Judge Gary I. Micon, Case Number: 21STCV20196, Date: 2024-12-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 21STCV20196, Date: 2024-12-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV20196 Hearing Date: December 9, 2024 Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 12-09-2024

Case # 21STCV20196, Perrigo, et al. v. Montecristo Trucking LLC, et al.

Trial Date: 03-24-2025

MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Thunder Ridge Transport, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Chad Perrigo and Alexa Perrigo

RELIEF REQUESTED

Strike Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against Defendant Thunder Ridge from the Third Amended Complaint.

RULING: Motion is granted.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On April 28, 2021, Plaintiff Chad Perrigo (Chad) was involved in a collision with a semi-truck driven by Defendant Jorge Castaneda Rodriguez (Rodriguez). As a result of the collision, Chad suffered injuries. At the time of the collision, Defendant Montecristo Trucking, LLC owned the tractor and Defendant Fames Transport, Inc. owned the attached trailer.

Defendant Thunder Ridge Transport Inc. is an interstate US Mail carrier that contracted with the USPS to deliver packages. Thunder Ridge subcontracted the USPS Contract to Fames. Fames assumed delivery of packages under the USPS Contract. Fames subcontracted the USPS Contract to Montecristo without receiving contractually required permission from Thunder Ridge. Montecristo was acting as Fames’ independent contractor while performing under the USPS Contract. Rodriguez is the sole owner of Montecristo.

Plaintiffs Chad Perrigo and Alexa Perrigo (Plaintiffs) filed their Third Amended Complaint (3AC) on March 30, 2023 alleging causes of action for the injuries they suffered: (1) negligence, (2) negligent entrustment, (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, (4) dangerous condition of public property, and (5) loss of consortium. Plaintiffs allege Thunder Ridge failed to supervise or vet its drivers under its subcontract with Fames, Fames failed to supervise Montecristo, and that Thunder Ridge, Fames, and Montecristo breached their nondelegable duty to the public by requiring Rodriguez to drive while fatigued.

On August 8, 2024, the Court granted, in part, Thunder Ridge’s motion for summary judgment on the negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention causes of action. (08/08/2024 - Minute Order.) The Court denied the motion for the loss of consortium claim. Thunder Ridge also asked the Court to strike punitive damages as part of its motion for summary judgment. The Court denied this request because it should have been brought as either motion to strike or motion for summary adjudication.

Thunder Ridge filed this motion to strike punitive damages from the 3AC on September 23, 2024. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on November 22, 2024. No reply has been filed.

Summary of Arguments

Thunder Ridge moves to strike punitive damages against it from the 3AC. The 3AC contains legal conclusions and fails to plead specific factual allegations showing malice. The allegations do not rise to the level of “willful or conscious” disregard of Plaintiff’s interests. Thunder Ridge also could not know Rodriguez violated federal hours-of-service limitations because Thunder Ridge was unaware Fames hired Rodriguez. Plaintiff must support their claims for punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues Thunder Ridge filed its motion to strike after the 30-day statutory deadline and that the Court did not give Thunder Ridge permission to file a late motion. The clear and convincing evidence standard does not apply to punitive damages claims in a motion to strike analysis. The 3AC pleads ultimate facts demonstrating why a jury should award punitive damages by demonstrating that Thunder Ridge knew it was overworking Rodriguez, intentionally did not reduce Rodriguez’s hours or make sure he was not overworked, and allowed Rodriguez to operate a 30,000-pound tractor-trailer on a public roadway while fatigued. The Court should consider the entirety of the 3AC rather than just the portions Thunder Ridge cites.

No reply has been filed.

ANALYSIS

Motion to Strike - Section 435

A party may move to strike the whole or any part of a complaint within 30 days after service of the complaint unless extended by court order or stipulation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) Before filing a motion to strike, the parties must meet and confer “in person, by telephone, or by video conference.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) The moving party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the moving party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised by the motion to strike;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the moving party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.35, subd. (a)(3).)

Because Thunder Ridge did not file a meet and confer declaration and filed this motion after section 435’s 30-day cutoff, the Court only considers this motion under section 436.

