Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 20STCV44865, Date: 2024-03-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV44865    Hearing Date: March 18, 2024    Dept: F43

Dept. F-43

Date: 3-18-24

Case # 20STCV44865

Trial Date: 4-22-24

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants County of Los Angeles and Deputy Ernesto Avila

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Solomon Perkins

RELIEF REQUESTED

Summary Judge on the First Amended Complaint or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication on the following causes of action:

·         1st Cause of Action: Negligence

·         10th Cause of Action: Deprivation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) – Unlawful Detention

·         11th Cause of Action: Deprivation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) – Monell Violations

RULING: Summary Judgment is granted.

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice: Granted pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d).

Evidentiary Objections to the Deposition of Solomon Perkins: Overruled/Not Relied Upon (Code Civ. Proc., 437c, subd. (q).)

Evidentiary Objections to the Deposition of Thea Perkins: Overruled/Not Relied Upon (Code Civ. Proc., 437c, subd. (q).)

Evidentiary Objections Submitted in the Responsive Separate Statement: Overruled/Not Considered (Code Civ. Proc., 437c, subd. (q).) Any and all written objections must be submitted in a separately filed pleading. (Cal. Rules Ct., rule 3.1354(b).)

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff Solomon Perkins alleges that on February 13, 2020, he was a seven-year-old special needs student at Tesoro Del Valle Elementary School (the School), which was governed by Defendant Saugus Union School District (the District). According to the complaint, a fellow classmate named Tobin reported to a school staff member on campus that Plaintiff was carrying a gun in his backpack. Plaintiff alleges that he instead told Tobin he had a “Nerf-Slingshot gun” with him, not an actual gun.

According to School Principal Gina Nolte, Tobin and another student claimed that Plaintiff said he had a gun and planned to kill everyone except the other student. Although Plaintiff denies making those statements, he does not dispute that those two students conveyed those remarks to Nolte and other School employees.

Plaintiff then alleges that his backpack was searched by Nolte, who found neither an actual nor toy gun. Even so, he alleges, Nolte reported the alleged threat to defendant Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) and the “mental health department.” According to the complaint, the mental health department “attempted to commit Plaintiff.”

Plaintiff also alleges that his mother, Thea Perkins, was contacted by the School and came to the School campus, but only after sheriff’s deputies, including defendant Ernest Avila (Avila), had interrogated him. No other adult acting on Plaintiff’s behalf was present. After his mother arrived, Plaintiff alleges that they were detained there until armed deputies escorted them off campus.

On November 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed his original complaint with ten causes of action. On October 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed an eleven cause of action First Amended Complaint alleging the following: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent Supervision, Training and/or Retention; (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (4) Violation of California Education Code §§ 200, 201, 220 and 260 – Discrimination on the Basis of Disability; (5) Violation of Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution; (6) False Imprisonment; (7) Violation of Americans with Disability Act; (8) Violation of California Government Code section 11135 – Discrimination Based on Disability; (9) Violation of 42 USC section 1983 – Violation of the Equal Protection Clause; (10) Violation of 42 USC section 1983 – Deprivation of Civil Rights; and (11) Violation of 42 USC section 1983 –Monell Violations.

On February 15, 2023, defendants County of Los Angeles and Avila initially filed their motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. On June 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed his opposition. Thereafter, on July 7, 2023, defendants County of Los Angeles and Avila filed their reply. This matter was initially set to be heard on July 12, 2023 in Department F51 in the Chatsworth Courthouse, but it was continued due to the court’s unavailability. On July 26, 2023, Hon. Andrew E. Cooper recused himself from the case. Ultimately, this action was assigned to Department F49. (See July 26, 2023 Minute Order re: Assignment.)

On January 24, 2024, defendants County of Los Angeles and Avila filed the instant motion for summary judgment. It is noted that this filing is identical to the one submitted on February 15, 2023. In light of this, the court shall consider the original briefings that had been filed.

ANALYSIS

Defendants County of Los Angeles and Avila (hereinafter “Defendants”) move for summary adjudication on the first, tenth, and eleventh causes of action for negligence, deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (unlawful detention), and deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell violations). Defendants contend that they were permitted to interview Plaintiff without parental consent or presence, there was no constitutional violation of Plaintiff’s rights, and are protected by statutory immunity and qualified immunity. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he was in Defendants’ custody when they violated his fourth amendment rights, and that Defendants are not entitled to any form of immunity.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

The pleadings frame the issues for motions, “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)”  (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) 

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.”  (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) 

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467; see also CCP § 437c(c).) “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence.  It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.” (Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 (citation omitted).)

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff has voluntarily agreed to dismiss the eleventh cause of action against defendant County of Los Angeles. (Opposition at pg. 8.) Thus, Plaintiff concedes that summary adjudication should granted as to this cause of action. Accordingly, the court grants summary adjudication as to the eleventh cause of action.

