Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 21STCV09278, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV09278    Hearing Date: February 26, 2024    Dept: F43

Dept. F-43

Date: 2-26-24

Case # 21STCV09278, R.W. vs. Doe 1, et al.

Trial Date: 3-10-25

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff R.W.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication

RULING: Denied in its entirety

SUMMARY OF ACTION

In 1981-1982, Plaintiff R.W. was a 14-15 year old member of the Greek Orthodox Church, when was allegedly sexually assaulted by Father Stanley Adamakis, an ordained priest assigned to a location in Northridge. Plaintiff alleges the church organization was aware of Father Adamakis’s pedophile activities.

On March 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Negligence (three causes of action) and Negligent Supervision, Negligent Hiring and/or Retention (three causes of action). On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint Negligence (three causes of action against three different entities within the Greek Orthodox organization) and Negligent Supervision, Negligent Hiring and/or Retention (three causes of action against three different entities within the Greek Orthodox organization). On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint Negligence (three causes of action against three different entities within the Greek Orthodox organization) and three causes of action for Negligent Supervision, Negligent Hiring and Retention.

On June 22, 2021, the action was transferred from Department 31 to Department 47. On July 2, 2021, Defendants filed a 170.6 challenge to Department 47, thereby leading to reassignment to Department 49. On September 27, 2021, the court overruled the demurrer to the complaint and denied the motion to strike. Defendants answered on October 6, 2021.

On July 27, 2022, the court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the statute of limitations, but granted the motion for summary adjudication as to the recovery of treble damages.

Requests for Judicial Notice: Granted.

The court takes judicial notice of the filing of the pleadings, but not the content of the pleadings for the truth of the matter asserted.

Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Paul Nicks and Plaintiff’s evidence: Overruled.

Defendant Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America (Archdiocese) moves for summary judgment, and alternatively summary adjudication, on grounds that Plaintiff cannot state a basis of duty against the church: Father Adamakis was not an employee or agent of the church or Archdiocese; and Plaintiff lacks evidence of any “special relationship” establishing a basis for a duty of care.

Plaintiff in opposition challenges Defendant’s showing of sufficient grounds to shift the burden Plaintiff also argues that the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that the Archdiocese owed a duty to prevent foreseeable harm by Father Adamakis. Plaintiff next contends that triable issues of material fact exist on grounds of agency, thereby rendering the Archdiocese liable for the action of its ordained priest. Plaintiff maintains that a special relationship was in fact created through the invitation of Father Adamakis to the classroom on church premises where Father Adamakis undertook a duty of care for the welfare of Plaintiff on behalf of the church.

Defendant in its reply challenges the existence of any triable issues of material fact regarding special relationship between Adamakis and Defendant and Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant next denies any agency relationship. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant had actual knowledge of the acts of Adamakis. Finally, Defendant describes the testimony from the witnesses relied upon in opposition as unreliable and inadmissible (though Defendant only challenges the declaration of Nicks).

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

The pleadings frame the issues for motions, “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)” (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) “On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.”  (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; see also CCP § 437c(c).) “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence.  It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.” (Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 (citation omitted).)

The argument regarding the lack of a formal employment relationship/assignment relies on factual denial of any such relationship. Archdiocese concedes Father Adamakis was assigned to various parishes, but presented employment records showing the last assignment ended in 1979, prior to any alleged incident(s). Adamakis obtained “secular” employment at the time of his presence at the Northridge parish with a clinic providing public health services. [Ex. 4: March 31, 1981 Letter to George Bacopulous, Chancellor of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America.] Archdiocese also cites to prior deposition from Bishop Anthony Gergiannnakis of the Metropolis of San Francisco, whereby the Bishop admits to the presence of Father Adamakis in the state of California from the Diocese of Pittsburgh, but denial of any assignment. Father Adamakis was under suspension, but not defrocked. Father Adamakis was denied permission to perform any services or celebrate Sacraments with any other parish, including Northridge.  [Ex. 6: Deposition of Anthony Gergiannnakis, September 30, 2004, Case No. BC307171; Deposition of Bishop Spyridon.]

