Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV02348, Date: 2024-05-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23CHCV02348 Hearing Date: May 3, 2024 Dept: F43
Dept. F43
Date: 5-3-24
Case #23CHCV02348, William Holmquist vs. Ford Motor
Company, et al.
Trial Date: N/A
DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH
MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Ford Motor Company
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff William Holmquist
RELIEF REQUESTED
Demurrer to the Complaint
·
3rd Cause of Action: Violation of
Subdivision (A)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2
·
5th Cause of Action: Fraudulent
Inducement – Concealment
Motion to Strike
·
Punitive damages request and allegations (Page
14, lines 5-7; Page 18, line 10)
RULING: Demurred is sustained with leave to amend;
motion to strike is granted.
SUMMARY OF ACTION
On July 15, 2019, Plaintiff William Holmquist (Plaintiff)
purchased a 2019 Ford F-150. (FAC, ¶
9.) Plaintiff received various warranties in connection with the purchase of
the vehicle from Defendant Ford Motor Company (Defendant). (FAC, ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff
alleges that there were transmission defects, electrical defects, and other
non-conformities with the vehicle. (FAC, ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew of the vehicle’s
transmission defects prior to Plaintiff purchasing the vehicle. (FAC, ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleges that the Transmission
Defect makes the vehicle unsafe. (FAC, ¶ 41.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
issued several service bulletins related to the Transmission Defect. (FAC, ¶ 31.)
On August 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed his complaint with six
causes of action. Defendant’s demurrer to the Third and Fifth Causes of Action
of Plaintiff’s initial complaint was sustained with leave to amend on February
1, 2024. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (FAC) on March 1, 2024.
Defendant filed a demurrer to the Third and Fifth Causes of Action of the FAC with
a Motion to Strike on March 28, 2024. Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s demurrer
and motion to strike.
ANALYSIS
A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for
which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which
the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading
“by raising questions of law.” (Postley
v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a
pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be
liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (CCP
§ 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law…”
’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally
construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.
(Picton v. Anderson Union High School
Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)
Third Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code Section
1793.2(a)(3)
Defendant brings a demurrer to the Third Cause of Action for
Violation of Subdivision (A)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2. Defendant argues
that this cause of action fails to state sufficient facts alleging a failure to
provide sufficient service literature and replacement parts.
In cases where statutory remedies are invoked, “[f]acts, not
conclusions, must be pleaded,” and the facts “must be pleaded with
particularity.” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 396, 410.) The section at issue in this cause of action
requires a manufacturer to “[m]ake available to authorized service and repair
facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect
repairs during the express warranty period.” (Civ. Code § 1793.2(a)(3).)
Plaintiff’s Third Causes of Action remains largely unchanged
from the first iteration of Plaintiff’s complaint. It does not plead any facts
that would indicate that Ford failed to provide sufficient service literature
and replacement parts to its authorized repair facilities. While Plaintiff
added some paragraphs regarding the efforts taken to repair the vehicle (FAC, ¶¶
25-28, 38-40), these allegations do not allege that Defendant failed to provide
sufficient service literature or replacement parts to the service and repair
facilities. Additionally, under the cause of action itself, Plaintiff still just
recites the statutory language verbatim in his complaint. (FAC, ¶ 55.) This
does not meet the pleading standard requiring that facts be pleaded with
particularly. Plaintiff also did not add any facts under this cause of action
after being given leave to amend.
Once again, Plaintiff argues in his opposition that
inferences may be drawn from what he has pled, but he has not pled any facts
from which inferences may be drawn. He has only pled a recitation of the
statute. Plaintiff also argues that he does not have to plead what specific
parts or literature Defendant withheld because Defendant would have this
information. However, this would fall short of the notice pleading standard.
Without knowing what parts or literature Plaintiff is alleging were withheld,
Defendant cannot address Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff has also not pled how he
was damaged by the alleged withholding.
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is
sustained with leave to amend.
Fifth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement - Concealment
Defendant also brings a demurrer for the Fifth Cause of
Action for Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment. Defendant contends the
challenged cause of action fails to state sufficient facts alleging fraud.
A fraud cause of action requires a Plaintiff to plead and
prove: “(a) [a] misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or
nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”); (c) intent to
defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting
damage.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal 4th 631, 638.) Fraud
causes of action must be pled with specificity. “…This particularity
requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom
and by what means the representations were tendered.’” (Stansfield v.
Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73, quoting Hills Trans. Co. v.
Southwest (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 702, 707.)
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant allowed the
vehicle to be sold without disclosing the transmission defect. However, his
complaint does not allege that any specific misrepresentations were made to him
about the transmission, or that he relied on any communications from Defendant
about the transmission. (FAC, ¶¶ 64-74.) He also does not include any
statements from Defendant or its representatives that he would have relied upon
to buy the vehicle. Plaintiff’s complaint also does not allege where he bought
the vehicle.
Plaintiff’s allegations are not enough to satisfy the
pleading requirements for fraud. While Plaintiff alleges that the transmission
defect was not disclosed to him, he does not plead any facts indicating he
spoke with anyone from Ford Motor Company about the transmission. “The
requirement of specificity in a fraud action against a corporation requires the
plaintiff to allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent
representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said
or wrote, and when it was said or written.” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) Plaintiff has not pled this
information. He also has not pled whether there was any intent to defraud him.
Plaintiff has failed to plead the requisite specificity
required for fraud causes of action. He has not pled how, when, where, and by
what means the alleged misrepresentations (or nondisclosures, in this case)
were tendered. Without the specific details regarding the misrepresentations
and/or nondisclosure, Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for fraud.
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action is
sustained with leave to amend.
Motion to
Strike
Defendant has
moved to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages and related
allegations.
A court may
strike from the complaint any irrelevant, false, or improper matter. Under CCP
§ 435, “[a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve
and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” Under CCP
§ 436(a), “[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at
any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper . . . [s]trike out
any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” Under CCP
§ 436(b), the court may “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn
or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order
of the court.”
Punitive damages
are governed by Civ. Code § 3294: “In an action for the breach of an obligation
not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff,
in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example
and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).)
To state a prima
facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as
stated in Civ. Code § 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994)
8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by
the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others.” (Id. at 725.) Oppression is “despicable
conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious
disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) Fraud is defined
as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact
known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of
thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).)
No punitive
damages are available under the Song-Beverly Act. Recovery under that statute
is limited to a refund of the purchase price paid and payable (or replacement
of the subject vehicle), plus a civil penalty, where applicable, not to exceed
two times Plaintiff’s actual damages (Civ. Code § 1794.)
The Court has
sustained Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fraud cause of action. Because
punitive damages are not allowable under the Song-Beverly Act, punitive damages
are not available for any of Plaintiff’s other causes of action. If Plaintiff
is able to sufficiently amend his fraud cause of action, then punitive damages
may be requested. For now, Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for
punitive damages is granted.
Conclusion
Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiff’s Third and Fifth Causes of Action is sustained with
leave to amend.
Defendant’s
motion to strike is granted.
Moving party to give notice.