Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV00081, Date: 2024-06-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV00081    Hearing Date: June 4, 2024    Dept: F43

Dept. F-43

Date: 6-4-24

Case # 23CHCV00081, Urquidez v. Ford Motor Company et al.

Trial Date: None set

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant Ford Motor Company

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Rolando Urquidez

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

RULING: The motion is denied.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff Rolando Urquidez filed this lemon law action against defendants Ford Motor Company and Galpin Motors, Inc. on January 11, 2023. He filed his operative first amended complaint (FAC) on June 20, 2023. As relevant here, his FAC contains causes of action for:

            7.         Violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and

            8.         Violation of the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA).

Defendant Ford Motor Company (Defendant) now moves for judgment on the pleadings as to each of these causes of action.

Defendant contends, first, as to the seventh cause of action, that the CLRA does not apply to the manufacturer of a car and its eventual purchaser, or if it does, that Plaintiff has not stated a claim because he has not alleged Defendant affirmatively misrepresented the quality of the subject vehicle. Second, as to the eighth cause of action, Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to plead a necessary element of the MMWA: that he engaged with an informal dispute resolution mechanism before suing.

Plaintiff argues (1) contractual privity with Defendant is not required for a CLRA claim; (2) a CLRA claim can be based on concealment of material facts rather than affirmative misrepresentation; and (3) the FAC sufficiently pleads MMWA compliance, or at least its futility.

ANALYSIS

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064.) “A demurrer tests the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law; as such, it raises only a question of law.” (Osornio v. Weingarten (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 304, 316.) No matter how unlikely or improbable, the complainant’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) However, the Court does not need to assume the truth of “contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) If there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain an attack to a pleading without leave to amend. (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).   

As to Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action: the CLRA prohibits certain “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in the sale of consumer goods, including misrepresentations regarding the quality of the goods.  (See Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a).)  Both affirmative misrepresentations and the failure to disclose material facts by a party with a duty to disclose a safety concern are actionable under the CLRA.  (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1258 (Gutierrez).)   

Defendant contends a CLRA action can only be maintained against a defendant who “entered into a consumer transaction” with the plaintiff. (MPA, 3:27-28.) Not so. Practices described in Civil Code section 1770 are unlawful when “undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer”. (Civ. Code, § 1770(a), emphasis added.) A consumer injured by a practice proscribed in section 1770(a) may bring an action against the offender. (Id., § 1780(a).)

As alleged, even if Defendant did not enter into a transaction with Plaintiff, Defendant at least entered in a transaction with a dealership that was intended to result in the sale or lease of the subject vehicle to Plaintiff. (See Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 834 (Daugherty) [dismissing CLRA cause of action against manufacturer on substantive grounds, while assuming statutory definition satisfied].)

Defendant also argues Plaintiff has not stated a claim because he alleges no “affirmative misrepresentation” by Defendant. But Plaintiff does not need to. “[D]eceptive practices proscribed in the CLRA include the concealment or suppression of material facts. [Citation.] This is because fraud or deceit encompasses the suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it, or the suppression of a fact that is contrary to a representation that was made. [Citation.]” (Collins v. eMachines, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 249, 255, emphasis added.)

“A failure to disclose a fact can constitute actionable fraud or deceit in four circumstances: (1) when the defendant is the plaintiff's fiduciary; (2) when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known or reasonably accessible to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations that are misleading because some other material fact has not been disclosed.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, demonstrate Defendant had exclusive knowledge of material information about the defective transmission that were not reasonably available to Plaintiff. This states a claim under the CLRA.

Defendant’s motion is denied as to the seventh cause of action.

As to Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action: “The [MMWA], 15 U.S.C. sections 2301 et seq., authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty. [The MMWA] ‘calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law,’ except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule. [Citation.]” (Daugherty, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 832-833.) The MMWA requires a plaintiff to engage in an informal dispute resolution procedure maintained by a manufacturer as a precondition to bringing suit. (See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(C).) Defendant argues Plaintiff did not allege it satisfied this requirement.

Plaintiff points to paragraphs 103 and 104 of his complaint:

“Plaintiff has ... met all of Plaintiff’s obligations and preconditions to bring this claim, or alternatively it would have been futile for Plaintiff to do so. [¶] In addition, Plaintiff has met all of Plaintiff’s obligations for bringing this claim as provided in the written warranties, or alternatively, Defendant does not maintain an informal dispute resolution process for the purpose of resolving claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and does not maintain an informal dispute resolution process for resolving express warranty claims ... .”

(Compl., ¶¶ 103-104.)

Plaintiff argues these are “ultimate facts” that satisfy pleading requirements. The Court agrees. California’s “fact pleading” rules require a pleading to apprise an adversary of the factual basis of the plaintiff’s claim, providing information detailed enough for the adversary to prepare a defense. (See Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 719-721; Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) Plaintiff’s allegations place Defendant on sufficient notice to explore the truth or falsity of the allegations and mount a defense. He has stated a claim.

Defendant’s motion is denied in its entirety.