Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV00694, Date: 2024-02-20 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 23CHCV00694 Hearing Date: February 20, 2024 Dept: F49
Dept. F49
Date: 2/20/24
Case #23CHCV00694
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT
DEPARTMENT F-49
FEBRUARY 20, 2024
MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT’S PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE
Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23CHCV00694
Motion filed: 10/31/23
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Claudia Aceves (“Plaintiff”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant” or “GM”)
NOTICE: ok
RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Defendant GM to produce a Person Most Qualified (“PMQ”) for all categories in the Deposition Notice, within 10 calendar days.
TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code §§ 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle she purchased in 2019, for which Defendant General Motors, LLC (“GM”) issued the manufacturer’s express warranty. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 9.)
On March 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) Breach of Express Written Warranty; and (5) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability. On 4/19/23, Defendant filed its Answer.
On October 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion (the “Motion”).
On February 2, 2024, GM filed its Opposition. Subsequently, on February 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Reply.
ANALYSIS
Any party may obtain discovery by taking in California the oral deposition of any person. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.) If the deponent is a party, the notice, by itself, compels production of the documents. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.280, subd. (a).)
“If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).)
A. All Procedural Requirements Are Met
1. No Separate Statement Is Required.
Defendant GM, in its Opposition, argues that the Motion is procedurally defective due to the absence of a separate statement, citing California Rules of Court rules 3.1345(a)4) and (a)(5). (Opp’n., at 9.) This argument shall fail, as the requirement for a separate statement does not apply in instances where GM failed to produce a deponent.
According to California Rules of Court rule 3.1345(a)(4), a separate statement is required where a motion seeks to compel answers to questions that were asked at deposition but not answered. Similarly, rule 3.1345(a)(5) applies when a motion seeks the production of documents requested but not produced at deposition.
Here, given that GM did not produce its deponent, it becomes impossible to know which questions would remain unanswered or what documents would not be produced by the deponent. Consequently, a separate statement could not feasibly list the full text of unasked questions and non-responses, as required by California Rules of Court rule 3.1345(c).
Therefore, the Court concludes that the requirement for a separate statement is not applicable in this context, given GM’s failure to produce a deponent.
2. Meet and Confer Efforts Were Sufficient.
GM further contends that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer with GM, as required. (Opp’n., at 4.) According to GM’s counsel, Plaintiff sent emails on October 3 and October 19, 2023, solely demanding dates for the deposition of GM’s PMQ, but did not attempt to address GM’s concerns with the Notice. (Gavrilescu Decl., ¶ 4.) This argument, however, is misplaced. The meet and confer requirement, for the purpose of this Motion, is specifically related to addressing the issue of GM’s deponent’s failure to appear and making efforts to find a mutually agreeable time for the deposition. It is not required to address the objection as the objection does not stay the taking of the deposition.
Moreover, in GM’s written objections, it agreed to produce its PMQ on Category Nos. 1-4, 7, and 10. (Gavrilescu Decl., ¶ 4.) On October 3, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed GM’s counsel seeking to arrange a mutually convenient time and place for Defendant’s deposition. (Sue Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. “4.”) Subsequently, on October 19, 2023, after receiving no response, Plaintiff followed up with another email to Defendant’s counsel requesting again to set a mutually convenient time and place for Defendant’s deposition. (Sue Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. “5.”) Despite these efforts, as of the date of filing of the instant Motion, GM has not provided any responses. (Sue Decl., ¶ 13.)
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently met the meet and confer requirement by making efforts to schedule a mutually agreeable time for the deposition.
B. GM Is Required to Comply with the Notice of Deposition.
1. GM’s Objection Does Not Stay the Taking of the Deposition
Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.280 subdivision (a) provides that service of a deposition notice “is effective to require any deponent who is a party to the action [] to attend and to testify, as well as to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing for inspection and copying.”