A.    Whether there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff fourth amendment rights were violated.

Defendants first move for summary adjudication on the first and tenth causes of action on the ground that there is no triable issue of material fact that they violated Plaintiff’s fourth amendment rights. In support of their position, Defendants rely on two arguments. First, they assert that Plaintiff was not in the custody of the LASD, likening the event to a Terry stop.  (Motion at pp. 9-10.) Second, they argue that Plaintiff was detained by the School, and as a result, Defendants were permitted to question Plaintiff without the presence of his mother. (Motion at pp. 10-11.)

As framed by the pleadings, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants were negligent and violated his civil rights by unlawfully detaining him for a prolonged period of time without reasonable suspicion and interrogating without his mother present or another advocate. (FAC ¶¶ 33-35, 89.)

“[N]ot all seizures are unconstitutional: only those that are unreasonable.” (Williams v. City. of San Diego (2021) 523 F.Supp.3d 1183, 1195.) “[T]he ultimate test of a seizure's reasonableness entails a balancing of the governmental interest which justifies the intrusion and the level of intrusion into the privacy of the individual.”  (Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan (9^th Cir. 1996) 92 F.3d 1486, 1496.) “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231 (Souza).)

In support of their burden, Defendants present the following evidence. On February 13, 2020, Plaintiff’s teacher reported to Nolte that Plaintiff made a threat to “shoot up” the school.” (UMF No. 1; RJN, Exh. 3, Nolte Decl. ¶¶ 16-21.) Nolte spoke with students Tobin Ponec and a classmate named Karen, corroborating the threat. (UMF No. 2; RJN Exh. 2, Quiller Decl, citing the Deposition of Tobin Ponec at pp. 15:12-20, 19:17-20:14, 20:25-21:7.) Plaintiff communicated this threat to school officials as well. (UMF No. 3; RJN Exh. 2, Quiller Decl, citing the Deposition of Tobin Ponec at pp. 15:12-20, 19:17-20:14, 20:25-21:7; RNJ, Exh. 3, Nolte Decl. ¶ 18.) LASD was contacted by school officials regarding the threat conveyed by Plaintiff and arrived at the School to investigate the threats of gun violence. (UMF Nos. 4-5; RJN Exh. 3, Nolte Decl. ¶¶ 20-21, 25-29; RJN Exh. 2 citing Exhibit E.)

By the time LASD arrived at the School, Plaintiff had been placed in the custody of school officials. (UMF Nos. 6, 14; RJN, Exh. 3 Nolte Decl. ¶¶ 25-32.) LASD requested Plaintiff’s mother to report to the School, but she initially refused to do so. (UMF Nos. 7, 15, 20; RJN, Exh. 3, Nolte Decl. ¶¶ 25-29.) Defendants had reasonable suspicion that there was a potential threat of gun violence because it was reported Plaintiff wanted to cause bodily harm to others and had possession of a gun. (UMF Nos. 13, 17; RJN Exh. 2, Quiller Decl. citing the Deposition of Tobin Ponec at pp. 15:12-20, 19:17-20:14, 20:25-21:7; RNJ, Exh. 3, Nolte Decl. ¶¶ 18, 20-21.) It was further reported by school officials that Plaintiff expressed self-injurious ideations. (UMF No. 18; RJN Exh. 3, Nolte Decl. ¶¶ 31-32, 34.) Because of Plaintiff’s age, he could not be released and needed his mother to be present. (UMF No. 19; Nolte Decl. ¶¶ 25-29.) When Plaintiff’s mother eventually arrived, she refused to submit Plaintiff to a mental health evaluation and proceeded to take him home. (UMF No. 21; RJN, Exh. 3 Nolte Decl. ¶¶ 31-32, 34.)

Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden in establishing that there are no triable issues of material fact that their conduct violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. While Defendants did not initial seize Plaintiff from his classroom, it is evident that they continued Defendant’s detention. Thus, Plaintiff was in the custody of the Defendants, and as a result, it must be shown that the detention was reasonable in light of the totality of circumstances. (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 231.) Furthermore, such reasonableness is determined by “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” (Bernal v. Sacramento County Sheriff Department (E.D. Cal. 2022) 598 F.Supp.3d 898, 904 (quoting Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 51.) Defendants were presented with a situation where Plaintiff purportedly made a gun threat while at school, and as a result, a temporary detention was necessary in order for Defendants to conduct an investigation for the safety of the School and its students. (See Stokes v. Faber (2021) 522 F.Supp.3d 225, 235 [determining that a warrantless arrest of a potential school shooter was reasonable].) Furthermore, the evidence shows that the length of the detention was not unreasonable because Plaintiff could not be released alone due to his age. (UMF No. 19.) Therefore, because Defendants have met their burden on summary judgment, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendants’ detention of Plaintiff was unreasonable.

