Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV01455, Date: 2025-06-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV01455    Hearing Date: June 11, 2025    Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 06-11-25

Case # 23CHCV01455, Melchor v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, et al.

Trial Date: 08-11-25

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants County of Los Angeles and Deputy Sheriff Jonathan Hensley

RESPONDING PARTY: No response has been filed.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Order granting defendants summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication.

RULING: Motion for summary judgment is granted.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

This case arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred at the intersection of Soledad Canyon Road and Whites Canyon Road in Santa Clarita, CA.

On October 17, 2022, at approximately 5:50 p.m., plaintiff Kareli Melchor (Plaintiff) was driving south on Whites Canyon Road at 40 mph.  (Defs.’ UMF No. 10.)  Defendant Deputy Sheriff Jonathan Hensley (Hensley) was driving west on Soledad Canyon Road.  (Defs.’ UMF No. 7.)  Hensley was driving a police interceptor owned and operated by defendant County of Los Angeles (LA County).  (Defs.’ UMF No. 3.)

Hensley activated the police interceptor’s lights and sirens a few miles before reaching the intersection.  (Defs.’ UMF No. 3.)  The sirens were audible to drivers at the intersection for approximately five seconds prior to the police interceptor approaching the subject intersection. (Defs.’ UMF No. 5.)  The light for vehicles traveling south on Whites Canyon Road was green.  (Defs.’ UMF No. 11.)  The traffic light was red for vehicles traveling west on Soledad Canyon Road.  (Defs.’ UMF No. 7.)  As the police interceptor approached the intersection from the west on Soledad Canyon Road, it slowed and came to a complete stop before reaching the intersection.  (Defs.’ UMF Nos. 4, 6.)

After all traffic came to a complete stop, the police interceptor slowly proceeded westward through the intersection.  (Defs.’ UMF No. 9.)  Despite the activation of emergency sirens and lights, Plaintiff failed to yield, proceeded through the intersection at approximately 40 mph, and collided with the police interceptor. (Defs.’ UMF No. 10-12.)

On May 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant Hensley and LA County alleging causes of action for negligence; negligent entrustment; negligent hiring, supervising, and retention; and vicarious liability of a public entity.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants drove the police interceptor in a negligent manner into Plaintiff’s car and caused the collision.  Defendants filed their answer on August 9, 2023.

On February 24, 2025, Defendants Hensley and LA County moved for summary judgment.  Plaintiff filed an opposition On May 21, 2025.  Defendants replied on May 29, 2025.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s failure to yield to an emergency vehicle and violation of California Vehicle Code 21806(a) was the cause of the collision.  The evidence establishes that Defendants’ actions were entirely reasonable, appropriate, and necessary under the circumstances, and that Plaintiff’s own negligent actions which caused the collision and her subsequent injuries.  Because Plaintiff cannot present evidence to establish Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiff’s second, third, and fourth causes of action also fail.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ motion should be denied on several grounds.  Procedurally, Defendants’ failed to file joint stipulations prior to filing their motion, and their separate statement contain several citation errors.  Specifically, Defendants’ separate statement violates Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(3) because it refers to declarations by paragraphs rather than lines or pages.  Next, Defendants fail to meet their burden of presenting admissible evidence demonstrating that the section 21055 exemption applies.  Defendants present no evidence that the red lights at the intersection were activated and visible from the front, and the Hensley declaration is vague concerning when he activated the vehicle’s lights and sirens and whether they were active upon impact.  The Angelotti, Cederlind, and Hensley declarations include conflicting statements about key facts.  It is also unclear whether Hensley was in active pursuit at the time of the collision.  Finally, the exemptions in Vehicle Code sections 21055 and 21056 are not grounds for summary judgment.

Defendants respond asserting that Plaintiff’s are attempting to create triable issues of fact through misapplying the Evidence Code.  The Angelotti, Cederlind, and Hensley declarations do not contain hearsay because they are based on each declarant’s personal knowledge of the collision.  The undisputed evidence shows that Defendants’ vehicle displayed a red light visible from the front and that the light and sirens were activated continuously from the time Hensley activated them, a few miles from the intersection, until the collision.  Angelotti and Cederlind’s declarations also establish that a red light was visible from the front of Defendants’ vehicle at the time of the collision.  The undisputed evidence also establishes that Defendants were acting in response to an emergency, and that Plaintiff’s breach of her duty to yield to emergency vehicles caused the collision.  Finally, the procedural issues Plaintiff raises are not fatal to Defendants’ motion.  Because the motion addresses all causes of action alleged in the complaint, no joint stipulation was required under Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(t).  Regarding the citation errors, each undisputed fact clearly cites specific exhibits or declarations, properly identifies the declarations, and lists the specific paragraph that supports the fact.  Plaintiffs do not argue that they will suffer prejudice from any minor errors in the citations.

