Judge Gary I. Micon, Case Number: 23CHCV00365, Date: 2024-05-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV00365, Date: 2024-05-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV00365 Hearing Date: May 31, 2024 Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 5-31-24

Case # 24CHCV00365, Labidi v. Bratton

Trial Date: N/A

DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Bratton

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff John Labidi

RELIEF REQUESTED

Moving party requests that the Court (1) sustain his demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint and (2) strike Page 4, paragraph 19(g), prayer for damages.

RULING: Demurrer is overruled. Motion is denied.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On February 5, 2024, Plaintiff John Labidi (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant John Bratton (Defendant) for unlawful detainer.

The Complaint alleges Plaintiff is the owner of the premises located at 17011 Gledhill Street, Northridge, CA 91325 (the Premises). (Compl., ¶¶3(a), 4.) The Complaint further alleges on May 10, 2021, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written agreement for Defendant to rent the Premises for $7,200.00 per month. The Complaint also alleges on January 30, 2024, Plaintiff served Defendant a three-day notice to pay rent or quit. (Compl., ¶9(a), 10(a)(3).) On February 2, 2024, Defendant failed to comply with the notice. (Compl., ¶9(b).) At the time the three-day notice was served, Defendant owed past-due rent in the amount of $50,600.00. (Compl., ¶12.)

On April 30, 2024, Defendant filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike. On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a late-opposition. A timely opposition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b) would have been May 17, 2024. A timely reply was due May 23, 2024, none had been filed.

ANALYSIS

Demurrer to Complaint

Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to allege the date the premises were constructed. As such, Defendant contends it is unable to evaluate the fair market value of the property, where Plaintiff demands a significant some in damages on an expedited basis by using the unlawful detainer procedure. Furthermore, Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to allege that they have complied with the applicable requirements of the local eviction ordinance in the Complaint.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues no law requires it allege the date the premises were constructed. Plaintiff also argues the Complaint complies with the requisite pleading requirements because Plaintiff does not allege the premises is subject to the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 under Civil Code section 1946.2. Thus, Plaintiff asserts it does not have to allege just cause for terminating Defendant’s tenancy.

“The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.)¿

“A¿demurrer¿tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The Court looks to whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The Court does not “read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we read the complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their context.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th p. 240.) “The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)¿¿¿

A general demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted or under section 430.10, subdivision (a), where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. All other grounds listed in Section 430.10, including uncertainty under subdivision (f), are special demurrers. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).)¿¿¿

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)¿¿

Generally, “[t]he basic elements of unlawful detainer for nonpayment of rent ... are (1) the tenant is in possession of the premises; (2) that possession is without permission; (3) the tenant is in default for nonpayment of rent; (4) the tenant has been properly served with a written three-day notice; and (5) the default continues after the three-day notice period has elapsed.” (KB Salt Lake III, LLC v. Fitness Int'l, LLC, (2023) 95 Cal. App. 5th 1032, 1045.) However, when a property is subject to the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 under Civil Code section 1946.2, “[t]o plead a valid unlawful detainer claim, the complaint must allege that the tenancy was terminated for “just cause.” (Attenello v. Basilious (2022) 88 Cal. App. 5th Supp. 1, 6.)

Here, Defendant cites to case law that does not support his contention Plaintiff must allege the date the premises were constructed. For instance, in Harris v. Bissell (1921) 54 Cal. App. 307, the court held “[s]ince the action is not upon contract but for recovery of possession and, incidentally, for the damages occasioned by the unlawful detainer, such rental value may be greater or less than the rent provided for in the lease.” (Harris v. Bissell (1921) 54 Cal. App. 307, 312–13.) Furthermore, the Complaint alleges that the subject property/premises is not subject to Tenant Protection Act of 2019 under Civil Code section 1946.2. (Compl., ¶7(a).) As such, Plaintiff is not required to allege the tenancy was terminated for just cause. Moreover, the Complaint alleges Defendant is in possession of the premises, without permission. (Compl., ¶¶ 12; 19(a)-(c).) Additionally, the Complaint alleges Defendant is in default for nonpayment of rent set at $7,200.00 per month. (Compl., ¶6(a)(2).) The Complaint also alleges Defendant was properly served with a written three-day notice and has continued to be in default after the three-day notice period has elapsed. (Compl., ¶9(a)(1).)

Therefore, the Court finds that the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support an action for unlawful detainer.

Motion to Strike

Defendant argues the earliest Plaintiff is entitled to holdover damages is after the expiration of the notice period. As such, Defendant contends Plaintiff’s request for holdover damages for the period before Defendant’s tenancy was terminated is not permitted and should be stricken.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues holdover damages are allowable and recoverable in unlawful detainer proceedings. Further, Plaintiff argues what he may recover is subject to proof. Plaintiff also contends Defendant argues how much plaintiff can recover and the merits of his damages claim, which is reserved for affirmative defense not a motion to strike, which only goes to plaintiff’s entitlement to claim holdover damages.

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1).)

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).)¿

“Damages occasioned by the unlawful detainer are available in any unlawful detainer proceeding.” (Saberi v. Bakhtiari (1985) 169 Cal. App. 3d 509, 515.)

Here, Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to holdover damages but merely contends the amount and time period for which Plaintiff is entitled holdover damages is limited to the time his tenancy was terminated and he remained in possession of the premises. However, a motion to strike is not the proper avenue to contest how much and through what time period Plaintiff may claim holdover damages. Thus, Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff’s request for holdover damages itself is prohibited by any case or statutory authority.

Therefore, the Court finds that requesting holdover damages in an unlawful detainer complaint is proper.

Conclusion

The demurrer overruled. The motion is denied.

Moving party to give notice.