In opposition, Plaintiff presents the following evidence. At the time of the incident Plaintiff was seven years old with special needs and in the second grade. (PUMF Nos. 1-2; Solomon Perkins Depo at pp. 13:6-10, 31:14-15; Thea Marie Perkins Depo, Vol. I at pp. 24:18-21, 35:4-12.) Due to Plaintiff’s special needs, he requires daily assistance with the aid of a paraprofessional, but during the questioning, his paraprofessional was not present with Plaintiff. (PUMF Nos. 36-37; Thea Marie Perkins Depo, Vol. I at pp. 24:18-21, 35:4-12, 43:15-23; Exh. 4, February 13, 2020 Letter from Paraprofessional Aide Lily.) He rejects the notion that he made a threat to shoot anyone at the School and indicates that he merely told classmates that he received a Spider-Man themed Nerf gun as a Christmas gift. (PUMF Nos. 4-5, Solomon Perkins Depo at pp. 30:19-31:7, 34:17-23, 57:13-15.)

Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that Tobin Ponec spread the rumor that Plaintiff possessed a gun on campus and that he has a history of bullying Plaintiff and spreading rumors about him. (PUMF Nos. 6-11; Solomon Perkins Depo at pp. 26:5-20, 30:19-31:7, 37:23-38:12; Thea Marie Perkins, Vol. I, at pp. 25:11-15, 27:28-28:5; Thea Marie Perkins, Vol. II at pp. 135:8-17.) Plaintiff’s mother repeatedly wrote to school officials regarding the bullying Perkins encountered from Tobin Ponec, but Nolte did not take any action to address the bullying. (PUMF Nos. 15-17; Thea Marie Perkins, Vol. I, at pp. 25:16-27:22.) After the report had been made, Plaintiff’s backpack was searched, and no weapon was found. (PUMF No. 19; Thea Marie Perkins Depo, Vol. I at pg. 35:21-23.) When LASD arrived, defendant Avila was aware that no weapon was found, but he conducted another fruitless search of Plaintiff’s backpack. (PUMF Nos. 24-25; Exh. 5, LASD’s Incident Report, dated February 13, 2020. Plaintiff was detained for the remainder of the school day. (PUMF Nos. 27; Thea Marie Perkins, Vol. II at pg. 99:18-100:9; Exh. 5  LASD’s Incident Report, dated February 13, 2020.)

Under the circumstances, the court finds that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to show that there is a triable issue of material fact that Defendant’s detention of Plaintiff was not reasonable. The court understands the general concerns that are raised when there is a threat of gun violence at a school, and the court reasons that the detention of a suspected individual must still be reasonable in light of the circumstances that are present. Plaintiff’s evidence suggests that the purported gun threat was made by another student who has a history of bullying Plaintiff and starting rumors about him.  However, based on the police report submitted in the opposition, Plaintiff admitted to making the threat of shooting everyone in his class except for certain individuals, but he claimed he was not serious. (Plaintiff’s Compendium of Evidence, Exh. 5.) Moreover, while Plaintiff opposes the instant motion for summary judgment by disputing having ever made the alleged threat, he does not dispute that the alleged threats and other concerning remarks were conveyed to law enforcement by others. In consideration of these facts, it is not unreasonable for a responding officer to continue to operate under the impression that the threat of a school shooting is real as it is not something to joke about. (Stokes, supra, 522 F.Supp.3d at pg. 235.) Moreover, even though Defendants did not find a gun on Plaintiff’s person or in his backpack, Defendants were still operating under a belief that Plaintiff desired to shoot people at the School and had ideations of self-harm, and it was unclear whether Plaintiff potentially had access to a firearm at home. As part of the investigation, it was necessary for Defendants to communicate with Plaintiff’s mother, and because Plaintiff’s mother did not arrive to school sooner, it became necessary to keep Plaintiff detained until she arrived. Thus, because Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden, the court finds that there is no triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Accordingly, the court grants summary adjudication as to the first and tenth causes of action on this ground.

B.     Whether Defendants are immune from liability

Defendants first argue that they are immune from liability under Government Code §§ 815.2 and 820.8 because there is no evidence to show that defendant Avila’s conduct was wrongful or resulted in any injury. (Motion at pg. 12.) However, this argument is not persuasive because the immunity afforded under Government Code § 820.8 only arises when the alleged injury was caused by the act of another person. In this instance, Plaintiff’s claim of unlawful detention is based solely on defendant Avila’s conduct.

Second, Defendants argue that defendant Avila is entitled to qualified immunity. (Motion at pp. 13-14.)

Government Code § 820.2 provides that “a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.”  Also, under California Government Code § 820.4, “[a] public employee is not liable for his act or omission, exercising due care, in the execution or enforcement of any law.” “Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” (P.B. v. Koch (9th Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 1298, 1301.) Under the circumstances, because defendant Avilia had detained Plaintiff in the course of his duties as a Sheriff’s deputy and did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, it follows that he is entitled to qualified immunity under Government Code §§ 820.2 and 820.4, defendant County of Los Angeles is also immune under Government Code § 815.2.

Accordingly, because defendant Avila is entitled to qualified immunity, summary adjudication is proper as to the first and tenth causes of action.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

Moving party to give notice.