Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV01879, Date: 2024-03-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23CHCV01879 Hearing Date: March 14, 2024 Dept: F43
Dept. F43
Date: 3-14-24
Case # 23CHCV01879, Laura Medrano vs. Leandra Garcia,
et al.
Trial Date: N/A
DEMURRER
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Leandra Garcia, individually and
as Trustee of the Leandra Garcia Living Trust, Daniel Sada III, and Maria
Miranda
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Laura Medrano
RELIEF REQUESTED
Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint
·
1st Cause of Action for Fraudulent/Intentional
Misrepresentation
·
2nd Cause of Action for Concealment
·
3rd Cause of Action for Quiet
Title
·
4th Cause of Action for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress
RULING: Demurrer is sustained in its entirety with
leave to amend
SUMMARY OF ACTION
This action arises from the alleged fraudulent transfer
of real property located at 1049 Hewitt Street, San Fernando, CA 91340 (the
“Property”). On June 27, 2023, Plaintiff Laura Medrano (“Plaintiff”) filed a
Complaint against Defendants Leandra Garcia (“Garcia”), individually and as
Trustee of The Leandra M. Garcia Living Trust, Daniel Sada III (“Sada”), Maria
Miranda (“Miranda”) (collectively “Defendants”), and DOES 1 through 20,
inclusive.
On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants alleging four causes of
action for fraudulent/intentional misrepresentation, concealment, quiet title,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The FAC alleges that Plaintiff and Defendant Garcia were
co-owners of the Property. (FAC, ¶ 11.) The FAC alleges that, in or around
2013, Defendant Garcia took advantage of Plaintiff’s vulnerable state and
defrauded her. (FAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that such fraud occurred when
Plaintiff’s mother was diagnosed with cancer, was hospitalized, and Plaintiff
was occupied with her mother’s illness. (FAC, ¶ 12.) Defendant Garcia contacted
Plaintiff, told Plaintiff she needed to sign a document for tax purposes only,
and defrauded Plaintiff into signing a document which transferred all of
Plaintiff’s interest in the Property to Defendant Garcia. (FAC, ¶ 13.) Each
time Plaintiff questioned Defendant Garica about the purpose of the form she
had to sign, she was told it was related to the Property’s taxes and that she
should not worry about anything. (FAC, ¶ 14.) Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, she
signed away her rights to her portion of the Property and Defendant Garcia
later transferred all rights, title, and interest to the entire Property by way
of a quitclaim deed to The Leandra M. Garcia Living Trust, Dated May 3, 2013.
(FAC, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that in or about July 2020, Defendant Garcia
granted the entire Property to Defendants Sada and Miranda. (FAC, ¶ 18.)
The FAC further alleges that at no time prior to January
2023 did Plaintiff know that any of the documents she was given by Defendant
Garcia to sign would in any way result in Plaintiff giving up her legal claims
and rights to her portion of the Property. (FAC, ¶ 17.) The FAC alleges that,
on around January 2023, Plaintiff found out for the first time that she no
longer had any rights, title, and interest to the Property, and that Defendant
Garica had defrauded her into signing away her rights to the Property. (FAC, ¶
19.)
Defendants filed a demurrer to each cause of action in
the FAC on November 3, 2023. Plaintiff filed her opposition on March 1, 2024.
Defendants filed their reply on March 8, 2024. Although filed and served late, the
Court exercises its discretion and will consider Defendants’ reply brief. (Cal.
Rules of Court, Rule 3.1300(d).)
ANALYSIS
Request for Judicial Notice: Defendants request that the
Court take judicial notice of a quit claim deed concerning the Property that
was recorded with the Recorder’s Office for Los Angeles County, California. Plaintiff
opposes Defendants’ request for judicial notice on the grounds that Defendants
are requesting that the Court take judicial notice of a document that is
disputed by Plaintiff. The Court “may take judicial notice of something that
cannot be reasonably controverted [such as a recorded deed], even if it negates
an express allegation of the pleading.” (Alfaro v. Community Housing
Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356,
1382.) “A court may take judicial notice of a recorded deed.” (West v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 803.) The request for
judicial notice is therefore granted.
Meet and Confer: Per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41,
subdivision (a), the parties were required to meet and confer in person, by
telephone, or by video conference before bringing the demurrer. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) An insufficient meet and confer process is not
grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd.
