CLASS ACTION/COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVER: All
Covered Claims under this Agreement must be submitted on an individual basis. No
claims may be arbitrated on a class or collective basis unless required by
applicable law. Covered Parties expressly waive any right with respect
to any Covered Claims to submit, initiate, or participate in a representative
capacity or as a plaintiff, claimant or member in a class action, collective
action, or other representative or joint action, regardless of whether the
action is filed in arbitration or in court. . . . To the extent there is a
question of enforceability of class or collective arbitration,
it shall be decided only by a court, not an arbitrator.
The arbitrator’s authority to
resolve disputes and make awards under this Agreement is limited to disputes
between: (i) an individual and JPMorgan Chase; and (ii) the individual and any
current or former officers, directors, employees and agents, if such individual
is sued for conduct within the scope of their employment. No arbitration
award or decision will have any preclusive effect as to the issues or claims in
any dispute with anyone who is not a named party to the arbitration.
[ . . . ]
8. SEVERABILITY:
If any part of this Agreement
is held to be void or unenforceable, the remainder of the Agreement will be
enforceable and any part may be severed from the remainder as appropriate, to
the extent permitted by law. . . . . Notwithstanding the foregoing, any issue
concerning the validity of the class, collective, or representative or joint
action waiver provided in Paragraph 4 of this Agreement must be decided by a
court with jurisdiction over the Parties, and an arbitrator does not have
authority to consider the issue of the validity of the waiver. If for any
reason the class, collective, or representative or joint action waiver is found
to be unenforceable, the class, collective, or representative or joint action
may only be heard in court and may not be arbitrated under this Agreement.
(Drummond Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. A [bold added].)
Plaintiff does not challenge Defendant Chase’s
assertion that she signed the BAA and that it is a valid agreement. Instead,
Plaintiff asserts that because both “individual” and “representative PAGA
actions are representative actions brought in the same of the State, Plaintiff’s
individual PAGA claim cannot be compelled to arbitration pursuant to the class
action waiver provision of Section 4 the BAA.
Plaintiff ignores case law that holds that a PAGA action contains
both an individual and a representative component. In Viking River Cruises,
Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 (Viking), the United States
Supreme Court held that “the FAA preempts the rule of [Iskanian v. CLS Transportation
Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348] insofar as it precludes division of
PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.” (Id.
at p. 662.) In Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104,
the California Supreme Court confirmed that Viking River allowed PAGA
claims to be split into individual and non-individual claims. (Id. at p.
1118.) In other words, PAGA claims are composed of “violations sustained by the
plaintiff employee (what Viking River called individual claims” and
“claims on behalf of other employees (i.e., non-individual claims).” (Ibid.)
“After Viking, every PAGA action is properly understood as a combination
of two claims: an ‘individual’ claim, arising from the Labor Code violations
suffered by the plaintiff or plaintiffs themselves, and a ‘representative’
claim, arising from violations suffered by other employees.” (Piplack v.
In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1288.)
Here, the severance provision in Section 8 of
the BAA, prevents the representative waiver of Section 4 from being a wholesale
PAGA action waiver, thus allowing Plaintiff’s PAGA action to be served into an
individual claim and a representative claim. (See Westmoreland v. Kindercare
Education LLC (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 967, 982.) Otherwise, Plaintiff would
be prohibited from bringing a PACA action “regardless of whether the action is
filed in arbitration or in court.” (Drummond Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. A [bold added].)
Moreover, the BAA class action waiver in this
action is similar to waiver provisions in the arbitration agreement in Adolph,
which stated: “To the extent permitted by law, you and Company agree not to
bring a representative action on behalf of others under the [PAGA] in any court
or in arbitration.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1115.)
However, because the arbitration agreement also included a severability clause,
the plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims could be compelled to arbitration and
the representative action stayed. (Ibid.) Even though the government is
the real party in interest in a PAGA action and an aggrieved employee
“functions as a substitute for an action brought by the government itself”, the
employee’s individual PAGA claim can be compelled into arbitration, regardless
of its representative nature. (Id. at p. 1117.)
Accordingly, the court does not read the BAA as
prohibiting representative claims or preventing the severance of PAGA claims
into individual and representative claims. The language of the BAA is broad and
applies to “Any and all ‘Coved Claims’ including, but not limited to,
claims of . . . failure to pay wages, bonuses or other compensation, . . . and
violations of any other common law, federal, state, or local statute,
ordinance, regulation or public policy . . . .” (Drummond Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. A.)
Therefore, whether Plaintiff is an “aggrieved employee” “against whom one or
more of the alleged violations was committed” is a covered claim that arises
out of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant Chase and is a question that
should be submitted to arbitration. (Lab. Code, § 2699(c).)
As to Plaintiff’s second point, the court does
not find that sending Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims to arbitration is a
“futile act” because the BAA is binding on Plaintiff and Defendant but not on
unnamed parties, meaning arbitration will have a preclusive effect on this
action. (Civ. Code, § 3532.)
Lastly, as to Defendant Chase’s request for a
statement of decision, Defendant cites no statute or case law finding that a
statement of decision is required. Defendant Chase’s citation to Metis
Development LLC v. Bohacek (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 679, 689, fn. 3 only
notes that certain cases cited therein “do not expressly hold, but perhaps
imply, that a statement of decision would have been required if requested.”
“[C]ases are not authority for propositions not considered therein.” (Roberts
v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 372.)
Therefore, Defendant Chase’s request for a
statement of decision is denied.
The motion to compel arbitration of
Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims is granted, and the representative PAGA
action is stayed.
Conclusion
Defendant Chase’s motion to
compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual PAGA claims is granted.
Plaintiff’s representative PAGA action is stayed pending arbitration.