Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV02095, Date: 2025-01-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23CHCV02095 Hearing Date: January 22, 2025 Dept: F43
Dept. F43
Date: 01-22-25
Case # 23CHCV02095, Perez v. FCA US LLC
Trial Date: 05-27-25
COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Juan Gonzalez Perez
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant FCA US LLC
RELIEF REQUESTED
Order compelling code-compliant responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories numbers 29 and 32.
RULING: Motion is granted. The Court awards $2,200.00 in monetary sanctions.
SUMMARY OF ACTION
On October 30, 2021, Plaintiff Juan Gonzalez Perez (Plaintiff) purchased a 2021 Jeep Gladiator. The vehicle began experiencing mechanical defects, and Plaintiff sued defendants FCA US LLC (FCA) and FAB4 LLC d/b/a Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram of Van Nuys for violating the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging that defendants were unable to repair the defects and that FCA did not replace the car or make restitution. The complaint alleges causes of action for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and negligent repair.
On December 19, 2023, Plaintiff served its Special Interrogatories on FCA. (Declaration of Armando Lopez, ¶ 4, Exh. A.) FCA served unverified responses on January 23, 2024 and later sent verifications on February 20, 2024. (Lopez Dec., ¶ 5, Exh. B.) On April 5, 2024, Plaintiff sent FCA a meet and confer letter detailing the issues with FCA’s responses and asking FCA to provide supplemental responses by April 19, 2024. (Lopez Dec., ¶ 6, Exh. C.) The parties agreed to extend the motion to compel further deadline to May 3, 2024. (Lopez Dec., ¶ 7, Exh. D.) FCA never responded to the letter.
Plaintiff filed this motion to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories 29 and 32, on May 3, 2024. Defendant filed an opposition on June 26, 2024.
The parties held subsequent meet and confer discussions and filed a joint statement on September 30, 2024. The parties remain at an impasse on rquests 29 and 32.
ANALYSIS
A demanding party may move to compel further responses to special interrogatories where the demanding party fails to respond or responds with objections or incomplete answers. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, 2030.300.) The demanding party must serve the motion to compel further within 45 days after service of verified responses, unless the parties agree, in writing, to extend the time to file. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c).) If the responding party serves unverified responses, the 45-day time limit does not run until verified responses are served. (See Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 135-136.)
“[I]nterrogatories are designed to permit discovery of all facts ‘presently known to a defendant upon which it predicates its defenses’ (Citation.)” (Burke v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 285.) “[T]he trial court cannot refuse to compel answers on the basis that the interrogatories call for ‘legal opinion(s).’” (Ibid.) As such interrogatories should be permitted where the answer consists of disfavored overbroad general denial which gives no guidance regarding specific matters legitimately at issue. (Id. at p. 286-287.)
Plaintiff’s burden in Song-Beverly cases
“A plaintiff pursuing an action under the Act has the burden to prove that (1) the vehicle had a nonconformity covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair (the presentation element); and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts (the failure to repair element).” (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094 [citing Civ. Code, § 1793.2; Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 886-887].)
To recover civil penalties in a Song-Beverly case, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant manufacturer’s failure to repurchase or replace a vehicle after a reasonable number of repair opportunities was willful. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (c).) A manufacturer’s conduct may be willful if it makes no effort “to gather the available information on repair history[.]” (See Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 185.) “A decision made without the use of reasonably available information germane to that decision is not a reasonable, good faith decision.” (Id. at p. 186.)
The SROGs and responses at issue are the following:
SROG No. 29: Do YOU contend that your response to Plaintiff(s)’ pre-litigation repurchase request is a defense to liability under the Song-Beverly Act?
FCA’s Response: FCA US objects because this interrogatory seeks information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation and is therefore not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. FCA US also objects to Plaintiff’s definition of the terms “YOU” and/or “YOU” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US.
SROG No. 32: State the date on which you contend the SUBJECT VEHICLE first qualified for a vehicle repurchase under the Song-Beverly Act.
FCA’s Response: FCA US offered to repurchase the Subject Vehicle in or about May 11, 2023.
Plaintiff argues FCA’s answers to both interrogatories are evasive, incomplete and not compliant. FCA opposes arguing Plaintiff’s SROGs are overbroad and oppressive and seek information that bears no relevance to the dispute in this case.
