Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 24VECV01848, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24VECV01848 Hearing Date: February 19, 2025 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: Wednesday, February 19, 2025
CASE NUMBER: 24VECV01848
CASE NAME: Watergate Property Owners Association v. Douglas J. DeNoce
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Douglas J. DeNoce
OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Watergate Property Owners
Association
TRIAL DATE: Not set.
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
PROCEEDING: Demurrer to First Amended Complaint
OPPOSITION: 11 January 2025
REPLY: 11
February 2025
TENTATIVE: Defendant
DeNoce’s demurrer to the FAC is overruled. Defendant must file an Answer by March
5, 2025. An OSC Re: Answer is set for March 12, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. and a Case
Management Conference is set for the same date and time. Plaintiff to give notice.
Background
On April 23, 2024, the Watergate Property Owners Association (“Plaintiff”
or “Watergate”) filed Complaint against Douglas J. DeNoce as an individual and
as the trustee of the Savannah N. DeNoce Trust (collectively “Defendant” or
“DeNoce”); and Does 1 to 20.
After the demurrer to the Complaint was sustained with leave to amend,
Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging two
causes of action: (1) breach/violation of the association’s CC&Rs and
injunctive relief; and (2) declaratory relief.
Defendant DeNoce now demurs to the FAC. Plaintiff Watergate opposes the
Motion. The matter is now before the court.
request
for JUDICIAL notice
The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of
the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court
of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and
“[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are
capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of
reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d), and
(h).) “Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting
the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its
meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d
369, 374.)
Defendant DeNoce requests judicial notice of the following:
Exhibit A: The June 21, 2021 Annual Meeting
Minutes as produced by plaintiff Watergate Property Owners Association’s
(“Watergate”) in related Case No. 23STCV22387, which is Exhibit A to Mr.
DeNoce’s declaration.
Exhibit B: The July 6, 2021 Annual Meeting
Minutes as produced by Watergate in related Case No. 23STCV22387, which is
Exhibit B to Mr. DeNoce’s declaration.
Exhibit C: The March 29, 2022 Notice of
Annual Membership Meeting, which is Exhibit C to Mr. DeNoce’s declaration.
Exhibit D: The May 3, 2022 Annual Membership
Meeting, including the accompanying Voting Instructions and Election and Voting
Rules and Regulations, which is Exhibit D to Mr. DeNoce’s declaration.
Exhibit E: The June 20, 2022 Annual Meeting
Minutes, which is Exhibit E to Mr. DeNoce’s declaration.
Exhibit F: The June 19, 2023 Regular Session
Minutes, which is Exhibit F to Mr. DeNoce’s declaration.
Exhibit G: The October 24, 2024 Notice of
Annual Meeting of Members and Organization Meeting of the Board of Directors,
which is Exhibit G to Mr. DeNoce’s declaration.
Exhibit H: The Restated Bylaws of Watergate
Property Owners Association, which is attached as Exhibit H to Mr. DeNoce’s
declaration.
Defendant DeNoce seeks judicial notice pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(g)
and § 452(h). The Meeting notes are not facts or propositions of “such common
knowledge” so the court cannot take judicial notice pursuant to Evid. Code §
452(g). The court also fails to find the Meeting notes are judicially
noticeable under Evid. Code 452(h) because although their content is not in
dispute, the meeting notes are not “capable of immediate and accurate
determination” but were instead produced through the regular course of
discovery in another related case.
Lastly, Defendant DeNoce seeks judicial notice on the basis that Exhibits
A to H are incorporated by reference into the FAC. “Unlike rule-established
judicial notice, incorporation-by-reference is a judicially created doctrine
that treats certain documents as though they are part of the complaint itself.
The doctrine prevents plaintiffs from selecting only portions of documents that
support their claims, while omitting portions of those very documents that
weaken—or doom—their claims.” (Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc. (9th
Cir. 2018) 899 F.3d 988, 1002.) California courts have permitted judicial
notice of matters referenced in the pleadings. (See Legg v. United Ben. Life
Ins. Co. of Omaha (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 573, 580 [reference to prior
judgment in complaint permitted the court to take judicial notice of the prior
actions referenced in the pleadings].)
Defendant DeNoce asserts that the Meeting notes are referenced in
Paragraphs 12-14 and 16 to 18 of the FAC because they relate to Plaintiff’s
governing documents. However, Paragraph 7 is the Paragraph wherein Plaintiff
asserts that it has the power to carry out its rights and obligations, which
Defendant wishes to bring into question with the Meeting notes. “While the existence of those documents may be
judicially noticed, the matters asserted in those documents may not.” (Adams
v. Bank of America, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 666, 673–674.)
