Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 22CHCV01520, Date: 2024-04-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22CHCV01520    Hearing Date: April 19, 2024    Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 4-19-24

Case #22CHCV01520, Marvin Ayala, et al. vs. Ford Motor Company, et al.

Trial Date: N/A

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Marvin Ayala and Kathia Ayala Nunez

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Ford Motor Company and Galpin Ford

RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiffs are requesting attorney fees in the amount of $61,711.00, plus $4,056.64 in costs, from Defendants.

RULING: Motion for attorney fees is granted. No costs will be awarded at this time.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiffs Marvin Ayala and Kathia Ayala (Plaintiffs) had sued Defendants Ford Motor Company and Galpin Ford (Defendants) for causes of action related to the Song-Beverly Act. On March 8, 2024, the parties settled the case for a total of $73,399.00. Defendants made the offer to settle, and Plaintiffs accepted. The Settlement Agreement also provided for attorney fees and costs reasonably incurred by Plaintiffs, provided that the parties were unable to agree on the amount. After the settlement was agreed upon, the parties could not agree on the amount of attorney fees. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed this motion.

Plaintiffs are requesting $61,711.00 in attorney fees from Defendants. Plaintiffs argue in their motion that the attorney fees and hourly rates are reasonable. Plaintiffs’ evidence in support of their request for attorney fees are a declaration from their attorney, Michael Saeedian, and billing statements that show which attorney worked on a task, what the task was, how much time was spent on the task, the attorney’s hourly rate, and the amount of money for the task. (Saeedian Decl., Ex. A.) The Saeedian Declaration also includes a table which shows the hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on the case and their hourly rates. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 26.)

Michael Saeedian’s hourly rate was $695 for 45.7 hours for a total of $31,761.50. Adina Ostoia’s hourly rate was $695 for 0.1 hours for a total of $69.50. Christopher Urner’s hourly rate was $525 for 39.2 hours for a total of $20,580.00. Jorge L. Acosta’s hourly rate was $250 for 37.2 hours for a total of $9,300.00.

The total lodestar was calculated by multiplying each of these attorney’s hourly rate by their hours worked then adding them all together. The total hours spent on the case was 122.2 hours. The total lodestar amount, as previously noted, is $61,711.00.

Plaintiffs have also requested costs in the amount of $4,056.64. However, costs are awarded pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700. Costs will be addressed through Plaintiffs’ memorandum of costs at the appropriate time.

ANALYSIS

A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a).) “A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.)

Plaintiffs are the prevailing party by virtue of the fact that the parties settled in Plaintiffs’ favor via the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiffs have requested a total of $61,711.00 in attorney fees.

Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ motion on the basis that Plaintiffs are only entitled to allowable and reasonable attorney fees. Defendants argue that the attorney fees were unreasonably incurred because Ford complied with its obligations under the Song-Beverly Act. Next, Defendants argue that the hourly rates of Plaintiffs’ attorneys are excessive. Finally, Defendants argue that the claimed time incurred is unreasonable.

Plaintiffs argue in their reply that Defendants are asking the Court to apply improper legal standards. Next, Plaintiffs argue that a post-litigation settlement offer does not cut off fees. Plaintiffs also argue that Ford did not comply with its obligations under the Song-Beverly Act. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the fees and rates of the attorneys are reasonable and should be awarded in full.

Defendants argue in their opposition that the Song-Beverly Act only entitles Plaintiffs to attorney fees for “actual time expended.” (Civ. Code § 1794(d).) Defendants argue that this means that analysis as to whether the fees and costs sought are reasonable under the circumstances is required. (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) Next, Defendant argues that once objection to the fees has been raised, then Plaintiffs’ counsel bears the burden of showing that the fees were reasonably necessary, and the Court has the discretion to reduce fees awarded. (En Palm, LLC v Teitler Family Trust (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 775.)

In determining the reasonableness of fees, courts look to the factors from Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, disapproved on other grounds by Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68 n.5. The factors from Wollersheim are (1) the amount of money involved in the litigation; (2) the nature of the litigation and its difficulty and the intricacies and importance of the litigation; (3) the skill required and employed in handling the litigation, the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the case, and counsel’s education and experience in the particular type of work involved; (4) the attention given to the case; (5) the success of the attorneys efforts; and (6) the time consumed by the litigation. (Id.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ attorney fees were unreasonably incurred because Ford had offered to repurchase the vehicle. Defendants argue that, rather than except this offer, Plaintiffs pursued this litigation. It is unclear what Defendants mean by this, or whether there was a pre-litigation repurchase offer, as Plaintiffs’ reply seems to indicate that Defendants were referring to the Settlement Agreement. Additionally, a post-litigation complaint settlement offer in a Song-Beverly has been rejected as evidence of “compliance” with the law. (See Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 348, “[Upon a vehicle manufacturer's failure to honor a warranty, the manufacturer must “promptly” make an offer of repurchase or restitution. (Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (d)(2).) Not years later during litigation.”].) Defendant’s offer to settle while litigation is ongoing is not evidence of compliance.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ hourly rates are unreasonable and that Plaintiffs’ have provided no evidence justifying the hourly rates. Defendants have also not provided any evidence that the hourly rates are unreasonable. Instead, Defendants just call the hourly rate of $695 “exorbitant” without any evidence to back up this claim. (Opposition at p. 6.) Given the Court’s discretion and experience, the Court finds that the hourly rates indicated by Plaintiffs are reasonable.

Next, Defendants argue that the lodestar amount should be reduced by 54.4 hours. Defendants argue that the time spent deciding whether to represent the Ayalas should be reduced, the time for administrative work performed by Jorge Acosta should be reduced, the time spent on drafting certain documents should be reduced, and the time for the motion for summary adjudication should be reduced.

Defendants argue that the motion for summary adjudication was just a way to inflate the attorney fees in this case. Plaintiffs argue in response that the motion was reasonable and necessary given the evidence that Plaintiffs had. Furthermore, whether a motion was successful or reasonable is not the kind of hair-splitting that a court needs to engage in when deciding motions for attorney fees.

Next, as for the 2.7 hours for the time spent deciding whether to represent the Ayalas, Plaintiffs argue in their reply that the Song-Beverly Act allows for attorney fees for the “commencement and prosecution” of a case. (Civ. Code 1794(d).) The Court will allow Plaintiffs to request this 2.7 hours.

Plaintiffs also argue in their reply that all of Defendants arguments regarding administrative work rely upon federal cases. They also argue that attorney fees requests that include administrative tasks are allowable. Necessary overhead support services that secretaries and paralegals provide to attorneys may be included in an attorney fees award. (City of Oakland v. McCullough (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.) More generally, it has been said that “necessary support services for attorneys, e.g., secretarial and paralegal services, are includable within an award of attorney fees” (Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914, 951), and that among the various factors pertinent to determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee is “the overhead expense of the attorney” (Estate of Lanza (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 720, 726).) That being said, the Court believes that some of the paralegal fees related to finalizing and serving documents should be cut. Rather than determine that amount now, the Court requests that the parties prepare arguments for the hearing regarding the paralegal fees.

Finally, the amounts of time that Defendants indicated as being excessive for certain documents (the complaint, discovery, etc.) are not present in the billing statements. It appears that Defendants may have taken it upon themselves to add together different billing lines to come up with these amounts. The Court rejects Defendants’ arguments concerning the billing for these documents.

Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees is granted. The Court will determine the amount to award upon hearing arguments related to the paralegal fees. Costs will be addressed with the memorandum of costs.

Moving party to give notice.