FCA’s responses to both SROGs are evasive and without merit. SROG number 29 asks FCA to state whether its responses to Plaintiff’s pre-litigation requests for repurchase is a defense in this case. This question is relevant to determining the bounds of the litigation in this case and what Plaintiff should prepare for trial. Because Plaintiff must prove FCA’s failure to repair or repurchase was willful in order to receive civil penalties, this information is relevant and necessary. Further, the definition section in Plaintiff’s SROGs explicitly state that “YOU” and “YOUR” refers to defendant FCA. SROG number 32 is also clear and asks FCA to state the date FCA believes Plaintiff’s vehicle qualified for repurchase under the Song-Beverly Act. The SROG did not ask on what date FCA offered to repurchase the vehicle. If these dates are the same, FCA is to provide an answer stating such.
Accordingly, the Court strikes FCA’s objections to SROGs 29 and 32 and orders FCA to serve objection-free code-compliant responses on Plaintiff.
Sanctions
The court must impose monetary sanctions against a party or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or oppose a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).)
Plaintiff requests $2,620.00 in monetary sanctions against FCA and its counsel. (Lopez Dec., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff’s counsel, Armando Lopez, charges an hourly rate of $400.00. (Lopez Dec., ¶ 9(a)-(c).) The request includes the following: (1) 2.4 hours drafting this motion - $960.00; (2) estimated 2 hours reviewing an opposition and replying - $800.00; (3) 2 hours preparing for and attending the motion hearing - $800.00; and (4) filing costs - $60.00. (Lopez Dec., ¶¶ 9, 10.)
FCA opposes because Plaintiff’s original meet and confer efforts were insufficient, and FCA agreed to further meet and confer efforts and to provide supplemental responses. However, FCA did not provide supplemental responses as of the writing of this tentative.
The Court finds the hourly rate and time spent on the motion reasonable but reduces the amount spent reviewing the opposition and replying to 1 hour because Plaintiff did not file a reply.
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request in the reduced amount of $2,200.00: (1) 2.4 hours preparing this motion; (2) 1 hour reviewing the FCA’s opposition; (3) 2 hours preparing for and attending the motion hearing; and (4) a $60.00 filing fee.
ORDER
Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories 29 and 32 is granted. The Court also awards Plaintiff $2,200.00 in monetary sanctions.
1. Defendant FCA US, LLC is ordered to serve objection-free, code-compliant responses within forty-five (45) days of the date of this order.
2. Defendant FCA US, LLC and its attorney of record are ordered to pay Plaintiff $2,200.00 in monetary sanctions.
3. Defendant’s counsel is ordered to pay Plaintiff’s attorney within twenty (20) days of the date of this order.
Plaintiff to give notice.
Dept.
F43
Date:
01-22-25
Case
# 23CHCV02095, Perez v. FCA US LLC
Trial
Date: 05-27-25
COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION
MOVING
PARTY: Plaintiff Juan Gonzalez Perez
RESPONDING
PARTY: Defendant FCA US LLC
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Order
compelling code-compliant responses to Requests for Production numbers 28, 30,
31, 34, 35, and $2,780.00 in sanctions.
RULING: Motion is granted,
in part, for requests 28, 31, 34, and 35, and denied, in part, regarding
requests 30. The Court awards $2,380.00 in monetary sanctions.
SUMMARY
OF ACTION
On
October 30, 2021, Plaintiff Juan Gonzalez Perez (Plaintiff) purchased a 2021
Jeep Gladiator. The vehicle began
experiencing mechanical defects, and Plaintiff sued defendants FCA US LLC (FCA)
and FAB4 LLC d/b/a Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram of Van Nuys for violating the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging that defendants were unable to
repair the defects and that FCA did not replace the car or make
restitution. The complaint alleges
causes of action for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty,
and negligent repair.
On
December 19, 2023, Plaintiff served its Requests for Production, Set One on FCA. (Declaration of Armando Lopez, ¶ 4, Exh.
A.) FCA served unverified responses on
January 23, 2024 and later sent verifications on February 20, 2024. (Lopez Dec., ¶ 5, Exh. B.) On April 5, 2024, Plaintiff sent FCA a meet
and confer letter detailing the issues with FCA’s responses and asking FCA to
provide supplemental responses by April 19, 2024. (Lopez Dec., ¶ 6, Exh. C.) The parties agreed to extend the motion to
compel further deadline to May 3, 2024.
