Judge Gary I. Micon, Case Number: 23CHCV00740, Date: 2025-02-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV00740, Date: 2025-02-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV00740 Hearing Date: February 10, 2025 Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 02-10-25

Case # 23CHCV01654, Archer v. General Motors LLC

Trial Date: 02-18-25

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant General Motors LLC

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Ian Archer

RELIEF REQUESTED

Order granting Defendant summary judgment.

RULING: Motion for summary judgment is granted.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff Ian Archer purchased a used 2018 GMC Sierra 2500 (Sierra Vehicle) on December 30, 2021. Plaintiff alleges that the used Sierra Vehicle was sold to Plaintiff with enforceable express remedies issued by defendant General Motors LLC (GM). The vehicle began experiencing mechanical defects, and Plaintiff sued GM for violating the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging that Nissan was unable to repair the defects and did not replace the car or make restitution. Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 7, 2023, alleging causes of action for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and violations of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b).

GM filed a motion for summary judgment on all causes of action in Plaintiff’s complaint on October 29, 2024. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint on December 16, 2024. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the summary judgment motion on January 27, 2025. On February 5, 2025, GM filed its reply concurrently with its opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend.

In its January 3, 2025 minute order, the Court stated that if Plaintiff’s motion for leave is denied, the summary judgment motion would be heard. If the motion for leave is granted, the summary judgment motion would be continued for further briefing as to the new amended complaint.

The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend and now rules on this motion for summary judgment.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

GM argues the undisputed material facts show the Plaintiff cannot maintain any causes of action in its complaint because Plaintiff’s Sierra Vehicle is a used vehicle which Plaintiff did not purchase with new manufacturer full warranties. Further, GM is not a distributor who sold Plaintiff the used Sierra Vehicle.

Plaintiff’s opposition does not directly dispute GM’s material facts or arguments but presents evidence that GM is a distributor. Plaintiff also contends that the Court should grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint considering the California Supreme Court’s October 31, 2024 ruling in the Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC case.

GM replies that Plaintiff’s opposition cannot refute the undisputed material facts in GM’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff does not dispute GM’s material facts. Plaintiff’s attempt to equate GM’s manufacturing role with direct involvement in AutoNation’s resale of the Sierra Vehicle fails under the Supreme Court’s recent Rodriguez ruling. The undisputed material facts still show that Plaintiff was not the original owner of the Sierra Vehicle and that Plaintiff did not receive a New Warranty when he purchased the Sierra Vehicle. Finally, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint is procedurally defective because Plaintiff included it as part of its opposition even though Plaintiff already filed a separate motion in December 2024.

The Complaint’s Allegations

The complaint alleges the following: GM is a “manufacturer” and “distributor” under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Compl., ¶ 14.) On December 30, 2021, Plaintiff purchased a 2018 GMC Sierra, VIN No.: 1GT12UEY6JF222996 (Sierra Vehicle) from a selling dealership. (Compl., ¶8.) The vehicle came with express warranties from GM not the selling dealership. (Compl., ¶¶ 9.)

GM warranted the Sierra Vehicle, and Plaintiff in connection with the purchase received various warranties, including a 3-year/36,000 mile express bumper to bumper warranty, a 5-year/60,000 mile powertrain warranty which covers the engine and the transmission, as well as various emissions warranties that exceed the time and mileage limitations of the bumper to bumper and powertrain warranties. (Compl., ¶ 9.)

The vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty and developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including, transmission, engine, and emission system defects. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff delivered the vehicle to an authorized GM repair facility for repairs, but GM was unable to conform Plaintiff’s used Sierra Vehicle to the applicable express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts. (Compl., ¶¶ 23-24.) GM also failed to either promptly replace the “new motor vehicle” or to promptly make restitution under the Song-Beverly Act’s “repair-or-replace” provision. (Compl., ¶¶ 25-26.)

Plaintiff alleges the causes of action: (1) Breach of Express Written Warranty (Civ. Code, §¿1791.2, subd. (a), 1794) (Song-Beverly); (2) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civ. Code, §§ 1791.1; 1794; 1795.5) (Song-Beverly); and (3) Violation of Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (b) (Song-Beverly).

ANALYSIS

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

The pleadings frame the issues for motions “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)” (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) “On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence. It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.” (Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 (citation omitted).)