Defendant GM argues, in its Opposition, that its written objection to Plaintiff on September 14, 2023 (Gavrilescu Decl., ¶ 3), objected to the Notice of Deposition on the grounds that the Categories is overly broad and irrelevant. (Opp’n., at 6-7.) However, Defendant GM does not provide legal authorities or legal analysis to justify its PMQ’s nonappearance at the deposition based on its objection.
“In addition to serving this written objection, a party may also move for an order staying the taking of the deposition and quashing the deposition notice. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. The taking of the deposition is stayed pending the determination of this motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., ¶ 2025.410, subd. (c).)
Here, GM has not filed a motion for staying the taking of the deposition or quashing the deposition notice.
Therefore, the Court finds GM’s argument lacks merit, and GM should produce its deponent according to the deposition notice.
2. GM Fails to Show that Categories Sought for the Deponent’s Knowledge Are Irrelevant.
Defendant GM argues that concerning Categories Nos. 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, and 15, information about other vehicles “of the same year, make, and model” of the Plaintiff’s vehicle are irrelevant to the pending claims. (Opp’n., at 7.)
Moreover, GM argues that Category No. 13, where Plaintiff seeks testimony concerning GM’s third-party dispute resolution program, is also irrelevant because, according to GM’s records, Plaintiff does not participate in any such program. (Opp’n., at 8.)
Furthermore, GM contends that with regard to Category Nos. 5 and 16-19, GM’s internal policies and procedures “have zero relevant to whether GM was able to conform Plaintiff’s Blazer to its warranty within a reasonable number of attempts.” (Ibid.)
“[D]oubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery … An appellate court cannot reverse a trial court’s grant of discovery under a ‘relevancy’ attack unless it concludes that the answers sought by a given line of questioning cannot as a reasonable possibility lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or be helpful in preparation for trial.” (Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 785, 790 (quoting Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.))
Here, Plaintiff posits that evidence concerning issues and resolutions involving third parties is directly relevant to demonstrating that a manufacturer was previously aware of a defect, a critical element in analyzing whether a manufacturer “willfully” fails to fulfill its obligations under the Act. (Mot.’ at 8.)
Additionally, Plaintiff’s Complaint encompasses claims under Civil Code sections 1793.2, subdivision (d) (relating to service and repair, or replacement and reimbursement), 1793.2, subdivision (b) (relating to service and repair), 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3) (relating to service literature and replacement parts), alongside claims for breach of the express warranty, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and fraudulent concealment. It cannot be said that information sought under these Categories precludes a reasonable possibility of leading to the discovery of admissible evidence. Therefore, the Court finds GM’s argument unconvincing.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s position is supported by the established principles of discovery as outlined in precedents. GM acknowledges that it “did agree to produce its PMQ on Category Nos. 1-4, 7, and 10.” (Gavrilescu Decl., ¶ 3.) Furthermore, GM does not contest Plaintiff’s evidence showing that Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to secure a mutually agreeable date for the deposition, which GM failed to provide.
3. Code of Civil Procedure Section 2031.310(b)(1) Does Not Apply to This Motion.
Defendant GM, in its Opposition, references Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(b)(1) to assert that Plaintiff is required to articulate specific facts demonstrating good cause for the discovery sought, arguing that Plaintiff’s request is overly broad and seeks production of trade secret material (Opp’n., at 4-5, 8.)
The Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(b)(1) specifies that “A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with each of the following...”) Additionally, subdivision (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 states, “On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand ...” (Underlines added.)
Here, it is explicitly stated in Plaintiff’s Motion and proposed order that the Motion seeks only the deposition. Given that there is no request for production for inspection involved, this section does not apply to instant Motion.
The undisputed evidence presented to the Court demonstrates that GM did not produce its PMQ as per the Notice of Deposition, and it failed to ever provide Plaintiff with a mutually agreeable date for the deposition despite repeated requests. Based on these facts, the motion has merit and is therefore granted.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of GM’s person most knowledgeable is granted. GM is ordered to produce its person most knowledgeable on the categories identified in the notice of deposition at a mutually agreeable time within twenty days of notice of this order.
Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice of this order.