Judge Gary I. Micon, Case Number: 21CHCV28908, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 21CHCV28908, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21CHCV28908 Hearing Date: February 20, 2025 Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 02-19-25, 02-20-25

Case # 21CHCV28908, Moroso v. Newegg Business Inc., et al.

Trial Date: 11-03-25

MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES, SET THREE AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, SET TWO

MOVING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Rose Moroso and Tyler Lawrence Moroso

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Rideshare Car Rentals, LLC

RELIEF REQUESTED

Order compelling Defendant to provide verified, objection-free responses to Plaintiff Rose Moroso’s third set of form interrogatories and second set of requests for production.

RULING: Motion is granted.

SUMMARY OF ACTION AND ARGUMENTS

August 31, 2023, plaintiff Rose Moroso propounded her second set of requests for production (RFPs) on defendant Rideshare Car Rentals LLC (Rideshare), but Rideshare did not serve responses by the October 2, 2023 deadline. On October 9, 2024, plaintiff Rose Moroso propounded on her third set of form interrogatories FROGs, which consisted of numbers 1.0 and 17.0, on Rideshare. Responses were due November 11, 2024, but Rideshare never served responses. After meeting and conferring with opposing counsel, plaintiffs Rose Moroso and Tyler Lawrence Moroso (Plaintiffs) filed this motion to compel FROG and RFP responses on December 16, 2024.

On February 3 and 4, 2025, Rideshare filed oppositions contending that plaintiff Taylor Lawrence Moroso is a non-propounding party who cannot move to compel Rideshare’s responses, that Plaintiffs’ requests for admissions seek unnecessary information, and that because Rideshare ceased operations in 2023, there is no longer a company representative who can assist with responding to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests.

Plaintiffs replied on February 10 and 11, 2025, contending that Rideshare has not provided any responses to Plaintiffs RFPs and FROGs or shown good cause for failing to respond. Rideshare asserts no claims of privilege or the work-product doctrine and refuses to produce those documents it has in its custody such as its alleged contracts with the other defendants. According to Melendez v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1343, Rideshare did not provide good cause or specific details explaining Rideshare’s inability to find employees or former corporate representatives to answer the FROGs or RFPs even though Plaintiffs have located at least two former Rideshare employees. Further, Rideshare does not state whether its insurance carrier is available to or not to step in and provide verified responses.

MEET AND CONFER

A motion to compel form interrogatory responses must include a declaration stating facts showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to resolve the issues mentioned in the motion before filing. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1), 2016.040.) Counsel met and conferred on September 5, 2024. (Declaration of Armine Khatchaturian, ¶ 7.) On October 2, 2024, Rideshare’s counsel informed Plaintiffs’ counsel that no responses would be forthcoming because Rideshare had not been in contact with any individual with the capacity to act on Rideshare’s behalf in over a year, but that counsel would continue to reach out to Rideshare. (Ibid.) After Rideshare’s counsel did not reply to a follow-up email on November 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this motion.

ANALYSIS

Form Interrogatories

A propounding party may move to compel responses to form interrogatories where the responding party fails to provide any responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) The propounding party must show the interrogatories were properly served, that the time to respond expired, and no response has been served. (Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-906.) Unless excused by a protective order, the responding party must serve responses (an answer, objection, or election to allow inspecting or copy records) within 30 days after the interrogatories are served or according to an agreed upon deadline extension. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.210, subd. (a), 2030.270.) Failing to respond within these time limits waives objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (a).) If the responding party cannot respond due to lack of personal knowledge, the party may state as much after making a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other persons or organizations. (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 406.)

If the responding party is an entity, the interrogatories must be directed at the entity rather than an officer, director, or employee of the entity. (Mowry v. Superior Court (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 229, 233-235, disapproved on other grounds by San Diego Professional Ass’n v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 194.) The entity must then disclose information known to all persons in its employ. (Rutter Group, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial § 8:1056.) “While a corporation or public agency may select the person who answers interrogatories in its behalf, it has a corresponding duty to obtain information from all sources under its control—information which may not be personally known to the answering agent.” (Gordon v. Superior Court (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 157, 167-168 [emphasis added].)

Requests for Production, Set Two

A demanding party may move to compel responses to requests for production where the responding party fails to provide any responses. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.300, subd. (b), 2030.290, subd. (b).) The demanding party must show the requests were properly served, that the time to respond expired, and no response has been served. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 403-404.) The responding party must respond separately to each demand by agreeing to comply, stating an inability to comply, or objecting to all or part of the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a).) The responding party must serve responses within 30 days after the requests for production are served or according to an agreed upon deadline extension. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.260, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) Failing to respond within these time limits waives objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (a).) If the responding party cannot respond due to lack of personal knowledge, the party may state as much after making a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other persons or organizations. (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 406.) There is no deadline for filing a motion to compel RFPs unless the motion results in “substantial prejudice” to the party to whom the motion is directed. (Crippen v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 254, 260.) Rideshare makes no claim of prejudice here.

Dissolved Corporations and Rideshare’s ability to respond to motions

Rideshare’s counsel states Rideshare ceased operations in the second half of 2023 and that there is no longer a company representative who can assist in responding to discovery requests. (Declaration of Dean A. Olson, ¶ 2.)

