Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 22CHCV00696, Date: 2024-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22CHCV00696    Hearing Date: March 13, 2024    Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 3-13-24

Case # 22CHCV00696, Umberto Barragan, et al. vs. Jaime Barragan

Trial Date: 4-15-24

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Jaime Barragan

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Umberto Barragan and Cynthia Ann Flores

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication

RULING: The motion for summary judgment is denied. However, the motion for summary adjudication as the second cause of action for promissory estoppel is granted.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS:

Defendant’s evidentiary objections to all declarations and exhibits proffered in plaintiffs’ opposition:

Umberto Barragan’s Declaration:

Overruled: Nos.1-4, Nos. 10-22, Nos. 24-33, No. 35, Nos. 37-48

Sustained: Nos. 5-9, No. 23, No. 36, Nos. 49-58

Cynthia Ann Flores’s Declaration:

Overruled: Nos.59-78

Sustained: N/A

Lawrence Szabo’s Declaration:

Overruled: Nos.79-84

Sustained: N/A

Exhibits:

Overruled: Exhibits 1-33

Sustained: N/A

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiffs Umberto Barragan and Cynthia Ann Flores (Plaintiffs) have alleged two causes of action for breach of contract and promissory estoppel against Defendant Jamie Barragan (Defendant). Umberto is the brother of Jaime, and Cynthia is the niece of Umberto and Jaime.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit because they believe that oral promises that Defendant made to his siblings back in 2006 would entitle them to a share of the net proceeds of the sale of a property that was owned by their sister Henrietta, who died in 2005. The property in question is the Hewitt Property, which Defendant sold in 2022 for $769,000.00.

Prior to her passing, it is alleged that Henrietta wished for the Hewitt Property and another property, the Huntington Property, to be sold and the proceeds split among her siblings. After Henrietta’s death, the siblings learned that Defendant had title to the property and questioned how that happened. It was after this conversation that they claim that he promised to share the proceeds from the sale of the property with them. Plaintiffs filed suit after Defendant did not share the proceeds from the 2022 with them.

Another property that Defendant addresses in his motion is the Reedley Property. The Reedley Property was a property that Jaime bought for his daughters, but which was put in Henrietta’s name because of concerns related to Jaime’s ex-wife. The Reedley Property was never put back in Jaime’s name, and at the time of Henrietta’s death, it was still in her name. Pursuant to Henrietta’s probate case, the proceeds for sale of this property were split four ways. Jaime argues in his motion that there was an agreement that if his siblings deeded him the Reedley Property, then he would give them proceeds from the sale of Hewitt and Huntington Properties.

Cynthia alleges that she is entitled to a share of the proceeds because she is an heir to her father Ruben’s estate. Ruben was the brother of Umberto and Jaime.

Defendant filed his motion for summary judgment on December 29, 2023. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on February 28, 2024. An untimely reply was filed on March 8, 2024.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice: Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial notice of records of judicial proceedings and some recorded deeds. The Court takes judicial notice of these documents.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract on the basis that Defendant’s brother failed to agree to, breached, and/or abandoned the condition that full title and ownership of the Reedley Property be returned to Jaime alone. Defendant also moves on the basis that the First and/or Second Causes of Action are barred by the statute of limitations. Third, Defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that the Second Cause of Action for promissory estoppel fails because Jaime did not make a promise that he should have reasonably expected to induce his brothers’ forbearance. Finally, Defendant moves on the basis that Defendant Cynthia Ann Flores lacks standing to enforce Defendant’s purported promises to her deceased father.

Plaintiffs in opposition argue that triable issues of fact exist as to whether there was a condition precedent to Defendant’s obligation to share the net sales proceeds from the Hewitt Property. Plaintiffs also argue that there are triable issues concerning the statute of limitations, the claim for promissory estoppel, and whether Cynthia lacks standing.

In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to rebut the grounds for the motion because Plaintiffs’ factual assertions are not supported by the evidentiary record and/or entirely misrepresent facts before the Court.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

The pleadings frame the issues for motions, “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)” (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) “On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.”  (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; see also CCP § 437c(c).) “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence.  It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.” (Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 (citation omitted).)

Issue 1

Defendant argues that the First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract fails because his brothers failed to agree to, breached and/or repudiated Jaime’s term, condition, and consideration that full title and ownership of the Reedley Property be returned to him alone.

“A cause of action for breach of contract requires proof of the following elements: (1) existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant's breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the breach.” (CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1226, 1239.) It is “essential to the existence of a contract” that there be consideration, “for a promise unsupported by consideration has no binding force.” (Torlai v. Lee (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 854, 858.) Express conditions are stated in the contract and are determined by the intention of the parties as disclosed by the agreement. (Sosin v. Richardson (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 258, 264.) “The repudiation of a contract by one of the parties thereto, if acted upon by the nonrepudiating party before withdrawal, constitutes a breach thereof by the former and excuses performance thereunder by the latter.” (Winegar v. Gray (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 303, 309.) Anticipatory repudiation constitutes a total breach and occurs when the promisor without justification makes a positive statement indicating that he will not or cannot substantially perform his contractual duties. (Daum v. Superior Court (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 283, 288.)