The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act

The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is a remedial statute that protects consumers who purchase products covered by express warranties by regulating warranty terms and imposing service and repair obligations on parties who issue warranties. (Rodriguez I, 77 Cal.App.5th 209, 217 [quoting Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 798].) “The Act’s protections apply against the party who sold the product to the buyer and issued the express warranty. (Id. at p. 218.)

1. New goods

The Act defines “consumer goods” as any “new product or part” that is bought, used, or leased for “use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, except for clothing and consumable.” (Com. Code, § 1791, subd. (a).) The Act’s “refund-or-replace provision” requires manufacturers of goods to either replace the goods or reimburse the buyer the purchase price of the goods if “after a reasonable number of attempts the manufacturer is unable to conform the goods to the applicable express warranty. (Com. Code, § 1791, subd. (d)(1).) The Act also provides claims for breaches of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for “new products.” (Com. Code, §§ 1791.1, subd. (c), 1792.)

The California Supreme Court recently clarified a circuit split regarding the Act’s definition of “new motor vehicle” which narrowed the scope of which vehicles qualified for the Act’s “repair-or-replace” remedy. The Supreme Court held that “a motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty does not qualify as a ‘motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’ under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2)’s definition of ‘new motor vehicle’ unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale.” (Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189, 196 (Rodriguez II).)

2. Used goods

The Act also provides protections for used goods but limits those protections to sellers or distributors of the used product. (See Com. Code, § 1795.5.) A “distributor” is an entity “that stands between the manufacturer [of consumer goods] and the retail seller in purchases, consignments, or contracts for sale of consumer goods.” (Com. Code, § 1791, subd. (e).)

The Act provides express and implied warranty protections for used goods only where the entity selling the used product issues an express warranty at the time of sale. (Com. Code, §§ 1795.5, subd. (a).) “It shall be the obligation of the distributor or retail seller making express warranties with respect to used consumer goods (and not the original manufacturer, distributor, or retail seller making express warranties with respect to such goods when new) to maintain sufficient service and repair facilities within this state to carry out the terms of such express warranties.” (Com. Code, § 1795.5, subd. (a).)

Implied warranties for used products have a maximum duration of three months and liability lies with distributors or retailers, not the manufacturer, unless the manufacturer issues a new warranty with the sale of the used good. (Com. Code, § 1795.5, subd. (c); see Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 398; Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, 339-340.)

Issue #1: First cause of action for Breach of Express Warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, section 1791, subdivision (a)

Issue #2: Third cause of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, section 1793.2, subdivision (b)

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s express warranty claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff did not purchase a “new motor vehicle” or receive any new or additional warranty coverage from GM with the used vehicle.

As mentioned above, the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act provides relief for consumers who purchase cars sold “with a full warranty” not “previously sold cars accompanied by some balance of the original warranty.” (Rodriguez II, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 225; see also Civ. Code, § 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).)

GM argues that the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff was not the original owner of the Sierra Vehicle. On December 30, 2021, Plaintiff purchased the used Sierra Vehicle, with 38,967 miles on the odometer, from AutoNation Chevrolet Valencia. (UMF No., 2; Declaration of Cameron Major, Exh. A, at p. 1.) As evidenced by the Retail Sales Contract dated December 30, 2021, GM was not involved in the transaction between AutoNation and Plaintiff. (UMF Nos. 2-3; Major Dec., Exh. A, at p. 1 [listing Plaintiff as “Buyer,” N/A as “Co-Buyer” and AutoNation Chevrolet as “Dealer/Creditor”]; Declaration of James Oaks, ¶ 5.)

On November 7, 2018, Suburban Buick GMC Cadillac (Suburban Buick) delivered the Sierra Vehicle to its original owner with 190 miles on its odometer. (UMF Nos. 6-7; Major Dec., Exh. A, at p. 1 [listing the vehicle as “used”]; Oaks Dec., ¶ 6, Exh. B - GM’s “View Vehicle Delivery Information” report.) In connection with the delivery to the original owner, GM issued a New Vehicle Limited Warranty (Warranty) with bumper-to-bumper coverage for the earlier of 36 months or 36,000 miles and powertrain coverage for the earlier of 60 months or 60,000 miles. (UMF No. 7; Oaks Dec., ¶ 7, Exh. C, at pp. 2, 4 - GMC Limited Warranty and Owner Assistance Info. Booklet; Exh. D, - GM’s “View Vehicle Summary” report.) Thus, the Warranty’s coverage began when Suburban Buick delivered the Sierra Vehicle to its original owner on November 7, 2018. (UMF No. 8; Oaks Dec., Exh. C, at p. 2 [“The warranty period for all coverages begins on the date the vehicle is first delivered or put into use and ends at the expiration of the coverage period.”].)

