Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 21STCV41513, Date: 2024-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV41513    Hearing Date: August 8, 2024    Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 8-8-24

Case #21STCV41513, Sheila Katerelos, et al. vs. Magic Mountain, LLC, et al.

Trial Date: 2-18-25

 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants S&S Worldwide, Inc.; S&S Power, Inc.; and S&S Arrow LLC

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Sheila Katerelos and Ari Katerelos

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication

 

RULING: Motion is granted.

 

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiffs Sheila and Ari Katerelos (Plaintiffs) allege that Sheila Katerelos suffered a subdural hematoma or traumatic brain injury on the X2 roller coaster at Defendant Magic Mountain, LLC’s Six Flags Magic Mountain theme park on February 16, 2020. Plaintiffs also filed suit against Defendants S&S Worldwide, S&S Power, and S&S Arrow (S&S Defendants), alleging that these entities designed the X2 roller coaster ride trains. Plaintiffs allege that Sheila was injured when her head hit the headrest of her seat on the X2 ride train.

 

Plaintiffs have alleged four causes of action for (1) general negligence; (2) strict products liability; (3) negligent product liability; and (4) loss of consortium (for Plaintiff Ari Katerelos).

 

The S&S Defendants (Defendants) filed this motion for summary judgment on May 15, 2024. Defendants argue that there is no evidence to support Plaintiffs’ causes of action against them, particularly as to the element of causation. Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion.

 

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice: Defendants have requested that the Court take judicial notice of documents filed in this case, a bankruptcy court order from Utah, and an ASTM document. The Court takes judicial notice of these documents.

 

Plaintiffs’ Evidentiary Objections:

            Sustained: 1, 5, 19,

Overruled: 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30

 

Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections:

            Sustained: 1, 2, 3, 4

            Overruled: 5

 

ANALYSIS

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

 

The pleadings frame the issues for motions, “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)” (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) “On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.”  (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

 

            Issue 1

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ First, Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action for Negligence, Strict Product Liability, Negligent Product Liability, and Loss of Consortium against the S&S Defendants are barred as a matter of law because there is no evidence to support S&S Defendants’ successor liability to Arrow Dynamics, LLC, the manufacturer of the X, now the X2.

 

Defendants spend a large portion of their motion arguing that they are not responsible for the debts and liabilities of Arrow Dynamics, the builder of X, now X2, under successor liability exceptions. Plaintiffs argue in their opposition that Defendants’ arguments on this matter are irrelevant because the design of the X rollercoaster is not at issue in this case. The X2 rollercoaster is the one that Plaintiff Sheila Katerelos was allegedly injured on. Plaintiffs argue that the restraint system on the X2 is what this case has always been about.

 

Defendants argue in their reply that the corporate successorship liability is relevant because they are not liable for the entire X2. Defendants argue that their alleged liability only extends to the coaster trains it redesigned and manufactured for the X2 roller coaster, but does not include the structure, track, support columns, braking system, etc. Defendants also argue that the configuration of the X2 trains, the seats, restraints, etc., did not change from the X, nor did the track profile or ride force/dynamics. They argue that while they were responsible for the design, engineering, and manufacturing quality of the X2 trains, they had no duty to repair any defects in the coaster after the two-year warranty period. (Archer Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. B, ¶ 7.3.) Defendants claim that at the time of Plaintiffs’ alleged injury, the warranty period had long since passed.

 

However, Defendants then argue that their liability, if any, is limited to the coaster trains. Defendants’ arguments on this point appear to be contradictory. They say they are not liable, but if they are liable, it is only for the coaster trains, but Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that her injuries were caused by alleged design defects in the coaster train and its restraint system. Therefore, Plaintiffs are correct that it is irrelevant that Defendants were not the designers of the X rollercoaster because Plaintiff Sheila Katerelos was allegedly injured on the X2 rollercoaster.

 

Because this issue appears to be irrelevant and Defendants’ arguments for it are contradictory, Defendants’ motion will not be granted on this issue.  

 

            Issue 2

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ First, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action for Negligence, Negligent Product Liability, and Loss of Consortium against the S&S Defendants, are barred, as a matter of law, because there is no evidence to support Plaintiffs' allegations that the S&S Defendants’ conduct, even if it breached any alleged duty of care, was a substantial factor in causing the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs, including any traumatic brain injury alleged by Plaintiff, Sheila Katerelos.

 

The basic elements of a negligence action are: (1) the defendant had a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect the plaintiff, (2) the defendant failed to meet this standard of conduct, (3) the defendant’s failure was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury, and (4) the plaintiff was damaged. (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.App.4th 913, 914.)

 

In order to succeed on a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must establish causation. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have insufficient evidence to establish that the X2 rollercoaster caused her injuries.