ANALYSIS

Summary Judgment Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

The pleadings frame the issues for motions “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)”  (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.)  “On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Ibid.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)  “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence.  It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.”  (Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 [citation omitted].)

            The Parties’ Evidence

Defendants present the declarations of two individuals who witnessed the collision—John Angelotti and Marianne Cederlind; defendant Hensley’s declaration; witness John Angelotti’s August 22, 2024 deposition transcript; the Complaint; Defendants’ Answer; and Plaintiff’s responses to defendant Hensley’s special interrogatories.

Plaintiff presents no opposing evidence.

Plaintiff’s Procedural Arguments: Citation and Joint Stipulation issues

Plaintiff argues the court should deny Defendants’ request in the alternative for summary adjudication on procedural grounds because the separate statement violates Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(3) by not properly citing evidence, not separately identifying each cause of action or affirmative defense, and not separately listing each issue.

Each material fact in the separate statement must be followed by a reference to supporting evidence.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).)  The court has discretion to deny a summary judgment motion based on the moving party’s failure to comply with the separate statement and evidentiary requirements.  (Ibid.)  Failing to list a specific exhibit number is not automatic grounds for denying a summary judgment motion.  As long as the separate statement specifically identifies and describes the evidence and directs the court to the specific and relevant portion of the evidence, such as page numbers, lines, or paragraphs, this is sufficient for the court to consider the party’s evidence.  (See Jones v. P.S. Development Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 707, 722, fn. 6, disapproved on other grounds by Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512.)

The court acknowledges that Defendants’ separate statement does not identify the evidence by specific exhibit letters, except UMF Nos. 1 and 2.  However, Defendants do using the name of each piece of evidence they cite in support of their separate statement referencing specific paragraph numbers in declarations, page numbers, and specific interrogatory numbers.  Finally, the separate statement identifies four issues, each cause of action, and incorporates the same undisputed material facts to support each issue.  Thus, the court does not deny the motion on the ground of deficient separate statement.

Next, Plaintiff contends that the court cannot grant Defendants’ request for summary adjudication because Defendants do not dispose of any cause of action or defense and did not file a joint stipulation stating the issues to be adjudicated or a declaration form each stipulating party that the motion will further judicial economy.  Defendants respond that they have filed this motion to dispose of all causes of action, not just negligence.

Before moving for summary adjudication of a legal issue or claim for damages, other than punitive damages, that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty, the parties must: (1) file a joint stipulation stating the issue or issues to be adjudicated; and (2) a declaration of each stipulating party stating the motion will further the interest of judicial economy by decreasing trial time or significantly increase the likelihood of settlement.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (t)(1)(A).)

Defendants move for summary judgment or summary adjudication on all causes of action, Therefore, the court does not deny this motion pursuant to section 437c, subd. (t).

Issue No. 1: Plaintiff cannot establish breach of duty or causation on her first cause of action for negligence.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot establish negligence because California Vehicle Code section 21055 exempts Defendants from liability.  Specifically, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants breached any duty and that any breach caused her injuries or damages.

Plaintiff claims that section 21055 does not apply because the harm here was caused by regular negligence.  Plaintiff asserts that a material fact exists concerning whether Hensley was in active pursuit because the Cederlind states that he came from a different direction than other police vehicles and because he stopped at the intersection before entering the intersection.  Further, the presented evidence does not establish that Defendants’ vehicle displayed a lighted red lamp visible from the front as a warning to other drivers or that the officer sounded his siren as he entered the intersection.  Plaintiff also asserts that the evidence shows that defendant County of Los Angeles is vicariously liable for defendant Hensley’s negligence, citing various provisions of law without presenting any opposing evidence.

“The elements of a negligence cause of action are (1) the existence of a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) injury to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s breach, and (4) actual damages.”  (Romero v. Los Angeles Rams (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 562, 567.)

            1.  Duty

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants owed her a duty to use reasonable care in their conduct leading up to and on the day of the collision.  (Compl., ¶¶ 15, 21, 30.)  Defendants contend that Hensley’s actions fall within Vehicle Code sections 21055 and 21056 because Hensley acted in response to a pursuit call.  (Defs.’ UMF No. 3.) 

