Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: BC666680, Date: 2022-10-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC666680 Hearing Date: October 24, 2022 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: October 24, 2022
CASE NUMBER: BC666680
CASE NAME: Wael
HH Awad, et al. v. Harry Nadjarian, et al.
MOVING PARTIES: Defendants, Harry Nadjarian, Industrial Motor Power
Corporation, and IMP Energy Solutions, LLC
OPPOSING PARTIES: Plaintiffs, Wael HH Awad and Al Qastal Heavy Equipment and
Spare Parts Trading
TRIAL DATE: Post
Judgment –Judgment entered February 4, 2022
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
MOTION: Defendants’
Motion for Charging Order
OPPOSITION: None
as of October 21, 2022.
REPLY: No
opposition filed.
TENTATIVE: Plaintiff’s
motion is granted as to the request for a charging order. Plaintiff’s motion is
otherwise denied without prejudice. Plaintiff is to give notice.
Background
This
action arises in connection with the sale of Caterpillar (“CAT”) generators
from Harry Nadjarian ("Nadjarian"), Industrial Motor Power
Corporation ("IMP"), and IMP Energy Solutions, LLC
("IMPES") (collectively “Defendants”) to Al Qastal Heavy Equipment
and Spare Parts Trading (“Al Qastal”) and its owner, Wael Awad (collectively
“Plaintiffs”), in exchange for a forty percent (40%) stake in IMPES.
Plaintiffs
filed their operative Complaint on June 28, 2017. Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges
TEN causes of action: (1) fraud; (2) rescission based on Fraud in the Inducement
of a Contract (Civ. Code § 1689(b)(1)); (3) rescission based on unilateral
mistake (Civ. Code § 1689(b)(1)); (4) recission based on mutual mistake (Civ.
Code § 1689(b)(1)); (5) rescission based on failure of consideration (Civ. Code
§ 1689(b)(2), (4)); (6) breach of fiduciary duty against Nadjarian; (7)
conversion; (8) dissolution of limited liability company (Corp. Code § 17707.03)
against IMPES; (9) accounting against IMPES; and (10) dissolution of
partnership (Corp. Code § 16801) against Nadjarian.
On
January 20, 2022, Plaintiffs failed to appear at the Final Status Conference,
and trial documents were not filed pursuant to this department’s Trial
Preparation Order. On January 25, 2022, Plaintiffs failed to appear at the
Order to Show Cause set by the court, and the court instructed Defendants to
prepare a proposed Order to Dismiss. On February 4, 2022, the court granted
Defendants’ proposed order and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice.
On August 1, 2022, the court granted Defendants’ motion for
attorney fees pursuant to CCP § 1717.
Defendants now move for the following order, pursuant to CCP
§§ 708.310 and Corp. Code §§ 16502, 16504, 15907.03, and 17705.03:
1.
Charging the Plaintiffs’ interest of Defendant IMPES
and the partnership interest of Plaintiffs in partnership with Defendant
Nadjarian.
2.
Orders for the sale of the same interests.
(Notice of
Motion, 2-3.) No opposition has been filed to the instant motion.
Discussion
I.
Legal Authority
CCP § 708.310 provides as follows:
“If a money
judgment is rendered against a partner or member but not against the
partnership or limited liability company, the judgment debtor's interest in the
partnership or limited liability company may be applied toward the satisfaction
of the judgment by an order charging the judgment debtor's interest pursuant to
Section 15907.3, 16504, or 17705.03 of the Corporations Code.”
Additionally, Corp. Code § 16504 permits a court having
jurisdiction to “charge the transferable interest of the judgment debtor
to satisfy the judgment” on application by a judgment creditor. (Corp. Code § 16504(a).) Such a charging order “constitutes a lien on
the judgment debtor’s transferable interest in the partnership.” (Corp. Code §
16504(b).) Further, the court may order foreclosure of the interest subject to
the charging order at any time. (Id.) However, “at any time before
foreclosure,” an interest may be redeemed in any of the following ways:
“(1) By the judgment
debtor.
(2) With property other
than partnership property, by one or more of the other partners.
(3) With partnership
property, by one or more of the other partners with the consent of all of the
partners whose interests are not so charged.”