GM did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage to Plaintiff or the Sierra Vehicle when Plaintiff purchased the vehicle used in December 2021. (UMF No. 9; Oaks Dec., Exh. D, at pp. 1-2.) Plaintiff received only the balance of coverage under the Warranty that GM issued to the original owners. (UMF No. 9.)

Plaintiff does not oppose these facts.

The only issue remaining is whether a New Warranty was issued in December 2021 when Plaintiff purchased the used Sierra Vehicle.

Plaintiff introduces his own material facts to create a dispute regarding whether the Plaintiff’s Sierra Vehicle was covered by an enforceable New Vehicle Warranty. Plaintiff states that on December 30, 2021, he purchased the Sierra Vehicle, which was covered by an enforceable New Vehicle Limited Warranty issued by GM, from GM dealership AutoNation. (Declaration of Siyun Yang, ¶¶ 5-7, Exhs. 2, 3, 4.) Plaintiff notes that GM’s Warranty, Service, & Maintenance Booklet states that “[t]his warranty . . . is provided to the original and any subsequent owners of the vehicle during the warranty period” and covers repairs to correct various vehicle defects including “vibrations, or other normal characteristics of the vehicle due to materials or workmanship occurring during the warranty period.” (PUMF Nos. 1-2; Yang Dec. , Exh. 4, at p. 4.) The Warranty Booklet also provides an implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose to covered vehicles for the duration of the written warranty. (PUMF No. 4, Yang Dec., ¶ 9, Exh. 4.)

Plaintiff does not support his contentions with evidence showing a new written warranty was issued with his purchase of the used Sierra Vehicle or proof that Plaintiff purchased a “full warranty” that same day. Both GM and Plaintiff’s vehicle history evidence shows that any new warranties were issued in August 2018 with coverage beginning November 7, 2018, when the Sierra Vehicle was delivered to its original owner.

Based on the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Rodriguez II, Plaintiff’s Sierra Vehicle is a used vehicle that was purchased without the issuance of a new warranty and is not a “motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” under the Song-Beverly Act’s definition of a “new vehicle.” Therefore, the “repair-or-replace provision” does not apply to Plaintiff’s used Sierra Vehicle, and Plaintiff’s causes of action for express warranty and violation of section 1793.2, subdivision (b) fail as a matter of law.

Accordingly, there are no triable issues of material fact that Plaintiff purchased a used vehicle without acquiring a new full manufacturer’s warranty on the vehicle, and the Court grants GM summary judgment on the first and second causes of action.

Issue #3: Second cause of action Breach of Implied Warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act

Defendant also moves for summary judgment on the second cause of action because the evidence shows that GM is not a distributor who is liable for breaching implied warranties in selling Plaintiff’s used Sierra Vehicle.

The second cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under Civil Code, sections 1791.1 and 1794 alleges that the Sierra Vehicle’s sale was accompanied by GM’s implied warranty and that the Sierra Vehicle was not fit for its ordinary purpose because it had several defective vehicle systems or components. (Compl., ¶¶ 32-35.)

Implied warranty of merchantability means the consumer goods: “(1) [p]ass without objection in the trade under the contract description[;] (2) [a]re fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used[;] (3) [a]re adequately contained, packaged, and labeled[;] and (4) [c]onform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label.” (Civ. Code, § 1791.1, subd. (a).) “Consumer goods” are “any new product or part thereof that is used, bought, or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, except for clothing and consumables.” (Civ. Code, § 1791, subd. (a) [emphasis added].) The implied merchantability cause of action may be based upon a latent condition that is not discovered by the consumer and reported to the seller within the duration period. (See Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1308-1309.)

“[I]n the sale of used consumer goods, liability for breach of implied warranty lies with distributors and retailers, not the manufacturer, where there is no evidence the manufacturer played any role in the sale of the used car to plaintiff.” (Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 398 [emphasis added].) A “manufacturer” is an individual or entity that “manufactures, assembles, or produces consumer goods.” (Civ. Code, § 1791, subd. (j).) A “retailer” is an individual or entity that “that engages in the business of selling or leasing consumer goods to retail buyers.” (Civ. Code, § 1791, subd. (l).) Distributors are individuals or entities who “stand[] between the manufacturer and the retail seller in purchases, consignments, or contracts for sale of consumer goods.” (Civ. Code, § 1791, subd. (e).) When a distributor or retailer makes express warranties with respect to used consumer goods, an implied warranty of merchantability or fitness also attaches to the goods is coextensive with the express warranties up to a limited duration. (Civ. Code, § 1795.5, subd. (c).)