All operators of motor vehicles have a “duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway.”  (See Veh. Code, § 21056.)

“[W]here the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle is engaged in a specified emergency function he may violate certain rules of the road, such as speed and right of way laws, if he activates his red light and where necessary his siren in order to alert other users of the road to the situation.  In such circumstances the driver may not be held to be negligent solely upon the violation of specified rules of the road, but may be held to be negligent if he fails to exercise due regard for the safety of others under the circumstances.”  (City of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 395, 402-03; Veh. Code, §§ 21055, subds. (a)-(b), 21056.)

“Where the driver of an emergency vehicle fails to activate his red light, and where necessary his siren, he is not exempt from the rules of the road even though he may be engaged in a proper emergency function, and negligence may be based upon the violation of the rules of the road.”  (City of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 395, 403 [citation omitted].)

The undisputed evidence shows that on October 17, 2022, Hensley drove his assigned vehicle in response to an emergency call.  Hensley was on duty and assigned to vehicle when he received a pursuit call.  (UMF No. 3.)  Hensley’s declaration indicates that once he received the call, he immediately activated his sirens and lights.  (Declaration of John Hensley, ¶ 2.)  The sirens and lights were active for a couple of miles before he reached the subject intersection.  (Hensley Dec., ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff presents no evidence to dispute Hensley’s declaration.

“The courts are in agreement that a public entity may not be held liable due to its police officers’ decision to engage in a chase.”  (City of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 395, 404.)  However, “police officers pursuing a suspect have no special exemption from the duty to exercise due care for the safety of others, their exemption is from the presumption of negligence that would arise for the violation of a safety rule.”  (City of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 395, 405.)  Absent special factors or some special relationship, a person does not have a duty to warn another about a dangerous situation unless that person creates the dangerous situation.  (Ibid.)

The undisputed evidence also demonstrates that Defendants cannot be held liable for breaching duty of care based on violating specific rules of the road because Hensley was responding to an emergency and complied with the conditions required for Vehicle Code section 21055 immunity to apply.  On October 17, 2022, Hensley was on duty and assigned to vehicle when he received a pursuit call.  (UMF No. 3.)  Hensley states that he immediately activated his sirens and lights after he received a pursuit call.  (Declaration of Deputy Jonathan Hensley, ¶ 2.)  The sirens and lights were used for a couple of miles leading up to the intersection, and witnesses John Angelotti and Marianne Cederlind state that the sirens were audible to drivers at the intersection at least five seconds before Hensley’s vehicle approached the intersection.  (Defs.’ UMF Nos. 4-5; Hensley Dec., ¶ 3.)  Marianne Cederlind, who was driving near the intersection at the time of the collision, states that she heard sirens and saw flashing lights east of the intersection as a police vehicle approached the intersection.  (Declaration of Marianne Cederlind, ¶¶ 4, 6, 8.)  John Angelotti states that while he was stopped at the intersection, he heard emergency sirens and then saw a police vehicle with lights and sirens activated approach the intersection.  (Declaration of John Angelotti, ¶¶ 5-6.)  Angelotti claims that he heard the sirens for approximately five seconds before seeing the police vehicle and saw its flashing lights.  (Angelotti Dec., ¶ 6.)  Therefore, Defendants are not liable for negligence based on violating the California Vehicle Code pursuant to the section 21055 exemption.

However, the undisputed evidence also demonstrates that Defendants also owed Plaintiff a duty to exercise due regard for Plaintiff’s safety.

The court now addresses whether Defendants breached this latter duty.

2.  Breach

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the duty of care by failing to exercise due care required for reasonable drivers; failing to keep a proper look out for other vehicles before crossing the intersection; and failing to avoid colliding with Plaintiff despite having opportunity to do so had he been operating his vehicle with reasonable care.  Plaintiff asserts that, based on the green light, she had the right of way to proceed at the intersection and that Defendants had a duty to yield to her.

Defendants assert that the undisputed evidence shows that Defendants did not breach any duty of care to Plaintiff.