II.
Analysis
Defendants correctly explain they were awarded attorney
fees and costs in the amounts of $389, 411.00 and $11,263.44, respectively, and
that these costs have not yet been paid. (Motion, 4.) Defendants also correctly
explain that Plaintiff owns 40% interest of Defendant IMPES, and Plaintiff owns
another 50% interest of an unnamed partnership described in Paragraph 31 and
the Tenth Cause of Action of the Complaint. (Id.)
Defendants then point to relevant portions of the
Corporations Code, which provide:
15907.03 (a) On application to a court of competent
jurisdiction by any judgment creditor of a partner or transferee, the court may
charge the transferable interest of the judgment debtor with payment of the
unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest. To the extent so charged, the
judgment creditor has only the rights of a transferee. . . . (b) A charging
order constitutes a lien on the judgment debtor's transferable interest. The
court may order a foreclosure upon the interest subject to the charging order
at any time. The purchaser at the foreclosure sale has the rights of a
transferee. . . .
16504 (a) On application by a judgment creditor of a
partner or of a partner's transferee, a court having jurisdiction may charge the
transferable interest of the judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment. The court
may appoint a receiver of the share of the distributions due or to become due
to the judgment debtor in respect of the partnership and make all other orders,
directions, accounts, and inquiries the judgment debtor might have made or that
the circumstances of the case may require.
(b) A charging order constitutes a lien on the
judgment debtor's transferable interest in the partnership. The court may order
a foreclosure of the interest subject to the charging order at any time. The
purchaser at the foreclosure sale has the rights of a transferee.
17705.03 (a) On application by a judgment creditor of
a member or transferee, a court may enter a charging order against the
transferable interest of the judgment debtor for the unsatisfied amount of the
judgment. A charging order constitutes a lien on a judgment debtor's
transferable interest and requires the limited liability company to pay over to
the person to which the charging order was issued any distribution that would
otherwise be paid to the judgment debtor.
(b) To the extent necessary to effectuate the
collection of distributions pursuant to a charging order in effect under
subdivision (a), the court may do any of the following:
(1) Appoint a receiver of the distributions subject to
the charging order, with the power to make all inquiries the judgment debtor
might have made. (2) Make all other orders necessary to give effect to the
charging order.
(3) Upon a showing that distributions under a charging
order will not pay the judgment debt within a reasonable time, foreclose the
lien and order the sale of the transferable interest. The purchaser at the
foreclosure sale obtains only the transferable interest, does not thereby
become a member, and is subject to Section 17705.02.
(C) At any time before foreclosure under paragraph (3)
of subdivision (b), the member or transferee whose transferable interest is
subject to a charging order under subdivision (a) may extinguish the charging
order by satisfying the judgment and filing a certified copy of the
satisfaction with the court that issued the charging order.
(d) At any time before foreclosure under paragraph (3)
of subdivision (b), a limited liability company or one or more members whose
transferable interests are not subject to the charging order may pay to the
judgment creditor the full amount due under the judgment and thereby succeed to
the rights of the judgment creditor, including the charging order.
(e) This title does not deprive any member or
transferee of the benefit of any exemption laws applicable to the member's or
transferee's transferable interest.
(f) This section provides the exclusive remedy by
which a person seeking to enforce a judgment against a member or transferee
may, in the capacity of judgment creditor, satisfy the judgment from the
judgment debtor's transferable interest. (Motion, 4-5.)
Defendants point to an apparent split of authority
requiring the consent of partners, but further contend that the split is a moot
issue “as all of the other members of [IMPES] have consented to the sale, and
[Nadjarian] has consented to foreclosure of Mr. Award’s partnership interest.”
(Motion, 5.)
Defendants’ motion is granted. Defendants have
demonstrated that a judgment has been entered against Plaintiff and that Plaintiff
has not made any progress towards satisfying the judgment to date.
Additionally, Defendants have demonstrated that Plaintiff has an interest in IMPES
and the second unnamed partnership with Nadjarian which may be charged to
satisfy the judgment pursuant to CCP § 708.310 and Corp. Code § 16504.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motion is granted. Defendants are to give
notice.