Motion to Strike - Section 436

A court may, upon motion or at any time, strike from the complaint “any irrelevant, false, or improper matter” or “all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 436, subds. (a)-(b), 187; Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 830 [noting the court’s inherent power to limit the focus of the proceedings to the issues framed by the remaining viable pleadings].) An “irrelevant matter” is an allegation that “is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense,” “is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense,” or “a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)-(c).) The Court must read the factual allegations in the complaint as a whole and assume their truth. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

A motion to strike punitive damages may lie where the alleged facts do not rise to the level of “malice, fraud, or oppression” required to support punitive damages. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth specific facts demonstrating the elements stated in Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721; see also Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id. at p. 725; Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression is “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) “Malice and oppression may be inferred from the circumstances of a defendant’s conduct.” (J. R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890 (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 430, 444.)

“A corporation may be held liable for punitive damages for the acts of its agents and employees when the act is motivated by actual malice or done under circumstances amounting to oppression, providing that the act is done with the knowledge or under the direction of corporate officials having power to bind the corporation.” (Id. at p. 445.)

To survive a motion to strike, the complaint must plead ultimate facts showing entitlement to relief. (Clauson, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255; but see Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.”].) The complaint cannot simply characterize the Defendant’s conduct as “intentional, willful and fraudulent.” (See Gombos v. Ashe (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 517, 526-527; Grieves, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 166; Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)

As an initial matter, a complaint must plead ultimate facts to support a punitive damages claim. (Clauson, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255; Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases 59 Cal.App.5th 241, 265 [“[T]he term ‘ultimate fact’ generally refers to a core fact, such as an essential element of a claim.”].)

The 3AC characterizes Thunder Ridge’s actions as willful, purposeful, and knowing without alleging specific facts showing Thunder Ridge’s knowledge of Rodriguez’s relationship with Fames and Thunder Ridge’s intent to consciously disregard Rodriguez and the general public’s safety. Plaintiffs allege Thunder Ridge “willfully” chose to ignore state and federal regulations and the California Commercial Drivers Handbook concerning commercial drivers with “reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of the general public.” (3AC, ¶¶ 86-87.) Plaintiffs also allege Thunder Ridge repeatedly and willfully violated the hours of services limitation set by the Federal Motor Carrier regulations and took no action to correct the conduct. (3AC, ¶ 88.) Plaintiffs further allege that Thunder Ridge breached its duty to ensure Rodriguez was qualified to operate a commercial trucking vehicle and chose Rodriguez to drive a commercial trucking vehicle on public roads while fatigued. (3AC, ¶¶ 89, 91.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege Thunder Ridge “willfully” failed to perform its nondelegable duty by not ensuring that Fames delivered mail parcels in a safe manner. (3AC, ¶ 90.) These statements are legal conclusions which Plaintiffs do not support with specific facts.

Further, the 3AC does not allege facts sufficient to show that Thunder Ridge had the requisite knowledge to support a claim for punitive damages. A corporate entity cannot be held liable for punitive damages resulting from the acts of its employees or subcontractors unless, after knowledge or opportunity to learn about the subcontractors’ actions, the corporate entity’s managing agent “retains the wrongdoer in service.” (J. R. Norton Co., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 445 [holding Local Union liable for its team member because its president knew of the member’s misconduct and failed to investigate misconduct claims].)

Plaintiffs do not allege any misconduct by specific Thunder Ridge employees or managing agents. Plaintiffs’ allegations that Thunder Ridge disregarded Rodriguez’s safety, failed to ensure Rodriguez was qualified, and chose to allow a fatigued Rodriguez to drive are directly contradicted by Plaintiffs’ own allegations that Fames subcontracted with Montecristo, which Rodriguez owns, without Thunder Ridge’s consent. (See 3AC, ¶ 35.) Thunder Ridge lacked the requisite knowledge of Rodriguez’s role or alleged misconduct because Thunder Ridge was unaware of Fames’ contract with Montecristo.

Additionally, the Court has already found that Thunder Ridge did not hire Rodriguez in its ruling on Thunder Ridge’s motion for summary judgment. (See 08/08/2024 – Minute Order at p. 4.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ allegations that Thunder Ridge knowingly hired Rodriguez and disregarded Rodriguez’s safety lack merit.

Accordingly, the 3AC fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages, and the Court grants Thunder Ridge’s motion to strike punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted.

Moving party to give notice.