Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 21CHCV00189, Date: 2024-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21CHCV00189    Hearing Date: March 28, 2024    Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 3-28-24

Case # 21CHCV00189, Duda Adams vs. GG&C 1 LLC

Trial Date: N/A

 

DEMURRER TO THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants GG&C LLC and David L. Adams

RESPONDING PARTIES: Plaintiff Duda Adams

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

Demurrer

·         Eighth Cause of Action for Quiet Title

·         Twelfth Cause of Action for Equitable Mortgage

 

RULING: Demurrer to Eighth Cause of Action is overruled; demurrer to Twelfth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend.

 

SUMMARY OF ACTION

The claims at issue both address the real property located at 18834 Devonshire, Northridge, California 91324 that was purchased entirely with funds earned by Plaintiff Duda Adams (Plaintiff). Based on cultural norms of the Romani people, the property was not titled to Plaintiff but, rather, to an entity (GG&C) by her domestic partner Blancy Uwnawich (Blancy) for Plaintiff’s benefit during her lifetime. Defendant David Adams (David), who is Blancy’s son, defied the cultural imperatives when Blancy passed away. Rather than maintaining the cultural norms and permitting Plaintiff to continue to conduct herself as the owner of the property, he excluded her entirely and evicted her from the property.

 

The Court previously sustained a demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on the basis that the SAC did not sufficiently allege the cultural norms that would give Plaintiff a title interest in the property. The Court also allowed Plaintiff to substitute a previous cause of action for adverse possession for the new cause of action for equitable mortgage.

 

Plaintiff thereafter filed a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) with the new cause of action and additional facts regarding the cultural norms. Defendants demur to the TAC. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.

 

ANALYSIS

Defendants demur to the Eighth and Twelfth Causes of Action on the basis that they fail to allege facts sufficient to constitute causes of action. Plaintiff argues in opposition that they are sufficiently pled. No reply has been filed as of March 25, 2024.

 

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (CCP § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law…” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)

 

Eighth Cause of Action

Defendants demur to the Eighth Cause of Action for Quiet Title on the basis that it fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action.

 

California law recognizes a distinction between legal and equitable ownership. In general, an equitable or beneficial ownership exists in favor of the party or parties funding a purchase and delivery of the purchased item. (See Finkbohner v. Glens Falls Insurance Company of Glens Falls, New York (1907) 6 Cal.App. 379.) California law prioritizes the equitable or beneficial ownership over issues of legal title. (See 926 North Ardmore Avenue, LLC v. County of Los Angeles (2017) 3 Cal.5th 319, 343; Reilly v. City & County of San Francisco (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 480, 489.)

 

Defendants argue in their demurrer that except where title was acquired through fraud, “…an action to quiet title will not lie in favor of the holder of an equitable title as against the holder of a legal title. (22 Cal. Jur., p. 111; G. R. Holcomb Estate Co. v. Burke, 4 Cal. (2d) 289, 48 P. (2d) 669, 674; Booth v. Taylor, 135 Cal.App. 348, 26 P.(2d) 846…” (Bacon v. Bacon (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 540, 544.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead that fraud occurred and instead only alleges a legal conclusion of fraud.

 

Plaintiff argues that she has an equitable interest in the property due to her having funded the purchase of the property and because she has paid to maintain the property since it was purchased in 2007. She alleges that she has a total of $780,000 in equity in the property based on the monthly payments that she made between the purchase of the house in 2007 and her ouster in 2020.

 

Plaintiff also argues that she has sufficiently pled into the financial and fraud exceptions for an equitable owner to challenge a titled owner of real property. Plaintiff argues that she has sufficiently pled the financial exception contemplated by G.R. Holcomb Estate Co. v. Burke (1935) 4 Cal.2d 289 because she pled that her funds were used to buy and maintain the property from its purchase in 2007 until her ouster after Blancy’s death. (TAC, ¶ 59a.) She alleges that there was understanding between her and Defendants that she was the true owner and that the legal title was merely for appearances.

 

Plaintiff also argues that she has sufficiently pled the fraud exception. As explained in Warren v. Merrill (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 96, 114, the available “remedies include quieting title in the defrauded equitable title holder’s name and making the legal title holder the constructive trustee of the property for the benefit of the defrauded equitable titleholder.”

 

Plaintiff’s TAC alleges that “it is apparent that David Adams, individually and as the individual in control of GG&C, engaged in fraud when representing he would abide by the arrangement that GG&C would hold legal title to the Subject Property for Plaintiff’s benefit. David Adams’ fraudulent statements were made several and various times in conversations from approximately the time the Subject Property was titled to GG&C until Blancy Uwnawich’s death. He must have known his statements were fraudulent and were made with the intent to gain control of the Subject Property to the exclusion of Plaintiff. Plaintiff actually relied on David Adams’ representations to allow the property to be titled to GG&C, and the reliance was justifiable because of their relationship.” (TAC, ¶ 59b.)

 

Plaintiff argues that her allegations in paragraphs 59a and 59b of the TAC are sufficient to maintain a cause of action for quiet title based on equitable title because she has pled that her funds were used to buy and maintain the property and because she alleged that David Adams engaged in fraud. Based on the cultural background given in the TAC, the Court finds, for purposes of demurrer, that Plaintiff’s allegations for the Eighth Cause of Action are sufficient to survive this stage of the proceedings.

 

Defendants’ demurrer to the Eighth Cause of Action for Quiet Title is overruled.

 

Twelfth Cause of Action

Defendants demur to the Twelfth Cause of Action for Equitable Mortgage on the basis that it fails to allege facts sufficient to a cause of action.

 

“An ‘equitable mortgage’ is one that is created by a court of equity rather than by the formal act of the parties. Under certain circumstances, the court determines that equity, fairness, and justice warrant enforcement of a security interest between the parties despite the fact that no formal mortgage was created or that an attempted creation was defective.” (5 Cal. Real Est. § 13:31 (4th ed.).” Additionally, “[t]he equitable mortgage is a security interest in the property according to the mutual intentions of the parties.” (Id.) In order to create an equitable mortgage, there must be evidence that the parties mutually intended to create such an interest. (See Kaiser Industries Corp. v. Taylor (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 346, 350.)

 

While Plaintiff may have pled that some kind of security interest understanding existed with Blancy, she has not pled any facts that would indicate that such an understanding existed with David. There are also no facts pled indicating that a security interest would be formed based on Romani cultural understandings. Plaintiff has also not pled any facts indicating that she was in the role of a creditor such that a security interest would be expected to form with David.

 

Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to maintain a cause of action for equitable mortgage. Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action is sustained. Given that this was the Third Amended Complaint, the Court shall not grant leave to amend for this cause of action. (See CCP § 430.41(e)(1).)

 

Conclusion

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action is overruled. Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s Twelfth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend.

 

Defendants are given 20 days to file an answer to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint.

 

Moving party to give notice.