Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 24STCV24831, Date: 2025-06-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV24831    Hearing Date: June 4, 2025    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 Wednesday, June 4, 2025

CASE NUMBER:                   24STCV24831

CASE NAME:                        Miguel A. Alfaro Piceno v. Yard House, L.P., et al.

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendants The Yard House, LP, Yard House USA, Inc. and GMRI, Inc

OPPOSING PARTY:             Plaintiff Miguel A. Alfaro Piceno

TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set

PROOF OF SERVICE:           OK

PROCEEDING:                      Motion to Compel Arbitration

OPPOSITION:                        14 May 2025

Amend. Opp.                       15 May 2025

Supp. Brief:                        15 March 2025

REPLY:                                  20 May 2025

TENTATIVE:                         The Yard House Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is denied.

Background

On September 23, 2024, Miguel A. Alfaro Piceno (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants The Yard House L.P.; Yard House USA, Inc. GMRI, Inc. dba The Yard House (collectively “Yard House Defendants”), Juan Figueroa, and Does 1 to 5.

The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges the following eight causes of action: (1) Discrimination, including discriminatory discharge based on actual or perceived disabilities, (2) Failure to engage in a good faith interactive process, (3) Failure to accommodate, (4) Discrimination, including discriminatory discharge based on actual or perceived national origin and/or immigration status, (5) Discrimination, including discriminatory discharge based on age, (6) Retaliation, including retaliatory discharge based on actual or perceived participation in protected activities, (7) Harassment and/or hostile work environment, and (8) Failure to prevent discrimination, harassment and retaliation.

The Yard House Defendants now move for an order to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The matter is now before the court.

motion to compel arbitration 

I.         Legal Standard 

“California law reflects a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for resolving disputes.¿ To further that policy, Code of Civil Procedure, section 1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless one of three limited exceptions applies.¿ Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal¿ issues.”¿ (CCP § 1281.2; Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 967.)¿ Similarly, public policy under federal law favors arbitration and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract and that courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms.¿ (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.)¿¿¿¿¿ 

¿¿¿¿ 

In deciding a motion or petition to compel arbitration, trial courts must first decide whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties and then determine whether the claims are covered within the scope of the agreement.¿(Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.)¿ The opposing party has the burden to establish any defense to enforcement.¿ (Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 579 [“The petitioner ... bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and the opposing party, plaintiffs here, bears the burden of proving any fact necessary to its defense.”].)¿¿¿ 

II.        Request for Judicial Notice

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) “Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)

The Yard House Defendants request judicial notice of the following:

Exhibit A: A true and correct copy of the Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures of the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA Rules”), which may be located at www.adr.org.

The court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(h).

III.      Discussion

The Yard House Defendants assert that they have maintained a Dispute Resolution Process (“DRP”) for all their employees since at least 2005. (Varela Decl., ¶¶ 4, 5.) “On February 28, 2013, an acknowledgement of the DRP was executed bearing the name and signature of Miguel A. Alfaro, which confirmed receipt, review, and understanding of the DRP book. The acknowledgement also confirmed his agreement to submit covered matters to the DRP.” (Id. ¶ 10, Ex. C, D. [DRP].)

Plaintiff disputes that he saw, signed, or printed his name on the DRP. (5/14/2025 Piceno Decl., ¶¶ 10-13.) “I was never provided a copy of the Defendants· Dispute Resolution Process C--DRP'') in Spanish or in English or the purported cover memorandum that allegedly accompanied the DRP booklet with the included acknowledgement form in 2013 or thereafter.” (Id. at p. 13.) Plaintiff further asserts that on or about April 5, 2022, Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s request for a copy of his personal file and the copies he received did not contain the February 28, 2013, Agreement. (Id. ¶ 7.)

“Where, as here, the respondent challenges the validity of the signature, however, the petitioner must ‘establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the signature was authentic.’” (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 544 (Bannister) citing Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060.) “In such proceedings, ‘the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.’” (Bannister, at p. 544 citing Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)

On April 14, 2025, Defendants submitted a supplemental brief that contained a declaration of retained expert Beth Chrisman, a Certified Questioned Document Examiner who purported to authenticate Plaintiff’s signature on the DRP. (Defendant’s Supp. Brief Ex. A [Chrisman Decl.].) Plaintiff’s amended opposition filed on May 15, 2025, also presents the expert declaration of Jim Blanco, a Forensic Document Examiner, who determined that the signature was not Plaintiff’s. (Blanco Decl., ¶ 26.) “It is for the trier of fact to resolve such conflict among experts, and once it has done so its determination will not be disturbed on appeal.”  (Estate of Zalud (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 945, 952.)

Plaintiff cites the deposition of Jennifer Potter (“Potter”), Defendants’ Person Most Qualified (“PMQ”), who testified that the DRP was inside Plaintiff’s personnel file. (Potter Depo. at p. 20:11-16.) Potter could not testify that the DRP was given to Plaintiff in February 2013 and had no firsthand knowledge that the DRP was given to employees before 2014 or that Plaintiff signed the DRP. (Id. at pp. 30:2-13; 34:10-35:2; 41:10-23; 45:4-11; 47:6-17; 50:3-5.) Potter was also unable to explain why the DRP, or the Cover Memorandum in Spanish or in English during his employment or the acknowledgment form within the DRP booklet, was not given to Plaintiff when he requested his personnel file, when the DRP was allegedly stored in his employee file. (Id. at pp. 42:22-43:19; 44:1-6.)

Defendants also presented the Declaration of Jeanette Varela, the current Associate Manager – Dispute Resolution, but her declaration fails to present evidence that Plaintiff signed or was presented with the DRP. (Varela Decl., ¶ 4.) Moreover, the February 28, 2023, DRP that purports to contain Plaintiff’s signature also has the signature of the Manager/Director. (Id. Ex. C.) Yet Defendants fail to explain why the Manager/Director was unable to provide evidence that Plaintiff signed the DRP on February 28, 2023, or knew about the DRP.

The court finds the Yard House Defendants failed to meet their burden of authenticating Plaintiff’s signature by a preponderance of the evidence and thus failed to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement. Defendant’s Motion is denied.

Conclusion

The Yard House Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is denied.