(Lopez Dec., ¶ 7, Exh. D.) FCA
never responded to the letter.
Plaintiff
filed this motion to compel further responses to its Requests for Production,
Set One, on May 3, 2024. Defendant filed
an opposition on June 6, 2024.
The
parties held subsequent meet and confer discussions and filed a joint statement
on September 30, 2024. The parties
stated that once FCA provides Plaintiff with verified supplemental responses to
requests 28, 30, 31, 34, and 35, Plaintiff’s request is moot. It is unclear whether further supplemental
responses have been served.
ANALYSIS
If
a party’s response to an inspection demand is unsatisfactory, the demanding
party may move to compel further responses.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).)
The
response to each inspection demand must (1) state the responding party agrees
to comply with the inspection demand; (2) state an inability to comply with the
demand; or (3) object to all or part of the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd.
(a).) An agreement to comply must state
that the production and inspection will be allowed in whole or part and that
the documents demanded are in the responding party’s possession, custody, or
control and will be produced. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 2031.220.) The documents must
be labeled and sorted to correspond with the categories in the demand. (Pollock v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1348, 1358; Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.280, subd.
(a).)
The relevant RFPs and responses are as follows:
RFP No. 28: All DOCUMENTS which describe YOUR rules, policies,
or procedures regarding requiring a consumer in California to sign a release
agreement as part of a pre-litigation repurchase.
FCA’s response: FCA US objects to this request because the phrase
“All DOCUMENTS which describe” is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks
information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of the case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiff’s definition
of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes
entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are
not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control. FCA US further objects to this request
pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. § 2031.240 to the extent that this request seeks
either internal communications or documents that contain the mental impression
of FCA US’s counsel and communications between FCA US and its counsel, which
are protected by attorney client privilege and/or the work product doctrine.
RFP No. 30: All DOCUMENTS evidencing the rationale of YOUR
response to the pre-litigation repurchase request for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.
FCA’s response: FCA US will comply in part and produce a copy of
any Customer Assistance Inquiry Records (CAIRs) containing communications with
Plaintiff relating to the Subject Vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request
because the phrase “All DOCUMENTS evidencing . . .” is vague, ambiguous, overly
broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this
case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiff’s
definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and
includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities
who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control. FCA US further objects to this request
pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. § 2031.240 to the extent that this request seeks
either internal communications or documents that contain the mental impression
of FCA US’s counsel and communications between FCA US and its counsel, which
are protected by attorney client privilege and/or the work product doctrine.
RFP No. 31: All DOCUMENTS constituting YOUR pre-litigation
letter to Plaintiff(s) in response to Plaintiff(s)’ request for a repurchase of
the SUBJECT VEHICLE.
FCA’s Response: FCA US will comply in part and produce a copy of
any Customer Assistance Inquiry Records (CAIRs) containing communications with
Plaintiff relating to the Subject Vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request
because it is vague, ambiguous, and overly broad. FCA US also objects to Plaintiff’s definition
of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes
entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are
not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.
RFP No. 34: YOUR template “goodwill” pre-litigation repurchase
letter in California.
FCA’s response: FCA US objects to this request because it is vague,
ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to
the needs of this case. FCA US further
objects to this request because it lacks foundation and calls for speculation. FCA US also objects to Plaintiff’s definition
of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes
entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are
not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control. FCA US also objects to this request because
the phrase “template ‘goodwill’ prelitigation repurchase letter” is vague and
ambiguous. FCA US further objects to
this request because it is vague, ambiguous, and limitless in time and
therefore overbroad and oppressive.
RFP No. 35: YOUR template pre-litigation repurchase letter(s)
for a vehicle being repurchased pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.
FCA’s response: FCA US objects to this request because it is vague,
ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to
the needs of this case. FCA US further
objects to this request because it lacks foundation and calls for speculation. FCA US also objects to Plaintiff’s definition
of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes
entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are
not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control. FCA US also objects to this request because
the phrase “template pre-litigation repurchase letter” is vague and ambiguous. FCA US further objects to this request because
it is vague, ambiguous, and limitless in time and therefore overbroad and
oppressive.
