Judge Gary I. Micon, Case Number: 23CHCV01430, Date: 2024-10-31 Tentative Ruling

On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff Najee Lamar Brown (Plaintiff) filed this motor vehicle personal injury action against Defendants Cristian Cruz and Alida Zarate (Defendants). Cruz was driving a vehicle owned by Zarate when he rear-ended Plaintiff on January 29, 2023.

After receiving the police report from the accident on February 16, 2024 (Neubauer Decl., ¶ 8), Plaintiff learned that the report indicated that Cruz was driving under the influence of alcohol when the crash happened. Plaintiff seeks to add a prayer for punitive damages to her complaint pursuant to CCP § 425.13, as well as a paragraph regarding Cruz driving under the influence of alcohol, as stated in the police report.

Plaintiff filed this motion for leave to file First Amended Complaint on September 19, 2024. Plaintiff argues that she has complied with the applicable rules of the Court providing the effect of the amendment, why it is necessary and property, when the facts giving rise to the amendment were discovered, and the reasons why the request was not made earlier. Plaintiff also argues that punitive damages are warranted because the act of driving a car while intoxicated constitutes malice.

Defendant Zarate filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion on October 16. Zarate argues that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she acted with diligence in amending her complaint. Zarate also argues that Plaintiff’s allegations as to Zarate in the proposed First Amended Complaint would be subject to a demurrer and motion to strike.

Defendant Cruz filed his opposition to Plaintiff’s motion on October 17. Cruz argues that Plaintiff has failed to provide an adequate basis for her proposed amendments, including her request for punitive damages. He also argues that the information that Plaintiff seeks to add does not constitute a new discovery, as it has been in Plaintiff’s possession for a year and a half.[1] Cruz also argues that the declaration does not say why the request for amendment was not made earlier.

Plaintiff filed her reply on October 25. Plaintiff first argues that Defendants have made no showing of prejudice. Plaintiff next argues that Defendants’ attack on the validity and merit of Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is misplaced because as a general rule, courts do not consider the validity and merit of the proposed amended pleading in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.

Courts are authorized, in their discretion, to “allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars . . .” (CCP § 473(a)(1).) CCP § 576, likewise, provides that “any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment to any pleading . . .” (CCP § 576.) The determination of whether to grant leave to file an amended pleading rests in the court’s sound discretion.

Leave to amend is to be liberally granted at any stage in the proceedings, up to and including trial. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1986) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487; see also County of Sanitation Dist. No. 2 of Los Angeles County v. Kern County (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1618 (noting that a plaintiff may be granted amendment even at the time of trial).) To overcome the policy of liberally granting amendments at any stage of litigation, a defendant must show both actual prejudice and inexcusable delay. (Magpali, 48 Cal.App.4th at 487.) Prejudice exists where an amendment to a complaint would result in a delay of trial; loss of critical evidence; added costs of preparation; and increased burden of discovery. (Id. at 486-488.)

Trial in this case is over nine months away. Defendants would not be prejudiced in that regard if leave to amend were granted. Defendants argue that there was an inexcusable delay in filing this motion because Plaintiff has had the police report in her possession for a year and a half (though it may have only been since February 2024). Plaintiff claims that the reason for her delay is that Defendant Cruz did not file his answer until May 15, 2024. Defendants argue that this is not a sufficient reason for Plaintiff to have not filed a motion for leave to amend sooner. However, complaints can be amended up to and including trial. Regardless of the exact reason for the delay, leave to amend is to be liberally granted. The Court will not deny the motion based on Plaintiff’s alleged delay in filing this motion.

Defendants also attempt to argue the merits of the amendments, particularly the inclusion of the request for punitive damages. However, as Plaintiff argues in her reply, it is premature to argue the merits of the amendment. That type of challenge is better left for a demurrer. (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048; Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 760 [“the better course of action would have been to allow [plaintiff] to amend the complaint and then let the parties test its legal sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings.”].) The Court will leave the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages for future proceedings.

There is a policy of liberally granting leave to amend. Because Defendants have not shown prejudice and inexcusable delay, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint is granted. The proposed First Amended Complaint filed with Plaintiff’s motion is deemed filed.

[1] The Court will note that there appears to be some confusion as to when Plaintiff’s counsel obtained the police report. Plaintiff’s motion states that her counsel received the police report on February 16, 2023 (Motion at p. 3), while her counsel’s declaration states that the police report was received on February 16, 2024 (Neubauer Decl., ¶ 8). Plaintiff’s reply does not address this discrepancy.