Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 19CHCV00868, Date: 2024-06-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19CHCV00868    Hearing Date: June 12, 2024    Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 6-12-24

Case #19CHCV00868, Albert Dib vs. Habibollah Elahinejad, et al.

Trial Date: N/A

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Albert Dib

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Habibollah Elahinejad and LA Home Improvement, Inc.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff is requesting attorney fees in the amount of $181,650.00 from Defendants.

RULING: Motion for attorney fees is denied without prejudice.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff Albert Dib (Plaintiff) sued Defendants Habibollah Elahinejad and LA Home Improvement, Inc. (Defendants) for a breach of lease. After a bench trial, Plaintiff prevailed on his breach of lease claim. Judgment was entered in Plaintiff’s favor on January 12, 2024, and Plaintiff was awarded $472,096.00 in damages.

A provision of the lease agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants allows Plaintiff to recover attorney fees if he needed to bring an action to enforce the terms of the lease agreement. (Stepanski Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) Because of this provision, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorney fees pursuant to Civ. Code § 1717 on January 18, 2024.

Plaintiff is requesting $181,650.00 in attorney fees from Defendants. Plaintiffs argue in their motion that the attorney fees and hourly rates are reasonable. Plaintiff’s only evidence in support of his motion for attorney fees is a declaration from his attorney, Lisa A. Stepanski. (Stepanski Decl., ¶¶ 6-8.)

Ms. Stepanski’s hourly rate for trial, court appearances, settlement conferences, and depositions was $350, and she represents that she charged Plaintiff 71.1 hours at $350 an hour for a total of $24,885. (Stepanski Decl., ¶ 6.) She charged Plaintiff $225 an hour for 513.2 hours of drafting motions and opposition, the FAC and SAC, propounding and responding to written discovery, deposition preparations and trial preparation, for a total of $115,470. (Stepanski Decl., ¶ 7.) Finally, she charged Plaintiff $150.00 an hour for 275 hours to gather and produce documents, review documents, communications, and research, for a total of $41,250. (Stepanski Decl., ¶ 8.)

The total hours spent on the case was 859.3 hours. When adding these together, the total lodestar amount is $181,605. This is different from the $181,650 that Plaintiff is requesting. It is unknown where the extra $45 comes from, unless Plaintiff just transposed the numbers.

Defendants filed their opposition late on June 3, 2024. However, the Court will consider Defendants’ opposition, despite the late filing.

Defendants argue in their opposition that Plaintiff’s attorney has not sufficiently documented the reasonableness of her request. She has attached no billing statements to the motion. Instead, the entirety of Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees is based on his attorney’s declaration. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has not provided sufficient detail of her billing under the circumstances.

Plaintiff argues in his reply that his attorney’s declaration is sufficient and further detail is not required. Plaintiff also argues that the record allows for the Court to value the attorney fees awarded to Plaintiff at the requested amount.

ANALYSIS

A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Civ. Code § 1717(a).) “A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.)

Plaintiff is the prevailing party because Plaintiff prevailed on his breach of lease action. Therefore, Plaintiff can recover attorney fees pursuant to Civ. Code § 1717.

In determining the reasonableness of fees, courts look to the factors from Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, disapproved on other grounds by Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68 n.5. The factors from Wollersheim are (1) the amount of money involved in the litigation; (2) the nature of the litigation and its difficulty and the intricacies and importance of the litigation; (3) the skill required and employed in handling the litigation, the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the case, and counsel’s education and experience in the particular type of work involved; (4) the attention given to the case; (5) the success of the attorneys efforts; and (6) the time consumed by the litigation. (Id.)

Defendants argue in their opposition that there is no way to determine whether Plaintiff’s requested fees are reasonable because Plaintiff has not provided billing records or any other detailed breakdown of the requested costs. Plaintiff’s attorney has provided a declaration that states how many hours were spent on broad categories of work, such as trial, drafting motions, and communications.

Plaintiff argues in his reply that detailed billing records are not necessary and that the declaration of his attorney is sufficient. Plaintiff cites Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.5th 1363, which states that “The law is clear, however, that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records. (See Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1398, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 754; Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 677.) Raining Data’s attorneys provided declarations detailing their experience and expertise supporting their billing rates, and explained the work provided to Raining Data. Barrenechea did not offer any evidence to challenge any statement in Raining Data’s counsel’s declarations.” (Id. at 1375.)

Weber, the case cited by Raining Data, states the following: “Plaintiff complains that counsel did not state the total number of hours nor substantiate the hours or amounts with copies of time records or copies of billing statements. Counsel’s declaration and verified cost memorandum were, however, made under penalty of perjury. Mathematical calculation could show the number of hours was between 90 and 103. The work done was described. The trial court could make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case, and of the credibility of counsel’s declaration unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements. Although a fee request ordinarily should be documented in great detail, it cannot be said in this particular case that the absence of time records and billing statements deprived the trial court of substantial evidence to support an award; we do not reweigh the evidence.” (Weber, 39 Cal.App.4th at 1587.)

The Court interprets this paragraph from Weber to mean that whether an attorney’s declaration is sufficient to detail the fees incurred rests in the trial court’s sound discretion. The statements in the declaration of Plaintiff’s attorney do not provide substantial evidence to support the requested reward. While the case did go on for four years, 513.2 hours spent drafting motions, complaints, and responding to discovery appears quite excessive. The Court would like to see a further breakdown of this time spent before the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion in the requested amount. Looking at the history of this case, there were very few motions filed. If there were any discovery disputes, they did not come before the Court. The 275 hours that Plaintiff’s attorney claims that she spent to “gather and produce documents in this action, review documents produced by others, communications and legal research” also appears excessive.

For a request for attorney fees of over $181,600, the Court would like more detail before it grants Plaintiff’s motion. This is a large amount of fees, and the Court does not want to grant it based on the broad strokes description given in Plaintiff’s attorney’s declaration. Further detail is needed before the Court can determine the reasonableness of the requested amount.

Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees is denied without prejudice.

Moving party to give notice.