Judge Gail Killefer, Case Number: 24STCV24125, Date: 2025-03-07 Tentative Ruling

TENTATIVE: Defendant UDR’s demurrer is overruled. Defendant must file an Answer by March 21, 2025. The Court schedules an OSC Re: Answers for April 3, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., and continues the Case Management Conference for the same date and time. Defendant to give notice.

On September 18, 2024, Daniela Schoenberg (“Plaintiff”) filed an action against United Dominion Realty, L.P. (“Defendant” or “UDR”) and Does 1 to 15. The Complaint alleges three causes of action: (1) Tenant Harassment (LAMC § 45.33 et seq.); (2) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Use & Enjoyment; and (3) Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.

Defendant UDR now demurs to the first cause of action for Tenant Harassment. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The matter is now before the court.

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452(c), (d), and (h).) “Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)

Exhibit A: A letter to Mayor Eric Garcetti from the Los Angeles Housing + Community Investment Department (“HCIDLA”) dated December 3, 2018, entitled “HCIDLA RECOMMENDATION ON THE ADOPTION OF AN ANTI-TENANT HARASSMENT ORDINANCE IN RESPONSE TO COUNCIL MOTION 14-0268-S13.

Demurrer[1]

Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.¿ (CCP, § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In evaluating a demurrer, the court accepts the complainant’s properly pled facts as true and ignores contentions, deductions, and conclusory statements. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1976) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Moreover, the court does not consider whether a plaintiff will be able to prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such proof. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 604.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff was a tenant in a property located in Los Angeles, CA since February 2021. (Compl., ¶ 1, Ex. A.)Defendant UDR owned the Property. (Ibid.) The FAC asserts that Defendant was cited by the Los Angeles Housing + Community Investment Department (“LAHD”) for safety violations, but Defendant continued to illegally collect rent from Plaintiff in violation of Civ. Code § 1942.4. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 11.)

On August 28, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a written request to Defendant that her Unit was without hot water and Defendant marked the request as “completed” without fixing the issue. (Compl., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff continued to submit written request to restore hot water to her unit “in September 2023, November 2023, December 2023, January 2024, and February 2024” but Defendant continued to mark the requests as “completed” without ever fixing the issue. (Ibid.) Plaintiff submitted a complaint to LAHD and Defendant was cited on January 18, 2024. (Id. ¶ 14.) Defendant failed to restore the hot water, and was cited again on February 26, 2024. (Id. ¶ 16.) Defendant did not fix the issue until 8 months later in March 2024. (Id. ¶ 17.)

On May 13, 2024, Plaintiff noticed mold in her bathroom and notified Defendant, but Defendant ignored the request and all subsequent requests. (Compl., ¶ 21.) On May 22, 2024, an inspection confirmed the presence of mold in her bathroom and kitchen. (Id. ¶ 22.) Defendant ignored the mold inspection report and informed Plaintiff on June 18, 2024, that it would not abate the mold in her Unit. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23.) Plaintiff moved out of her unit in July 2024 due to Defendant’s refusal to abate the mold. (Id. ¶ 24.)

The first cause of action is premised on the allegation that “Defendants have engaged in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at Plaintiff that has caused detriment and harm and that serves now lawful purpose” such as “reducing housing services without a concomitant reduction in rent.” (Compl., ¶¶ 38, 39.) “Defendants engaged in acts or omissions which interfered with Plaintiff’s right to use and enjoy the rental unit.” (Id. ¶ 40.)

Defendant UDR demurs to the first cause of action on the ground that the Complaint fails to state facts demonstrating tenant harassment a private right of action under the Ordinance.

Article 5.3 of Chapter IV the Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) prohibits tenant harassment. (LAMC, § 45.33.) LAMC § 45.33 defines harassment as “bad faith conduct directed at a specific tenant or tenants that causes the latter detriment or harm.”

Examples of Tenant Harassment include but are not limited to the following actions:

2. Failing to perform and timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by Federal, State, County, or local housing, health, or safety laws; or failure to follow applicable industry standards to minimize exposure to noise, dust, lead paint, asbestos, or other building materials with potentially harmful health impacts.

An aggrieved tenant under this article, or any person, organization, or entity who will fairly and adequately represent the interests of an aggrieved tenant(s) under this article, may institute civil proceedings as provided by law, against any landlord violating any of the provisions of this article and any person who aids, facilitates, and/or incites another to violate the provisions of this article, regardless of whether the rental unit remains occupied or has been vacated due to harassment.

The court finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges harassment as defined by LAMC § 45.33 because Defendant UDR repeatedly failed to restore the hot water and remediate the mold, causing Plaintiff to move out of her unit. LAMC § 45.35(A) permits a tenant to bring a Tenant Harassment claim under the LAMC even if the unit has been vacated.

In interpreting a state, the court construes “words in their broader statutory context and, where possible, harmonizing provisions concerning the same subject. [Citations.]” (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 478.) The court is not persuaded that LAMC § 45.35(A) should be read narrowly as only applying to continuous harassing conduct rather than past harassing conduct. It makes no sense to interpret the Tenant Harassment Act as allowing a harasser to escape liability because the harasser succeeded in their unlawful objective of having the tenant vacate the unit. The court must avoid interpreting the statute in a manner that would produce absurd consequences not intended by the lawmakers. (See Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1394.)

The court finds that the Tenant Harassment Act does not require Plaintiff to plead continuing harassing conduct to bring a private right of action. Thus, the demurrer is overruled.

The Court schedules an OSC Re: Answers for April 3, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., and continues the Case

[1] Pursuant to CCP § 430.41, the meet and confer requirement has been met. (Kuberka Decl., ¶¶ 5, 6.)