An informal promise to make a gift is not binding upon the promisor. (Haase v. Cardoza (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 35, 36.)

“An obligation is conditional, when the rights or duties of any party thereto depend upon the occurrence of an uncertain event.” (Civ. Code § 1434.) “A condition precedent is one which is to be performed before some right dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is performed.” (Civ. Code §1436.) “The existence of a condition precedent normally depends upon the intent of the parties as determined from the words they have employed in the contract.” (Karpinski v. Smitty’s Bar, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 456, 464.) Conditions precedent are not favored in the law, and “courts shall not construe a term of the contract so as to establish a condition precedent absent plain and unambiguous contract language to that effect.” (Colaco v. Cavotec SA (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1183.)

Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs did not follow through on returning full title and ownership of the Reedley Property to him, then they have not upheld their end of the contract. However, as discussed below, a declaration signed by Defendant in 2006 makes no mention of the Reedley Property as part of this deal.

Plaintiffs argue in opposition that the agreement that is at issue is this Declaration signed by Defendant on February 13, 2006:

“That pursuant to the verbal agreement between my brothers, Joseph Barragan, Ruben Barragan, Umberto Barragan, and myself, the two (2) real properties currently held in my name alone and located in Los Angeles addressed as follows:

1.      1428 Hewitt Street San Fernando, CA 91340

2.      552 and 556 Huntington San Fernando, CA 91340

that upon a sale of either or both of the real properties, the net proceeds will be divided equally amongst the four (4) of us: Joseph Barragan, Ruben Barragan, Umberto Barragan, and Jaime Barragan, pursuant to our sister, Henrietta Barragan’s wishes as set out in her last will and testament.”

(Plaintiffs’ Ex. 6.)

Defendant argues that the 2006 Declaration does not create a triable issue of fact because (1) the Declaration was not a complete expression of the actual terms of the parties’ agreement, (2) Umberto’s assertions in his Declaration are merely conclusory and otherwise inadmissible, (3) Plaintiff Umberto provides a self-serving Declaration that contradicts his deposition testimony, and (4) Plaintiff’s wholly mischaracterize the scope and effect of Jamie’s deposition testimony, which does not create an issue of fact as to Undisputed Fact Nos. 28, 29, 30 and 35.

Nevertheless, the question is whether Defendant’s declaration represents an informal promise constituting a gift, or a more formal agreement representing a contract between the parties. If it was a gift, then it would not be enforceable. If it is a contract, then it appears to lack consideration and mutual assent, as it is only a declaration signed by Defendant. There is also the question of what relationship this document has to the original oral agreement and whether it was intended to replace the oral agreement.

Triable issues of material fact exist as to whether this declaration represents a gift, or whether it, along with the oral agreement, make an enforceable contract. Motion denied on this issue.

Issue 2

Defendant argues that the First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and Second Cause of Action for Promissory Estoppel are barred by the Statute of Limitations.

The statute of limitations for a breach of oral contract action is two years. (CCP § 339(1) (action upon a contract, obligation or liability not in writing); Aubry v. Goldhor (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 399, 403.) The statute of limitations for a promissory estoppel claim based upon an oral promise is also two years. (CCP § 339(1); Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1223-1224.) A cause of action ordinarily accrues when “the wrongful act is done and the obligation or liability arises.” (Wind Dancer Prod. Grp. v. Walt Disney Pictures (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 56, 73.) The statute of limitations does not begin to run from the time of making a contract, but from the time the cause of action accrues or as of the date of the breach of the obligation. (CCP § 312; Niles v. Louis H. Rapoport & Sons, Inc. (1942), 53 Cal.App.2d 644, 651.)

Defendant argues in his motion that the alleged breach would have accrued as early as 2006 or no later than 2010 or 2011 because of a proposed stipulation that the property would be sold and proceeds would be paid prior to distribution of Henrietta’s state (which was wrapped up in 2010 or 2011). However, Plaintiffs argue that the alleged breach of the agreement happened on March 9, 2022, when Defendant sold the Hewitt Property and failed to share the proceeds with Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ basis for this argument is that the stipulation that Defendant indicated was never agreed to, signed, or filed with the Court. (Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement, Fact 20.)

Defendant replies that Plaintiffs do not even attempt to dispute Jamie’s true nature and scope of his purported promise, as confirmed by Umberto’s probate attorneys,  which does limit the time within which Jamie was or would have been required to sell the Hewitt Property. Moreover, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Declaration - that Jamie’s purported promise to share proceeds would last indefinitely until he or his future heirs decided to sell the San Fernando Properties - fails as a matter of law. Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint expressly alleges that the “verbal agreement entered into by [the brothers] mistakenly did not include a date, or any other provisions, concerning when the properties had to be sold by Jaime Barragan” which shows that the agreement was not meant to be indefinite.