After a corporation has dissolved, the corporation ceases to exist except for the limited purpose of “winding up its affairs [including] discharging obligations and defending lawsuits.” (Catalina Investments, Inc. v. Jones (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1, 7; A.B. Concrete Coating Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n (E.D. Cal. 2020) 491 F.Supp.3d 727, 733.)

In Melendrez v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeal held that if a corporation no longer exists and no director is elected or appointed on behalf of the corporation, the insurer becomes the assignee of the corporation’s policies and claims against it. (215 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1346.) Melendrez is distinct from this case because in Melendrez, the attorney representing the responding bankrupt corporation had been assigned to the case by the corporation’s insurer. (Id. at p. 1348.) The attorney then filed substantive responses to discovery on behalf of the corporation but told the trial court that the responses could not be verified because the corporation had no officer, director, employee, or agent who could verify the responses. (Id. at p. 1346.) The Court of Appeal remanded the case and order the trial court to determine whether the corporation still existed, whether a director could be elected or appointed, and whether the corporation’s insurers held attorney-client privilege. (Id. at p. 1357.)

This case is distinct from Melendrez because the record does not indicate that Rideshare’s insurance carrier appointed counsel nor has Rideshare’s counsel provided any discovery responses. Further, Plaintiffs have located two former Rideshare employees and present excerpts from former Rideshare employee Franklin Escobar’s deposition taken on November 5, 2024. Rideshare’s counsel attended this deposition. (See Khatchaturian Dec., Exh. A.) During the deposition, Escobar named several Rideshare employees including “Chief of Operations” “Michael Harris.” (Declaration of Armine Khatchaturian, Exh. A - Escobar Depo., 17:17-25.)

Since December 2023, Rideshare has filed several responsive pleadings. Rideshare’s counsel does not state at whose direction he is representing Rideshare or explain why Rideshare’s former representatives, employees, corporate officers, or Rideshare’s insurance carrier are unavailable to assist with responding to Plaintiffs’ discovery. Without this information, Rideshare fails to present a “substantial justification” for not providing verified responses, explain the impossibility of providing responses, or provide verified responses showing a good faith effort to respond but an inability to do so. Rideshare also fails to present proof that Rideshare has been dissolved and is no longer active. To the contrary, on October 2, 2024, Rideshare’s counsel stated that Rideshare “remains active and in good standing with the CA Secretary of State.” (Khatchaturian Dec., Exh. C, at p. 1.) Therefore, Rideshare’s “cessation of operations” argument fails to provide a substantial justification for failing to provide responses.

Non-propounding and propounding parties joining in motions to compel

Rideshare contends that Plaintiffs’ motion is procedurally defective because a non-propounding party, plaintiff Tyler Lawrence Moroso, joined the propounding party, plaintiff Rose Moroso, in bringing this motion. However, Rideshare does not make any arguments explaining how this prejudices Rideshare’s position or prevented Rideshare from providing responses to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests.

Plaintiffs cite Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285 to support their argument that because their interests are aligned, non-propounding plaintiff Tyler Lawrence Moroso joining this motion is not an issue. Hernandez is factually distinct from this case because there, all defendants jointly propounded discovery requests, but each defendant filed separate motions to compel. Plaintiff Rose Moroso propounded the discovery requests and her non-propounding co-party joins her in her motions to compel.

Courts of Appeal have held that a non-propounding party may be awarded sanctions if their discovery interests align with the propounding party’s discovery interests. (Parker v. Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 285, 301 [“[T]here can be circumstances in which the discovery interests of the propounding party and a co-party are so closely aligned it would be a useless duplication of effort for both parties to pursue the same discovery and invoke the same remedies against an opposing party.”]; Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Cropper (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 901, 905.) The non-propounding party has the burden of proving his interests align with the propounding party interests in that the non-propounding party suffered a detriment as the result of the responding party’s misuse of the discovery process. (Parker, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th. at pp. 301-302.) Plaintiffs’ interests are aligned because they filed this case together seeking damages from Rideshare and other defendants for the wrongful death of Lawrence Samuel Moroso and now seek relevant evidence from Rideshare showing Rideshare’s role in the alleged negligence which led to the death. Therefore, Rideshare’s argument that Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is defective for joining a non-propounding party fails. However, The Court cautions Plaintiffs to properly file their motions in their future filings.

Plaintiff Rose Moroso properly served her FROGs on Rideshare on October 9, 2024. (Khatchaturian Dec., Exh. B, p. 9.) Rideshare did not serve verified responses by the original November 11, 2024 deadline. Plaintiff Rose Moroso also properly served her RFPs Rideshare on August 31, 2023. (Khatchaturian Dec., Exh. B, p. 85.) Rideshare did not serve verified responses by the original October 2, 2023 deadline. As of December 16, 2024, Rideshare has not served responses for the RFPs or FROGs, nor has Rideshare filed a motion for a protective order. Rather than respond to Plaintiffs’ RFPs with its objections, Rideshare ignored Plaintiffs’ requests and waited until its opposition to voice its concerns.

Accordingly, the Court orders Rideshare to serve code-compliant, objection-free responses to Plaintiff Rose Moroso’s third set of form interrogatories and second set of requests for production.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel code-compliant, objection free responses to plaintiff Rose Moroso’s third set of form interrogatories and second set of requests for production is granted.

Plaintiffs to give notice.