 

Plaintiffs argue in their opposition that a triable issue of material fact exists regarding causation because Defendants have not met their burden of production and persuasion. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have failed to provide any evidence of which train Sheila Katerelos was riding, the condition of her headrest, the durometer reading for that headrest, or the last time the headrest was replaced or inspected. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants’ expert, Cargill, did not perform any testing as it relates to a riders head striking the headrest while riding X2. (Lanzetta Decl., Ex. N, Cargill Depo., 87:4-18.) Plaintiffs argue that because this testing was not done, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by striking her head on the headrest. Plaintiffs also cite a series of cases where the plaintiffs cannot remember how they were injured, and which Plaintiffs claim demonstrate that circumstantial evidence of causation may be sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.

 

Defendants argue in their reply that they met their burden on summary judgment and shifted the burden of proof to Plaintiffs. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ expert declaration from Dr. Ziejewski does not prove that Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the X2. Dr. Ziejewski did not test the X2 himself and instead relied on the documents of others. Defendants also argue that the case he relies on to support his argument that biomechanical engineers are qualified to render an opinion as to the forces generated in particular accidents and the types of injuries those forces may generate is not binding on this Court because it is a decision from the Sixth Circuit. He also relied on Cargill’s testing, which showed that the X2 did not produce sufficient ride forces to cause a traumatic brain injury. Defendants argue that Dr. Ziejewski’s declaration is purely speculative, and that he missed the detail in Plaintiff’s deposition where she said that she hit her head at the end of the ride, not during the ride. (Ex. G, Sheila Katerelos Depo. Vol. II, pp. 193:8-13, 196:2-10.)

 

As for Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding circumstantial evidence, Defendants cite the following: “The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable where the accident is of such a nature that it can be said, in light of past experience, that it probably was the result of negligence by someone and that the defendant is probably the one responsible.” (Howe v. Seven Forty Two Co., Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1163-1164.) This presumption arises when the evidence satisfies the following: “(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action of contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” (Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 825-826.)

 

Defendants argue that the X2 rollercoaster was not in their exclusive control at the time of the Plaintiff’s injuries. Instead, it was under the control of the Magic Mountain Defendants, and the warranty period on the rollercoaster had long since passed. Because it was not in their control, there cannot be an inference that they were responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries.

 

Defendants have met their burden in demonstrating that Plaintiffs have not established causation. In Plaintiffs’ opposition, they did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate causation. Because of the lack of evidence to support Plaintiffs’ position, there are no triable issues of material fact.

 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on this issue.

 

            Issue 3

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for Strict Product Liability and Third Cause of Action for Negligent Product Liability based on a theory of design defect against the S&S Defendants are barred, as a matter of law, because there is no evidence of a design or manufacturing defect, and Plaintiffs cannot prove the essential element of causation.

 

Whether product liability is based on strict liability or negligence, a plaintiff bears the burden of showing that a defendant’s defective product caused an injury. The plaintiff’s inability to show a manufacturing defect is fatal to his claims. (Scott v. C.R. Bard, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 763, 773.)

 

Plaintiffs argue that summary judgment must be denied on this issue because the X2 headrest was defective under the consumer expectations test. The California Supreme Court held “the consumer expectations test is reserved for cases in which the everyday experience of the product’s users permits a conclusion that the product’s design violated minimum safety assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of expert opinion about the merits of the design. It follows that where the minimum safety of a product is within the common knowledge of lay jurors, expert witnesses may not be used to demonstrate what an ordinary consumer would or should expect.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 567.)

 

While Plaintiffs cite the ordinary consumer test, Plaintiffs do not point to any evidence that supports their argument. Instead, they just draw the conclusion that ordinary consumers know how headrests should work without providing any evidence that the headrest was what caused Plaintiff’s injuries.

 

Defendants, on the other hand, have provided evidence that the rollercoaster was operating as it should and that there are no defects with the design. Furthermore, as previously noted, Plaintiffs have failed to establish causation.

 

Therefore, there are no triable issues of material for the product liability causes of action. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted for this issue.

 

            Issue 4

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff Ari Katerelos’ Fourth Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium is barred, as a matter of law, because the claim is derivative of Plaintiff, Sheila Katerelos’ claims for negligence and strict product liability, and Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for negligence, negligent product liability and strict product liability against the S&S Defendants.

 

Because the Court granted summary judgment on the negligence causes of action, summary judgment is also granted for this cause of action because it is derivative of the negligence causes of action.

 

CONCLUSION

The motion for summary judgment is granted for Issues 2-4 and all four of Plaintiffs’ causes of action. Defendants are ordered to submit a proposed judgment.

 

Moving party to give notice.