(a)(4).) Defendants’ counsel attests to attempting to meet and confer by
telephone with Plaintiff’s counsel. (Brown Decl., ¶¶ 4-8.) The meet and confer
requirement has not been met. While the Court will still assess the merits of
the demurrer, the Court reminds the parties of the need to comply with the
requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Defendants demur to each cause of action in the FAC on the
grounds that all causes of action asserted therein are time barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. Defendants further argue that each cause of
action asserted in the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, and are stated ambiguously and unintelligibly.
Plaintiff opposes the demurrer on the grounds that the
causes of action in the FAC are not time barred because the delayed discovery
rule applies, and Plaintiff has alleged facts in support of the delayed
discovery rule. Plaintiff further argues that she has alleged sufficient facts
as to the First Cause of Action for Fraudulent/Intentional Misrepresentation,
Second Cause of Action for Concealment, and Fourth Cause of Action for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiff requests leave to amend
if the demurrer is sustained in whole or in part.
“A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter
of law.” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) “[T]he court gives the complaint a
reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material
facts properly pleaded.” (Ibid.)
A demurrer accepts as true all well pleaded facts and those facts of which the
court can take judicial notice but not deductions, contentions, or conclusions
of law or fact. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068,
1078.) Although courts construe pleadings liberally, sufficient facts must be
alleged to support the allegations pled to survive a demurrer. (Rakestraw v.
California Physicians' Serv. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.)
A cause of action for fraud is subject to a three-year
statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) A cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress is subject to a two-year
statute of limitations. (Pugliese v. Superior Court (2007) 146
Cal.App.4th 1444, 1450.) Where a quiet title cause of action is based on fraud,
such quiet title cause of action is subject to a three-year statute of
limitations. (Ankoanda v. Walker-Smith (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 610, 615.)
“Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at the time
when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.” (Fox v.
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806.) “An important
exception to the general rule of accrual is the discovery rule, which postpones
accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to
discover, the cause of action.” (Id. at p. 807.) “A plaintiff has reason
to discover a cause of action when he or she has reason at least to suspect a
factual basis for its elements.” (Ibid.) “[S]uspicion of one or more of
the elements of a cause of action, coupled with knowledge of any remaining
elements, will generally trigger the statute of limitations period.” (Ibid.)
“The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should
have, inquiry notice of the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “In order to rely
on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, [a] plaintiff
whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the
benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the
time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier
discovery despite reasonable diligence.” (Id. at p. 808.) “In assessing
the sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery, the court places the
burden on the plaintiff to show diligence; conclusory allegations will not
withstand demurrer.” (Ibid.)
Here, the first, second, and fourth causes of action are
only alleged against Defendant Garcia. Based on the allegations of the FAC, the
alleged wrongful actions of Defendant Garica occurred in 2013; however, this
action was not filed until June 27, 2023. On the face of the FAC, Plaintiff’s First
Cause of Action for Fraudulent/Intentional Misrepresentation, Second Cause of
Action for Concealment, and Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress Cause of Action are all barred by the applicable statute
of limitations. The FAC does not sufficiently invoke the delayed discovery rule
because the FAC does not specifically allege: (1) the manner of Plaintiff’s
discovery of Defendant Garica’s alleged wrongful actions; or (2) Plaintiff’s inability
to have made an earlier discovery of Defendant Garica’s actions despite
reasonable diligence. In fact, the FAC does not allege any reasonable diligence.
As to the third cause of action, which is only alleged
against Defendants Sada and Miranda, the Court finds that such cause of action
fails for the same reasons that the first, second, and fourth causes of action
in the FAC. On its face, the third cause of action in the FAC is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts
to invoke the delayed discovery rule. The third cause of action arises from the
alleged wrongful actions of Defendant Garcia, which occurred in 2013. The
opposition does not even address Defendants’ argument concerning the
insufficiency of the Third Cause of Action for Quiet Title. Plaintiff has
therefore conceded to such argument as “[c]ontentions are waived when a party
fails to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority.” (Moulton
Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.)
As to Defendants’ demurrer on the grounds of uncertainty,
the Court rejects such grounds because the allegations of the FAC are “sufficiently
clear to apprise the defendant[s] of the issues that must be met.” (Bacon v.
Wahrhaftig (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 599, 605.)
Given that the Court has determined that the causes of
action asserted in the FAC are all barred by their respective statutes of
limitation, the Court need not address Defendants’ arguments concerning whether
Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to satisfy the elements of each cause of
action.
The demurrer of Defendants to Plaintiff’s First, Second,
Third, and Fourth Causes of Action is sustained with leave to amend.
Moving party to give notice.