GM argues the undisputed material facts show that GM was not a distributor or retail seller of Plaintiff’s Sierra Vehicle. (UMF Nos. 1-10; Oaks Dec., ¶¶ 4-8; Exhs. A, B, C, D.) Plaintiff’s Sierra Vehicle was purchased by its original owner in November 2018. (UMF Nos. 2, 6-7; Major Dec., Exh. A, at p. 1 [listing the vehicle as “used”]; Oaks Dec., ¶ 6, Exh. B - GM’s “View Vehicle Delivery Information” report.) On December 30, 2021, Plaintiff purchased the used Sierra Vehicle from dealership AutoNation. (UMF Nos. 2-3; Major Dec., ¶¶ 3-4, Exh. A, at pp. 1, 4 - Retail Sales Contract.) GM was not involved in the transaction between AutoNation and Plaintiff. (UMF Nos. 2-3; Major Dec., Exh. A, at p. 1; Oaks Dec., ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff does not dispute GM’s facts but does state that GM was involved in the distribution and resale of Plaintiff’s Sierra. (PUMF No. 5; Yang Dec., ¶ 11; Exhs. 2, 5, 6.) Plaintiff points to three exhibits. The first exhibit, the Retail Sales Contract between AutoNation and Plaintiff, makes no mention of GM. (Yang Dec., Exh. 2.) The second exhibit, a Vehicle History for Plaintiff’s Sierra Vehicle with no date for when the history was pulled, lists the date of Plaintiff’s purchase as December 30, 2021 and a “Selling BAC” of “166762P.” (Yang Dec., ¶ 11, Exh. 5.) The vehicle history does not mention AutoNation or GM or the relevance of the “Selling BAC”. The third exhibit is a CARFAX Vehicle History Report, dated June 7, 2023. (Yang Dec, Exh. 6.) The report lists two owners, one from 2018 and one from 2021. (Ibid.) The report also shows that the Vehicle was first offered for sale in February 2018 by Allen Cadillac GMC and then offered for sale again on October 31, 2018, by Suburban Buick GMC Cadillac until it was purchased by the original owner on November 17, 2018. (Ibid.)

Although the complaint alleges GM is a manufacturer and distributor, the Court does not see how Plaintiff’s evidence shows that GM is a distributor of “used consumer goods” under section 1795.5. The evidence does not show that GM stood between itself and the listed retail sellers in purchasing, consigning, or contracting to sell Plaintiff’s Sierra Vehicle. There are no triable issues of material fact that GM is not a distributor of Plaintiff’s used Sierra Vehicle, and thus no implied warranty of merchantability or fitness arose from GM to Plaintiff when Plaintiff purchased the used Sierra Vehicle.

Accordingly, the Court grants GM’s motion for summary judgment on the second cause of action.

Plaintiff’s request for leave to file an amended complaint after Rodriguez II

If a party wants a court to consider a previously unpleaded issue in connection with the motion for summary judgment, the party must request leave to amend prior to the summary judgment hearing. (Vulk v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 243, 256.)

The Court has denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend in a separate tentative.

CONCLUSION

Defendant General Motors LLC’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Defendant General Motors LLC to give notice.

Dept. F43

Date: 02-10-25

Case # 23CHCV01654, Archer v. General Motors LLC

Trial Date: 02-18-25

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Ian Archer

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors LLC

RELIEF REQUESTED

Order granting Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended Complain adding new material facts and four new causes of action.

RULING: Motion is denied.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On October 29, 2024, GM filed a motion for summary judgment on all causes of action.

On December 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

On February 5, 2025, GM filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend as part of its reply to Plaintiff’s summary judgment opposition.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Plaintiff moves for leave to file an amended complaint to add facts that GM placed Plaintiff’s used Sierra Vehicle into the stream of commerce despite knowing that the vehicle exhibited an Engine Heater Short Circuit defect. Plaintiff supposedly learned these facts during discovery. Plaintiff also moves to add four additional causes of action based on recent developments in Lemon Law jurisprudence. Based on the California Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Stiles v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 9 (Stiles) and Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (Rodriguez II), which held that “used” vehicles are not “new motor vehicles” under section 1793.22, subd. (e)(2) without issuance of a “full manufacturer warranty,” Plaintiff cannot maintain a Song-Beverly claim on his used Sierra Vehicle based on the new facts learned above. However, Rodriguez II allows Plaintiff to seek remedies under the California Commercial Code and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Because this new interpretation of “new motor vehicles” would automatically cause Plaintiff’s causes of action to fail, Plaintiff will suffer prejudice if the Court denies Plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint.

