Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV00546, Date: 2024-09-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV00546    Hearing Date: September 13, 2024    Dept: F43

The Las Canoas Co. vs. Patrick C. McGarrigle, et al.

Trial Date: N/A

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

MOVING PARTY: Defendants McGarrigle, Kenney & Zampiello, APC, and Patrick C. McGarrigle

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff The Las Canoas Co.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendants are requesting attorney fees in the amount of $120,959.20.

RULING: Motion for attorney fees is granted.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff The Las Canoas Co. (Plaintiff) filed this action on February 27, 2023. On April 29, 2024, this Court issued a ruling granting Defendants McGarrigle, Kenney & Zampiello, APC, and Patrick C. McGarrigle’s (Defendants) anti-SLAPP motion. This made Defendants the prevailing party for purposes of this action. As such, Defendants filed a motion for attorney fees on July 2, 2024.

Defendants are requesting $120,959.20 in attorney fees from Plaintiff. Defendants argue in their motion that the attorney fees and hourly rates are reasonable. Defendants’ evidence in support of their request for attorney fees included a declaration from their attorney, Courtney Curtis-Ives, and billing statements (with some redactions as to the tasks and the amount billed for the task) that show which attorney worked on a task, what the task was, and how much time was spent on the task. (Curtis Ives Decl., Ex. 2.) The Curtis-Ives Declaration also describes the hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on the case and the amount that those attorneys billed. (Curtis-Ives Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 10, 11.)

Courtney Curtis-Ives’ hourly rate was $878.00 an hour for 102.9 hours ($90,346.20). Mr. Waxler’s hourly rate was $1,057.00 for 1.2 hours ($1,268.40). Mr. Bucknell’s hourly rate was $1,057.00 for 14.8 hours ($15,643.60). Ms. Stone’s hourly rate was $538.00 for 1.1 hours (though technically $591.80, Defendants’ attorney’s declaration only asks for $591.00). Mr. Goldstein’s hourly rate was $437.00 for 16 hours ($6,992.00). Ms. Boyd’s hourly rate was $437.00 for 14 hours ($6,118.00).

The total lodestar was calculated by multiplying each of these attorney’s hourly rate by their hours worked then adding them all together. The total hours worked for the attorneys totaled 150. The total lodestar amount, as previously noted, is $120,959.20.

In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants should not be awarded the attorney fees because their defense was provided by an unnamed insurance company. Next, Plaintiff argues that the number of hours is excessive for a simple and straightforward anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff also argues that the request for fees includes time that was solely attributable to the anti-SLAPP motion and that the redactions of some of the time entries makes it impossible to tell if they were for time spent on the anti-SLAPP motion. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the hourly rates are excessive and unwarranted given that the Defendants did not disclose that they were being represented by their insurer.

Defendants argue in their reply that it is irrelevant that Defendants have liability insurance, and defense counsel did not conceal anything. Next, they argue that this was not a simple or straightforward anti-SLAPP motion and that the hourly rates and total fees sought are reasonable. Finally, Defendants argue that the fee request does not seek time for work outside of the anti-SLAPP motion.

ANALYSIS

A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a).) “A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.) An award of attorney fees is mandatory upon the granting of an anti-SLAPP motion in favor of a defendant. (CCP § 425.16(c); see also Ketchum v. Moses (2021) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.)

Defendants are the prevailing party because their anti-SLAPP motion was granted by the Court. Defendants have requested a total of $120,959.20 in attorney fees.

First is the issue raised by Plaintiff that Defendants should not be able to recover attorney fees because Defendants’ insurance company handled their representation. Defendants cite cases in their reply that are instructive on this issue. There are cases that support Defendants’ position that it should still be able to recover fees. (See, e.g., Nemecek & Cole v. Horn (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 641, 652 (“We also reject Horn’s contention that the attorney fee request should have been denied because the fees were paid by Lawyers Mutual rather than Nemecek itself”) (citing Staples v. Hoefke (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1397, 1410 (“Plaintiffs were not entitled to avoid their contractual obligation to pay reasonable attorney fees based on the fortuitous circumstance that they sued a defendant who obtained insurance coverage providing a defense”)); see also Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 284-285 (found that there is no authority to support the proposition that a defendant who successfully brings an anti-SLAPP motion is barred from recovering fees if the fees were paid by a third party).)

Based on the foregoing, Defendants may recover attorney fees even though their insurance company handled their representation in this case.

The next issue is the argument raised by Plaintiff is that Defendants should not have redacted their billing statements because it makes it difficult to determine whether the requested fees were directly attributable to the anti-SLAPP motion or if they were for something else. The Court, having reviewed the billing statements submitted by Defendants as Exhibit 2 to the Curtis-Ives Declaration, agrees that the redactions make it difficult to determine what exactly the billings were for. Also, because the amount of money charged for each task was redacted, it also makes it difficult to determine whether the attorney fees requested by Defendants in their motion is an accurate reflection of the amount actually generated. In a few instances, even the number of hours spent on certain tasks is redacted.

Footnote 1 of the Curtis-Ives declaration indicates that the descriptions of the time entries were redacted for confidentiality, work product, and/or attorney-client privilege concerns. (Curtis-Ives Decl., p. 3.) However, the California Supreme Court has distinguished between providing such information during pending litigation as opposed to litigation that has concluded. (Los Angeles County Bd. Of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282.) Because the fees request does not concern ongoing litigation, it appears that the privilege does not apply to that information.

To the extent that Defendants argue that they do not have to provide this billing information (see Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698), the Court agrees. In Syers, the Court of Appeal found that “The trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting defense counsel’s computation of attorney hours as hours reasonably spent working on the case. It is well established that ‘California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of hours reasonably spent. [Citations.]’” (Id.) “‘Because time records are not required under California law ..., there is no required level of detail that counsel must achieve. See, e.g., PLCM Group[, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p.] 1098, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 997 P.2d 511 (‘We do not want “a [trial] court, in setting an attorney’s fee, [to] become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of every detailed facet of the professional representation. It ... is not our intention that the inquiry into the adequacy of the fee assume massive proportions, perhaps dwarfing the case in chief,” ’…)’” (Id. at 699-700.)

Based on the language in Syers, the Court will not require more detailed billing records from Defendants. Based on the Court’s review of the Declaration submitted by Defendants’ attorney and the Court’s review of the relevant anti-SLAPP motion, it is reasonable that Defendants’ attorneys would have spent 150 hours on the motion. Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount of attorney fees requested by Defendant is reasonable.

The Court grants Defendants’ motion in the full requested amount of $120,959.20.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for attorney fees is granted in the amount of $120,959.20.

Moving party to give notice.