However, if the statute of limitations did not begin to run until March 9, 2022, then this action was filed well within the two-year statute of limitations when it was filed on August 26, 2022. Because plaintiffs dispute that the stipulation defendant relies on was ever signed, there are triable issues of fact as to when the statute of limitations began to run.

Thus, the motion is denied on the statute of limitations grounds.

Issue 3

Defendant argues that the Second Cause of Action for Promissory Estoppel fails as a matter of law because he did not make a promise he should have reasonably expected to induce his brothers’ forbearance, whereby injustice can be avoid only be enforcement of the promise.

The elements of promissory estoppel are (1) a promise, (2) the promisor should reasonably expect the promise to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person, (3) the promise induces action or forbearance by the promisee or a third person, and (4) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310.) The doctrine of estoppel must be applied strictly and should not be enforced unless substantiated in every particular. (Bear Creek Co. v. James (1953) 115 Cal. App. 2d 725, 732.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ contention that Jaime’s promise to share the proceed of sale should have induced the forbearance of his brothers fails. First, he argues that it fails because there is no evidence that Jaime’s brothers threatened to file a lawsuit against him concerning the San Fernando properties. Second, he argues that the description of the promise is incomplete and ignores the conditions that the Reedley Property be returned to him. Third, Defendant argues that the promise ignores that the property was to be sold prior to Henrietta’s estate closing. Finally, he argues that Plaintiffs cannot show that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.

Plaintiffs argue in their opposition that Defendant’s February 2006 Declaration, discussed above, is the promise. Second, Plaintiffs argue that they relied upon the promise.

In reply, Defendant notes that Plaintiffs failed to provide any arguments to support their contention that their reliance was reasonable and foreseeable because the Memorandum includes a heading without any argument underneath it.

The Court reviewed the Opposition and was also unable to locate any argument regarding the second element regarding reasonableness and foreseeability.

Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden. There is not a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant’s February 2006 Declaration constitutes a promise, and if so, whether an injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of that promise. Motion granted on the second cause of action for promissory estoppel.

Issue 4

Defendant argues that Cynthia lacks standing to enforce Jaime’s purported promises to her deceased father because she cannot recover on behalf of her father’s estate. Specifically, Defendant argues that Cynthia brings this action in her own personal name and prays that she personally be awarded damages to her sole and exclusive personal benefit. She does not bring this action “on behalf” of, much less for the benefit of, her father’s Estate. (Undisputed Fact No. 39.)

“Generally, an executor or other personal representative is the person authorized to maintain or defend an action on behalf of a probate estate.” (Ring v. Harmon (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 844, 850; see Probate Code § 9820.) “There are limited circumstances where the beneficiary of the estate has standing to sue a third party to seek redress for an injury to the estate.” (Id.) One such exception are actions for possession of or to quiet title to the property of a decedent. (Probate Code § 9654.) “Also, appellate courts have occasionally recognized ‘special circumstances’ where it is appropriate to allow the beneficiary to pursue an action because the personal representative cannot or will not act. (Citation.)” (Ring, supra, at 850.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Cynthia can recover based on her interest as an heir to her father’s estate. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Cynthia can recover because Ruben’s interest succeeded to his surviving spouse, Manuela, upon his death, and when Manuela died, Cynthia became the Trustee of the Manuela Barragan Living Trust. The final accounting of Henrietta’s estate indicated that any property of the estate would be distributed to the living siblings and the appointed representative of the Estate of Ruben Barragan. Manuela Barragan was the representative for Ruben’s estate. In the Petition for Final Distribution of Ruben’s estate, it was indicated that all after-discovered property of the decedent of the estate shall be distributed to Manuela. Manuela’s assets were placed in the Living Trust, of which Cynthia is the Trustee and one of two beneficiaries. Plaintiffs argue that this means that Cynthia is entitled to half of Ruben’s alleged 25% interest in the Hewitt Property, thereby giving her standing.

Defendant argues that Cynthia fails to establish that she inherited any of her father’s causes of action because those causes of actions accrued before her father passed away. Moreover, Cynthia lacks standing to bring those causes of action individually. Additionally, if Cynthia had sued in a representative capacity on behalf of her father’s Estate, she fails to provide any evidence showing that “special circumstances” exist that allow her to sue in the place of the Estate administrator.

Defendant failed to provide any authority supporting his contentions. Additionally, Cynthia presented a special circumstance which was the inheritance from Manuela Barragan. Therefore, a triable issue of material fact exists. Thus, the Motion is denied on the standing grounds.

Conclusion

The motion for summary judgment is denied. However, the motion for summary adjudication as the second cause of action for promissory estoppel is granted.

Trial remains set for April 15, 2024.

Moving party to give notice.