There are too many unestablished facts to permit the court to take
judicial notice of Exhibits A to H. Defendant fails to show that the Bylaws
attached as Exhibit H are the current Bylaws and that the Board was not
permitted to change the number of votes needed to achieve quorum under the
applicable Bylaws. Moreover, on its face, Exhibit A states that 27 ballots
received no quorum was obtained but Exhibit B states that with 32 ballots
quorum was obtained. Accordingly, the court cannot accept Defendant DeNoce’s
interpretation of Exhibit B which asserts that there was no quorum at the July
6, 2021 Annual Meeting because this is in dispute with the facts asserted in
Exhibit B. “A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice only if the
matter is reasonably beyond dispute.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont
General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.)
Therefore, judicial notice of Exhibits A, B, and H is denied.
Defendant DeNoce also wishes that the court take Judicial Notice of Exhibits
C, D, E, and F and find that the Board failed to comply with Civ. Code § 5103
during the 2022, 2023, and 2024 Board elections. Civ. Code § 5103 states in the
relevant part “the association may, but is not required to, consider the
qualified candidates elected by acclamation if all of the following conditions
have been met . . .” Defendant DeNoce asserts that the Board was not exempt
from § 5103 because the Board failed to abide by § 5103(e) because meeting
agenda failed to reflect “the name of each qualified candidate that will be
seated by acclamation if the item is approved.” (Civ. Code, § 5103.) Defendant
fails to point to what provision of § 5103(e) renders a Board election void due
to failure to comply with all its provisions.
The court cannot judicially notice the Meeting notes and interpret them
to find that as a matter of law, the Board Elections were void or that the
Board was not Properly Constituted such that no Architectural Committee was elected,
and Plaintiff was excused from submitting an application to the Architectural
Committee and there was no breach of the Governing Documents.
If Defendant DeNoce wants the court to find Plaintiff’s board elections
are void, Defendant must file an action under Civ. Code § 5145 which provides
the relief Defendant requests:
(a) A member of an association may
bring a civil action for declaratory or equitable relief for a violation of
this article by the association, including, but not limited to, injunctive
relief, restitution, or a combination thereof, within one year of the date that
the inspector or inspectors of elections notifies the board and membership of
the election results or the cause of action accrues, whichever is later. If a
member establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the election
procedures of this article, or the adoption of and adherence to rules provided
by Article 5 (commencing with Section 4340) of Chapter 3, were not followed, a
court shall void any results of the election unless the association
establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the association's
noncompliance with this article or the election operating rules did not affect
the results of the election. The findings of the court shall be stated in
writing as part of the record.
(b) A member who prevails in a
civil action to enforce the member's rights pursuant to this article shall be
entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and court costs, and the court may
impose a civil penalty of up to five hundred dollars ($500) for each violation,
except that each identical violation shall be subject to only one penalty if
the violation affects each member of the association equally. A prevailing
association shall not recover any costs, unless the court finds the action to
be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. If a member prevails in a
civil action brought in small claims court, the member shall be awarded court
costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred for consulting an attorney in
connection with this civil action.
(c) A cause of action under
subdivision (a) may be brought in either the superior court or, if the amount
of the demand does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of the small claims
court, in small claims court.
(Civ. Code § 5145.)
Unless Defendant DeNoce brings and prevails on a Civ. Code § 5145 claim,
the court declines to find as a matter of law that Plaintiff was not a properly
constituted Board at the time Defendant breached the Governing Documents. The
court cannot take judicial notice of matters that require formal proof. (Kilroy
v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145.)
Accordingly, Judicial Notice of Exhibits C, D, E, & F is denied. Plaintiff’s
objections to Defendant’s request for judicial notice are also sustained.
I. Legal Standard
Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect
by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A
demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer
must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.¿
(CCP, § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In
evaluating a demurrer, the court accepts the complainant’s properly pled facts
as true and ignores contentions, deductions, and conclusory statements. (Daar
v. Yellow Cab Co. (1976) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713; Serrano v. Priest (1971)
5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Moreover, the court does not consider whether a plaintiff
will be able to prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such
proof. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d
590, 604.)
Leave to amend must be allowed
where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to
show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)
II. Discussion
Defendant DeNoce
demurs to 1st and 2nd causes of action on the basis the FAC fails to allege
that DeNoce violated the CC&Rs, and that Plaintiff had the authority to act
under the CC&Rs.
Section 5.01 of the
CC&Rs states:
SECTION 5.01. ARCHITECTURAL APPROVAL: No building, fence, wall, patio cover or other structure shall be
commenced or erected upon any unit by any OWNER, nor shall any exterior
addition to or change or alteration therein affecting the exterior appearance
of a unit be made until the plans and specifications showing the nature, kind,
shape, height, materials, and location of the same have been submitted to the
ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE, provided for in Section 5.02, and approved in writing
by the Board of Directors as to harmony of external design and location and
relation to surrounding units and topography. In the event said COMMITTEE or
its designated representatives, fails to approve or disapprove such design and
location within sixty (60) days after said plans and specifications have been
submitted, the improvements shall be deemed to be approve in accordance with
said plans.
(FAC, Ex. 1, Art.
5, § 5.01.)