GM opposes arguing that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint is procedurally defective because Plaintiff included it as part of its opposition even though Plaintiff already filed a separate motion in December 2024.

ANALYSIS

“The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1); see also In re Marriage of Liss (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1429.) “Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 576.)

Judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters between the parties, and therefore, courts have held that “there is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.” (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296-297.) “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.” (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530, citations omitted.) “Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in a delay of trial, along with loss of critical evidence, added costs of preparation, [and] increased burden of discovery.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2020) [Weil & Brown], ¶ 6:656, citations omitted.)

Motions for leave to amend must also meet certain procedural requirements. For instance, California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a) requires that the motion “(2) State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.” Additionally, Rule 3.1324(b) requires that the declaration in support of a motion for leave to file an amended complaint must state: “(1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

Plaintiff’s “new” facts and causes of action

As set forth in the Declaration of Siyun Yang, Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff seeks to add new facts and four new causes of action against GM: violations of California’s Uniform Commercial Code for breaches of implied and express warranties, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. (Declaration of Siyun Yang, ¶¶ 10-19, 21.)

Plaintiff proposes adding factual allegations that before purchasing the Sierra Vehicle, Plaintiff reviewed GM’s promotional materials which ultimately sparked their interest in purchasing the 2018 GMC Sierra 2500 from GM’s authorized dealership AutoNation Chevrolet Valencia (AutoNation). (Yang Dec., ¶ 13, Exh. 2, ¶¶ 8-10.) GM participated in “used vehicle distribution and resale,” through its authorized dealerships, including AutoNation, which performed pre-delivery inspection and was involved in the re-distribution of Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Yang Dec., ¶ 14, Exh. 2, ¶¶ 11-18.) Between January 2022 and January 2023, Plaintiff’s Sierra Vehicle exhibited issues such as a clunk feeling when coming to a stop and upon acceleration, oil leaking, harsh downshift of the transmission, and unexpected low coolant and gear slipping. (Yang Dec., ¶ 15, Exh. 2, ¶¶ 21-24.) Despite being notified by GM that vehicles of the same make and model as Plaintiff’s, including Plaintiff’s Sierra Vehicle, were experiencing engine defects, AutoNation placed the Sierra Vehicle into the stream of commerce, with an open and incomplete Safety Recall, Plaintiff purchased the Sierra Vehicle, and Plaintiff was never informed of the recall during pre-sale communications. (Yang Dec., ¶¶ 13-16, Exh. 2, ¶¶ 25-30.)

Based on these supposedly new facts, Plaintiff seeks to add four new claims to his complaint: Plaintiff’s 2018 GMC Sierra 2500 is a “used” vehicle, and GM substantially participated in the distribution and retail sale of Plaintiff’s Sierra Vehicle even though GM knew the vehicle, and vehicles of the same make, model, and year, exhibited engine issues and were subject to an open and incomplete Safety Recall. As the California Supreme Court stated in its October 31, 2024 holding in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC, these unalleged material facts strengthen the complaint, and Plaintiff may request leave to amend the complaint to seek remedies under other authorities such as California’s Uniform Commercial Code.

Plaintiff’s motion is procedurally defective because it violates Rule of Court 3.1324(b)(3)-(4), which explicitly requires plaintiffs to state when the new facts were discovered and why plaintiffs did not present the facts sooner. The Yang Declaration does not state when discovery and document production occurred, or why the motion was not brought earlier. The Court also notes that Plaintiff would know at the time of filing this complaint that GM’s promotional materials sparked Plaintiff’s interest in the 2018 GMC Sierra 2500. Plaintiff also alleges the existence of specific mechanical defects including noises that he should have known about when he filed his original complaint. Further, Plaintiff admits that several of the “new” factual allegations are discoverable in public filings but does not explain why Plaintiff did not mention these publicly available facts in the original complaint.

Because Plaintiff does not state when he discovered these new facts, explain why he did not include the facts he knew in his original complaint, or why the motion for leave to amend was not brought sooner, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Ian Archer’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint is denied.

Plaintiff Ian Archer to give notice.