Plaintiff in opposition to the motion relies on a general finding of foreseeability founded by prior knowledge by the Church of the alleged predilections of Father Adamakis. Father Adamakis remained a priest in the order until he was later defrocked years after the alleged incidents. Although certain exhibits were submitted under seal, Plaintiff cites to the deposition testimony of Bishop Anthony regarding a basis of knowledge of prior incidents involving Father Adamakis in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Notwithstanding the purported ban from participating in church sanctioned services, Plaintiff cites to the deposition testimony and declarations of witnesses regarding the presence of Father Adamakis performing the liturgy and presiding over the congregation contrary to the denials of Bishop Spyridon. [Deposition of Timothy Mullen; Declaration of Paul Nicks.] Candace Andreno denied seeing Father Adamakis ever performing the liturgy, but specifically recalls seeing him present on church grounds without his priest “habit.”

In the Timothy Mullen deposition, the deponent specifically testifies to informing Father Thanos of how Adamakis inappropriately touched him, while Mullen was suffering from a seizure. [Mullen Depo.] Mullen proceeds to explicitly describe efforts to report the activity of Adamakis, to which Father Thanos purportedly countered that any claims from a neurologically impacted teenage parishioner lacked credibility against the word of a college educated priest with a degree in psychology. [Ibid.] The alleged molesting activities by Adamakis continued following seizures by Mullen. [Ibid.]

The court finds both Father Adamakis was present and associated with church activities in some capacity, regardless of whether Adamakis was authorized or unauthorized from conducting any form of religious services at the subject church. Thus, Plaintiff establishes the presence of Adamakis at all relevant times. [Depositions of Mullen and Andreno, Declaration of Nicks.] The evidence also establishes that Father Adamakis was at a minimum somehow associated with the Archdiocese via the San Francisco diocese during the relevant time frame, albeit “suspended” from priestly duties, but not defrocked or excommunicated. The Archdiocese performs administrative services for the organization, which included the Northridge parish. [Deposition of Father Andreas Vithoulkas.]

The motion offers limited legal address of the employment criteria regarding the difference between an employee versus independent contractor, but otherwise lacks specific discussion regarding a “suspended” priest still vaguely associated with the Pittsburgh and San Francisco Diocese. (See S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 349-350.) The court finds no sufficient basis of support for a finding of a lack of any employment relationship for purposes of ruling on the motion for summary judgment simply based on the denial of any employment relationship with the Metropolis entity. The court therefore denies the motion for summary judgment, and summary adjudication as to the second cause of action for negligent hiring on grounds of a failure to establish the lack of a legal or factual basis for summary judgment.

Assuming Father Adamakis was some form of “employee” as a suspended priest affiliated with Metropolis, even if via Pittsburgh, without any specifically assigned priestly duties, Defendant frames the conduct of the priest as outside the scope of conduct of a priest, and therefore not rendering the church liable. Additionally, Defendant denies any “ratification” of said conduct, even if sexual misfeasance was occurring. Plaintiff alternatively relies on a claim that the presence of Adamakis with access to the facilities created an agency relationship thereby establishing a basis of liability. Plaintiff relies on the presence of Father Adamakis and access to non-public portions of the premises following the alleged prior reports, as the basis of liability. Said presence and access are established in the deposition testimony and declaration, including the deposition of Plaintiff. [Deposition of R.W.] Plaintiff’s deposition also establishes that Adamakis had access, outside of normal church hours, to a Sunday school classroom in St. Nicholas, which is the location on church grounds where Plaintiff remembers being assaulted. [Deposition of R.W., pp. 34-36 and 42.] The access to church grounds that Adamakis had could be demonstrative of a possible agency relationship between him and the church.

“A principal is responsible for no other wrongs committed by his agent … unless he has authorized or ratified them, even though they are committed while the agent is engaged in his service.” (Civ. Code § 2339.) “[A]n employer may be liable for an employee’s act where the employer either authorized the tortious act or subsequently ratified an originally unauthorized tort. (Citations.) The failure to discharge an employee who has committed misconduct may be evidence of ratification. (Citation.) The theory of ratification is generally applied where an employer fails to investigate or respond to charges that an employee committed an intentional tort, such as assault or battery. (Citations.) Whether an employer has ratified an employee’s conduct is generally a factual question. (Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 169–170; Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 810.) “[R]atification [generally] relates back to the time the tortious act occurred.” (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1111.)