The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Hensley did not breach his duty of care to Plaintiff because he activated his lights and sirens before entering the intersection, his lights were visible from the front the intersection, and exercised due care and regard for the safety of others by slowing and coming to a complete stop prior to entering the subject intersection, with emergency lights and siren still activated.  (UMF Nos. 3-6.)  Hensley was driving westbound on Soledad Canyon Road, and as he approached the subject intersection he had a red light.  (Hensley Dec., ¶¶ 4-5.)  Hensley states that at approximately 5:50 p.m., he slowed and came to a complete stop at the entrance of the intersection, as a majority of drivers stopped at the intersection, and then proceeded into the intersection at a slow speed, clearing lane by lane.  (UMF No. 9; Hensley Dec., ¶¶ 6-8.)  Cederline states that Hensley’s vehicle stopped at the intersection before entering the intersection (Cederline Dec., ¶ 7), and Angelotti testified that he saw Hensley’s vehicle stop or slow before entering the intersection.  (Angelott Depo., p. 19:6-14.)  Both Angelotti and Cederline claim they heard the sirens and saw the lights before Hensley approached and entered the intersection.  (Angelotti Depo., p. 18:14-18; Cederline Dec., ¶ 6.)

As Hensley drove through the intersection, he saw Plaintiff’s vehicle moving southbound on Whites Canyon Road towards the intersection at about 30-40 m.p.h.  (UMF No. 10.)  Hensley states that Plaintiff had a green light, but the cited evidence does not support this fact.  (UMF No. 11; Hensley Dec., ¶¶ 11-13; Special Interrogatory No. 12 (set one).)  Hensley slammed on his brakes when he saw Plaintiff’s vehicle just before the impact.  (Hensley Dec., ¶ 12.)  Plaintiff then proceeded through the intersection, and her vehicle collided with Defendants’ vehicle.  (UMF No. 12.)

Plaintiff does not dispute these facts with supporting evidence.

Therefore, the undisputed facts show that Hensley’s actions were reasonable and necessary under the circumstances and that he showed due regard to the safety of other drivers on the road.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to establish breach of duty.

            3.  Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants caused her damages and the collison.

Defendants assert that the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff’s breach of her duty to yield the right of way to Defendants caused her damages not Defendants’ actions.  Defendants cite Veh. Code, § 21806.

Vehicle Code section 21806 requires that all surrounding traffic yield the right-of-way to any authorized emergency vehicle which is sounding a siren and has at least one lighted lamp exhibiting a visible red light.  (Veh. Code, § 21806.)  Yielding means (1) immediately driving to the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any intersection, and remaining stopped until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed and (2) immediately stopping the street car, clearing any intersection, and remaining stopped until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed.  (Veh. Code, § 21806, subds. (a)(1), (b).)

The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff failed to yield to Defendants’ vehicle when Plaintiff entered the subject intersection and collided subsequently collided with Defendants’ vehicle.  (UMF Nos. 12-13.)  The evidence already establishes that Hensley activated the siren and lights before he slowly entered the intersection and that he entered the intersection slowly after determining that all traffic had stopped.  Both Angelotti and Cederlind testified or declared that they were at the subject intersection, saw Defendants’ vehicles lights, and heard the vehicle’s sirens.  Hensley, Cederlind, and Angelotti all state that they saw Plaintiff’s vehicle enter the intersection without slowing down, and that Plaintiff’s vehicle collided with Defendants’ vehicle.  (UMF No. 12.)

Plaintiff presents no evidence to dispute Angelotti, Cederlind, and Hensley’s testimony.

Because Defendants’ vehicle lights were visible and the sirens were activated, with all other traffic stopped at the intersection, Plaintiff was required to yield to Defendants’ vehicle under Veh. Code, § 21806.  Plaintiff did not yield, collided with Defendants’ vehicle, and suffered injuries.  Thus, the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff’s actions, violating section 21806, caused her injuries and damages.

Because Plaintiff presents no evidence to establish that Defendants breached their statutory or common law duty of care and that any breach caused Plaintiff’s damages and injuries, the court grants Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s first cause of action for negligence.

            Issue Nos. 2, 3, and 4: Plaintiff cannot establish her causes of action as a matter of law.

To establish a negligent entrustment, Plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant owned a vehicle, (2) which the driver operated, (3) defendant knew or should have known the driver was incompetent or unfit to drive, (4) the defendant permitted the driver to operate the vehicle, and (5) the driver’s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff.  (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565-566; see also CACI No. 724.)

Because Plaintiff presents no disputing evidence to establish negligence, the court also grants summary judgment for Defendants on the second, third, or fourth causes of action

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

Defendants to give notice.