Section 5 of
Watergate’s Rules and Regulations, adopted in 2021 further provides:
5.1. NO MODIFICATIONS OR IMPROVEMENTS OT THE
EXTERIOR OF THE UNITS INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO ROOFS, FENCES, GATES,
DOORS, WINDOWS, GUTTERS, DOWNSPOUTS, PATIO COVERS, SECURITY DEVICES, CAMERAS,
ADDITIONAL LIGHTING, AND SATELLITE DISHES SHALL BE PERMITTED WITHOUT SUBMISSION
OF REQUIRED FORMS AND WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE/BOARD. Forms
requesting architectural changes are available from the Management Company
[citation]. Homeowners not submitting an application will be asked to cease
work until required forms are submitted and approved and may be subject to a
fine and removal of the unapproved modifications at their own expense.
(FAC, Ex. 2, § 5.01.)
The FAC alleges
that Defendant DeNoce violated Section 5.01 of the CC&Rs and the Rules and
Regulations (the “Governing Documents”) by “by erecting and installing a video
surveillance camera, which is itself attached to a mount on the roof of the
Subject Property, on or around March 17, 2023” and failing to remove the
cameral despite several written notices. (FAC, ¶¶ 12, 13) It was not until June
9, 2023 that Defendant submitted a “residential improvement application”
requesting permission to install the “roof-mounted video surveillance camera at
issue.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff demanded that Defendant remove the
roof-mounted camera, but Defendant has refused, and injunctive relief is
necessary to ensure Defendant’s compliance with the governing documents. (Id.
¶ 17.) The FAC further asserts “[t]he Association has performed all obligations
required of it and of the Governing Documents, except those obligations that
the Association was prevented from or excused from performing due to
Defendants’ conduct.” (Id. ¶ 20.)
Defendant’s
demurrer attempts to introduce evidence that is not in the complaint and for
which the court cannot take judicial notice to assert that Plaintiff invited
DeNoce to submit an architectural application for approval. “The hearing on
demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the
guise of having the court take judicial notice of affidavits, declarations,
depositions, and other such material which was filed on behalf of the adverse
party and which purports to contradict the allegations and contentions of the
plaintiff.” (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981)
123 Cal.App.3d 593, 605.) “Accordingly, judicially noticeable facts may
supersede any inconsistent factual allegations contained in a complaint.” (City
of Chula Vista v. County of San Diego (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1713,
1719.)
First, Defendant
asserts the FAC fails to allege Plaintiff had a properly constituted
Architectural Committee. However, Defendant fails to cite provisions of the
Governing Documents where the fact that if the Architectural Committee was not
properly appointed by the Board, Plaintiff’s obligations to apply under
Sections 5.01 is excused. Moreover, Defendant’s contention that that the
Architectural Committee was not properly appointed contradicts the allegations
in the FAC, which assert that “Watergate has all the power necessary to carry
out its rights and obligations, including the right, duty and power to contract
for legal services, adopt rules and regulations in furtherance of the purposes
of Watergate, and to prosecute any action to enforce its rights and
obligations, including the bringing of this action.” (FAC, ¶ 7.) The FAC also
asserts that “All lots within the Development are subject to Watergate’s
CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations (“Governing Documents”), and by virtue of
their ownership of the Subject Property, which is within the Development, the
Defendants agreed to abide by, and is bound by, all terms and conditions of the
Governing Documents which run with the land and bind all owners of an interest
in the Development.” (Id. ¶ 8.)
Defendant does not
deny that he installed the roof-mounted video surveillance camera before
seeking permission from Plaintiff’s Architectural Committee. Because Defendant
was obligated to first submit an application for approval before installing the
camera, Defendant cannot now state that Architectural Committee should be
deemed to have approved Plaintiff’s application because it did not act within
60 days. (FAC, Ex. 1, Art. 5, § 5.01.) Submitting an application prior to
installing the roof camera was a condition precedent to the Architectural
Committee’s approval or denial of the Plaintiff’s application. (FAC, Ex. 1,
Art. 5, § 5.01 Ex. 2, § 5.01.) Consequently, Plaintiff “direct[ed] Defendants
to remove the camera immediately, and warning that fines may be imposed against
them if the violative camera was not removed.” (FAC, ¶ 13.) Defendant fails to
point to any provisions in the Governing Documents that required the Architectural
Committee to consider any application for architectural changes that had
already been installed without committee approval.
Based on the above,
the demurrer is overruled.
Conclusion
Defendant DeNoce’s demurrer to the
FAC is overruled. Defendant must file an Answer by March 5, 2025. An OSC Re: Answers is set for March 12, 2025,
at 8:30 a.m. and a Case Management Conference is set for the same date and time.
Plaintiff to give notice.
[1]
Pursuant to CCP § 430.41, the meet and confer
requirement has been met. “Any
determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient
shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (CCP § 430.41(a)(4).)
As the failure to meet and confer does not constitute grounds to overrule a
demurrer, the court continues to the merits.