Defendant cites to the leading case on vicarious liability involving an accused molesting priest. “It would defy every notion of logic and fairness to say that sexual activity between a priest and a parishioner is characteristic of the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church. There is simply no basis for imputing liability for the alleged conduct of the individual defendant-priests in this instance to the respondent Archbishop. Similarly, appellant has not pointed out any fact which could lead this court to a conclusion that the Archbishop ratified the concupiscent acts of the priests.” (Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1453, 1461.) The court finds the case definitive in terms of discharging any intentional tort liability claims against Defendant. Nevertheless, as Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the impact of the case, the issue naturally dovetails into consideration of a special relationship established between the parties, thereby imposing an alternative basis of negligence liability.

“A defendant cannot be held liable in negligence for harms it did not cause unless there are special circumstances — such as a special relationship to the parties — that give the defendant a special obligation to offer protection or assistance. This rule reflects a long-standing balance between several competing interests. It avoids difficult questions about how to measure the legal liability of the stranger who fails to take affirmative steps to prevent foreseeable harm, instead leaving the stranger to make his or her own choices about what assistance to offer. (Citation.) At the same time, it extends a right of recovery to individuals in relationships involving dependence or control, and who by virtue of those relationships have reason to expect the defendant’s protection. (Citation.) [¶] Where such a special relationship exists between the defendant and a minor, the obligation to provide such protection and assistance may include a duty to protect the minor from third party abuse.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 220 “Brown.”)

Defendant anticipates this argument and denies any such basis of liability. In denying the lack of any special relationship, Defendant relies on Plaintiff’s admission that he was not a parishioner, and never otherwise enrolled or participated in any church organized activities, such as Sunday school or other educational programs, altar boy duties, or youth programs. Of the multiple incidents, only one occurred on church premises. [Deposition of RW.]

Again, the existence of an employment relationship or not in no way impacts consideration for the determination of a special duty. The existence of a special duty can present a separate and independent basis of liability against moving Defendant. The testimony of RW clearly places RW and Father Adamakis on church premises, when Father Adamakis allegedly engaged in sexual misconduct with minor Plaintiff. [RW Depo.] The court also cites back to the testimony of Mullen regarding reports to Father Thanos regarding prior incidents involving Father Adamakis. The San Francisco diocese was also admittedly aware of Adamakis’s presence at the Northridge parish, and only disallowed any priestly duties, but otherwise failed to warn or seek to limit the conduct of Father Adamakis on the parish premises.

The court therefore finds moving Defendant was at least potentially aware of potentially wrongful activity on the premises, and chose to allow Adamakis to both remain associated with the Northridge parish and at a minimum implicitly consent to unfettered access to private portions of the facility. Even without accessibility to private premises, and the reliance on claims of activity occurring off-site, Adamakis was still present around minor parishioners at all relevant times, thereby imposing a special duty of care on the church as an umbrella organization to protect minor invitees on the premises.

Public policy articulated in the Brown case imposes a special duty of care on the managing entity to protect underage/minor congregants and guests alike from a known threat of a pedophile priest with access to non-public portions of church premises. (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 220.) Nothing in this situation requires further consideration for determination of a duty of care under Rowland. “[T]here may be other circumstances that give rise to a comparable affirmative duty to protect. (Citation.) But where no such circumstances exist, the Rowland factors do not serve as an alternative basis for imposing duties to protect. The purpose of the Rowland factors is to determine whether the relevant circumstances warrant limiting a duty already established, not to recognize legal duties in new contexts.” (Id. at p. 221.) The court therefore finds triable issues of material fact regarding the basis of a special duty of care as a matter of law based on deposition testimony, declarations, and evidence submitted.

The motion is denied in its entirety.

Trial remains set for March 10, 2025.

Moving party to give notice.