Regarding RFP number 28, Plaintiff argues
that whether FCA has a policy requiring consumers to sign release agreements,
like the one it sent Plaintiff, would demonstrate whether it willfully violates
the Song-Beverly Act. Because case law
states it is not unreasonable for a consumer under the Act to reject a
prelitigation settlement offer that contains unfavorable and extraneous
nonfinancial terms, such as a vague release agreement or illegal conditions,
the information it seeks in discoverable.
Therefore, this request seeks discoverable information. Regarding numbers 30-31, and 34, Plaintiff
states the information requested is relevant to show whether FCA’s offer (and
its systematic procedures for such offers and transactions) complied with or
violated the Song-Beverly Act, and whether FCA behaved as though it did or did
not believe its response was governed by the law.
In opposition, FCA argues Plaintiff’s
request is overbroad because it seeks documents that have no relation to
Plaintiff’s vehicle. The term
“templates” is also vague and overbroad.
Further, FCA has already provided Plaintiff with multiple policy and
procedure manuals detailing FCA’s own methodology—the Warranty Administration
Manual, Dealer Policy Manual, and CAC Policies & Procedures.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s request
is not vague or overbroad because the RFP definition section states that “YOU”
and “YOUR” means “FCA”. Although FCA’s
response states it has already Plaintiff with several manuals, FCA’s response
is not code compliant and does not state whether these manuals are responsive
to the category of documents requested.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a)(1)-(3) [stating responses to
inspection demands must include a valid objection, a statement of compliance,
the inability to comply, or identify the relevant responsive documents
produced].)
However, the Court does find that FCA’s
attorney-privilege and work-product objections have some merit regarding
request number 30. Plaintiff seeks
documents referencing the “rationale” behind FCA’s response to the
pre-litigation repurchase request. By
using the term “rationale”, Plaintiff widens the scope of the requested
documents that could implicate FCA and FCA’s counsel’s confidential conversations,
thought processes, and potential legal strategy behind deciding how to respond
to the request. Therefore, this
objection has merit.
Accordingly, the Court strikes FCA’s
objections and orders FCA to provide a code-compliant response to RFP numbers
28, 31, 34, and 35. The Court denies
Plaintiff’s request regarding number 30.
Sanctions
The court must impose monetary sanctions against a
party or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or oppose a motion to compel further
responses to inspection demands, unless the court finds that the one subject to
the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances
make the imposition of the sanction unjust.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)
Plaintiff requests $ $2,780.00 in monetary sanctions
against FCA and its counsel. (Lopez
Dec., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff’s counsel,
Armando Lopez, charges an hourly rate of $400.00. (Lopez Dec., ¶ 10(c).) The request includes the following: (1) 2.8
hours drafting this motion - $1,120.00; (2) estimated 2 hours reviewing an
opposition and replying - $800.00; (3) 2 hours preparing for and attending the
motion hearing - $800.00; and (4) filing costs - $60.00. (Lopez Dec., ¶¶ 10(a)-(c), 11.)
FCA opposes stating Plaintiff’s original meet and
confer efforts were insufficient, and FCA agreed to further meet and confer
efforts and to provide supplemental responses.
However, FCA did not provide supplemental responses as of the writing of
this tentative.
The Court finds the hourly rate and time spent on the
motion reasonable but reduces the amount spent reviewing the opposition and
replying to 1 hour because Plaintiff did not file a reply.
Accordingly,
the Court grants Plaintiff’s request in the reduced amount of $2,380.00: (1)
2.8 hours preparing this motion; (2) 1 hour reviewing the FCA’s opposition; (3)
2 hours preparing for and attending the motion hearing; and (4) a $60.00 filing
fee.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Juan Gonzalez Perez’s motion to compel
further responses to Requests for Production is granted, in part, regarding
request numbers 28, 31, 34, and 35, and denied, in part, regarding request
number 30. The Court also awards
Plaintiff $2,380.00 in monetary sanctions.
1. Defendant
FCA US, LLC is ordered to serve code-compliant responses within 45 days of the
date of this order.
2. Defendant FCA US, LLC and its attorney of
record are ordered to pay Plaintiff $2,380.00
in monetary sanctions.
3.
Defendant’s counsel is ordered to pay Plaintiff’s attorney within twenty
(20) days of the date of this order.
Plaintiff to give notice.