Judge Gary I. Micon, Case Number: 19CHV00565, Date: 2024-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 19CHV00565, Date: 2024-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19CHV00565 Hearing Date: March 28, 2024 Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 3-28-24

Case # 19CHCV00565, Riquerme Berroa, Jr. vs. Maria Emma Barrera.

Trial Date: N/A

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Riquerme Berroa, Jr.

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Maria Emma Barrera

RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff Riquerme Berroa, Jr., (Plaintiff) is requesting attorney fees in the amount of $162,630 from Defendant Maria Emma Barrera

RULING: Granted in the amount of $162,630

SUMMARY OF ACTION AND ANALYSIS

In this case, the parties’ dispute concerned a rental unit that Plaintiff lived in on Defendant’s property. The property was in violation of Municipal Code sections. After a three day bench trial, this Court ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of $80,830.00 for Defendant’s violations. After judgment was entered, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorney fees on October 30, 2023. Plaintiff requests attorney fees in the amount of $162,630 for the four years of litigation.

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to attorney fees based on Defendant’s violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code §§ 151.09 and 151.10. Both of those sections allow a tenant to recover attorney fees for violations of the sections. Plaintiff further argues that fees incurred were reasonable, particularly when the length of the litigation is considered. Finally, Plaintiff argues that his attorney’s hourly rate of $550 is reasonable based on his experience.

Defendant argues in opposition that the motion is without support for the fees and that the time spent on this case was excessive. Defendant seeks a reduction multiplier of 50% since only one defendant was found liable, and a further 90% reduction because, according to Defendant, 90% of the causes of action did not allow for the recovery of attorney fees. Finally, Defendant argues that a reasonable amount for attorney fees in this case would be $4,503.20 based on Los Angeles County Superior Court Rule 3.214.

Plaintiff argues in his reply that all fees incurred were necessary to prove the causes of action for which judgment was entered. Next, Plaintiff argues that the fees are completely supported by the ruling of the Court and the evidence presented in the moving papers. Plaintiff also argues that LA Superior Court Rule 3.214 is inapplicable in this matter. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the fees sought were reasonably incurred and should be awarded.

A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a).) “A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.)

LA Municipal Code § 151.10 provides, in pertinent part, a landlord who violates this code, “shall be liable in a civil action to the person from whom such payment is demanded, accepted or retained for damages of three times the amount by which the payment or payments demanded, accepted or retained exceed the maximum rent or maximum adjusted rent which could be lawfully demanded, accepted or retained together with reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as determined by the court.” Likewise, LAMC § 151.09 provides, in pertinent part, as follows, “In addition, any landlord who fails to provide monetary relocation assistance as required by Subsection G. of this section shall be liable in a civil action to the tenant to whom such assistance is due for damages in the amount the landlord has failed to pay, together with reasonable attorney fees and costs as determined by court.”

Plaintiff argues that because the Court awarded damages for breach of these two code sections, then attorney fees are warranted in this action. Plaintiff represents that the attorney fees are for hours reasonably spent. The Court does not agree with Defendant’s argument that the motion is without support for the fees. The fees are clearly allowable under the relevant LA Municipal Code sections.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff only prevailed on certain causes of action, so the attorney fees are not justified or should be reduced. In EnPALM, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, the Court of Appeal held that the degree of success at trial was a factor in setting fees. Here, however, Defendant made no attempt to parse the billing of Plaintiff’s counsel in that manner or otherwise demonstrate how time was spent on the other causes of action or on the other defendant.

As for Defendant’s argument that the fees are not reasonable, Plaintiff has accounted for the 295.7 hours spent on the case over the course of four years. Nothing in Plaintiff’s statement of services appears to be unreasonable given the length and nature of the case. Defendant argues that the amount of time to do certain tasks, such as drafting the complaint, appear to be unreasonable. However, Defendant says that Plaintiff’s attorney took 9.2 hours to draft the complaint in this case, but the statement of services provided by Plaintiff only shows 4.3 hours for the actual drafting of the complaint. This appears to be a reasonable length of time for drafting a complaint. The other times are reasonable, as well. It is also worth noting that, of the 295.7 hours billed, 32.88 were spent obtaining the default and default judgment, and then responding to Defendant’s successful effort to vacate the default. That means that almost 33 hours of the time spent were due to Defendant’s own conduct. Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate of $550 an hour appears to be reasonable.

Finally, Defendant argues that the fees should be reduced to $4,503.20 based on LA Superior Court Rule 3.214 which provides that in cases where damages were between $50,000.01 and $100,000, the amount of fees awarded should be $3,270 plus 4% of the excess over $50,000. Rule 3.214(a) states that its guidelines apply “unless otherwise determined by the court.”

Plaintiff argues that the Court is not required to follow the fee guidelines because of the discretion the Rule gives the Court, and case law has shown that attorney fees awards are not limited by this fee schedule, and courts do not abuse their discretion when they award fees higher than those provided by the rule. (See Korech v. Hornwood (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1423; Crus v. Ayromloo (2007) 155 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1275.) Based on these cases, the Court is not required to follow the guidelines, as they are only recommendations and fees in excess of the guidelines may be awarded.

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this case. After carefully scrutinizing the case history and the billing statement, the Court finds that the amount of attorney fees requested by Plaintiff is reasonable. A total of 295.7 hours over the course of more than four years is not excessive. Additionally, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s hourly rates were unreasonable. No adjustment will be made to the amount requested by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is granted in the amount of $162,630.

Defendant is ordered to pay $162,630 to Plaintiff’s attorney within 30 days.

Moving party to give notice.